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Terms of Reference 
 
Mid-term evaluation of the Investment Facility and EIB own resources 
operations in ACP countries and the OCTs  
 
 
1 BACKGROUND FOR THE EVALUATION 
 
1.1 Description of the programme to be evaluated 
 
The European Investment Bank (EIB) supports the EU cooperation and development policies 
in the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and the Overseas Countries and 
Territories (OCT) under the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement signed in Cotonou in 2000 and 
revised in 2005 (the “Cotonou Agreement”), and the Overseas Association Decision, and 
related financial protocols. The EIB provides reimbursable financing under two separate 
windows:  
 
a) the “Investment Facility” (IF), which is funded out of EU Member States’ budgetary funds 
and under which the EIB provides loans, risk capital, as well as guarantees to ACP and OCT 
countries. The IF which has a capital endowment of EUR 3,137 billion (EUR 50 million for 
OCT)1 is a risk bearing instrument, structured as a revolving fund aimed at being financially 
sustainable over the 20 year horizon of the Cotonou Agreement.  
 
b) The EIB can also lend from its own resources (OR) up to an amount of EUR 2 billion 
(EUR 30 million for OCT) for the period 2008-20132. Operations carried out under the 
Bank’s own resources are covered by a specific guarantee of the EU Member States.  
 
In addition to the above, grant financing is also made available for interest rate subsidies and 
technical assistance.  For the period 2003-2008, the EIB was entrusted with the management 
of a EUR 187 million grant envelope, of which up to EUR 18,7 million could be used for 
technical assistance. The second financial protocol, for 2008-2013, provides for a grant 
envelope of EUR 400 million of grants for interest rates subsidies and technical assistance 
(EUR 1,5 million for OCT). Up to 40 million of this envelope can be used for project related 
technical assistance.   
 
The activities in the framework of EIB external mandate based on the Council decision 
633/2009/EC will not be covered by the present evaluation and are the subject of a separate 
review. 
 
1.2 Rationale and aims for the evaluation 
 
The rationale and aims for the evaluation are embedded in the Cotonou Agreement. In 
particular, Article 6b (Review of performance of the Investment Facility) of Annex II (Terms 
and conditions of financing) of this Agreement states that: "The overall performance of the 
Investment Facility shall be subject to a joint review at the mid-term and end-term of a 
financial protocol. Such an exercise may include a recommendation on how to improve the 
                                                 
1 EUR 2,037 million (EUR 20 million for OCT) for the period 2003-2008 to which was added a further EUR 1,1 
million (EUR 30 million for OCT) when Cotonou’s second financial protocol entered into force.  
2 For the period 2003-2008, the EIB could lend up to EUR 1,7 billion (EUR 20 million for OCT) 
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implementation of the Facility." Although this is not specified in the Cotonou Agreement, it is 
proposed to expand the scope of the evaluation to include projects financed from the own 
resources of the EIB.  
 
The framework of the evaluation will include: 
 
a) an evaluation of the EIB's financing activities in ACP/OCT countries, in the framework of 
the Investment Facility and Own Resources, including both quantitative aspects 
(commitments, disbursements) and qualitative aspects (development impact).  
 
b) an assessment of the complementarity between the EIB's activities in ACP and OCT 
countries - which are focused on the private sector and consist in the provision of loans and 
other debt instruments - and EC national and regional indicative programs in ACP/OCTs  
 
c) an assessment of the wider impact of the EIB's operations in ACP/OCT countries on the 
availability of finance within beneficiary countries.  
 
The evaluation will be supervised and managed by a Reference Group comprising of 
representatives from the following institutions: EIB, EC, ACP Secretariat and the Investment 
Facility Committee (representing EU Member States). 
 
The principal role of the Reference Group will be to facilitate and monitor the evaluation 
process and more specifically: 
 
- advise on the scope and focus of the evaluation and the elaboration of Terms of 
Reference; 
- review the reports produced by the consultants; 
- where necessary, facilitate contacts between the consultants and the concerned 
services, including as regards access to information and documentation; 
- advise on the quality of the work of the consultants.   
 
The evaluation will be carried out by external experts (referred in the text either as the 
evaluators and the consultant(s)), selected through the Evaluation Framework Contract 
procedure, Lot 1 and financed from the Intra ACP Technical Cooperation Facility. The criteria 
for the selection of the external experts are listed in this document.  
The final evaluation report submitted will draw conclusions and recommendations for future 
activities in the framework of Investment Facility and the Own Resources operations, and 
their relations with EU development policy and other IFIs. 
 
1.3. Scope of the evaluation 
 
The evaluation will cover, in appropriate ways: 
 
1) the EIB mandate under the Cotonou Agreement covering the period 2003-2008 (first 
financial protocol), 
2) the EIB mandate under the Cotonou Agreement covering the period 2008-2013 (second 
financial protocol), as at end-2009  
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Indicatively, investment projects financed during the period 2003-2008 in terms of signed 
commitments amount to just over EUR 2 billion under the IF (including EUR 20 mln for the 
OCTs) and slightly under EUR 1 billion under OR. It is equivalent to some 150 projects.  
 
2. COMMISSIONING BODY AND USER(S) OF THE EVALUATION 
 
This evaluation is commissioned by ACP Secretariat and managed by EC, Unit Aidco C4 
(Evaluation Manager). 
 
The review will be conducted in close cooperation with Unit DEV B1, the evaluation Unit 
AIDCO 03, DG ECFIN and with the EIB, including the evaluation department. The final 
report will be transmitted to the ACP Secretariat, the Commission, the EIB and will be 
presented to the Investment Facility Committee. It will be published on EC, the EIB’s and 
ACP Secretariat web sites.  
 
3. DOCUMENTATION AND INFORMATION AVAILABLE 
 
The main legal bases of the EIB activities are: 
 
• The ACP-EC Partnership Agreement between the African, Caribbean and Pacific States 
and the European Community and its Member States, signed at Cotonou (Benin) on 23 
June 2000, as revised in Luxembourg on 25 June 2005 (the “Cotonou Partnership 
Agreement II”) and in particular Annex I and Annex II thereof. 
 
• Council Decision 2001/822/EC of 27 November 2001 on the association of the overseas 
countries and territories (the “OCTs”) with the European Community, as amended by 
Council Decision 2007/249/EC of 19 March 2007 (the “Overseas Association 
Decision"). 
 
• The Internal Agreement of 18 September 2000 on the financing of Community aid 
under the multiannual financial framework for the period 2003 to 2007, in accordance 
with the Cotonou Partnership Agreement   
 
• The Internal Agreement of 17 July 2006 on the financing of Community aid under the 
multiannual financial framework for the period 2008 to 2013, in accordance with the 
revised Cotonou Partnership Agreement  
 
• Council Regulation (EC) No 617/2007 of 14 May 2007 on the implementation of the 
10th European Development Fund under the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement  
 
• Council Regulation (EC) of 27 March 2003 on the financial regulation applicable to the 
9th European Development Fund and, in particular Part Two thereof. 
 
• Council Regulation (EC) No 215/2008 of 18 February 2008 on the financial regulation 
applicable to the 10th European Development Fund and, in particular Part Two thereof. 
 
The Annual Reports on "Investment Facility", including audited financial statements, since 
2003 are available on EIB's web site, and are an important source of information. The 
evaluators will also have access to reports produced by the EIB Evaluation Department, as 
well as to projects specific documents (board report and related due diligence reports). 
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A more complete list of the EIB background documents is available in annex 3. 
 
 
4. OBJECTIVES AND TASKS OF THE ASSIGNMENT 
 
4.1. Evaluation objectives 
 
The evaluation will review the overall performance of the Investment Facility and Own 
Resources operations. It will review the portfolio in terms of project financing volumes 
(approvals, signatures and disbursements), by sector and by country/region, and instruments 
used,  as well as technical assistance and interest rates subsidies. The evaluation will base its 
conclusions on:  
 
i) in-depth evaluation of the relevance and performance (effectiveness, efficiency and 
sustainability) of EIB operations against their specific objectives as originally set within the 
Cotonou Agreement; 
 
ii) the assessment of consistency with the national and regional EU development policies and 
strategies in ACP countries, as well as with national policies of the partner countries, and of 
the value added of EIB operations since 2003.  
 
In the assessment, the value-added of EIB operations will be measured against three elements: 
support of EU policy objectives and those of the Cotonou Agreement, the quality of the 
projects themselves and the financial and non-financial advantages brought in by the EIB 
operations compared to potential alternative sources of financing.  
 
The assessment should cover: 
  
- selective analysis of the financial needs of the ACP and OCT beneficiaries, their 
absorption capacity and the availability of other sources of private or public financing 
for the relevant investments; 
- the assessment of the cooperation and complementarity of actions between the EIB 
and the Commission, 
- the assessment of the cooperation and synergies between the EIB and international and 
bilateral finance institutions and agencies. 
- the assessment of the long term financial sustainability of the IF in the specific ACP 
environment related to its expected development impact3.  
- the assessment of the risk profile of EIB's own resources operations and their 
performance, impact as well as coherence in relation to IF measures 
 
 
4.2. Evaluation tasks 
 
                                                 
3  The objective of ensuring the financial sustainability of the IF, which is managed as a revolving fund, entails 
maintaining the real value of the original endowment of the IF over the 20 year horizon of the Cotonou 
Agreement. 
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The specific tasks of the evaluator are to collect, analyse, judge and present primary and 
secondary data that addresses the evaluation objectives, to identify and answer evaluation 
questions, as well as to formulate recommendations in relation to the purpose of the 
evaluation exercise. They shall as a minimum include: 
 
1. Validating and refining the proposed methodological approach to the evaluation work. 
 
2. Identifying, in collaboration with the competent services, a set of evaluation questions; 
appropriate judgement criteria for each evaluation question; relevant quantitative and 
qualitative indicators for each criteria  
 
3. Collecting and analysing the relevant necessary data to answer the evaluation questions 
regarding the selected evaluation criteria in relation to the evaluated activities. 
 
4. Drawing conclusions based on the findings. 
 
5. Formulating recommendations in relation with the purpose of the exercise and the 
evaluation questions – in particular the evaluator will endeavour to answer all evaluation 
questions, and thereby provide robust and useable conclusions and recommendations to 
improve the implementation of the programme and/or any future activities in this area. 
 
6. Presenting findings and recommendations in a final evaluation according to the 
requirements listed in point 5.2 below. 
 
7. Presenting findings and recommendations to the Reference Group, the Commission, the 
EIB and the Investment Facility Committee. 
 
 
4.3. Common evaluation themes 
 
The evaluation will be based on the seven evaluation criteria: relevance, impact, effectiveness, 
efficiency, sustainability, coherence and the EIB value added notably, but not exclusively, as 
measured by the Environmental and Social Impact Assessment Framework (ESIAF). The first 
five correspond to the traditional practice of evaluation of development aid and have been 
formalised by the OECD (DAC). The criteria will be given different weightings based on the 
priority accorded to the evaluation questions. 
In general, questions (to a maximum of 10) will refer to the following main areas: 
• Achievement of main impacts/effects: the Consultants shall identify all recorded results 
and impacts, including any unintended ones, and compare these to the intended results 
and/or impacts. The Consultants will also identify the changes, which occurred in the 
areas in which the EIB interventions - through IF or OR investments - were supposed to 
produce an impact, including at a sectoral and/or country as well as regional level 4.  
• Relevance: The extent to which the Programme's objectives are pertinent to the needs, 
priorities, problems and issues it was designed to address and, more generally, to broader 
EU policies and strategies; and the optimisation of the relevance of the Programme is to 
be assessed. It will further consider the way in which activities are prioritised and a 
                                                 
4 The regions can include countries covered by other mandates. In such case synergies between the IF and other 
mandates in those regions should be examined.  
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pipeline developed, including the role of key stakeholders in the ACP partner countries 
and the EIB identifying projects. 
• Effectiveness: The extent to which the Programme has contributed to the EU 
development policy objectives and specific objectives assigned to the EIB under its 
mandated, as specified in the Cotonou Agreement, and in particular in Annex II thereof. 
• Efficiency: For the activities which were effective, it will be necessary to question to what 
extent funding, human resources, regulatory and/or administrative resources available 
contributed to, or hindered the achievement of the objectives and results.  
• Sustainability:  an analysis of the extent to which the results and impacts are being, or are 
likely to be maintained over time. 
• Co-ordination and complementarity :  The extent to which (i) the intervention logic of 
the Investment Facility and EIB own resources investments are coherent with and 
complementary to EC and/or Member State interventions that are designed to contribute 
to the EU external policy objectives, and (ii) there is a logical distinction in the mandates 
and in practice between the function of the own resources envelope and the IF. 
4.4. Approach and methodology 
 
The overall methodological guidance to be used is available on the web page of the 
EuropeAid evaluation unit under the following address:  
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/evaluation/methodology/index_en.htm 
The evaluation basic approach will consist of five phases in the course of which several 
methodological stages will be developed. The Consultant’s contribution is essentially but not 
only the area marked grey in the table below, to which the launch note should be added.  
 
Phases of the evaluation: Methodological Stages: 
 
1. Preparation Phase 
 
 
 Reference group constitution 
 ToR’s drafting  
 Launch Note (Consultant) 
 
 
2. Desk Phase5  
3. Field Phase  
4. Synthesis phase  
 
 Structuring of the evaluation 
 Data Collection6, verification of hypotheses 
 Analysis 
 Judgements on findings 
 
5. Feedback and Dissemination  
 
 The Consultant will be called upon to make 
up  to five interactive audio-visual 
presentations based on their findings, 
conclusions and recommendations 
 
                                                 
5   It includes interviews in Brussels and  Luxembourg  
6  The study will draw on the contents of (i) all relevant documentation supplied by the Commission Services 
and the EIB and (ii) documentation from other sources ( e.g. project documentation gathered during filed 
visits). 
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The field visits will have to represent a balanced approach in terms of regional coverage. 
There will be four field visits, including at least one to the Caribbean and one to the Pacific 
region.  
 
 
5. REPORTING AND/OR DELIVERABLES 
 
5.1. List of deliverables and meetings 
 
Within 15 days after the reception of the ToR, the Consultants will present a launch note 
which should contain:  
• their understanding of the ToR;  
• a methodological note including the implementation of the quality control;  
• the provisional composition of the evaluation team with CVs7;  
• a proposed budget.  
Following the launch note, the main key deliverables are: 
• The inception meeting; 
• The inception report; 
• The desk report; 
• The final report. 
 
The language of the reports shall be English.  
 
 
5.1.2. The inception meeting 
 
Upon approval of the launch note, the Consultant proceeds to the structuring stage leading to 
the production of an inception report.  
The main part of the work consists in the analysis of all key relevant documents regarding the 
EIB's operations in ACP countries. The Consultants will also take into account the 
documentation produced by other donors and international agencies. 
On the basis of the information collected and analysed, the Consultants will propose 
evaluation questions and prepare explanatory comments for each. The choice of the questions 
determines the subsequent phases of information and data collection, elaboration of the 
methods of analysis, and elaboration of final judgements. The consultants will also identify 
appropriate judgement criteria. 
A meeting will be held with the Reference Group to discuss and validate: 
-  the evaluation's regulatory framework, it's context, main users and expected uses; 
-  the evaluation's central scope; 
-  the scope extended to related policies; 
-  the intervention logic according to official documents;  
                                                 
7     All birthday dates must be written in the following Format: dd/mm/yyyy 
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-  the evaluation questions; 
-  explanatory comments associated to each evaluation questions (when possible, 
indicate judgement criteria).Upon validation by the Reference Group, the evaluation questions 
become part of the ToR. 
5.1.3. Inception report 
At the end of the inception phase, the consultants must deliver an inception report, which 
finalises the evaluation questions and describes the main lines of the methodological design 
including the indicators to be used, the strategy of analysis and a detailed work plan for the 
next stage.  
The inception report contains the following elements: 
• the intervention logic; 
• the validated evaluation questions; 
• a limited number of appropriate judgment criteria per evaluation question; 
• a limited number of quantitative and/or qualitative indicators related to each judgment 
criterion; 
• a proposal containing suitable working methods to collect data and information in the 
EIB Headquarters/Regional Offices and the EC Headquarters and Delegations, 
including information coming from the country itself and other donors in the country; 
• a first outline of the strategy and the methods used to analyse the collected data and 
information indicating any limitations; 
• a chain of reasoning for answering the question;  
• a concise description of the EIB operations in ACP countries related to the evaluation 
questions; 
• a detailed work plan for the next stage. 
 The report will also confirm if necessary:  
• the final composition of the evaluation team and  
• the final work plan and schedule.  
The two latter points will be agreed and confirmed through a formal exchange of letters 
between the Consultants and the Commission.  
This phase will include a short preparatory and exploratory visit of the Consultants to 
Luxembourg and/or Brussels. 
 
5.1.4. Desk report 
 
Upon approval of the inception report the Consultants proceed to the final stage of the desk 
phase. At the end of this phase, the Consultants will present a desk report setting out the 
results of this phase of the evaluation including all the following listed elements (the major 
part of the inception report will be in the annex of the desk phase report):  
• the evaluation questions with the agreed judgement criteria and its quantitative and 
qualitative indicators;  
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• the first elements of answer to the evaluation questions when available and the 
hypotheses to be tested in the field; 
• progress in the gathering of data. The complementary data needed for the analysis and 
to be collected in the field have to be identified; 
• methodological design, including evaluation tools ready to be applied in the field 
phase: (i) suitable methods of data collection within the country indicating any 
limitations, describing how the data should be cross-checked and specifying the 
sources, (ii) appropriate methods for data collection and to analyse the information, 
again indicating any limitations of those methods;  
• an exhaustive list of all the activities covered during the period and an exhaustive list 
of all activities examined during the desk phase, bearing in mind that activities 
analysed in the desk phase and the field phase have to be representative; 
• a work plan for the field phase: a list with brief descriptions of activities, projects and 
programmes for in-depth analysis in the field. The consultants must explain the value 
added of the visits. 
The field mission cannot start before the Evaluation Manager has approved the desk report.  
 
5.1.5. Field reporting 
 
The fieldwork shall be undertaken on the basis set out in the desk report and approved by the 
Reference Group. The work plan and schedule of the mission are agreed in advance with the 
relevant services concerned. Fieldwork will be organised in close coordination with the EIB 
(Head Office and regional representations). If during the course of the fieldwork it appears 
necessary to deviate from the agreed approach and/or schedule, the Consultants must ask the 
approval of the Evaluation Manager before any changes may be applied.  
At the conclusion of the field study the Consultants shall present the preliminary findings of 
the evaluation to the Reference Group in writing.  
 
5.1.6. Final report 
 
The Consultants will submit the draft final report in conformity with the structure set out in 
annex 1. Comments from the Reference Group and the Evaluation Manager must be taken 
into consideration.  
The Consultants may either accept or reject the comments but in case of rejection they must 
justify (in writing) the reasons for rejection (the comments and the Consultants’ responses are 
annexed to the report). If the Consultants don't want to take them in the report, they must 
explain the reasons why in a separate document..  
If the Evaluation Manager considers the report to be of sufficient quality, he/she will circulate 
it for comments to the Reference Group. The Reference Group will convene to discuss it in 
the presence of the evaluation team.   
The final report will include an executive summary of not more than 5 pages and shall be 
accompanied by a 1 page key findings and recommendations synthesis report. The 
presentation (Power point) will be prepared and revised in accordance with the final report. 
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The final version of the report, which shall be drafted in English, will need to be translated 
into French by the contractor. If the result of the translation is not appropriate, the contractor 
will need to include requested modifications. 
The final report will have to be sent electronically and in hard copies to EC (10 copies), ACP 
secretariat (10 copies), EIB (10 copies), both in English and in French, and the IF Committee 
representatives (27 copies), the language to be specified. 
 
The evaluators have to hand over on an appropriate support (electronical or paper) all relevant 
data gathered during the evaluation.  
The contractor shall submit a methodological note explaining how the quality control and the 
capitalisation of lessons learned have been addressed. 
The Evaluation Manager makes a formal judgement on the quality of the evaluation (cf. annex 
2). 
  
5.1.7. Presentation of the results 
The evaluator will also be called upon to make up to five interactive audio-visual 
presentations including to the IF Committee (in Luxembourg) and the ACP Committee of 
Ambassadors (in Brussels) based on their findings, conclusions and recommendations.  
 
5.2. Format and timing of documents, reports, publications 
 
The evaluator must ensure that the desk study and first findings reports under this contract are 
clear, concise, and operational. Each report must focus and clearly report on what is new, the 
status of any findings/ conclusions/ recommendations (e.g. whether they are tentative or more 
final), any problems encountered and how they will be surmounted, and the next steps and 
timetable 
 
The final report shall conform to the following schema: 
 
1. Title page 
2. Table of Contents 
3. Executive Summary (including the recommendations) 
4. Introduction 
5. Research Methodology 
6. Evaluation Results 
7. Conclusions and recommendations 
8. Annexes 
 
As all evaluation reports shall be available to the public, no form of confidential data8 shall be 
contained in the final report (they shall be included in a separate Annex). 
 
                                                 
8 In particular, in view of the confidential or commercially sensitive nature of some of the project-related 
information to be exchanged in the course of this evaluation, the consultant undertakes not to disclose such 
information received from the Bank or any other Party without written consent. 
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The Reference Group will assess the quality of all reports. For a report to be considered as 
being of adequate quality, the minimum requirements are that: 
 
- Conclusions are clearly and unambiguously based on evaluation findings, which 
themselves follow logically from, and are justified by, sound analyses and 
interpretations based on carefully described assumptions and reasoning. 
- Recommendations flow directly from the conclusions and provide a basis for 
addressing weaknesses and/or reinforcing strengths. 
 
 
6. ORGANISATION AND TIMETABLE 
 
6.1. Work plan 
The estimated work plan for the evaluation is the following: starting date in September 2009, 
draft final report in May 2010. 
 
Evaluation Phases 
and Stages 
 
Notes and Reports Dates Meetings/Communications 
 
Preparatory phase 
 
   
 Draft ToRs 27 July 2009 RG meeting 
 Launch note and CVs of 
experts 
End August 
2009 
Consultation by email 
 
Desk Phase 
 
   
Structuring Stage Short presentation of the 
approach and the 
Evaluation Questions 
beginning 
November 
2009 
RG Meeting (kick –off/inception 
meeting) 
 
 Draft Inception Report end 
November 
2009 
Optional: Short preparatory visit of the 
consultants to Luxembourg and/or 
Brussels. 
 Final Inception Report December 
2009 
A formal exchange of letters between 
the Consultants and the Commission 
confirms the final composition of the 
evaluation team and the final work plan 
and schedule. 
Desk Study Draft Desk Report end January 
2010 
RG Meeting 
 Final Desk Report  February 
2010 
 
 
Field Phase 
  De-briefing meeting with the Delegation 
/ or EIB Regional office 
 Information on findings May 2010  RG meeting 
 
Synthesis phase  
   
 1st draft Final report June 2010 RG Meeting
 Revised draft Final report mid-June 
2010  
 
 Final Main Report July 2010  
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6.2  Evaluation team 
 
This evaluation is to be carried out by a team with advanced knowledge, and experience in at 
least the following fields: 
 
- Strong professional experience in evaluation and familiarity with the methodological 
approach set by the EC. Ability to draw out lessons and implications for country and 
sector policies. Sound and proven experience in evaluation methods and techniques, 
preferably in ACP countries, including at the programme and policy level plus 
relevant field experience. Ability to assess and communicate best practices.  
- State of the art knowledge of international finance architecture, including access to 
specific expertise related to activities of the EIB. 
- In-depth understanding of EC external policies and practices. Appropriate experience 
across the range of instruments, programmes and types of external co-operation, and 
access to knowledge on the ACP region. 
- The team must be prepared to work in English, and possess excellent drafting skills. 
Consultants must be strictly neutral. Conflicts of interests must be avoided.  
 
 
6.3. Budget 
 
The overall costs include: 
• The evaluation as such; 
• 2.5% of the total budget excluding the costs of the seminar are to be used for quality 
control; 
• Presentation of the results 
The total of these 3 elements must not exceed € 300.000. 
 
6.5  Payments Modalities 
 
The payments modalities shall be as follows: 30% on acceptance of the inception note; 50% 
on acceptance of draft final report; 20% on acceptance of final report.
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ANNEX: 1. OVERALL STRUCTURE OF THE FINAL REPORT 
 
The final report shall conform to the following schema: 
1. Title page 
2. Table of Contents 
3. Executive Summary (including the recommendations) 
4. Introduction 
5. Research Methodology 
6. Evaluation Results 
7. Conclusions and recommendations 
8. Annexes 
 
 
Length: the final report must be kept short (70 pages maximum excluding annexes). 
Additional information regarding the context, the programme and the comprehensive aspects 
of the methodology and of the analysis will be put in the annexes. 
 
(1) Conclusions 
 
– The conclusions have to be assembled by homogeneous "clusters" (groups). It is not 
required to set out the conclusions according to the 5 DAC criteria; 
– The chapter on "Conclusions" has to contain a paragraph or a sub-chapter with the 3 to 4 
principal conclusions presented in order of importance; 
– The chapter on "Conclusions" must also make it possible to identify subjects, for which 
there are good practices and the subjects, for which it is necessary to think about 
modifications or re-orientations; 
 
(2) Recommendations 
 
– Recommendations have to be linked to the conclusions without being a direct copy of 
them; 
– Recommendations have to be treated on a hierarchical basis and prioritised within the 
various clusters (groups) of presentation selected; 
– Recommendations have to be realistic, operational and feasible. As far as it is 
practicable, the possible conditions of implementation have to be specified; 
– The chapter on "Recommendations" has to contain a sub-chapter or a specific 
paragraph corresponding to the paragraph with the 3 to 4 principal conclusions. 
Therefore, for each conclusion, options for action and the conditions linked to each 
action as well as the likely consequences should be set out. 
• Annexes (non exhaustive) 
 
- Methodological approach 
- Information matrix 
- Monograph, case studies 
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- List of institutions and persons met 
- List of documents consulted 
 
 
NOTE ON THE EDITING OF REPORTS 
 
- The final report must: 
 be consistent, concise and clear; 
 be well balanced between argumentation, tables and graphs;  
 be free of linguistic errors;  
 include a table of contents indicating the page number of all the chapters listed 
therein, a list of annexes (whose page numbering shall continue from that in 
the report) and a complete list in alphabetical order of any abbreviations in the 
text; 
 contain one (or several) summaries presenting the main ideas. For example, the 
answers to the evaluation questions and the main conclusions could be 
summarised and presented in a box. 
- The executive summary has to be very short (max. 5 pages); 
- The final version of the report shall be typed in 1,5 lines spacing and printed double sided, in 
DIN-A-4 format; 
- The font shall be easy to read (indicative size of the font: Times New Roman 12); 
- The presentation shall be well spaced (the use of graphs, tables and small paragraphs is 
strongly recommended). The graphs must be clear (shades of grey produce better contrasts 
on a black and white printout); 
- The main report shall not exceed 70 pages including the cover page, the table of content, the 
lists of annexes and abbreviations. The annexes shall not be too long; 
- The content must have a good balance between main report and annexes; 
- Reports shall be glued or stapled; plastic spirals are not acceptable due to storage problems. 
 
 
Please, note that: 
 
- The Consultant is responsible for the quality of translations and their conformity with the 
original; 
- All data produced in the evaluation are property of the EC. 
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ANNEX 2 - QUALITY ASSESSMENT GRID  
Concerning these criteria, the evaluation report is: 
 Unacceptable Poor Good 
Very 
good Excellent 
1. Meeting needs:  Does the evaluation adequately 
address the information needs of the commissioning 
body and fit the terms of reference? 
     
2. Relevant scope:  Is the rationale of the policy 
examined and its set of outputs, results and 
outcomes/impacts examined fully, including both 
intended and unexpected policy interactions and 
consequences? 
     
3. Defensible design:  Is the evaluation design 
appropriate and adequate to ensure that the full set of 
findings, along with methodological limitations, is 
made accessible for answering the main evaluation 
questions? 
     
4. Reliable data:  To what extent are the primary 
and secondary data selected adequate. Are they 
sufficiently reliable for their intended use? 
     
5. Sound analysis:  Is quantitative information 
appropriately and systematically analysed according 
to the state of the art so that evaluation questions are 
answered in a valid way? 
     
6. Credible findings:  Do findings follow logically 
from, and are they justified by, the data analysis and 
interpretations based on carefully described 
assumptions and rationale? 
     
7. Validity of the conclusions:  Does the report 
provide clear conclusions? Are conclusions based on 
credible results? 
     
8. Usefulness of the recommendations:  Are 
recommendations fair, unbiased by personnel or 
shareholders’ views, and sufficiently detailed to be 
operationally applicable? 
     
9. Clearly reported:  Does the report clearly 
describe the policy being evaluated, including its 
context and purpose, together with the procedures 
and findings of the evaluation, so that information 
provided can easily be understood? 
     
Taking into account the contextual constraints on 
the evaluation, the overall quality rating of the 
report is considered. 
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ANNEX 3 – A LIST OF EIB BACKGROUND DOCUMENTS  
 
 
3.1  Governing instruments 
 
• The ACP-EC Partnership Agreement between the African, Caribbean and Pacific States 
and the European Community and its Member States, signed at Cotonou (Benin) on 23 
June 2000, as revised in Luxembourg on 25 June 2005 (the “Cotonou Partnership 
Agreement II”) and in particular Annex I and Annex II thereof. 
 
• Council Decision 2001/822/EC of 27 November 2001 on the association of the overseas 
countries and territories (the “OCTs”) with the European Community, as amended by 
Council Decision 2007/249/EC of 19 March 2007 (the “Overseas Association 
Decision"). 
 
• The Internal Agreement of 18 September 2000 on the financing of Community aid 
under the multiannual financial framework for the period 2003 to 2007, in accordance 
with the Cotonou Partnership Agreement   
 
• The Internal Agreement of 17 July 2006 on the financing of Community aid under the 
multiannual financial framework for the period 2008 to 2013, in accordance with the 
revised Cotonou Partnership Agreement  
 
• Council Regulation (EC) No 617/2007 of 14 May 2007 on the implementation of the 
10th European Development Fund under the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement  
 
• Council Regulation (EC) of 27 March 2003 on the financial regulation applicable to the 
9th European Development Fund and, in particular Part Two thereof. 
 
• Council Regulation (EC) No 215/2008 of 18 February 2008 on the financial regulation 
applicable to the 10th European Development Fund and, in particular Part Two thereof. 
 
3.2 Related evaluations can be found at http://www.eib.org/evaluation 
 
• AIDCO – Evaluation of Commission’s aid delivery through development banks and EIB  
• EIB/EV – Evaluation of the EIB financing of water and sanitation projects outside the 
EU 
 
3.3 EIB internal documents  
 
• Investment Facility Operational Guidelines (October 2002) 
• Guidelines for equity investments under the Investment Facility (CA Doc 05/218) 
• Guarantees – Operational principles to guide the implementation of guarantees under the 
Investment Facility (CA Doc 04/379) 
• Technical note on the use of interest subsidies in the ACP  
• ACP-IF Local currency lending 
• Credit Risk Policy Guidelines and procedures for Investment Facility Operations (March 
2004) and first revision thereof (June 06 – CA Doc 06/248) 
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• EIB Strategic orientations for financial sector operations in ACP countries 
(CA Doc 08/53) 
• Cotonou Partnership Agreement - Summary of activities in Micro-Finance and 
operational outlook (CA Doc 07/465) 
• EIB participation in regional development banks in the ACP (CA Doc 07/183) 
 
• The ACP-EU Water Facility and EIB’s involvement in ACP water and sanitation sectors 
(CA Doc 07/195) 
 
• Development Impact Assessment Framework (DIAF) of Investment Facility projects 
(CA Doc 05/123) 
• Development Impact and Value Added of investment loans in ACP countries 
(CA Doc 06/510) 
• Extension and adaptation of the Economic and Social Impact Assessment Framework 
(ESIAF, ex-DIAF) to all operations (including financial sector operations) outside the 
EU and pre-accession countries (CA Doc 08/52) 
 
• Investment Facility Annual Reports (2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008) 
 
• ACP - Investment Facility Business Plans  
2004-2006 – CA Doc 04/113 
2005-2007 – CA Doc 05/71 
2006-2008 – CA Doc 06/130 
2007-2009 – CA Doc 07/196 
2008-2010 – CA Doc 08/49 
2009-2011 – CA Doc 09/56 
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Annexe 2 - Concise overview of EIB 
portfolio in ACP countries and OCTs 
This annexe provides a concise descriptive overview of the portfolio of EIB operations in 
ACP and OCTs financed under the Investment Facility (IF) and EIB Own Resources 
(OR). It also addresses Interest Rate Subsidies (IRS) to IF and OR loans and Technical 
Assistance (TA) provided by the EIB in ACP countries and OCTs. It also presents an 
analysis of the IF and OR portfolio. 
 
This annexe is structured as follows: 
 Section 1: Descriptive overview of the IF and OR portfolio 
 Section 2: Analysis of the IF and OR portfolio 
1.  Descriptive overview of EIB operations in ACP and OCTs 
1.1 General overview 
Over the period 2003 to September 2009, a total of €4,105m1 was approved for EIB 
operations in the ACP countries and OCTs under the Investment Facility (64%) 
and EIB Own Resources (36%). Of these funds, €3,292m2 was contracted and €1,608m 
disbursed, that is respectively 80% and 39% of the total (see figure below).  
                                                 
1  Approvals net of cancellation. The total amount approved, including cancellation after approval, was €4,266m over 
the period 2003 to September 2009. 
2  Signatures net of cancellation. The total amount signed, including cancellation after signature, was €3,459m 
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Figure 1.1 - Overview of EIB operations in ACP countries  and OCT– 2003 to 
09/2009 
 
Note: Approvals and signatures amounts are net of cancellation. Number of operations are net of cancellation
Source: EIB data and ADE analysis
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Cumulative Investment Facility (IF) approvals from 2003 to September 2009 amounted 
to €2,646m (€2,616m for ACP countries and €30m for OCTs). They represented 74% of 
the total financial allocation for the IF under EDFs 9 and 10 (€2,037m3 for ACP and €20m 
for OCTs under EDF 9; €1,500m and €30m respectively for ACP and OCTs under EDF 
10). The total amounts signed (€2,195m) and disbursed (€1,057m) represented respectively 
83% and 40% of the amounts approved. 
 
The loans financed under EIB Own Resources (OR) amounted to €1,067m under 
Cotonou I and €391m under Cotonou II4 (€20m for OCTs under Cotonou II and the rest 
for ACP countries). Under Cotonou I, signatures and disbursements totalled €943m and 
€545m respectively, or 88% and 51% of the approvals. Under Cotonou II, €154m was 
signed and €6.4m was disbursed or 39% and 1% of the approvals. 
 
                                                 
3  The initial endowment of EUR 2 200 million for the IF has been revised downwards proportionally to EUR 2 037 
million following the setting-up during 2004 of the EUR 500 million EU Water Facility and the EUR 250 million EU 
Energy Facility under the 9th EDF (Source : EIB, Annual Press Conference, Briefing Note n°8, Luxembourg 9 
February 2006). 
4  Cotonou II came into force in July 2008 
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Over the period 2003 to September 2009, 120 operations were approved under the IF, 28 
under OR, and a further eight under both IF and OR. In total 156 operations were 
approved and 177 contracts were signed5.  
 
Interest Rate Subsidies (IRS) were granted to 32 loans financed under IF loans (19) and 
OR loans (13). The IRS estimates amounted to €134m6 and €33m was used. 
 
Technical assistance (TA) is provided to support directly or indirectly EIB operations. 
TA started in 2007 and cumulative amounts of €30m were approved up to September 2009 
for a total number of 37 TA operations; a total of €18m was contracted and €9m disbursed. 
 
The table below provides more details on the amounts contracted and disbursed, 
differentiating between the Cotonou Agreement’s first and second financial protocols. It 
shows for instance that the first IF envelope for ACP countries was largely contracted 
(94%) and the second envelope is also well underway in terms of contracting (17% 
contracted after 2 years out of a 5.5 year duration). Disbursements relating to the first IF 
envelope for ACP countries amounted to 55% at the end of September 2009.  
Table 1.1 : Overview of EIB operations in ACP countries  and OCT, per financial 
protocol – 2003 to 09/2009 
Mandate 
  
  
 Endowment  Contracted Disbursements 
 €m  €m % of 
endow. 
€m  % of 
contr. 
1st Fin. Prot.  IF ‐ ACP  2,037 1,918 94% 1,048  55% 
2003‐June2008  IF ‐ OCT  20 20 100% ‐  0% 
   OR ‐ ACP  1,700 943 55% 545  58% 
   OR ‐ OCT  20 ‐ 0% 1,593  N/A 
   Total  3,777 2,881 76% 1,593  55% 
2nd Fin. Prot.  IF ‐ ACP  1,500 257 17% 7  3% 
July2008‐2013  IF ‐ OCT  30 ‐ 0% ‐  N/A 
   OR ‐ ACP  2,000 154 8% 6  4% 
   OR ‐ OCT  30 ‐ 0% ‐  N/A 
   Total  3,560 411 12% 14  3% 
TOTAL 1st + 2nd 
Fin. Prot.  IF ‐ ACP  3,537 2,175 61% 1,055  49% 
2003‐2013  IF ‐ OCT  50 20 40% ‐  0% 
   OR ‐ ACP  3,700 1,097 30% 552  50% 
   OR ‐ OCT  50 ‐ 0% ‐  N/A 
   TOTAL  7,337 3,292 45% 1,607  49% 
Notes. Contracts after adjustments. Details on endowments provided further in this section.  
Source: EIB data and ADE analysis 
                                                 
5  Number of operations and contracts are net of cancellation. The operations and contracts number including those 
cancelled were respectively 160 and 184.   
6  Estimations net of cancellation. 
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1.2  Investments Facility portfolio 
The following section presents the trends in, and the various breakdowns of, the IF 
portfolio. The figure below shows the trend in IF funds in terms of approvals, signatures 
and disbursements. The other figures in this section are based only on the amounts signed 
during the period 2003 to September 2009. 
Figure 1.2 – IF: Trend in the amounts approved, signed and disbursed - 2003 to 
09/2009 - €m 
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The evolution of the IF funds is characterised by a general upward trend from 2003 to 
2006. In 2007 approvals and signatures decreased compared to 2006 and then remained 
relatively stable in 2008 and 2009 (September 2009). Disbursements increased up until 
2007, reaching a total amount of €329m for that year, and then fell back in 2008 and 2009. 
 
In terms of geographic breakdown, the IF finances operations in both ACP countries 
and OCTs. As shown in the figure below, the main sub-region is Central and Eastern 
Africa (30% of IF signatures). Regional operations across African countries and ACP States 
also represent a substantial proportion of IF signatures (26%).  
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Source: EIB data and ADE analysis
Note:  signatures net of  cancellation
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€571m
Caribbean and Pacific
€241m
Figure 1.3 – IF: Regional breakdown - 2003 to 09/2009 - signatures €m 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country specific IF operations amounted to €1,124m (51% of total IF signatures) in 35 
countries. Regional (Africa and ACP) and sub-regional operations represent 49% of overall 
IF signatures, or €1,071m. In terms of number of contracts undertaken under IF 
operations7, 58 were regional and 87 were country-specific.    
 
                                                 
7  One operation can have more than one contract when the operation has for example several borrowers or several 
financing instruments.  
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The sector breakdown of IF portfolio is presented in the figure below: 
Figure 1.4 – IF: Sector breakdown - 2003 to 09/2009 - signatures €m 
Source: EIB data and ADE analysis
Note:  signatures net of  cancellation
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Investment in the financial sector, including credit lines, amounted to 56% of the IF 
portfolio (€1,211m). It is the main sector supported by the IF. The energy sector is the 
second main sector accounting for 20% of total IF signatures. The operations in this sector 
are mainly led by public institutions (12 out of 16 contracts). In the industry sector 
(including mining), which accounts for 14%, all the contracts (17) are led by the private 
sector. The other sectors are:  
 water & sewerage (3%),  
 transport (2%),  
 services (including tourism) (2%),  
 telecommunications (2%) and  
 agriculture, fisheries & forestry (1%). 
 
The majority of the IF portfolio is led by the private sector (€1,719m) for operations in 
financial services and in industry. Public sector-led operations account for €475m, mainly 
in the energy sector.   
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The breakdown by financial instrument used by the EIB under the IF is shown below: 
Figure 1.5 – IF: Financial instrument breakdown - 2003 to 09/2009 - signatures €m 
Source: EIB data and ADE analysis
Note:  signatures net of  cancellation
Senior loan
€839m
Equity 
€441m
Agency Agreement
€290m
17%
7%
38%
20%
13%
Credit line
€360m
Subordinated loan 
and quasi equity
€154m
Guarantee
€112m
5%
 
 
Senior loan is the main instrument used in term of amount signed (38%) and number of 
contracts signed (44) over the period 2003 to September 2009. For equity investments, 44 
contracts were signed but funds invested via this instrument were less than those invested 
through senior loans (20% of total amount signed for Equity). Agency Agreements are 
used in the framework of European Financing Partners (EFP) I, II and III.  
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1.3 EIB Own Resources portfolio 
The following section presents the trends in, and various breakdowns of, the EIB Own 
Resources portfolio. The figure below shows the trends in OR in terms of approvals, 
signatures and disbursements. The other figures of this section are based only on the 
amount signed during the period 2003 to September 2009. 
Figure 1.6 – OR : Trends in the amounts approved, signed and disbursed 2003 to 
09/2009  [€m] 
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OR approvals, signatures and disbursements increased between 2003 and 2007, reaching a 
peak of €548m of approvals in 2007. While disbursements kept on increasing in 2008, 
approvals and signatures decreased during that year. Approvals have increased in 2009 but 
signatures and disbursements have not followed the same trend. This can maybe be 
explained by the fact that data showed in this figure go up to September 2009 and thus do 
not cover the last months of the year. 
 
Most of the OR portfolio goes to ACP countries (€1,438m) and only a small proportion to 
OCTs (€20m approvals but no signatures up to September 2009). In terms of sub-
regional breakdown, 47% of the amounts signed are for contracts in Southern Africa and 
Indian Ocean and 37% in West Africa and the Sahel.  
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Source: EIB data and ADE analysis
Note:  signatures net of  cancellation
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Figure 1.7 – OR: Regional breakdown 2003 to 09/2009 - signatures [€m] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The OR portfolio is earmarked more to country-specific than to regional operations. 
Indeed, 11% of the signatures are for regional contracts whereas the remainder goes to 18 
countries, of which Madagascar (€285m), Nigeria (€125m) and Ghana (€115m) are the 
main beneficiaries. In terms of number of operations per region, 11 have been financed in 
Southern Africa & Indian Ocean, 8 in West Africa & Sahel, 6 in the Caribbean & Pacific 
and 3 in Central & Eastern Africa.  
 
The sector breakdown of OR is shown here below: 
Figure 1.8 – OR: Sector breakdown - 2003 to 09/2009 - signatures €m 
Source: EIB data and ADE analysis
Note:  signatures net of  cancellation
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The OR portfolio mainly supports the industrial sector (37%) and the energy sector (21%). 
The financial sector, including credit lines, represents 21% of the total amount signed. The 
other sectors supported are transport (11%), water & sewerage (9%) and services (including 
tourism) (1%).  
 
These OR contracts are shared almost equally between the private sector (56%, mainly for 
industry and financial services) and the public sector (44%, in this case for energy, 
transport and water). 
 
The EIB uses two financial instruments for OR contracts:  
 Senior loans (€963m, or 88% of the total amount signed) 
 Credit lines (€134m or 12%) 
1.4 Interest Rate Subsidies 
This section describes the Interest Rate Subsidies (IRS) provided under IF and OR loan 
arrangements. As mentioned above, IRS were granted in respect of 32 loans, namely 19 
financed by the IF, and 13 loans out of OR over the period 2004 to September 2009. Out 
of these 32 loans, 2 were in OCTs and 30 in ACP countries. The trends in the IRS amounts 
estimated and used are presented in the figure below:  
Figure 1.9 – IRS: Trends in amounts estimated and used - 2004 to 09/2009 - €m 
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IRS amounts estimated (at the time of the contract signature) increased between 2004 and 
2008 with a drop in 2007. The resources used (at the time of disbursement) were relatively 
stable over the period. 
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In terms of geographical breakdown, the figure below shows the sub-regions benefiting 
from IF and OR contracts with an IRS (amounts estimated in €m):   
Figure 1.10 – IRS : Regional breakdown - 2004 to 09/2009 - estimates €m 
Source: EIB data and ADE analysis
Note: Estimates net of  cancellation
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IRS are provided mainly for loans in Central and Eastern Africa in terms of amounts 
estimated (41% of the total estimates for seven loans). The other sub-regions are:  
 West Africa and Sahel (32% for 11 loans) 
 Southern Africa and Indian Ocean (19% for 6 loans)    and 
 Caribbean and Pacific (9% for 8 loans). 
 
As presented in the figure below on sector breakdown, 64% of the IRS granted (in terms 
of estimates) are for loans in the energy sector, mainly led by public institutions. The 
second main sector is water and sewerage, representing 28% of the total amount estimated. 
These operations are led by the public sector only. The other sectors are: transport (4%); 
industry (2%); credit lines (1%) and agriculture, fisheries and forestry (1%). 
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Figure 1.11 – IRS: Sector breakdown - 2004 to 09/2009 - estimates €m 
Source: EIB data and ADE analysis
Note: Estimates net of  cancellation
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The justification for granting an IRS in respect of loans financed under the IF or OR 
concerns mainly HIPC countries (84% of the total amount estimated). Other justifications 
relate to issues concerning environment (7%), social sector (6%), privatisation (3%), EC 
sugar policy (0.5%) and natural disaster recovery (0.5%) 
1.5 Technical assistance 
Provision of Technical Assistance (TA) started in 2007. The total amount approved for TA 
up to September 2009 was €30m (€18m under Cotonou 1 and €12m under Cotonou 2). 
Over the period, 59% of the amounts approved were contracted and 29% disbursed. The 
following table shows the evolution of these amounts over the three years: 
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Table 1.1 – TA: Evolution of approvals, contracts and disbursements - 2007 to 
09/2009 - €m 
TA  2007 2008 2009
Approvals 
  
5,8   
  
14,0   
  
10,4   
Contracts 
  
3,6   
  
7,9   
  
6,5   
Disbursements
  
1,7   
  
1,8   
  
5,3   
   Source: EIB data and ADE analysis 
   Note: contracts after adjustments 
 
The following figure presents the geographical breakdown of TA contracts:  
 
Figure 1.12 – TA:  Regional breakdown - 2007 to 09/2009 – contracts - €m 
Source: EIB data and ADE analysis
Note: Contracts af ter adjustements
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Most of the TA funds contracted are for regional operations in the ACP countries (82% of 
the total amount contracted for 15 contracts). Other TA were contracted in: 
 Central and Eastern Africa (9%, 12 contracts); 
 West Africa and Sahel (6%, 4 contracts); 
 Southern Africa and Indian Ocean (2.6%, 2 contracts); and 
 Caribbean and Pacific (0.4%, 4 contracts). 
 
Over the period 2007 and 2009, the TA focused mainly on: 
 financial sector operations (62% of the total amount contracted); 
 global loans (16%) ; 
 the energy sector (15%) ; and 
 the communication sector (7%). 
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2. Analysis of the IF and OR portfolio 
The objective of this section is to provide a synthetic overview of the deployment of OR 
and IF resources in view of assessing the main needs they have addressed.  
 
It includes three sets of tables, presented at the end of this Annexe. 
 
The first set (tables 1a to 1c) is based on the 2009 Annual Report of the Investment 
Facility. 
 
It provides the yearly evolution of signed operations (numbers and amount) from 2003, 
date of entry into force of the Cotonou Agreement) to 2009, and the cumulated operations 
over the whole period, for respectively the IF, the OR, and in the ACP and the OCTs. The 
distinction is made between private led and public initiatives.  
 
These tables convey the following messages: 
 
 The Bank has, according to its mandate, effectively targeted its interventions to private 
sector led initiatives. They represent 83% of IF and 51% of OR cumulated signatures.  
 
 
 
 
 The average project size of OR interventions (€ 35.4 m) is more than twice that of IF 
(€ 15.3 m). Some explanatory factors can be found in the examination of tables 2 and 3. 
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 The overview of the Bank’s signed operations in the ACP and the OCT’s since 2003 
shows that at the end of 2009 signed commitments under EDF 9 and EDF 10 
amounted to nearly € 4 billion i.e. 54% of the total combined IF and OR allocations.  
As the 10th EDF portfolio is still being built up this amount will further increase. 
 
The following diagram shows the cumulated IF and OR signed operations at the end of 
each year, i.e. the pace at which the portfolios of IF and OR interventions have been built 
up.  
 
The purple coloured line corresponds to a linear distribution of operations along the whole 
period. Taking into account the fact that the Cotonou mandate entered into force in 2003 
and extends to 2013, roughly 64% of the time available for building up the portfolio was 
elapsed by end 2009.  
 
Cumulated signed operations under the IF and OR amount to 54%. This average ratio, 
however, covers two different evolutions. The building up of the IF portfolio has been 
much faster, with signatures already amounting to 70% of allocation, than that of the OR 
with  only 39%. 
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The other sets of tables are based on data provided by the EIB and used for the exhaustive 
inventory of EIB operations presented in annexe 2. They are more detailed than those 
provided in the 2009 Annual Report of the IF but they cover only the period 2003 to end 
September 2009.  However, they enter into more details on the deployments of 
instruments and their direction to regions and sectors.  
 
Table 2 show the geographical distribution of the net cumulative amount of contracts over 
the period 2003-Sept. 2009. For each region the contracts are distributed by sector. The 
table indicates for each region and sector the percentage of the total projects costs that was 
funded by the EIB. 
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Under the IF, EIB funding covered 16% of the total cost of all operations. This coverage 
was relatively similar in all regions except the Caribbean and the Pacific where it is 
significantly higher with 23%.  For the OR the average share of funding was 14% with a 
higher variance that for IF, the ratio mounting to 41% in the Caribbean and the Pacific. 
These differences reflect the variations in the sector distribution of operations across the 
region. The funding provided to telecommunications, transport and water tend to cover a 
higher proportion (30% to 40%) of the total costs of projects than in the other sectors. 
This is true for both the IF and the OR. Contributions to the sectors energy, industry, 
financial services and tourism cover a much smaller share of the total costs of the projects 
(10% to 15%). 
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Table 3 gives the breakdown of cumulated contracts by sector and by financial instrument 
with identification of the proportion of operations that were addressing private led 
initiatives.  
 
Under the IF (table 3a) and the OR (Table 3b) the infrastructure sectors (energy, transport 
and water) are supported exclusively with senior loans offered to a majority of public sector 
led initiatives. The other sectors under the IF and the OR are supported with senior loans 
and the other financial instruments; for these other sectors all financial instruments were 
targeted to private sector led initiatives.  
 
As a result 78% of IF operations and 59% of OR were directed to the private sector8 with 
an average of 72% for the consolidated IF and OR operations. The main factor is higher 
share of infrastructure projects in the OR than in the IF portfolio. The fact that these 
projects tend to be both large projects and projects for which the share of the total cost 
funded by the Bank is higher than in other sectors is one factor that contributes to the 
higher average size of OR projects compared to IF ones.  
                                                 
8  These figures differ slightly from those of table 1 because the periods covered do not coincide. 
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2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total % of 9th & 
10th EDF 
allocations
Aver. Proj. 
Size (€ m.)
   N° of operations 12 21 26 38 19 23 22 161
     of which private 12 19 20 32 18 21 21 143
      of which public 0 2 6 6 1 2 1 18
    Amount in € m. 140,15 337,23 351,22 569,62 314,63 326,25 450,10 2.489,20 70% 15,46
     of which private 140,15 311,98 197,62 485,12 216,13 267,75 445,80 2.064,55 14,44
          in % 100,0% 92,5% 56,3% 85,2% 68,7% 82,1% 99,0% 82,9%
      of which public 0,00 25,25 153,60 84,50 98,50 58,50 4,30 424,65 23,59
   N° of operations 2 1 3
     of which private 2 1 3
      of which public 0 0 0
    Amount in € m. 10,00 10,00 20,00 40% 6,67
     of which private 10,00 10,00 20,00 6,67
          in % 100,0% 100,0% 100,0%
      of which public 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
   N° of operations 12 21 26 38 21 24 22 164
     of which private 12 19 20 32 20 22 21 146
      of which public 0 2 6 6 1 2 1 18
    Amount in € m. 140,15 337,23 351,22 569,62 324,63 336,25 450,10 2.509,20 70,0% 15,30
     of which private 140,15 311,98 197,62 485,12 226,13 277,75 445,80 2.084,55 14,28
          in % 100,0% 92,5% 56,3% 85,2% 69,7% 82,6% 99,0% 83,1%
      of which public 0,00 25,25 153,60 84,50 98,50 58,50 4,30 424,65 23,59
   N° of operations 1 5 4 5 7 8 10 40
     of which private 1 3 3 3 4 2 3 19
      of which public 0 2 1 2 3 6 7 21
    Amount in € m. 6,10 62,23 150,91 167,25 431,81 224,75 403,17 1.446,22 39,1% 36,16
     of which private 6,10 39,93 110,91 67,75 389,51 9,00 110,30 733,50 38,61
          in % 100,0% 64,2% 73,5% 40,5% 90,2% 4,0% 27,4% 50,7%
      of which public 0,00 22,30 40,00 99,50 42,30 215,75 292,87 712,72 33,94
   N° of operations 1 1
     of which private 1 1
      of which public 0 0
    Amount in € m. 10,00 10,00 20,0% 10,00
     of which private 10,00 10,00 10,00
          in % 100,0% 100,0%
      of which public 0,00 0,00 0,00
   N° of operations 1 5 4 5 7 8 11 41
     of which private 1 3 3 3 4 2 4 20
      of which public 0 2 1 2 3 6 7 21
    Amount in € m. 6,10 62,23 150,91 167,25 431,81 224,75 413,17 1.456,22 38,8% 35,52
     of which private 6,10 39,93 110,91 67,75 389,51 9,00 120,30 743,50 37,18
          in % 100,0% 64,2% 73,5% 40,5% 90,2% 4,0% 29,1% 51,1%
      of which public 0,00 22,30 40,00 99,50 42,30 215,75 292,87 712,72 33,94
   N° of operations 13 26 30 43 28 32 33 205
     of which private 13 22 23 35 24 24 25 166
      of which public 0 4 7 8 4 8 8 39
    Amount in € m. 146,25 399,46 502,13 736,87 756,44 561,00 863,27 3.965,42 54,0% 19,34
     of which private 146,25 351,91 308,53 552,87 615,64 286,75 566,10 2.828,05 17,04
          in % 100,0% 88,1% 61,4% 75,0% 81,4% 51,1% 65,6% 71,3%
      of which public 0,00 47,55 193,60 184,00 140,80 274,25 297,17 1.137,37 29,16
Source: EIB Investment Facilty, Annual Report 2009, annexes 2 and 3
A
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 Table 1 IF/OR Signed operations 2003-2009 (ACP and OCTs)
Table 1a:  Investment Facility
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Table 1b:  Own Resources
Table 1c:  Total IF + OR
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Agriculture, 
fisheries, 
forestry
Credit 
lines
Energy Industry 
(incl. 
mining)
Financial 
services
Services 
(incl. 
tourism)
Telecom
municatio
ns
Transport Water 
sewerage
Total Share of 
total cost 
funded by 
EIB
West Africa & Sahel 3.98 89.03 81.25 32.65 135.32 13.69 355.92 15%
Caribbean and Pacific 3.50 77.16 3.20 71.46 25.00 21.85 38.74 240.91 23%
Central and East Africa 9.10 154.50 344.00 66.76 73.04 16.50 663.91 16%
Regional Africa and ACP 270.00 16.74 284.15 570.89 17%
Southern Africa & Indian Ocean 46.00 17.60 187.78 17.11 25.10 15.00 54.50 363.09 13%
Total 16.58 636.69 446.05 303.93 581.08 50.10 36.85 52.43 71.00 2 194.71 16%
Share of total cost funded by EIB 21% 27% 15% 10% 13% 19% 30% 40% 40% 16%
Agriculture, 
fisheries, 
forestry
Credit 
lines
Energy Industry 
(incl. 
mining)
Financial 
services
Services 
(incl. 
tourism)
Telecom
municatio
ns
Transport Water 
sewerage
Total Share of 
total cost 
funded by 
EIB
West Africa & Sahel 65.00 75.00 75.48 100.00 47.00 66.50 428.98 19%
Caribbean and Pacific 49.00 42.55 0.00 91.55 41%
Central and East Africa 55.00 8.93 63.93 9%
Regional Africa and ACP 0.00
Southern Africa & Indian Ocean 20.00 59.50 318.22 6.10 79.00 30.05 512.87 12%
Total 0.00 134.00 232.05 402.63 100.00 6.10 0.00 126.00 96.55 1 097.33 14%
Share of total cost funded by EIB 29% 14% 9% 20% 8% 40% 37% 14%
Agriculture, 
fisheries, 
forestry
Credit 
lines
Energy Industry 
(incl. 
mining)
Financial 
services
Services 
(incl. 
tourism)
Telecom
municatio
ns
Transport Water 
sewerage
Total Share of 
total cost 
funded by 
EIB
West Africa & Sahel 3.98 154.03 156.25 108.13 235.32 0 0 60.69 66.50 784.90 17%
Caribbean and Pacific 3.50 126.16 45.75 0.00 71.46 25.00 21.85 38.74 0.00 332.46 26%
Central and East Africa 9.10 154.50 399.00 75.69 73.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 16.50 727.84 15%
Regional Africa and ACP 0.00 270.00 0.00 16.74 284.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 570.89 17%
Southern Africa & Indian Ocean 0.00 66.00 77.10 506.00 17.11 31.20 15.00 79.00 84.55 875.96 12%
Total 16.58 770.69 678.10 706.56 681.08 56.20 36.85 178.43 167.55 3 292.04 15%
Share of total cost funded by EIB 21% 27% 15% 10% 13% 16% 30% 40% 38% 15%
Table 2b: Net cumulative amount contracted  2003- Sept. 2009: OR
Table 2a: Net cumulative amount contracted  2003-Sept. 2009: IF
Table 2c: Net cumulative amount contracted  2003-Sept. 2009: IF + OR
Source: Inventory file provided by EIB and own calculations.  
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Agriculture, 
fisheries, 
forestry
Credit 
lines
Energy Industry 
(incl. 
mining)
Financial 
services
Services 
(incl. 
tourism)
Telecom
municatio
ns
Transport Water 
sewerage
Total Share of 
total cost 
funded by 
EIB
Senior loan 21.58 446.05 146.69 50.00 14.00 36.85 52.43 71.00 838.60 15%
   of w. private 100% 20% 100% 100% 100% 100% 14% 0% 44%
Credit line 359.69 359.69 20%
   of w. private 99% 99%
Guarantee 11.80 100.00 111.80
   of w. private 100% 100% 100%
Equity and quasi equity 2.00 145.44 411.07 36.10 594.61 12%
   of w. private 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Agency agreement 270.00 20.06 290.00
   of w. private 100% 100% 100%
Total 23.58 629.69 446.05 303.93 581.13 50.10 36.85 52.43 71.00 2 194.71 16%
   of w. private 100% 99% 20% 100% 100% 100% 100% 14% 0% 78%
Share of total cost funded 
by EIB
26% 15% 10% 13% 19% 40% 40% 16%
Agriculture, 
fisheries, 
forestry
Credit 
lines
Energy Industry 
(incl. 
mining)
Financial 
services
Services 
(incl. 
tourism)
Telecom
municatio
ns
Transport Water 
sewerage
Total Share of 
total cost 
funded by 
EIB
Senior loan 232.05 402.63 100.00 6.10 126.00 96.55 963.33 13%
   of w. private 4% 100% 100% 100% 0% 0% 54%
Credit line 134.00 134.00 29%
   of w. private 100% 100%
Guarantee
   of w. private
Equity and quasi equity
   of w. private
Agency agreement
   of w. private
Total 134.00 232.05 402.63 100.00 6.10 126.00 96.55 1 097.33 14%
   of w. private 100% 4% 100% 100% 100% 0% 0% 59%
Share of total cost funded 
by EIB
29% 14% 9% 20% 8% 40% 37% 14%
Agriculture, 
fisheries, 
forestry
Credit 
lines
Energy Industry 
(incl. 
mining)
Financial 
services
Services 
(incl. 
tourism)
Telecom
municatio
ns
Transport Water 
sewerage
Total Share of 
total cost 
funded by 
EIB
Senior loan 21.58 678.10 549.32 150.00 20.10 36.85 178.43 167.55 1 801.93 14%
   of w. private 100% 15% 100% 100% 100% 100% 4% 0% 49%
Credit line 493.69 493.69 22%
   of w. private 99% 99%
Guarantee 11.80 100.00 111.80
   of w. private 100% 100% 1.00
Equity and quasi equity 2.00 145.44 411.07 36.10 594.61 12%
   of w. private 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Agency agreement 270.00 20.06 290.00
   of w. private 100% 100% 100%
Total 23.58 763.69 678.10 706.56 681.13 56.20 36.85 178.43 167.55 3 292.04 15%
   of w. private 100% 99% 15% 100% 100% 100% 100% 4% 0% 72%
Share of total cost funded 
by EIB
27% 15% 10% 13% 16% 40% 38% 15%
Table 3b: Net cumulative amount contracted  2003- Sept. 2009: OR
Table 3a: Net cumulative amount contracted  2003- Sept. 2009: IF
Table 3c: Net cumulative amount contracted  2003- Sept. 2009: IF+OR
Source: Inventory file provided by EIB and own calculations.   
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EIB operation 
number 
(Serapis)
Operation name
Start date 
(operation 
signature)
Net Amount 
approved (€)
EIB contract 
number (FI) Contract name
Type of 
portfolio 
(IF, OR, GA ‐ 
ACP, OCT)
Start date 
(contract 
signature)
Status
 Net Amount 
signed (€) 
 Total 
amount 
disbursed (€) 
 Total 
amount 
estimated of 
IRS 
Region Country Sector
Financial 
instrument
Private or Public 
sector
20000279 MAGADI SODA PURE ASH PROJECT 18/11/2003 8.930.000                 22507 MAGADI SODA PURE ASH PROJECT / A OR ‐ ACP 7/04/2004 Fully 
Reimb
        8.930.000      8.930.000  Central and 
Eastern Africa Kenya
Industry 
(incl. 
mining)
Senior loan  Private
22508 MAGADI SODA PURE ASH PROJECT / B (IF) IF ‐ ACP 7/04/2004 Fully 
Reimb
      11.265.500    11.264.466  Central and 
Eastern Africa Kenya
Industry 
(incl. 
mining)
Senior loan  Private
22509 MAGADI SODA PURE ASH PROJECT / C (IF) IF ‐ ACP 7/04/2004 Fully 
Reimb
        1.654.719      1.654.719  Central and 
Eastern Africa Kenya
Industry 
(incl. 
mining)
Subordinate
d loan and 
quasi equity
 Private
20010242 MOMA TITANIUM 29/04/2003 22604 MOMA TITANIUM MINERALS IF ‐ ACP 18/06/2004 Disbursed       15.000.000    15.000.000  Southern Africa 
and Indian Ocean Mozambique
Industry 
(incl. 
mining)
Senior loan  Private
22605 MOMA TITANIUM MINERALS IF ‐ ACP 18/06/2004 Disbursed       40.000.000    40.000.000  Southern Africa 
and Indian Ocean Mozambique
Industry 
(incl. 
mining)
Subordinate
d loan and 
quasi equity
 Private
23084 MOMA TITANIUM C IF ‐ ACP 30/06/2005 Disbursed         2.750.000      2.750.000  Southern Africa 
and Indian Ocean Mozambique
Industry 
(incl. 
mining)
Subordinate
d loan and 
quasi equity
 Private
20010417 NIGERIA GLOBAL LOAN 30/03/2004 50.000.000               22824 NIGERIA GLOBAL LOAN IF ‐ ACP 6/12/2004 Disbursed       49.944.175    49.944.175  West Africa and 
Sahel
Nigeria Credit line Credit line  Private
20020186
ACPGLOB.AUTHOR. PROJ.COTONOU‐
IF CA2003
17/12/2003 30.000.000              22712 FABULOUS FLOWERS IF ‐ ACP ‐ GA 4/10/2004 Disbursed         2.000.000      2.000.000  Southern Africa 
and Indian Ocean Botswana
Agriculture, 
fisheries, 
forestry
Subordinate
d loan and 
quasi equity
 Private
20030054 22932 ETUDE EL AOUJ IF ‐ ACP ‐ GA 10/02/2005 Canc Aft 
Sig
                      ‐                       ‐    West Africa and 
Sahel
Mauritania
Industry 
(incl. 
mining)
Equity   Private
20040012 22600 SHORECAP INTERNATIONAL LTD (SCI) IF ‐ ACP ‐ GA 29/06/2004 Signed         2.500.000      1.417.453  Regional Africa 
and ACP states Regional ‐ ACP
Financial 
services
Equity   Private
20040060 23422 NAMIBIA ‐ OLD MUTUAL MIDINA FUND IF ‐ ACP ‐ GA 10/03/2006 Signed         4.000.000                     ‐    Southern Africa 
and Indian Ocean Namibia Credit line Credit line Public
20040107 22662 DFCU LEASING GLOBAL LOAN IF ‐ ACP ‐ GA 9/08/2004 Disbursed         5.000.000      5.000.000  Central and 
Eastern Africa Uganda Credit line Credit line  Private
20040203 22951 AQUALMA III IF ‐ ACP ‐ GA 2/03/2005 Disbursed         5.000.000      5.000.000  Southern Africa 
and Indian Ocean Madagascar
Agriculture, 
fisheries, 
forestry
Senior loan  Private
20040447 22897 SAMOA VENTURE CAPITAL FUND IF ‐ ACP ‐ GA 30/12/2004 Signed            350.000              3.183  Caribbean and 
Pacific
Samoa
Financial 
services
Equity   Private
20040540 23192 ADVANS IF ‐ ACP ‐ GA 27/09/2005 Disbursed         3.500.000      3.500.000  Regional Africa 
and ACP states Regional ‐ ACP
Financial 
services
Equity   Private
20050041 23346 BANQUE REGIONALE DES MARCHES B IF ‐ ACP ‐ GA 16/12/2005 Disbursed            609.796          609.796  West Africa and 
Sahel
Regional ‐ 
West Africa
Financial 
services
Equity   Private
20020283 ECONET WIRELESS NIGERIA 22/07/2003 ‐                              Canc Aft 
Approval
20020376 KANSANSHI COPPER MINE 16/09/2003 34.000.000               22358 KANSANSHI COPPER MINE IF ‐ ACP 11/12/2003 Disbursed       34.000.000    34.000.000  Southern Africa 
and Indian Ocean Zambia
Industry 
(incl. 
mining)
Subordinate
d loan and 
quasi equity
 Private
20020377 SONABEL III 9/11/2004 15.250.000               22885 SONABEL III IF ‐ ACP 28/12/2004 Signed       15.250.000    11.524.892      2.160.000  West Africa and 
Sahel
Burkina Faso Energy Senior loan Public
20020481 EBTR MAURITANIE 29/04/2003 4.000.000                 22065 EBTR MAURITANIE IF ‐ ACP 2/06/2003 Disbursed         3.694.897      3.694.897  West Africa and 
Sahel
Mauritania Transports Senior loan  Private
20020506
WESTIN ROCO KI BEACH AND GOLF 
RESORT
9/11/2004 20.000.000               22887 WESTIN ROCO KI BEACH AND GOLF RESORT IF ‐ ACP 29/12/2004 Signed       20.000.000    18.148.820  Caribbean and 
Pacific
Dominican 
Republic
Services 
(incl. 
Tourism)
Subordinate
d loan and 
quasi equity
 Private
20020722 AES SONEL‐ELECTRICITY SUPPLY 18/07/2006 23767 AES SONEL‐ELECTRICITY SUPPLY IF ‐ ACP 8/12/2006 Signed       55.000.000    36.446.195  Central and 
Eastern Africa Cameroon Energy Senior loan  Private
23768 AES SONEL‐ELECTRICITY SUPPLY B IF ‐ ACP 8/12/2006 Signed       10.000.000                     ‐    Central and 
Eastern Africa Cameroon Energy Senior loan  Private
13.020.000              
57.750.000              
65.000.000              
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EIB operation 
number 
(Serapis)
Operation name
Start date 
(operation 
signature)
Net Amount 
approved (€)
EIB contract 
number (FI) Contract name
Type of 
portfolio 
(IF, OR, GA ‐ 
ACP, OCT)
Start date 
(contract 
signature)
Status
 Net Amount 
signed (€) 
 Total 
amount 
disbursed (€) 
 Total 
amount 
estimated of 
IRS 
Region Country Sector
Financial 
instrument
Private or Public 
sector
20030010 BEL OMBRE HOTEL 22/07/2003 6.100.000                 22172 BEL OMBRE HOTEL A (SENIOR LOAN) OR ‐ ACP 12/08/2003 Disbursed         6.100.000      6.100.000  Southern Africa 
and Indian Ocean Mauritius
Services 
(incl. 
Tourism)
Senior loan  Private
22173 BEL OMBRE HOTEL B (SUBORDINATED LOAN) IF ‐ ACP 12/08/2003 Disbursed         3.300.000      3.300.000  Southern Africa 
and Indian Ocean Mauritius
Services 
(incl. 
Tourism)
Subordinate
d loan and 
quasi equity
 Private
22174 BEL OMBRE HOTEL C (INDIRECT EQUITY) IF ‐ ACP 12/08/2003 Disbursed         2.800.000      2.800.000  Southern Africa 
and Indian Ocean Mauritius
Services 
(incl. 
Tourism)
Equity   Private
20030042 AFRICAN BANKS HOLDINGS, LLC 24/06/2003 30.000.000               22199 AFRICAN BANKS HOLDINGS, LLC IF ‐ ACP 9/09/2003 Signed         2.032.606      3.552.689  Regional Africa 
and ACP states
Regional ‐ 
Africa
Financial 
services
Equity   Private
20030052 SNIM VII 5/05/2004 22.500.000               22795 SNIM VII IF ‐ ACP 27/11/2004 Disbursed       22.500.000    22.500.000  West Africa and 
Sahel
Mauritania Energy Senior loan  Private
20030142
LIAISON MARITIME DAKAR‐
ZIGUINCHOR
9/11/2004 10.000.000               23093 LIAISON MARITIME DAKAR‐ZIGUINCHOR IF ‐ ACP 1/07/2005 Signed       10.000.000      7.850.000      2.396.000  West Africa and 
Sahel
Senegal Transports Senior loan Public
20030150 AUREOS WEST AFRICA FUND 24/06/2003 8.750.000                 22124 AUREOS WEST AFRICA FUND IF ‐ ACP 30/06/2003 Signed         8.750.000      6.544.920  West Africa and 
Sahel
Regional ‐ 
West Africa
Financial 
services
Equity   Private
20030152
AUREOS SOUTHERN AFRICA 
VENTURE CAPITAL 24/06/2003 10.500.000               22125 AUREOS SOUTHERN AFRICA VENTURE CAPITAL IF ‐ ACP 30/06/2003 Signed       10.500.000      7.533.297 
Southern Africa 
and Indian Ocean
Regional ‐ 
Southern 
Africa
Financial 
services
Equity   Private
20030160 AUREOS EAST AFRICA FUND 24/06/2003 6.800.000                 22126 AUREOS EAST AFRICA FUND IF ‐ ACP 30/06/2003 Signed         6.800.000      6.596.009  Central and 
Eastern Africa
Regional ‐ 
East Africa
Financial 
services
Equity   Private
20030167 MAURITIUS CONTAINER TERMINAL II 14/12/2004 14.000.000               22871 MAURITIUS CONTAINER TERMINAL II OR ‐ ACP 21/12/2004 Disbursed       14.000.000    14.000.000  Southern Africa 
and Indian Ocean Mauritius Transports Senior loan Public
20030179 PRET GLOBAL BURKINA FASO II 18/11/2003 22343 PG BURKINA FASO II IF ‐ ACP 8/12/2003 Disbursed         6.084.720      6.084.720  West Africa and 
Sahel
Burkina Faso Credit line Credit line  Private
22344 PG  BURKINA FASO CREDIT BAIL II IF ‐ ACP 8/12/2003 Disbursed         2.000.000      2.000.000  West Africa and 
Sahel
Burkina Faso Credit line Credit line  Private
20030186 BOAD PG IV 5/05/2004 25.000.000               22844 BOAD PG IV A OR ‐ ACP 10/12/2004 Disbursed       25.000.000    25.000.000  West Africa and 
Sahel
Regional ‐ 
West Africa Credit line Credit line  Private
22845 BOAD IV B FACILITE DE GARANTIE IF ‐ ACP 10/12/2004 Signed       25.000.000                     ‐    West Africa and 
Sahel
Regional ‐ 
West Africa
Financial 
services
Guarantee  Private
22846 BOAD IV C PRISE DE PARTICIPATION IF ‐ ACP 10/12/2004 Signed         4.600.000                     ‐    West Africa and 
Sahel
Regional ‐ 
West Africa
Financial 
services
Equity   Private
20030201
DEV. DU SECTEUR PRIVE PG II 
(CAMEROUN)
16/09/2003 22371 DEV. DU SECTEUR PRIVE PG II A CAMEROUN IF ‐ ACP 16/12/2003 Disbursed         3.000.000      3.000.000  Central and 
Eastern Africa Cameroon Credit line Credit line  Private
22372 DEV. DU SECTEUR PRIVE PG II B CAMEROUN IF ‐ ACP 16/12/2003 Canc Aft 
Sig
                      ‐                       ‐    Central and 
Eastern Africa Cameroon Credit line Credit line  Private
20030241 VINLEC IV 20/07/2004 8.300.000                 22837 VINLEC IV OR ‐ ACP 8/12/2004 Signed         8.300.000      6.837.632  Caribbean and 
Pacific
Saint Vincent 
and 
Grenadines
Energy Senior loan Public
20030292 COMPAGNIE SUCRIERE DU TCHAD 14/12/2004 11.800.000               23094 COMPAGNIE SUCRIERE DU TCHAD IF ‐ ACP 4/07/2005 Signed       11.800.000                     ‐        1.800.000  Central and 
Eastern Africa Chad
Industry 
(incl. 
mining)
Guarantee  Private
20030317
MOZ/RSA NATURAL GAS‐UPSTREAM 
COMPONENT
2/03/2004 10.000.000               22733 MOZ/RSA NATURAL GAS‐UPSTREAM 
COMPONENT
IF ‐ ACP 22/10/2004 Disbursed       10.000.000    10.000.000  Southern Africa 
and Indian Ocean Mozambique Energy Senior loan Public
20030347
AMENAGEMENT HYDROELECTRIQUE 
DE FELOU 18/07/2006 23700
AMENAGEMENT HYDROELECTRIQUE DE 
FELOU
IF ‐ ACP 23/11/2006 Signed       11.000.000                     ‐     Cancelled  West Africa and 
Sahel
Regional ‐ 
West Africa Energy Senior loan Public
23701
AMENAGEMENT HYDROELECTRIQUE DE 
FELOU B IF ‐ ACP 23/11/2006 Signed       11.000.000                     ‐     Cancelled 
West Africa and 
Sahel
Regional ‐ 
West Africa Energy Senior loan Public
23702
AMENAGEMENT HYDROELECTRIQUE DE 
FELOU C IF ‐ ACP 23/11/2006 Signed       11.000.000                     ‐     Cancelled 
West Africa and 
Sahel
Regional ‐ 
West Africa Energy Senior loan Public
20030405 VRA VII 19/07/2005 10.500.000               23332 VRA VII IF ‐ ACP 15/12/2005 Signed       10.500.000                     ‐        2.580.000  West Africa and 
Sahel
Ghana Energy Senior loan Public
6.100.000                
12.000.000              
29.600.000              
28.000.000              
33.000.000              
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20030441
ACPGLOB AUTHOR PROJ COTONOU‐
IF CA2004
14/12/2004 50.000.000              23427 SOCIETE GENERALE MAURITANIE IF ‐ ACP ‐ GA 17/03/2006 Disbursed         3.458.175      3.458.175  West Africa and 
Sahel
Mauritania
Financial 
services
Equity   Private
20040102 23743 ECOCIMENTO FIBRE CEMENT IF ‐ ACP ‐ GA 5/12/2006 Disbursed         1.300.000      1.300.000          157.070  Southern Africa 
and Indian Ocean Mozambique
Industry 
(incl. 
mining)
Senior loan  Private
20040216 23352 SEPH‐NOUADHIBOU IF ‐ ACP ‐ GA 21/12/2005 Disbursed         3.980.000      3.976.528  West Africa and 
Sahel
Mauritania
Agriculture, 
fisheries, 
forestry
Senior loan  Private
20050016 23834 ASTRUM TRAVEL HELICOPTER SERVICES IF ‐ ACP ‐ GA 22/12/2006 Signed         3.737.000      1.487.731  Caribbean and 
Pacific
Belize Transports Senior loan  Private
20050310 23409 BPI MADAGASCAR SME FUND IF ‐ ACP ‐ GA 14/02/2006 Signed         2.000.000      1.086.618  Southern Africa 
and Indian Ocean Madagascar
Financial 
services
Equity   Private
20050339 23325 BIMAO IF ‐ ACP ‐ GA 10/12/2005 Canc Aft 
Sig
                      ‐                       ‐    West Africa and 
Sahel
Regional ‐ 
West Africa
Financial 
services
Guarantee  Private
20050360 23617 KULA FUND II IF ‐ ACP ‐ GA 22/05/2006 Signed         4.400.000      1.883.450  Caribbean and 
Pacific
Regional ‐ 
Pacific
Financial 
services
Equity   Private
20050413 23812 SMALL ENTERPRISES GLOBAL LOAN IF ‐ ACP ‐ GA 19/12/2006 Disbursed         4.000.000      4.000.000  Caribbean and 
Pacific
Dominican 
Republic
Credit line Credit line  Private
24750 SMALL ENTERPRISES GLOBAL LOAN B IF ‐ ACP ‐ GA 12/12/2008 Signed         1.000.000                     ‐    Caribbean and 
Pacific
Dominican 
Republic
Financial 
services
Equity   Private
20050441 23904 MICROCRED (PLANET BANK) IF ‐ ACP ‐ GA 28/02/2007 Disbursed         3.000.000      3.000.000  Regional Africa 
and ACP states
Regional ‐ 
Africa
Financial 
services
Equity   Private
20050463 23644 ACCESS MICROFINANCE HOLDING IF ‐ ACP ‐ GA 20/10/2006 Signed         3.460.000      2.098.874  Regional Africa 
and ACP states Regional ‐ ACP
Financial 
services
Equity   Private
20050544 23402 ADEMI V IF ‐ ACP ‐ GA 1/02/2006 Disbursed            215.975          215.975  Caribbean and 
Pacific
Dominican 
Republic
Financial 
services
Equity   Private
23811 ADEMI V B IF ‐ ACP ‐ GA 19/12/2006 Disbursed         3.000.000      3.000.000  Caribbean and 
Pacific
Dominican 
Republic
Credit line Credit line  Private
24122 ADEMI V C IF ‐ ACP ‐ GA 10/10/2007 Disbursed            492.175          492.175  Caribbean and 
Pacific
Dominican 
Republic
Financial 
services
Equity   Private
20060121 24140 MARTIN S DRIFT KIMBERLITE PROJECT IF ‐ ACP ‐ GA 24/10/2007 Disbursed         5.000.000      5.000.000  Southern Africa 
and Indian Ocean Botswana
Industry 
(incl. 
mining)
Senior loan  Private
20070016 24074 RURAL IMPULSE MICROFINANCE FUND MEZZ IF ‐ ACP ‐ GA 10/08/2007 Disbursed         1.369.630      1.369.630  Regional Africa 
and ACP states Regional ‐ ACP
Financial 
services
Equity   Private
24075
RURAL IMPULSE MICROFINANCE FUND 
(EQUITY)
IF ‐ ACP ‐ GA 10/08/2007 Disbursed         1.027.210      1.027.210  Regional Africa 
and ACP states Regional ‐ ACP
Financial 
services
Equity   Private
20030461 AFRICAN LION MINING FUND II 20/07/2004 7.000.000                 22721 AFRICAN LION MINING FUND II IF ‐ ACP 12/10/2004 Fully 
Reimb
        5.739.697      5.739.697  Regional Africa 
and ACP states Regional ‐ ACP
Industry 
(incl. 
mining)
Equity   Private
20030471
NORMAN MANLEY INTERNATIONAL 
AIRPORT
3/05/2006 35.000.000               24818 NORMAN MANLEY INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT IF ‐ ACP 23/12/2008 Signed       35.000.000                     ‐        3.500.000  Caribbean and 
Pacific
Jamaica Transports Senior loan Public
20030476
EDFI EUROPEAN FINANCING 
PARTNERS (EFP) 18/11/2003 6.000                        22519  EUROPEAN FINANCING PARTNERS (EFP) IF ‐ ACP 30/04/2004 Disbursed                 6.000              6.000 
Regional Africa 
and ACP states Regional ‐ ACP
Financial 
services
Agency 
Agreement
 Private
90.000.000               22551 EDFI EUROPEAN FINANCING PARTNERS (EFP) IF ‐ ACP 13/05/2004 Signed       90.000.000    89.480.745  Regional Africa 
and ACP states Regional ‐ ACP Credit line
Agency 
Agreement
 Private
20030482 DANGOTE CEMENT 10/05/2005 23153 DANGOTE CEMENT ‐ A OR ‐ ACP 12/08/2005 Fully 
Reimb
      57.430.000    57.430.000  West Africa and 
Sahel
Nigeria
Industry 
(incl. 
mining)
Senior loan  Private
23154 DANGOTE CEMENT ‐ B OR ‐ ACP 12/08/2005 Fully 
Reimb
      18.050.000    18.050.000  West Africa and 
Sahel
Nigeria
Industry 
(incl. 
mining)
Senior loan  Private
33.057.851               23155 DANGOTE CEMENT ‐ C IF ‐ ACP 12/08/2005 Fully 
Reimb
      32.650.000    32.650.000  West Africa and 
Sahel
Nigeria
Industry 
(incl. 
mining)
Senior loan  Private
20030494 NOVOTEL DENARAU PROJECT 18/11/2003 6.000.000                 22442 NOVOTEL DENARAU PROJECT OR ‐ ACP 27/01/2004 Canc Aft 
Sig
                      ‐                       ‐    Caribbean and 
Pacific
Fiji
Services 
(incl. 
Tourism)
Senior loan  Private
5.000.000                 22443 NOVOTEL DENARAU PROJECT (IF) IF ‐ ACP 27/01/2004 Disbursed         5.000.000      5.000.000  Caribbean and 
Pacific
Fiji
Services 
(incl. 
Tourism)
Equity   Private
20040005 GRENLEC III 20/07/2004 5.000.000                 23150 GRENLEC III PROJECT IF ‐ ACP 28/07/2005 Disbursed         3.200.000      3.200.000  Caribbean and 
Pacific
Grenada Energy Senior loan  Private
90.909.091              
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20040026
WEST AFRICAN GAS PIPELINE 
(WAGP)
12/12/2006 75.000.000               23786 WEST AFRICAN GAS PIPELINE (WAGP) OR ‐ ACP 14/12/2006 Signed       75.000.000    56.218.835    18.148.000  West Africa and 
Sahel
Ghana Energy Senior loan Public
20040101 MOPANI COPPER PROJECT 14/12/2004 48.000.000               22941 MOPANI COPPER PROJECT IF ‐ ACP 25/02/2005 Disbursed       38.952.615    38.952.615  Southern Africa 
and Indian Ocean Zambia
Industry 
(incl. 
mining)
Senior loan  Private
20040134 MCEL MOBILE PHONES 20/09/2005 ‐                              Canc Aft 
Approval
20040138
PACIFIC ISLANDS FINANCING 
FACILITY
14/10/2004 23209 PACIFIC ISLANDS FINANCING FACILITY IF ‐ ACP 15/10/2005 Disbursed         7.000.000      7.000.000  Caribbean and 
Pacific
Regional ‐ 
Pacific
Credit line Credit line  Private
23322 PACIFIC ISLANDS FINANCING FACILITY B IF ‐ ACP 15/12/2005 Disbursed               70.825            70.825  Caribbean and 
Pacific
Regional ‐ 
Pacific
Credit line Credit line  Private
20040146 LUMWANA COPPER PROJECT 26/09/2006 23717 LUMWANA COPPER PROJECT A IF ‐ ACP 29/11/2006 Disbursed       37.299.515    37.299.515  Southern Africa 
and Indian Ocean Zambia
Industry 
(incl. 
mining)
Subordinate
d loan and 
quasi equity
 Private
23718 LUMWANA COPPER PROJECT B IF ‐ ACP 29/11/2006 Disbursed       13.476.989    13.476.989  Southern Africa 
and Indian Ocean Zambia
Industry 
(incl. 
mining)
Senior loan  Private
18.000.000               23719 LUMWANA COPPER PROJECT C OR ‐ ACP 29/11/2006 Disbursed       15.710.646    15.710.646  Southern Africa 
and Indian Ocean Zambia
Industry 
(incl. 
mining)
Senior loan  Private
20040147 ZESCO KARIBA NORTH II 19/07/2005 7.600.000                 23309 ZESCO KARIBA NORTH II IF ‐ ACP 9/12/2005 Signed         7.600.000      6.509.428  Southern Africa 
and Indian Ocean Zambia Energy Senior loan Public
20040173 PRET GLOBAL II (GABON) 14/09/2004 22737 PRET GLOBAL II (GABON) IF ‐ ACP 18/10/2004 Signed         6.500.000                     ‐    Central and 
Eastern Africa Gabon Credit line Credit line  Private
22738 PRET GLOBAL II (GABON) B IF ‐ ACP 18/10/2004 Disbursed         3.500.000      3.500.000  Central and 
Eastern Africa Gabon Credit line Credit line  Private
20040175
BGFIBANK APPUI AU SECT FINANCIER 
GABON
14/09/2004 ‐                              Canc Aft 
Approval
20040179 CLICO GLOBAL LOAN 20/09/2005 23226 CLICO GLOBAL LOAN IF ‐ ACP 3/11/2005 Disbursed       10.587.745    10.587.745  Caribbean and 
Pacific
Trinidad and 
Tobago
Credit line Credit line  Private
24317 CLICO GLOBAL LOAN B IF ‐ ACP 21/12/2007 Canc Aft 
Sig
                      ‐                       ‐    Caribbean and 
Pacific
Trinidad and 
Tobago
Credit line Credit line  Private
20040181 BLPC IV WIND POWER 21/11/2006 9.750.000                 23835 BLPC IV WIND POWER OR ‐ ACP 21/12/2006 Signed         9.750.000                     ‐        1.960.000  Caribbean and 
Pacific
Barbados Energy Senior loan  Private
20040255 OLKARIA II EXTENSION 13/04/2005 36.800.000               23027 OLKARIA II EXTENSION IF ‐ ACP 31/05/2005 Signed       32.500.000                     ‐    Central and 
Eastern Africa Kenya Energy Senior loan Public
20040257 KPLC GRID DEVELOPMENT 13/04/2005 43.000.000               23324 KPLC GRID DEVELOPMENT IF ‐ ACP 16/12/2005 Signed       43.000.000    17.221.938    10.290.000  Central and 
Eastern Africa Kenya Energy Senior loan Public
20040265 MAPUTO WATER SUPPLY 28/03/2006 31.000.000               23573 MAPUTO WATER SUPPLY IF ‐ ACP 20/07/2006 Signed       31.000.000      2.000.000      9.152.000  Southern Africa 
and Indian Ocean Mozambique
Water, 
sewerage
Senior loan Public
20040290 GILGEL GIBE II HYDROPOWER PLANT 3/03/2005 50.000.000               23224 GILGEL GIBE II HYDROPOWER PROJECT IF ‐ ACP 31/10/2005 Signed       50.000.000    48.995.133    18.410.000  Central and 
Eastern Africa Ethiopia Energy Senior loan Public
20040460 CAPITAL INVESTMENT LINE III 12/06/2007 40.000.000               24727 CAPITAL INVESTMENT LINE GL III IF ‐ ACP 26/11/2008 Signed       20.000.000          886.462  Southern Africa 
and Indian Ocean Zambia Credit line Credit line  Private
20040703 SBM GLOBAL LOAN 10/05/2005 20.000.000               23147 SBM GLOBAL LOAN OR ‐ ACP 28/07/2005 Disbursed       20.000.000    20.000.000  Southern Africa 
and Indian Ocean Mauritius Credit line Credit line  Private
20050036 CAPE II 19/07/2005 11.900.000               23349 CAPE FUND II IF ‐ ACP 20/12/2005 Signed       11.900.000    10.761.095  West Africa and 
Sahel
Regional ‐ 
West Africa
Financial 
services
Equity   Private
20050069 JIRAMA WATER II (MADAGASCAR) 28/03/2006 23.500.000               24391 JIRAMA WATER II (MADAGASCAR) IF ‐ ACP 19/03/2008 Signed       23.500.000                     ‐    Southern Africa 
and Indian Ocean Madagascar
Water, 
sewerage
Senior loan Public
20050137 NIGER ‐ PG SECTEUR FINANCIER II 19/07/2005 8.000.000                 23219 NIGER ‐ PG SECTEUR FINANCIER II IF ‐ ACP 26/10/2005 Disbursed         8.000.000      8.000.000  West Africa and 
Sahel
Niger Credit line Credit line  Private
20050170 CARIBBEAN DEV BANK III FACILITY 10/05/2005 40.000.000               23355 CARIBBEAN DEV BANK III FACILITY OR ‐ ACP 22/12/2005 Disbursed       40.000.000    40.000.000   Cancelled  Caribbean and 
Pacific
Regional ‐ 
Caribbean
Credit line Credit line Public
20050230 PORTS OF CAPE VERDE 15/07/2008 47.000.000               24594 PORTS OF CAPE VERDE OR ‐ ACP 26/09/2008 Signed       47.000.000      3.400.000  West Africa and 
Sahel
Cape Verde Transports Senior loan Public
20050251 BDEAC PRET GLOBAL III 31/01/2006 15.000.000               23483 BDEAC PRET GLOBAL III IF ‐ ACP 24/05/2006 Disbursed       15.000.000    15.000.000  Central and 
Eastern Africa
Regional ‐ 
Central Africa Credit line Credit line  Private
5.000.000                 23484 BDEAC PRET GLOBAL III B IF ‐ ACP 24/05/2006 Signed         5.000.000                     ‐    Central and 
Eastern Africa
Regional ‐ 
Central Africa
Financial 
services
Guarantee  Private
20050253
ACP&OCTGLOBAUTHOR IIICOTONOU‐
IF‐CA2006
31/01/2006 40.000.000              24265 CAPITAL FINANCIAL HOLDING IF ‐ ACP ‐ GA 11/12/2007 Signed         5.000.000                     ‐    Central and 
Eastern Africa
Regional ‐ 
Central Africa
Financial 
services
Equity   Private
13.000.000              
67.000.000              
10.000.000              
30.000.000              
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20050312 23777 KOLOMBANGARA FOREST PROJECT IF ‐ ACP ‐ GA 12/12/2006 Signed         3.500.000      2.525.345  Caribbean and 
Pacific
Solomon 
Islands
Agriculture, 
fisheries, 
forestry
Senior loan  Private
20050584 23588 BPI KENYA SME FUND IF ‐ ACP ‐ GA 3/08/2006 Signed         4.240.000      1.731.831  Central and 
Eastern Africa Kenya
Financial 
services
Equity   Private
20060035 23844 I & P IF ‐ ACP ‐ GA 22/12/2006 Disbursed         3.249.950      3.249.950  Regional Africa 
and ACP states
Regional ‐ 
Africa
Financial 
services
Equity   Private
20060099 24143 AFRICAP II IF ‐ ACP ‐ GA 25/10/2007 Signed         5.000.000      2.502.993  Regional Africa 
and ACP states
Regional ‐ 
Africa
Financial 
services
Equity   Private
20060325 24009 PRET GLOBAL PRO‐PME II IF ‐ ACP ‐ GA 28/06/2007 Signed         4.000.000      3.518.400  Central and 
Eastern Africa Cameroon Credit line Credit line  Private
20060457 24080 I&P CAPITAL II INVESTMENT FUND IF ‐ ACP ‐ GA 14/08/2007 Signed         4.614.400      1.965.669  Southern Africa 
and Indian Ocean
Regional ‐ 
Indian Ocean
Financial 
services
Equity   Private
20060582 24785 NFC FORESTRY PROJECT IF ‐ ACP ‐ GA 18/12/2008 Signed         5.000.000      2.346.628          677.000  Central and 
Eastern Africa Uganda
Agriculture, 
fisheries, 
forestry
Senior loan  Private
20070441 24573 ACCESS BANK LIBERIA IF ‐ ACP ‐ GA 8/08/2008 Signed         1.000.000          909.031  West Africa and 
Sahel
Liberia
Financial 
services
Equity   Private
20080012 24979 BANQUE DE DEPOT ET DE CREDIT DJIBOUTI IF ‐ ACP ‐ GA 26/05/2009 Signed         2.000.000                     ‐    Central and 
Eastern Africa Djibouti
Financial 
services
Equity   Private
20070328
ACP&OCTGLOBAUTHOR IIICOTONOU‐
IF‐CA2006
31/01/2006 10.000.000              24256 SOCREDO LIGNE DE CREDIT ENVIRONNEMENT IF ‐ OCT ‐ 
GA
10/12/2007 Signed         5.000.000                     ‐            500.000  Caribbean and 
Pacific
French 
Polynesia
Credit line Credit line  Private
20070303 24216 BCI ‐ LIGNE DE CREDIT ENVIRONNEMENTAL IF ‐ OCT ‐ 
GA
29/11/2007 Signed         5.000.000                     ‐            500.000  Caribbean and 
Pacific
New 
Caledonia
Credit line Credit line  Private
20050254
SMALL TOWN WATER & SANITATION 
PROGRAM
28/03/2006 16.500.000               23809 SMALL TOWN WATER & SANITATION 
PROGRAM
IF ‐ ACP 19/12/2006 Signed       16.500.000          955.951      4.608.000  Central and 
Eastern Africa Ethiopia
Water, 
sewerage
Senior loan Public
20050272 CAPRIVI INTERCONNECTOR 13/02/2008 35.000.000               24789 CAPRIVI INTERCONNECTOR PROJECT OR ‐ ACP 19/12/2008 Signed       35.000.000                     ‐    Southern Africa 
and Indian Ocean Namibia Energy Senior loan Public
20050276 DEVELOPMENT FINANCE LIMITED IX 13/12/2005 7.000.000                 23339 DEVELOPMENT FINANCE LIMITED IX IF ‐ ACP 20/12/2005 Disbursed         7.000.000      7.000.000  Caribbean and 
Pacific
Trinidad and 
Tobago
Credit line Credit line  Private
20050302 AIC CARIBBEAN FUND 13/12/2005 45.000.000               23882 AIC CARIBBEAN FUND BARBADOS IF ‐ ACP 18/01/2007 Signed       45.000.000    21.246.741  Caribbean and 
Pacific
Regional ‐ 
Caribbean
Financial 
services
Equity   Private
20050319 EMP AFRICA FUND II 13/12/2005 40.000.000               23499 ECP AFRICA FUND II IF ‐ ACP 15/05/2006 Signed       40.000.000    31.705.826  Regional Africa 
and ACP states
Regional ‐ 
Africa
Financial 
services
Equity   Private
20050328
PRIVATE ENTERPRISE FINANCE 
FACILITY
12/12/2006 20.000.000               24245 PRIVATE ENTERPRISE FINANCE FACILITY IF ‐ ACP 7/12/2007 Signed       20.000.000                     ‐    Central and 
Eastern Africa Kenya Credit line Credit line  Private
20050357 BUJAGALI HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT 9/05/2007 98.500.000               24282 BUJAGALI HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT IF ‐ ACP 14/12/2007 Signed       98.500.000    37.867.389  Central and 
Eastern Africa Uganda Energy Senior loan Public
20050362
PACIFIC ISLANDS FINANCING 
FACILITY II 21/11/2006 23754 PACIFIC ISLANDS FINANCING FACILITY II IF ‐ ACP 5/12/2006 Signed         5.000.000      3.260.573 
Caribbean and 
Pacific
Regional ‐ 
Pacific
Credit line Credit line  Private
23895 PACIFIC ISLANDS FINANCING FACILITY II B IF ‐ ACP 23/02/2007 Signed         2.000.000                     ‐            327.000  Caribbean and 
Pacific
Regional ‐ 
Pacific
Credit line Credit line  Private
20050372 CAP VERT ‐ SECTEUR FINANCIER PG II 22/11/2005 8.000.000                 23344 CAP VERT ‐ SECTEUR FINANCIER PG II IF ‐ ACP 20/12/2005 Canc Aft 
Sig
                      ‐                       ‐    West Africa and 
Sahel
Cape Verde Credit line Credit line  Private
20050376 MASERU WASTEWATER PROJECT 9/05/2007 14.300.000               24055 MASERU WASTEWATER PROJECT OR ‐ ACP 26/07/2007 Signed       14.300.000                     ‐        3.176.000  Southern Africa 
and Indian Ocean Lesotho
Water, 
sewerage
Senior loan Public
20050377 ALBION RESORT MAURITIUS 22/11/2005 23343 ALBION RESORT MAURITIUS B IF ‐ ACP 11/12/2005 Signed         5.000.000      4.500.000  Southern Africa 
and Indian Ocean Mauritius
Services 
(incl. 
Tourism)
Equity   Private
23438 ALBION RESORT MAURITIUS IF ‐ ACP 30/03/2006 Disbursed       14.000.000    14.000.000  Southern Africa 
and Indian Ocean Mauritius
Services 
(incl. 
Tourism)
Senior loan  Private
20050381 KOUILOU MAGNESIUM PHASE I 31/01/2006 13.000.000               23532 KOUILOU MAGNESIUM PHASE I IF ‐ ACP 19/06/2006 Fully 
Reimb
      13.000.000    13.000.000  Central and 
Eastern Africa Congo
Industry 
(incl. 
mining)
Subordinate
d loan and 
quasi equity
 Private
20050394
EDFI EUROPEAN FINANCING 
PARTNERS II 13/12/2005 23500 EDFI EUROPEAN FINANCING PARTNERS II IF ‐ ACP 12/05/2006 Signed       90.000.000    14.643.585 
Regional Africa 
and ACP states Regional ‐ ACP Credit line
Agency 
Agreement
 Private
23501 EDFI EUROPEAN FINANCING PARTNERS II B IF ‐ ACP 12/05/2006 Signed         5.000.000                     ‐    Regional Africa 
and ACP states Regional ‐ ACP
Financial 
services
Agency 
Agreement
 Private
23502 EDFI EUROPEAN FINANCING PARTNERS II C IF ‐ ACP 12/05/2006 Signed         5.000.000                     ‐    Regional Africa 
and ACP states Regional ‐ ACP
Financial 
services
Agency 
Agreement
 Private
20050411
GHANA FINANCIAL SECTOR GLOBAL 
LOAN II 18/07/2006 15.000.000               23842 GHANA FINANCIAL SECTOR GLOBAL LOAN II B IF ‐ ACP 22/12/2006 Disbursed       15.000.000    15.000.000 
West Africa and 
Sahel
Ghana Credit line Credit line  Private
25.000.000              
19.000.000              
100.000.000          
Final Report September 2010 Annex 3/ Page 5
MID-TERM EVALUATION OF THE IF AND EIB OR OPERATIONS IN ACP/OCTS
ADE - EGEVAL II
EIB operation 
number 
(Serapis)
Operation name
Start date 
(operation 
signature)
Net Amount 
approved (€)
EIB contract 
number (FI) Contract name
Type of 
portfolio 
(IF, OR, GA ‐ 
ACP, OCT)
Start date 
(contract 
signature)
Status
 Net Amount 
signed (€) 
 Total 
amount 
disbursed (€) 
 Total 
amount 
estimated of 
IRS 
Region Country Sector
Financial 
instrument
Private or Public 
sector
40.000.000               23852 GHANA FINANCIAL SECTOR GLOBAL LOAN II C OR ‐ ACP 22/12/2006 Signed       40.000.000    10.726.671  West Africa and 
Sahel
Ghana Credit line Credit line  Private
20050412 MC CAPITAL PRIVATE EQUITY FUND 13/12/2005 10.000.000               (No contracts signed at end 09/2009) IF ‐ ACP
20050493 DFCU LEASING GLOBAL LOAN II 31/01/2006 10.000.000               23543 DFCU LEASING GLOBAL LOAN II IF ‐ ACP 28/06/2006 Disbursed         7.500.000      7.500.000  Central and 
Eastern Africa Uganda Credit line Credit line  Private
20050504 EADB REGIONAL FINANCE FACILITY 18/07/2006 25.000.000               23680 EADB REGIONAL FINANCE FACILITY IF ‐ ACP 17/11/2006 Signed       25.000.000                     ‐    Central and 
Eastern Africa
Regional ‐ 
East Africa Credit line Credit line  Private
20050557
SAFAL STEEL INVESTMENTS (S & E 
AFRICA)
27/09/2007 12.000.000               (No contracts signed at end 09/2009) IF ‐ ACP
20050592 FIJI POWER 21/11/2006 24.500.000               23714 FIJI POWER OR ‐ ACP 28/11/2006 Signed       24.500.000                     ‐        4.251.000  Caribbean and 
Pacific
Fiji Energy Senior loan Public
20060058 SOUTHERN CARIBBEAN FIBER 12/12/2006 ‐                              Canc Aft 
Approval
20060101 CARIBBEAN DEV BANK IV 12/12/2006 20.000.000               23806 CARIBBEAN DEV BANK IV B IF ‐ ACP 19/12/2006 Signed       20.000.000                     ‐    Caribbean and 
Pacific
Regional ‐ 
Caribbean
Financial 
services
Guarantee  Private
20060152
SONEB‐ALIMENTATION EN EAU 
URBAINE
9/05/2007 13.000.000               24268 SONEB‐ALIMENTATION EN EAU URBAINE OR ‐ ACP 13/12/2007 Signed       13.000.000                     ‐        4.011.000  West Africa and 
Sahel
Benin
Water, 
sewerage
Senior loan Public
20060177 MALAWI GLOBAL LOAN III 13/03/2007 30.000.000               24470 MALAWI GLOBAL LOAN III IF ‐ ACP 4/06/2008 Signed       15.000.000      5.779.921  Southern Africa 
and Indian Ocean Malawi Credit line Credit line  Private
20060180 TVCABO MULTIMEDIA 6/02/2007 15.000.000               24136 TVCABO MULTIMEDIA PROJECT IF ‐ ACP 17/10/2007 Signed       15.000.000      7.500.000  Southern Africa 
and Indian Ocean Angola
Telecommu
nications
Senior loan  Private
20060197 FIRST BANK OF NIGERIA 19/10/2006 23741 FIRST BANK OF NIGERIA IF ‐ ACP 6/12/2006 Disbursed       35.000.000    35.000.000  West Africa and 
Sahel
Nigeria
Financial 
services
Senior loan  Private
23742 FIRST BANK OF NIGERIA B IF ‐ ACP 6/12/2006 Disbursed       15.000.000    15.000.000  West Africa and 
Sahel
Nigeria
Financial 
services
Senior loan  Private
20060201
MALAWI PERI‐URBAN WATER & 
SANITATION
9/05/2007 15.750.000               24802 MALAWI PERI‐URBAN WATER & SANITATION OR ‐ ACP 19/12/2008 Signed       15.750.000                     ‐        3.895.000  Southern Africa 
and Indian Ocean Malawi
Water, 
sewerage
Senior loan Public
20060256
ACCORD CADRE DE GARANTIE 
AFRIQUE CENTR 21/11/2006 50.000.000               24028
ACCORD CADRE GARANTIE AFRIQUE 
CENTRALE
IF ‐ ACP 10/07/2007 Signed       50.000.000                     ‐    Central and 
Eastern Africa
Regional ‐ 
Central Africa
Financial 
services
Guarantee  Private
20060268 INGA POWER REHABILITATION 10/06/2008 55.000.000               24732 INGA POWER REHABILITATION A OR ‐ ACP 10/12/2008 Signed       55.000.000                     ‐        8.740.000  Central and 
Eastern Africa
Congo 
(Democratic 
Republic)
Energy Senior loan Public
55.000.000               24733 INGA POWER REHABILITATION B IF ‐ ACP 10/12/2008 Signed       55.000.000                     ‐      10.046.000  Central and 
Eastern Africa
Congo 
(Democratic 
Republic)
Energy Senior loan Public
20060270
EAST AFRICAN SUBMARINE CABLE 
SYSTEM
27/09/2007 13.000.000               (No contracts signed at end 09/2009) IF ‐ ACP
20060307 RW ‐ GL II PRIVATE SECTOR SUPPORT 21/11/2006 23830 RW ‐ GL II PRIVATE SECTOR SUPPORT A IF ‐ ACP 21/12/2006 Disbursed         3.000.000      3.000.000  Central and 
Eastern Africa Rwanda Credit line Credit line  Private
23889 RW ‐ GL II PRIVATE SECTOR SUPPORT B IF ‐ ACP 2/02/2007 Signed         7.000.000      3.035.806  Central and 
Eastern Africa Rwanda Credit line Credit line  Private
20060308 ATLANTIC COAST REGIONAL FUND 7/05/2008 15.000.000               24539 ATLANTIC COAST REGIONAL FUND IF ‐ ACP 8/07/2008 Signed       15.000.000          425.138  Regional Africa 
and ACP states
Regional ‐ 
Africa
Financial 
services
Equity   Private
20060311 PRET GLOBAL III (GABON) 12/12/2006 7.000.000                 23952 PRET GLOBAL III (GABON) IF ‐ ACP 7/05/2007 Canc Aft 
Sig
                      ‐                       ‐    Central and 
Eastern Africa Gabon Credit line Credit line  Private
20060320 OCTS FINANCING FACILITY 17/07/2007 10.000.000               24431 OCTS FINANCING FACILITY IF ‐ OCT 9/05/2008 Signed       10.000.000                     ‐    Caribbean and 
Pacific
Regional ‐ OCT Credit line Credit line  Private
20060375 MUNALI NICKEL MINE PROJECT 13/03/2007 29.505.053               23945 MUNALI NICKEL PROJECT OR ‐ ACP 27/04/2007 Disbursed       29.505.053    29.505.053  Southern Africa 
and Indian Ocean Zambia
Industry 
(incl. 
mining)
Senior loan  Private
20060379 PEFF‐UGANDA 6/02/2007 35.000.000               24085 PEFF‐UGANDA IF ‐ ACP 31/08/2007 Signed       30.000.000    14.725.300  Central and 
Eastern Africa Uganda Credit line Credit line  Private
20060398 AMBATOVY NICKEL PROJECT 17/07/2007 260.000.000           24081 AMBATOVY NICKEL PROJECT OR ‐ ACP 22/08/2007 Signed     260.000.000  ########### Southern Africa 
and Indian Ocean Madagascar
Industry 
(incl. 
mining)
Senior loan  Private
20060525 CAMWATER 14/07/2009 40.000.000               (No contracts signed at end 09/2009) OR ‐ ACP
20060566 PROGRAMME EAU SENEGAL 9/05/2007 15.000.000               24217 PROGRAMME EAU SENEGAL OR ‐ ACP 29/11/2007 Signed       15.000.000                     ‐        1.408.000  West Africa and 
Sahel
Senegal
Water, 
sewerage
Senior loan Public
20070004 TENKE FUNGURUME MINING SARL 17/07/2007 100.000.000           (No contracts signed at end 09/2009) OR ‐ ACP
20070198 AEP OUAGADOUGOU II 13/02/2008 18.500.000               24527 AEP OUAGADOUGOU II OR ‐ ACP 3/07/2008 Signed       18.500.000                     ‐        5.917.000  West Africa and 
Sahel
Burkina Faso Water, 
sewerage
Senior loan Public
20070243 ECOBANK REGIONAL FACILITY 30/10/2007 50.000.000               24266 ECOBANK REGIONAL FACILITY OR ‐ ACP 12/12/2007 Disbursed       50.000.000    50.000.000  West Africa and 
Sahel
Regional ‐ 
West Africa
Financial 
services
Senior loan  Private
50.000.000              
10.000.000              
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20070258
ACP&OCT GLOBAUTHOR 
IVCOTONOU‐IF‐CA2008
11/03/2008 40.000.000              24819 SOCIETE DES PLANTATIONS DE MBANGA IF ‐ ACP ‐ GA 29/12/2008 Signed         4.100.000                     ‐    Central and 
Eastern Africa Cameroon
Agriculture, 
fisheries, 
forestry
Senior loan  Private
20070488
ACP&OCT GLOBAUTHOR 
IVCOTONOU‐IF‐CA2008
11/03/2008 10.000.000              (No contracts signed at end 09/2009)
IF ‐ OCT ‐ 
GA
20070306 JIRAMA ANDEKALEKA HYDRO 8/04/2008 24.500.000               24477 JIRAMA ANDEKALEKA HYDRO OR ‐ ACP 6/06/2008 Signed       24.500.000                     ‐        8.028.000  Southern Africa 
and Indian Ocean Madagascar Energy Senior loan Public
20070318 INTERCONTINENTAL BANK 20/11/2007 50.000.000               24315 INTERCONTINENTAL BANK OR ‐ ACP 28/12/2007 Signed       50.000.000                     ‐    West Africa and 
Sahel
Nigeria
Financial 
services
Senior loan  Private
20070341 DFL REGIONAL SME 15/07/2008 9.000.000                 24824 DFL REGIONAL SME OR ‐ ACP 22/12/2008 Signed         9.000.000      3.000.000  Caribbean and 
Pacific
Regional ‐ 
Caribbean
Credit line Credit line  Private
20070401 ASSAINISSEMENT DAKAR 15/07/2008 20.000.000               24813 ASSAINISSEMENT DAKAR OR ‐ ACP 23/12/2008 Signed       20.000.000                     ‐        5.644.000  West Africa and 
Sahel
Senegal
Water, 
sewerage
Senior loan Public
20070406 DERBA MIDROC CEMENT COMPANY 7/05/2008 29.045.375               24510 DERBA MIDROC CEMENT COMPANY IF ‐ ACP 23/06/2008 Signed       29.045.375                     ‐    Central and 
Eastern Africa Ethiopia
Industry 
(incl. 
mining)
Senior loan  Private
20070435
MOMBASA‐NAIROBI TRANSMISSION 
LINE
14/07/2009 60.000.000               (No contracts signed at end 09/2009) OR ‐ ACP
20080018
PACIFIC MOBILE NETWORK 
DEVELOPMENT
15/07/2008 24630 PMND C (DIGICEL TONGA) IF ‐ ACP 22/10/2008 Disbursed         3.651.904      3.651.904  Caribbean and 
Pacific
Regional ‐ 
Pacific
Telecommu
nications
Senior loan  Private
24631 PMND B (DIGICEL VANUATU) IF ‐ ACP 22/10/2008 Disbursed         4.491.841      4.491.841  Caribbean and 
Pacific
Regional ‐ 
Pacific
Telecommu
nications
Senior loan  Private
24633 PMND (DIGICEL SAMOA) IF ‐ ACP 22/10/2008 Disbursed         3.496.504      3.496.504  Caribbean and 
Pacific
Regional ‐ 
Pacific
Telecommu
nications
Senior loan  Private
24661 PMND D (DIGICEL FIJI) IF ‐ ACP 7/11/2008 Disbursed       10.213.384    10.213.384  Caribbean and 
Pacific
Regional ‐ 
Pacific
Telecommu
nications
Senior loan  Private
20080021 OHORONGO CEMENT NAMIBIA 3/02/2009 100.000.000           (No contracts signed at end 09/2009) OR ‐ ACP
20080031 AFRICAN LION MINING FUND III 10/06/2008 11.000.000               24511 AFRICAN LION MINING FUND III IF ‐ ACP 25/06/2008 Signed       11.000.000          929.398  Regional Africa 
and ACP states
Regional ‐ 
Africa
Industry 
(incl. 
mining)
Equity   Private
20080071 DR FINANCING FACILITY 15/07/2008 24563 DR FINANCING FACILITY IF ‐ ACP 12/08/2008 Disbursed         5.000.000      5.000.000  Caribbean and 
Pacific
Dominican 
Republic
Credit line Credit line  Private
24564 DR FINANCING FACILITY B IF ‐ ACP 12/08/2008 Disbursed       10.000.000    10.000.000  Caribbean and 
Pacific
Dominican 
Republic
Credit line Credit line  Private
24565 DR FINANCING FACILITY C IF ‐ ACP 12/08/2008 Disbursed         3.500.000      3.500.000  Caribbean and 
Pacific
Dominican 
Republic
Credit line Credit line  Private
20080111 AUREOS AFRICA FUND 15/07/2008 27.000.000               24579 AUREOS AFRICA FUND IF ‐ ACP 2/09/2008 Signed       27.000.000    12.633.299  Regional Africa 
and ACP states
Regional ‐ 
Africa
Financial 
services
Equity   Private
20080123 ADLEVO CAPITAL AFRICA 15/07/2008 15.000.000               24648 ADLEVO CAPITAL AFRICA IF ‐ ACP 17/10/2008 Signed       15.000.000                     ‐    Regional Africa 
and ACP states
Regional ‐ 
Africa
Financial 
services
Equity   Private
20080231 BEIRA CORRIDOR PROJECT 12/03/2009 24934 BEIRA CORRIDOR (RAIL COMPONENT) OR ‐ ACP 30/04/2009 Signed       42.000.000                     ‐    Southern Africa 
and Indian Ocean Mozambique Transports Senior loan Public
24935 BEIRA CORRIDOR (PORT COMPONENT) OR ‐ ACP 30/04/2009 Signed       23.000.000                     ‐    Southern Africa 
and Indian Ocean Mozambique Transports Senior loan Public
20080286 LIBERTIS MOBILE GSM ‐ GABON 23/09/2008 30.000.000               (No contracts signed at end 09/2009) IF ‐ ACP
20080291 SUGAR INDUSTRY REFORM PROJECT 12/03/2009 30.000.000               25101 MAURITIUS SUGAR INDUSTRY REFORM OR ‐ ACP 5/08/2009 Signed       13.000.000                     ‐            714.000  Southern Africa 
and Indian Ocean Mauritius
Industry 
(incl. 
mining)
Senior loan  Private
20080374 NIGER ‐ PG SECTEUR FINANCIER III 18/11/2008 8.000.000                 24777 NIGER ‐ PG SECTEUR FINANCIER III IF ‐ ACP 19/12/2008 Signed         8.000.000      2.155.660  West Africa and 
Sahel
Niger Credit line Credit line  Private
20080456
LEAPFROG MICROINSURANCE 
INVESTMENTS
16/12/2008 20.000.000               24981 LEAPFROG MICROINSURANCE INVESTMENTS IF ‐ ACP 6/05/2009 Signed       20.000.000          119.342  Regional Africa 
and ACP states Regional ‐ ACP
Financial 
services
Equity   Private
20080464 AFRICINVEST FUND II LLC 16/12/2008 20.000.000               24795 AFRICINVEST FUND II LLC IF ‐ ACP 19/12/2008 Signed       20.000.000      3.994.000  Regional Africa 
and ACP states
Regional ‐ 
Africa
Financial 
services
Equity   Private
20080491 JAMAICA TOLL ROAD 22/09/2009 50.000.000               (No contracts signed at end 09/2009) IF ‐ ACP
20080534
PAN‐AFRICAN INVESTMENT 
PARTNERS II LTD 3/02/2009 32.000.000               25025 PAN‐AFRICAN INVESTMENT PARTNERS II LTD IF ‐ ACP 26/06/2009 Signed       32.000.000      7.353.992 
Regional Africa 
and ACP states
Regional ‐ 
Africa
Financial 
services
Equity   Private
20080594 CAPE III 7/04/2009 30.000.000               24948 CAPE III IF ‐ ACP 15/05/2009 Signed       30.000.000                     ‐    West Africa and 
Sahel
Regional ‐ 
West Africa
Financial 
services
Equity   Private
32.000.000              
22.000.000              
65.000.000              
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(operation 
signature)
Net Amount 
approved (€)
EIB contract 
number (FI) Contract name
Type of 
portfolio 
(IF, OR, GA ‐ 
ACP, OCT)
Start date 
(contract 
signature)
Status
 Net Amount 
signed (€) 
 Total 
amount 
disbursed (€) 
 Total 
amount 
estimated of 
IRS 
Region Country Sector
Financial 
instrument
Private or Public 
sector
20080706 BDEAC PRET GLOBAL IV 16/06/2009 25.000.000               25114 BDEAC PRET GLOBAL IV IF ‐ ACP 26/08/2009 Signed       25.000.000                     ‐    Central and 
Eastern Africa
Regional ‐ 
Central Africa Credit line Credit line  Private
20080746
SOCGEN FRENCH POLYNESIA 
ENVIRONMENT GL 12/05/2009 20.000.000               (No contracts signed at end 09/2009) OR ‐ OCT
20080786
EDFI EUROPEAN FINANCING 
PARTNERS III 7/04/2009 24942 EDFI EUROPEAN FINANCING PARTNERS III IF ‐ ACP 8/05/2009 Signed       90.000.000                     ‐   
Regional Africa 
and ACP states Regional ‐ ACP Credit line Credit line  Private
24943 EDFI EUROPEAN FINANCING PARTNERS III B IF ‐ ACP 8/05/2009 Signed         5.000.000                     ‐    Regional Africa 
and ACP states Regional ‐ ACP
Financial 
services
Equity   Private
24944 EDFI EUROPEAN FINANCING PARTNERS III C IF ‐ ACP 8/05/2009 Signed         5.000.000                     ‐    Regional Africa 
and ACP states Regional ‐ ACP
Financial 
services
Guarantee  Private
20090010
REGMIFA MICROFINANCE FUND FOR 
AFRICA
12/05/2009 15.000.000               (No contracts signed at end 09/2009) IF ‐ ACP
20090021
MICROFINANCE ENHANCEMENT 
FACILITY
7/04/2009 50.000.000               25159 MICROFINANCE ENHANCEMENT FACILITY IF ‐ ACP 11/09/2009 Signed       50.000.000                     ‐    Regional Africa 
and ACP states Regional ‐ ACP
Financial 
services
Equity   Private
20090043 GROFIN AFRICA FUND 16/06/2009 20.000.000               25117 GROFIN AFRICA FUND IF ‐ ACP 14/08/2009 Signed       20.000.000                     ‐    Regional Africa 
and ACP states
Regional ‐ 
Africa
Financial 
services
Equity   Private
20090060 BTA TOLL ROAD 22/09/2009 32.000.000               (No contracts signed at end 09/2009) IF ‐ ACP
20090192 SHORECAP II 16/06/2009 15.000.000               (No contracts signed at end 09/2009) IF ‐ ACP
20090316 ADVANS SA SICAR II 14/07/2009 6.000.000                 (No contracts signed at end 09/2009) IF ‐ ACP
100.000.000          
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Annexe 4 – Intervention logic 
The intervention logic aims at describing schematically, but as accurately and clearly as 
possible, the objectives pursued through the deployment of the IF and the EIB-OR in the 
ACP countries and OCTs, as well as the intermediate stages and measures needed to 
achieve them. It is reconstructed on the basis of the official documents which established 
the Investment Facility and gave the EIB its mandate to provide loans from its own 
resources in the ACP countries and OCTs. These documents are listed under the heading 
“governing instruments” in annexe 3 of the Terms of Reference for this evaluation.  
 
The intervention logic is presented in Diagram 4.1. It shows the intended chain of 
successive outputs and outcomes that needed to be generated in order to achieve the 
desired overall impacts. As such it constitutes the basis for formulating the Evaluation 
Questions and serves as the benchmark against which the IF/OR operations will be 
evaluated.
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Diagram 4.1 Investment Facility and EIB own resources in ACP countries and OCTs : 
Intervention Logic 
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1. Activities / Inputs 
There are three broad categories of activities or inputs: (i) the resources provided by the IF; 
(ii) those provided by the EIB-OR; and (iii) all activities funded by the Commission in the 
context of its cooperation with the ACP and OCTs. The first two are the subject of this 
evaluation. The third category is included in the intervention logic as the IF and EIB-OR 
are intrinsically linked and have been designed to complement and strengthen them.  
 
The resources provided under both the IF and EIB-OR may be channelled to eligible 
enterprises directly or indirectly through eligible investment funds or financial 
intermediaries1 . 
 
It should be noted that the EIB operates on market-related terms in ACP countries and 
OCTs while offering flexibility: grace periods, long maturities and innovative products. 
 
It is worth noting that, apart for the provision of risk capital which is a specificity of the IF, 
both the IF and EIB-OR instruments provide similar inputs. 
1° The Investment Facility 
The Investment Facility is a revolving instrument, i.e loan amortizations will be re-invested 
in new operations.  Its operations shall be on market-related terms and conditions and shall 
avoid creating distortions on local markets and displacing private sources of finances2. 
 
The financial allocations for the IF under EDFs 9 and 10 are as follows: 
 
 EDF 9 
(2003-June 2008) 
 
EDF 10 
(July 2008-December 2013) 
ACP €2200 m3 €1500 m4
 
OCT €20 m5
 
€30 m
 
Sources: Cotonou Agreement and Council Decision 2001/822/EC 
 
For the IF, the respective inputs in the ACP countries and the OCTs are almost identical. 
 
                                                 
1  Cotonou, Annexe II, art 1 
2  Cotonou, Annexe II, art.3.1.a 
3  Cotonou, Annexe 1, art 2c 
 The initial endowment of EUR 2 200 million for the IF has been revised downwards proportionally to EUR 2 037 
million following the setting-up during 2004 of the EUR 500 million EU Water Facility and the EUR 250 million EU 
Energy Facility under the 9th EDF (Source : EIB, Annual Press Conference, Briefing Note n°8, Luxembourg 9 
February 2006). 
4  Cotonou, Annexe Ib, art 3c 
5  Council Decision 2001/822/EC; annexe IIA, art 1b. 
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Two types of inputs are provided by the IF, risk capital and ordinary loans: 
 
 Risk capital6 may be provided for non-controlling minority holdings, with remuneration 
provided on market-related terms7 and linked to project performance. Risk capital is 
managed as a sustainable revolving fund8 and it can take three main forms: 
 Equity participation (in enterprises including financial institutions)9; 
 Quasi-capital (conditional loans, participating loans, subordinate loans, etc..)10; 
 Guarantees and other credit enhancements which may cover political and other 
investment-related risks: for foreign and local investors/lenders11. 
 
 Ordinary loans12 are the second type of input provided under the IF. They include 
global loans. They may be provided on concessional terms in certain cases:  
 For loans provided without concessional terms, the reference interest rate is similar 
to that applied by EIB to similar loans13 and comprises a mark-up determined by 
the EIB. 
  Loans may be provided on concessional terms14, that is including an interest rate 
subsidy. The total volume of interest rate subsidies may not exceed 5% of the funds 
allocated for investment finance under the IF and EIB-OR15. The interest subsidies 
may be capitalised or used as grants to support project-related TA, especially for 
financial institutions in the ACP countries16. The revision of the Cotonou 
Agreement in 2005 adds that a maximum of 10% of the budget for interest rate 
subsidies may be used to support project-related TA in ACP countries17. The 
interest subsidies may be granted in the following circumstances: 
o For infrastructure projects in LDCs or post-conflict countries (and post-
natural disaster countries since the revision of Cotonou in 200518)  -  assuming 
they are a prerequisite for private sector development19  -  the interest rate on 
the loan will be reduced by 3%. However, since the revision of Cotonou in 
2005, for such investments in countries subject to restrictive borrowing 
conditions under the HIPC initiative or other internationally agreed debt 
sustainability framework, the EIB may reduce the interest rate to comply with 
                                                 
6  Cotonou Annexe II, Art 2,1,a and 2,2 to 5; Council Decision 2001/822/EC annexe IIC, Art 2,1a 
7  Cotonou Aannexe II, Art 2,4,b and 3,1,a 
8  Cotonou, Annexe II, Art 3.1 
9  Cotonou, Annexe II, Art. 2.2 
10  Cotonou, Annexe II, Art. 2.3 
11   Cotonou, Annexe II, Art. 2.5 
12  Cotonou, Annexe II art 2,1,b and 2,6-7; Council Decision 2001/822/EC annexe IIC, art 2,1b  
13  Cotonou, Annexe II, Art. 2.6 
14  Cotonou, Annexe II, Art. 2.7 
15  Cotonou, Annexe II, Art. 2.8 
16  Cotonou, Annexe II, art.2.9 
17  Cotonou (2005), Amendment to Annexe II, Art. 2.9. (NB: this amendment is reiterated in the ACP-EC Council of 
Ministers Decision n°2009/497/EC) 
 Under Cotonou I (respectively Cotonou II), €187m (respectively €400m) were endowed for interest subsidies. 
18  This amendment is reiterated in the ACP-EC Council of Ministers Decision n°2009/497/EC 
19  Cotonou, Annexe II, Art. 2.7a 
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these restrictions if it has not been possible to reduce the average cost of the 
funds through appropriate co-financing with other donors20. 
o For restructuring (within privatisation) or projects with social or 
environmental benefits, an interest subsidy no higher than 3% may be 
granted21.  
In both cases the final interest rate may not be less than one-half of the reference 
rate22. 
2° Loans from EIB’s Own Resources  
The financial allocations for such loans are: 
 
 2003-June 2008
 
July 2008-December 2013 
ACP Up to €1700 m23 
 
Up to €2000 m24 
 
OCT Up to € 20 m25 
 
Up to €30 m26 
Sources: Cotonou Agreement, Council Decision 2001/822/EC and Council Decision.2007/249/EC 
 
Like the loans provided under the IF, those funded from the EIB-OR may be provided 
with the same reference loans as applied by the EIB to similar loans27, or they may include 
an interest rate subsidy if certain conditions are met. Concessional loans may be granted 
provided the same conditions as those enumerated above for the IF are met. However a 
slight difference applies to the OCT in which all public sector projects are eligible for 
interest rate subsidy28. The subsidy is paid out of the IF and the period of the loan may not 
exceed 25 years29.  
 
A Government guarantee may be required for investment in public sector companies30. 
                                                 
20  Cotonou (2005), Annexe II, Art. 2.7aa. (NB: this amendment is reiterated in the ACP-EC Council of Ministers 
Decision n°2009/497/EC) 
21  Cotonou, Annexe II, Art. 2.7b 
22  Cotonou, Annexe II, Art. 2.7b 
23  Cotonou, Annexe I, Art 4 
24  Cotonou, Annexe 1B, Art 3. 
25  Council Decision 2001/822/EC, Annexe IIB, Art 1 
26  Council Decision 2007/249/EC, Art 1, 10.a. 
27  Cotonou, Annexe II, Art 4.2a for ACP ; Council Decision 2001/822/EC Annexe IIB, Art 2a 
28  Council Decision 2001/822/EC Annexe IIB, Art 2b(i) 
29  Cotonou Annexe  II Art 4,2,b,c, and d for ACP; Council Decision 2001/822/EC, Annexe IIB, Art 2b,(ii) and 2c, for 
OCT. 
30  Cotonou, Annexe II, Art. 4,3, for ACP ; (CD 2001/822/EC Annexe IIB, Art 2d, for OCT  
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3° Commission-programmed activities (check Art 76) 
The resources provided under the IF and EIB-OR must be considered within the broader 
context of partnership and association agreements with the ACP countries and the OCT; 
this is because instruments are deployed in complementarity with other activities conducted 
by the Commission and the MS in implementation of these agreements. For instance, 
chapter 7 of Cotonou, and particularly Art. 76, enumerates the array of instruments 
deployed for supporting private sector development, among which are the funds managed 
by the EIB. 
 
For this reason, in the lower part of Diagram 3.1 a third layer of inputs has been 
mentioned. They contribute to specific outputs that are generally different from, but 
complementary to, those of the activities of the IF and EIB-OR. They will not be reviewed 
by this evaluation but the sound conduct of EIB-managed operations within this broader 
cooperation context is clearly a relevant subject for this evaluation. 
2. Outputs 
Outputs are the results that can be immediately linked to the activities. Different major 
outputs can be identified. They can all emanate from either the IF or EIB-OR or both.  
 
In all economic sectors, private sector companies and commercially-run enterprises obtain 
access to loans and risk capital31. Similarly financial resources are made available for 
infrastructure and projects with potential social and environmental benefits. The provision 
of funds to local financial intermediaries and investment funds as channels for IF and EIB-
OR32 funds constitutes an output. 
 
The outputs thus facilitate a relaxation of a major development constraint as otherwise 
access to finance for projects eligible for IF and EIB-OR support would be extremely 
difficult or even impossible.  
 
An additional output is the mobilisation of other resources through the catalytic effect of 
the IF or EIB-OR33. 
3. Outcomes  
Outcomes are the results expected from materialisation of the outputs. Unlike the outputs 
they are not under the control of the agent that implemented the activities. Their link with 
the outputs is clear, although while production of the latter is necessary for generation of 
the outcomes, it is not necessarily sufficient since outcomes also depend on other factors, 
particularly action taken by the beneficiaries of the outputs. 
 
The main outcomes listed on Diagram 2.1 fall into three groups. 
                                                 
31  Cotonou, Annexe II, Art. 3.1 and Art. 4.1a; Council Decision 2001/822/EC Annexe IIC, Art 1 and Annexe IIB, Art. 1a 
32  Cotonou Annexe II, Art 1 
33  Cotonou, Annexe II, Art 3 and Art 4.1.b 
MID-TERM EVALUATION OF THE IF AND EIB OR OPERATIONS IN ACP/OCTS 
ADE - EGEVAL II  
Final Report  September 2010 Annexe 4/Page 7 
1° Outcomes in terms of functioning of the financial sector:  
 improvement in the return and achievement of an acceptable long-term risk 
profile34 for operations of the IF; 
 strengthening of the capacities of the financial intermediaries to address the 
financial needs of enterprises35. 
 
These outcomes are expected to result from outputs related to the channelling of 
funds via the financial intermediaries and from the catalytic effect of the EIB 
operations. 
 
2° Improvement in the profitability, employment and income generation potential of 
the enterprises that benefited from financial resources36. 
 
3° Enhanced public infrastructure resulting from availability of finance attributable to 
subsidised and higher-risk operations37.  
4. Intermediate impacts 
Intermediate impacts, as their name implies, link the outcomes to the overall impacts. They 
are worth identifying in an evaluation since the overall impacts are so vast that it is 
generally impossible to establish the contribution of cooperation activities to their 
realisation. Intermediate impacts are closer to the outcomes of the operations, but they also 
depend on many other factors. It is generally not possible to establish that an intermediate 
impact can be attributed to a particular activity or set of activities, but it is possible to assess 
whether or not these activities have contributed to the observed achievements.  
 
The following intermediary impacts are pursued when IF or EIB-OR operations are 
conducted: 
 the financial sector is strengthened and can provide enterprises with better access to 
finance38; 
 sustainable private sector growth is enhanced39; 
 productive sector competitiveness is enhanced40; 
 governance, integrity, social responsibility and the environment are all enhanced41; 
 the poor benefit from better public services42. 
                                                 
34  Cotonou, Annexe II Art.3.1 
35  Cotonou, Art. 76 and Annexe II, Art. 3b. 
36  Council Decision 2001/822/EC Annexe IIC, Art 1. 
37  Cotonou, Ann.ex II, Art. 2 
38  Cotonou, Art.76a 
39  Cotonou, Art. 76 and Art. 20,1a ; Council Decision 2001/822/EC Annexe IIC, Art 1 
40  Cotonou, Art.761a 
41  Cotonou, Art 20,1d; Art. 20,1,e. 
42  Cotonou, Art. 25 
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5. Impacts 
The overall impacts of all EU external cooperation are spelled out in the Consolidated 
Treaty of the EU43: “Union development cooperation policy shall have as its primary 
objective the reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty”.  
This overall objective is complemented by two overall objectives deemed indispensable for 
achievement of reduction of poverty, namely: 
 sustainable development44; 
 gradual integration of the partner countries into the world economy45. 
 
It is unlikely that the evaluation can identify with accuracy the contribution of EIB 
operations to these objectives, but if a contribution to the intermediate impacts can be 
established it can also be inferred that it constituted a move in the direction of the overall 
objectives.  
6. Coordination mechanisms for implementation of IF and 
EIB-OR 
Given the fact that the overall objectives of the IF and of the EIB mandate to use its own 
resources in ACP countries are those of Cotonou, it is clear that close coordination 
between the Commission and EIB must take place. Chapter II of the Internal Agreement 
of EDF 946 and Council Regulation 617/2007/EC on the implementation of EDF 10 
under the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement -as well as the revision of Cotonou in 2005 to 
some extent- spells out the details. Key points at each stage of the project cycle are 
presented in the table hereunder: 
                                                 
43  Consolidated Treaty of the EU, Art. 208 
44  Cotonou, Art. 1 and Art. 19 
45  Cotonou, Arts.2, 19 and 34. 
46  OJ L 317, 15.12.2000, Internal Agreement between Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, 
meeting within the Council, on the Financing and Administration of Community Aid under the Financial Protocol to 
the Partnership Agreement between the African, Caribbean and Pacific States and the European Community and its 
Member States signed in Cotonou (Benin) on 23 June 2000 and the allocation of financial assistance for the Overseas 
Countries and Territories to which Part Four of the EC Treaty applies. 
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Table 4.1 – Key points of coordination mechanisms between the EIB and the Commission for implementation of IF/OR 
 Internal 
Agreement 
of EDF 9 
(2000) 
Council 
Regulation 
617/2007/EC 
(2007) 
Cotonou 
(2005) 
Programming stage 
 The Commission shall prepare the Country Cooperation Strategy (CS) and its accompanying 
indicative programme after consultation with the EIB 
  
Art. 15.1   
 The preparation of the CS should involve the Bank on the matters relative to its operations 
and those of the Investment Facility  
 
Art. 15.2.c   
 Each CS shall be the subject to an exchange of views between the Member States and the 
Commission in the framework of the EDF Committee to which the EIB shall take part in  
 
Art. 15.5   
 During the annual review of the indicative programmes as well as for mid-term and end-of-
term reviews of CS, the EIB shall be consulted on matters relative to its operations and those 
of the Investment Facility  
 
Art. 17 and 
18) 
  
 Preparation of Regional Cooperation Strategy (RCS) and its accompanying indicative 
programmes shall be undertaken in coordination with the EU MS and the EIB on matters 
relative to its operations and those of the Investment Facility  
 
Art. 19.1 and 
19.2 
  
 The Commission should work with EU MS and the EIB when preparing its strategy papers 
(country or regional) on matters relating to its areas of expertise and operations, including as 
regards the Investment Facility. It should also ensure coherence, where relevant, with the EIB 
 
 Art 2b and 
Art.4.2 
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Implementation stage 
 A representative of the Bank shall take part to the work of the EDF Committee  
 
Art. 21.1   
 the Annual Action programmes should be prepared by the Commission with the partner 
countries and also involve EU MS and the EIB; 
 
 Art. 7.2  
 mutual exchange of information on implementation of cooperation activities between the 
Commission, EU MS and the EIB should take place; 
 
 Art. 7.6  
 the EIB should take part in the exchange of views in the EDF Committee  
 
 Art. 11.3  
 an IF Committee is set up under the auspices of EIB to approve inter alia the guidelines on 
implementation of the IF and the investment strategies and business plans of the IF: 
 
Art 29 Art. 13  
o the EIB shall cooperate closely with the Commission, and in particular: request 
the prior opinions of the Commission on investment strategies, business plans 
and general policy documents 
 
Art.30.4 Art. 13.5  
o for own resources loans and IF investment for which no prior IF Committee 
opinion is required, the EIB decides in accordance with its own procedures  
Art. 30.5 Art. 13.6  
Evaluation stage 
 Regular joint Commission-EIB evaluations, in association with the partner, of the results of 
the implementation of geographical and thematic policies should be undertaken  
 
 Art. 15  
 The overall performance of the Investment Facility shall be subject to a joint review at 
the mid-term and end-term of a financial protocol 
 
  Annexe II, 
Art. 6b 
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Annexe 5 – Evaluation questions, Judgement criteria and Indicators 
This Annexe presents the set of structured Evaluation Questions (EQS) in Judgement Criteria (JC) and Indicators (I) as agreed upon with the 
Reference Group during the structuring stage of the evaluation. It also presents, for each EQ, the rationale and coverage of the question, as well as its 
link with the Intervention Logic (see Annexe 4) and the evaluation criteria. Finally, it presents, for each indicator, the source of information and the 
tools used for data collection. 
 
 
EQ 1 To what extent were the IF/OR operations focused on the priority development needs of the countries in which they intervened, and to 
what extent did they remain in line with the national and regional EU development policies relating to ACP/OCTs?  
 
EQ1-RC EQ 1 on Relevance and Coherence 
Rationale 
and 
coverage of 
the 
question 
The question aims at verifying the relevance and coherence of the strategy and design of IF/OR operations at different levels. As this question 
concerns the level of strategy and design it will tackle issues of both relevance and coherence.  
In terms of relevance, it will examine to what extent the EIB’s IF/OR operations were designed so as to answer to the needs of the countries in 
terms of development. This will encompass checking to what extent they were in line with the national policies of the partner countries. That will in 
turn also lead to an examination of the raison d’être of the distinction between the mandates and, in practice, between the functions of the IF and 
OR, notably in terms of focus on development objectives.  
Responsiveness to countries’ needs is however not the only criterion on which the strategy and design behind the EIB IF/OR operations should be 
examined. Indeed they should also, in terms of coherence, be in line with the national and regional Commission development policies in the ACP 
countries and OCTs.  
Link with 
IL and 
evaluation 
criteria 
 The question is one of design and strategy, which is precisely expressed in the IL as a whole. Accordingly it aims at assessing the operational design 
against country needs and verifying its consistency with EU development policies.  
As the above rationale shows, it is a question that relates to both relevance and coherence. An element of EIB value added is also involved, albeit 
to a lesser extent, namely in terms of the specific value added that the EIB brings in terms of the pursuit of development objectives.  
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Judgement criteria and indicators            
JC 1.1 The EIB has explicit policies and guidelines to 
ensure that IF/OR operations financed are in line 
with development needs and EU development 
policies in ACP and OCTs and applies these 
guidelines 
           
I-
1.1.1 
Existence and coverage of specific guidelines EIB documents and 
opinions of interviewees
x x x        
I-
1.1.2 
Utilisation of these guidelines in selection and design 
of operations 
Opinions of 
interviewees 
 x x        
I-
1.1.3 
Opinions of EIB staff and other stakeholders 
(Commission Services, other donors, …) on 
appropriateness of the guidelines 
Opinions of 
interviewees 
x x x        
JC 
1.2 
The IF/OR selection of operations takes place on 
the basis of analyses of the countries’/regions’ 
development needs, which take into account 
stakeholders’ views and effectively reflect country 
needs 
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I-
1.2.1 
Existence of country/region development needs 
analyses for the countries/regions of intervention 
(prepared by EIB or other authorities) 
EIB and other 
agencies documents 
x          
I-
1.2.2 
These analyses have been prepared in collaboration 
with stakeholders (e.g. national/regional authorities 
and private sector representative institutions) 
EIB and other 
agencies documents, 
opinions of interviewees
x x x    x x x x 
I-
1.2.3 
Country/region needs are reflected in these analyses in 
a way that can be used by the EIB 
EIB and other 
agencies documents 
x         x 
I-
1.2.4 
Stakeholders agree that the analyses used are valid Opinions of 
interviewees 
 x x    x x x x 
I-
1.2.5 
Documents relating to individual operations explicitly 
refer to these analyses 
EIB appraisal 
documents 
x         x 
JC 
1.3 
Operations have been prioritised with a view to 
addressing development needs, and taking 
stakeholders’ views into account 
           
I-
1.3.1 
A pipeline based on region/ountry/sector needs exists EIB documents and 
opinions of interviewees
x          
I-
1.3.2 
EIB pro-actively generates projects that address 
development needs 
Opinions of 
interviewees 
 x x        
I-
1.3.3 
Project identification/appraisal documents 
demonstrate conformity with development needs and 
stakeholders’ support 
EIB appraisal 
documents 
x         x 
I-
1.3.4 
Final beneficiaries are identified in project 
documentation 
EIB appraisal 
documents 
x         x 
JC 
1.4 
The logical distinction in the sub-mandates and 
functioning of the IF/OR envelope allows 
financing development needs that the Bank could 
not cover with its own resources 
           
I-
1.4.1 
Extent to which the IF allows to finance  development 
needs that would be too risky to be funded with OR 
EIB documents and 
opinions of interviewees
x x x       x 
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I-
1.4.2 
Accordingly, different prioritisation approaches exist 
for IF and OR operations 
EIB documents and 
opinions of interviewees
x x x       x 
I-
1.4.3 
In addressing different types (in terms of financial risk 
involved) of development needs IF and OR are 
complementary (between operations or within an 
individual operation), enhancing responsiveness to 
development needs 
EIB documents and 
opinions of interviewees
x x x    x x x x 
JC 
1.5 
Operations examined aim at addressing 
countries’/regions’ needs 
           
I-
1.5.1 
Committee’s portfolio reviews show that operations 
address countries’/regions’ needs 
EIB documents x          
I-
1.5.2 
Stakeholders consider that operations address 
countries’/regions’ needs 
Opinions of 
interviewees 
 x x    x x x x 
JC 
1.6 
EIB IF/OR operations are designed and 
implemented with a view to alignment with 
Commission development policies in ACP/OCTs
           
I-
1.6.1 
The objectives of IF/OR operations support 
Commission development policy objectives 
EIB operations 
preparatory documents
x         x 
I-
1.6.2 
These objectives were maintained during 
implementation  
EIB progress , final 
and evaluation reports 
and opinions of 
interviewees 
x x x    x x x x 
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EQ 2  To what extent did IF/OR operations improve, without market distortion, access by enterprises to finance that would otherwise have 
been unavailable under the prevailing market conditions?  
 
EQ2-AF EQ 2 on Access to finance 
Rationale 
and 
coverage 
of the 
question 
This is one of six questions relating to effectiveness. More specifically it aims at verifying whether the EIB has fulfilled its role of providing finance 
where it would otherwise not have been available under appropriate terms, i.e. preserving the viability of the borrower and not distorting the 
functioning of the market. It concerns both private sector companies and commercially-run public enterprises, and includes financial resources made 
available for infrastructure in LDC/ post conflict countries, for restructuring, or for projects with potential social and environmental benefits. It thus 
covers several of the specific objectives assigned to the EIB under its mandate.  
As indicated by the phrasing of the question, the finance provided would not have been available under the prevailing market conditions. Hence the 
answer to the question will need to verify to what extent an analysis was conducted of the financial needs of the ACP/OCT beneficiaries, of their 
absorption capacity, and of the availability of other sources of private or public financing for the relevant instruments. It will also need to examine the 
type of advantages (financial, non-financial, quality-related) that EIB offered which were not available on the market.  
To sum up, the question tackles two dimensions: (i) to what extent did EIB improve access to finance (i.e. succeed in meeting the needs of enterprises 
in this respect) and (ii) to what extent did it do so under certain key conditions (e.g. without creating distortions) while still providing specific value 
added.  
Link with 
IL and 
evaluation 
criteria 
The question concerns a specific part of the intervention logic, namely how the inputs contributed to generating the outputs mentioned in the three 
last boxes of the outputs column.  
As mentioned above is it a question of effectiveness, but it also covers elements of EIB value-added, notably on the quality of the projects and on 
the financial and non-financial advantages accruing from the EIB operations compared to other sources of financing.  
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Judgement criteria and indicators            
JC 2.1 The IF/OR operations have met a substantial 
share of the financing needs of individual 
enterprises or, more broadly, a commensurate 
share of the productive sector 
           
I-
2.1.1 
Financial needs of the ACP and OCT enterprises as 
identified by country/sector reviews 
EIB and other 
agencies documents 
x          
I-
2.1.2 
EIB’s documented strategy (concentration, 
diversification, …) in terms of addressing financing 
needs of enterprises 
EIB documents x          
I-
2.1.3 
Coverage by IF/OR operations of needs at country / 
sector / sub-sector / individual enterprise levels  
EIB documents and 
opinions of interviewees
x x x       x 
JC 
2.2 
IF/OR financing did address segments that are 
not, or are insufficiently, served 
           
I-
2.2.1 
Prior to the financing of the operations, a selective 
analysis of the financial needs of the ACP and OCT 
beneficiaries and their absorption capacity has taken 
place  
EIB appraisal 
documents 
x         x 
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I-
2.2.2 
Prior to the financing of the operations, a selective 
analysis of other sources of private and public 
financing for the relevant investments has taken place  
EIB appraisal 
documents 
x         x 
I-
2.2.3 
Evidence that without the EIB the operation would 
not, or would insufficiently, have been served 
EIB project progress 
and final reports, 
project evaluation 
reports, and opinions 
of interviewees 
x x x    x x x x 
JC 
2.3 
IF/OR operations have not created distortions on 
local markets and have not displaced private 
sources of finance 
           
I-
2.3.1 
Evidence that products offered by the EIB would not 
otherwise be available.  
EIB operations 
preparatory documents, 
and opinions of 
interviewees 
x      x x x x 
I-
2.3.2 
Existence and justification of downward adjustments 
of the indicative credit spread (risk margin) in pricing 
risk of loans and guarantees  
Preparatory loan 
documents explaining 
the determination of 
the interest rate of the 
loans.  
x         x 
I-
2.3.3 
Conformity of criteria for selecting financial 
intermediaries with the EIB guidelines provisions 
Preparatory loan 
documents explaining 
the determination of 
the interest rate of the 
loans. 
x         x 
JC 
2.4 
IF/OR financing has brought specific added 
value 
           
I-
2.4.1 
Evidence of the leading role of EIB in putting together 
the financing plan 
EIB appraisal 
documents and 
opinions of interviewees
x x x    x x x x 
I-
2.4.2 
Evidence that IF/OR specific risk- bearing capacity 
led to financing operations that would otherwise not 
EIB project progress 
and final reports, 
x x x    x x x x 
MID-TERM EVALUATION OF THE IF AND EIB OR OPERATIONS IN ACP/OCTS 
ADE - EGEVAL II  
Final Report  September 2010 Annexe 5/Page 8 
have been financed or under less appropriate 
conditions. 
project evaluation 
reports, and opinions 
of interviewees 
I-
2.4.3 
IF/OR type of instruments (e.g. longer maturities 
and/or subsidised interest for loans; range of risk 
capital instruments) are not available from other 
sources 
Documents and 
opinions of interviewees
x x x x x x x x x x 
I-
2.4.4 
Range of non-financial contributions offered by the 
EIB at investee company level (e.g. in terms of 
governance, integrity, social responsibility, capacity 
building and good management practices) 
EIB documents x          
I-
2.4.5 
EIB contribution at project execution level 
(procurement process) and due attention to cost-
effectiveness 
EIB project progress 
and final reports, 
project evaluation 
reports, and opinions 
of interviewees 
x x x    x x x x 
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EQ 3 To what extent did IF/OR operations have a catalytic effect in helping enterprises to mobilise long-term local and foreign 
loan resources and investment?  
 
EQ3-CAT EQ 3 on Catalytic effect 
Rationale 
and 
coverage 
of the 
question 
IF/OR operations aim at generating a catalytic effect. Annex II of the Cotonou Agreement explicitly requires this for the operations of 
the investment facility, Article 3 stating that the operations should “endeavour to have a catalytic effect by encouraging the mobilisation of long-term 
local resources and attracting foreign private investors and lenders to projects in the ACP States”. This also applies to EIB Own Resources operations 
and to the OCTs. The present question aims at verifying to what extent such catalytic effect has indeed been generated.  
Link with 
IL and 
evaluation 
criteria 
The question addresses effectiveness, as it aims at verifying whether one of the expected outputs of the IF/OR operations has been 
generated, notably the first box of the output columns of the IL. It also has a dimension of value added of the EIB operations. Indeed, 
being able to generate a catalytic effect is precisely a value added that the EIB might offer; in turn, if the EIB is able to generate such a 
catalytic effect, this might be precisely for reasons of the value added it brings through its operations, whether in terms of project quality 
or of financial and/or non-financial advantages. To a lesser extent the question touches also upon the question of sustainability: 
indeed, if IF/OR operations contribute to attracting other resources, this can be considered a means of strengthening the probability 
that their results and impacts will be maintained over time.  
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Judgement criteria and indicators            
JC 
3.1 
EIB has contributed to mobilising a critical mass 
of additional finance needed by project 
beneficiaries  
           
I-
3.1.1 
EIB measures its mobilisation effect EIB project progress 
and final reports, and 
project evaluation 
reports 
x         x 
I-
3.1.2 
Ratio of mobilisation at project level EIB documents x         x 
I-
3.1.3 
Evidence of mobilisation effect and of extent to which 
it was critical to meeting financing needs 
EIB project progress 
and final reports, 
project evaluation 
reports, and opinions 
of interviewees 
x x x    x x x x 
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JC 
3.2 
EIB’s financial instruments (in particular the risk-
sharing and credit enhancement instrument) 
encourage mobilisation of additional commercial 
finance; EIB makes optimal use of its financial 
and risk-bearing capacity 
           
I-
3.2.1 
Extent to which EIB’s instruments are geared (design) 
to mobilisation 
EIB documents and 
opinions of interviewees
x x x       x 
I-
3.2.2 
Extent to which EIB assesses its mobilisation potential 
for each operation 
EIB documents and 
opinions of interviewees
x x x       x 
I-
3.2.3 
Hurdles to deployment of mobilisation instruments 
(e.g. pricing of guarantees, limits to volumes of 
subordinated finance, etc.) 
EIB documents and 
opinions of interviewees
x x x       x 
JC 
3.3 
EIB’s participation in an operation provides 
comfort and confidence to other lenders or 
investors  
           
I-
3.3.1 
Extent to which sponsor investment has been 
encouraged/triggered by EIB presence 
EIB project progress 
and final reports, 
project evaluation 
reports, and opinions 
of interviewees 
x x x    x x x x 
I-
3.3.2 
Extent to which private commercial financing sources 
have been encouraged/triggered by EIB presence  
EIB project progress 
and final reports, 
project evaluation 
reports, and opinions 
of interviewees 
x x x    x x x x 
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EQ 4 To what extent did IF/OR operations strengthen the local financial sector’s capacity, including in terms of social 
responsibility, to address the financial needs of enterprises? 
 
EQ4-FI EQ 4 on Financial intermediaries 
Rationale 
and 
coverage 
of the 
question 
Through its IF/OR operations the EIB intends also to strengthen the financial environment, notably by enhancing the capacities of 
financial intermediaries, including in terms of social responsibility, to address enterprises’ financial need. This implies a leveraging 
effect. This indeed should also generate effects that are likely to last in the long run and extend beyond a single operation. The present 
question aims precisely at examining to what extent this objective has been reached. The expression “local financial sector” refers to 
local bank and non-bank credit institutions and local capital market operations.  
Link with 
IL and 
evaluation 
criteria 
 The question is mainly a question of effectiveness that aims at verifying whether strengthening the capacities of financial 
intermediaries addresses enterprises’ financial needs. It is however also a question of sustainability, as strengthening the financial 
environment is a means of increasing the probability that the results and impacts of operations are maintained over time. The issue of 
the value-added of the EIB in this respect will also be examined.  
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Judgement criteria and indicators            
JC 
4.1 
IF/OR operations have strengthened the viability 
of the local/regional bank and non-bank credit 
institutions and equity funds 
           
I-
4.1.1 
EIB has specific requirements (e.g. governance, social 
responsibility, risk management, integrity) for 
EIB project documents 
and opinions of 
x x x     x  x 
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strengthening the viability of local/regional financial 
intermediaries 
interviewees 
I-
4.1.2 
Extent to which EIB TA has been provided to 
strengthen the foregoing 
EIB project documents 
and opinions of 
interviewees 
x x x     x  x 
I-
4.1.3 
Evidence of improvement in management practices 
and capacities, including in terms of social 
responsibility, following the EIB operation 
EIB progress and 
final project reports 
and evaluation reports, 
and opinions of 
interviewees 
x x x     x  x 
I-
4.1.4 
Evidence from intermediaries’ balance sheets before 
and after EIB operation 
Balance sheets of 
financial 
intermediaries 
x         x 
I-
4.1.5 
Evidence that EIB specific requirements and/or 
accompanying TA have contributed to strengthening 
viability 
Opinions of 
interviewees 
       x  x 
JC 
4.2 
Financial institutions supported by the EIB have 
improved their capacity to mobilise domestic 
savings 
           
I-
4.2.1 
Trend in domestic savings mobilised by the IF/OR-
supported institutions 
EIB progress and 
final project reports 
and evaluation reports 
x         x 
I-
4.2.2 
Evidence that this trend is linked to the EIB support EIB progress, final 
project reports and 
evaluation reports, and 
opinions of interviewees
x x x     x  x 
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JC 
4.3 
Local/regional bank and non-bank financial 
institutions supported by IF/OR have financed 
the development of enterprises including SMEs 
           
I-
4.3.1 
Trend in financing of enterprises by IF/OR-supported 
local/regional institutions 
EIB progress, final 
project reports and 
evaluation reports 
x         x 
I-
4.3.2 
Banks supported through IF/OR have increased long-
term lending or maintained it at previous levels 
EIB progress, final 
project reports and 
evaluation reports, and 
opinions of interviewees
x x x     x  x 
I-
4.3.3 
Evidence that this trend is linked to the EIB support EIB progress, final 
project reports and 
evaluation reports, and 
opinions of interviewees
x x x     x  x 
I-
4.3.4 
SME focus is among the criteria used by EIB for 
selecting financial intermediaries 
EIB appraisal project 
documents and 
opinions of interviewees
x x x     x x x 
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EQ 5 To what extent did enterprises which benefited from IF/OR support improve their performance and long term viability?  
 
EQ5-EP EQ 5 on  Enterprise performance 
Rationale 
and 
coverage 
of the 
question 
Through its operations, the EIB intends to contribute to improved performance and viability of the enterprises which benefit from its 
financing. The present question aims at assessing the  extent to which such improvement has taken place and is likely to be maintained, 
e.g. in terms of enterprise profitability, income generation, and governance. Where relevant a distinction will be made between, on the 
one hand, financial intermediaries that benefited from IF or OR support in terms of their capacity to invest in or provide loans to local 
SMEs, and on the other hand non-financial enterprises that benefited directly from IF or OR to strengthen and expand their activities. 
Link with 
IL and 
evaluation 
criteria 
The question thus mainly concerns effectiveness and sustainability, as specific attention will be devoted to the extent to which such 
results are likely to be maintained in the long run.  
In terms of linkage with the intervention logic, the question concerns more specifically the link with the third box in the results column.  
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Judgement criteria and indicators            
JC 
5.1 
Enterprises which benefited from IF/OR support 
have improved their governance and management 
capabilities 
           
I-
5.1.1 
Changes in the behavioural patterns of the managers 
and management practices  
EIB project documents 
and opinions of 
interviewees 
x         x 
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I-
5.1.2 
Evolution of accounting and reporting  Companies reports, 
EIB project 
documents, and 
opinions of interviewees
x      x x x x 
I-5.13 Evolution of corporate governance  Companies reports, 
EIB project 
documents, and 
opinions of interviewees 
x      x x x x 
JC 
5.2 
TA for institution building has contributed to 
creating sound enterprises  and/or to improving 
governance and management capabilities 
           
I-
5.2.1 
Changes in the behavioural patterns of managers, and 
in management practices, are observed in enterprises 
that benefited from TA 
EIB project documents 
and opinions of 
interviewees 
x      x  x x 
I-
5.2.2 
Inclusion in the TA projects of indicators that permit 
assessment of results in the areas of corporate 
governance and management capabilities 
TA project documents x         x 
I-
5.2.3 
Trends in these indicators  TA project documents x         x 
I-
5.2.4 
Managers’ opinions of enterprises which benefited 
from such TA 
Opinions of 
interviewees 
      x  x x 
I-
5.2.5 
Opinions of EIB and other donors involved  Opinions of 
interviewees 
      x x x x 
JC 
5.3 
Enterprises which benefited from IF/OR support 
have improved/restored their financial viability 
           
I-
5.3.1 
Evolution of financial results of enterprises which 
benefited from IF/OR support 
Companies accounts 
and reports, and EIB 
project documents. 
x         x 
I-
5.3.2 
Evolution and importance of (profitable) involvement 
in new activities and business expansion by non-
financial enterprises that benefited from IF or OR 
EIB project 
documents, activity 
reports of beneficiaries 
x      x  x x 
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of IF/OR, and 
opinions of interviewees
JC 
5.4 
Enterprises which benefited from IF/OR support 
have maintained and/or increased their 
competitiveness 
           
I-
5.4.1 
Trend in the ratio of credit granted to enterprises 
provided by the financial intermediaries that benefited 
from IF or OR loans to total domestic credit granted 
to enterprises  
Financial reports of 
the beneficiary 
institutions and 
Central Bank data 
x         x 
I-
5.4.2 
Expansion of activities on the domestic and foreign 
markets of non-financial beneficiaries of IF/OR 
Activity reports and 
accounts of these 
enterprises, and 
opinions of interviewees
 x x    x  x x 
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EQ 6 In what respect have IF/OR operations contributed to the sustainable growth of a competitive productive sector in the 
Partner countries?  
EQ6-PS EQ 6 on  Productive sector growth 
Rationale 
and 
coverage 
of the 
question 
In terms of (intermediate) impact, the EIB aims to contribute through IF/OR operations to enhancing the competitiveness of 
enterprises in a sustainable manner. The present question aims at understanding which features or dimensions of EIB financing 
contributed to enhancing such competitiveness. Unlike EQ5 this question targets more the productive sector as whole or specific 
segments thereof, rather than specific beneficiary enterprises. It focuses on the following aspects: 
- the contribution of IF/OR operations to the development of an enabling environment for private (or more generally 
productive) sector activities; 
-   their contribution to the development and strengthening of the local financial sector; 
-   their contribution to improvements in sustained growth and competitiveness of enterprises. 
Link with 
IL and 
evaluation 
criteria 
 The question thus mainly concerns impact and sustainability, as specific attention will be devoted to the extent to which such 
growth and competitiveness are likely to be maintained in the long run.  
In terms of linkage with the intervention logic, the question concerns more specifically the link with the second and third box of the 
intermediate impacts column.  
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Judgement criteria and indicators            
JC 
6.1 
EIB had an explicit strategy at country or sector 
level guiding the choice of operations to those 
most likely to generate a broader impact in terms 
of enhanced growth and competitiveness 
 
I-
6.1.1 
Inclusion in EIB country and sector strategies of 
assessment of potential impact of proposed operations
EIB strategies x   
I-
6.1.2 
Evidence that potential development impact is used as 
a key criterion in selecting and prioritising operations 
EIB guidelines, 
preparatory documents 
showing the application 
of the guidelines, 
opinions of interviewees.
x x x x 
JC 
6.2 
EIB operations have contributed to improving the 
business environment 
   
I-
6.2.1 
Accompaniment of EIB operations by TA or 
conditions meant improving the legal and regulatory 
framework and the business environment. 
Preparatory documents 
of EIB operations, 
EIB project progress 
and monitoring reports. 
x  x 
I-
6.2.2 
Evaluations of the results of such operations EIB project monitoring 
and evaluation of 
reports 
x  x 
I- Selected indicators from “Doing business in….” for “Doing business 
in…..” reports 
x   
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6.2.3 those countries where substantial operations were 
conducted. 
JC 
6.3 
EIB IF/OR support has contributed to 
developing / strengthening the local financial 
sector 
   
I-
6.3.1 
Trend in the volume and quality of products offered 
by the local financial sector 
Surveys of the financial 
sector. Central Bank. 
EIB analysis of the 
local financial sector.  
x   
I-
6.3.2 
Trend in credit to the private sector, and particularly to 
SMEs1 
EIB project and 
evaluation reports, 
reports, and opinions of 
interviewees. 
x x x x x x x 
JC 
6.4 
EIB IF/OR support has contributed to 
stimulating growth and competitiveness of the 
enterprise sector2 
 
I-
6.4.1 
Contribution of private sector to value added Economic studies and 
opinions of interviewees
x x x x x x x x x x 
I-
6.4.2 
Trend in employment in the private sector Economic studies and 
opinions of interviewees
x x x x x x x x x x 
I-
6.4.3 
Trend in investments in the private sector. Economic studies and 
opinions of interviewees
x x x x x x x x x x 
 
                                                 
1  The analysis of use of funds made available to financial intermediaries to assess whether they increased their funding of SMEs in comparison with the previous situation or with intermediaries that 
did not benefit from IF/OR. 
2  To assess the contribution of EIB operations to the evolution of the above indicators it is necessary to take into account the magnitude of the support of the EIB to the enterprise sector. 
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EQ 7 To what extent did IF/OR investments generate positive social and environmental impact?  
 
EQ7-SE EQ 7 on  Social and environmental impact 
Rationale and 
coverage of the 
question 
A large body of development indicators exists in international fora which also cover  -  besides economic, financial and technical criteria  
-   social and environmental impact. EIB has subscribed to this approach, inter alia by introducing the ESIAF. In this respect this EQ 
aims at examining the EIB’s practices and at assessing to what extent its investments contributed to generating positive impacts.  
Link with IL and 
evaluation criteria
The question concerns achievement of main impacts/effects, but focuses specifically on the social and environmental dimensions. 
By definition, these dimensions also address the sustainability of EIB’s operations. 
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Judgement criteria and indicators            
JC 7.1 EIB has systematically addressed social and 
environmental impact in its operations and 
ensured that mitigating measures were put in 
place 
           
I-7.1.1 Consistency of project processing with EIB 
standards procedures and guidelines, as reflected 
in the ESIAF framework 
Project appraisal 
documents and 
opinions of interviewees 
x x x       x 
I-7.1.2 Degrees of environmental sustainability sought by the 
EIB (from introduction of environmental 
requirements for all beneficiaries to specific 
environmental projects) 
EIB project documents x         x 
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JC 7.2 Enterprises supported by IF/OR have applied 
sound social, employment, and environmental 
policies 
           
I-7.2.1 EIB appraisal of implementation of sound social 
policies by IF/OR-supported enterprises  
EIB project documents 
and opinions of 
interviewees 
x x x    x  x x 
I-7.2.2 EIB appraisal of implementation of sound 
employment policies by IF/OR-supported enterprises 
EIB project documents 
and opinions of 
interviewees 
x x x    x  x x 
I-7.2.3 EIB appraisal of implementation of sound 
environmental polices by IF/OR-supported 
enterprises (e.g. with respect to reducing pollution 
loads, protecting biodiversity etc.) 
EIB project documents 
and opinions of 
interviewees 
x x x    x  x x 
JC 7.4 Infrastructure operations contributed to 
improving public services for the local population, 
including the poorer segments 
           
I-7.4.1 Evidence of consultation of the people affected by the 
infrastructure supported  
EIB operations 
preparatory documents 
and opinions of 
interviewees 
x x x    x x x x 
I-7.4.2 Evidence of identification of target populations, i.e. 
intended beneficiaries of the infrastructure supported 
EIB operations 
preparatory documents 
and opinions of 
interviewees 
x x x    x x x x 
I-7.4.3 Inclusion in operational design/conditions of 
indicators that allow verification that the expected 
benefits reached the targeted populations 
EIB operations 
preparatory documents 
and opinions of 
interviewees 
x x x    x x x x 
I-7.4.4 Trends in these indicators EIB project progress, 
final and evaluation 
reports, and opinions 
of interviewees 
x x x    x x x x 
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EQ 8 To what extent is the IF financially sustainable over the long-term horizon of the Cotonou Agreement? Has a right balance 
been found between its developmental objective, the level of commensurate individual project risk borne by the IF, and the 
financial viability requirement on the basis of the portfolio as a whole? 
EQ8-FS EQ 8 on  Financial sustainability of IF 
Rationale 
and 
coverage 
of the 
question 
Annex II of the Cotonou Agreement stipulates that the Investment Facility shall “be managed as a revolving fund and aim at being financially 
sustainable”. This is also mentioned in the operational guidelines of the Investment Facility, which states that the IF operations “will have 
to respond to market opportunities and projects financed by the IF will be required to yield an adequate economic rate of return” and that accordingly “a 
balance will have to be struck between the developmental objective and the requirement for financial viability”. The question will examine the extent to 
which the IF is likely to be financially sustainable and whether the afore-mentioned balance between the developmental objective and 
the requirement for financial viability has been found. It will examine whether the real value of the original endowment of the IF over 
the 20-year horizon of the Cotonou Agreement is being been maintained. It should be noted that a number of findings will be tentative 
or provisional, especially regarding the returns from equity investments and private equity funds where performance/returns are only 
apparent after five years or more. 
Link with 
IL and 
evaluation 
criteria 
 The question addresses effectiveness in that it aims at verifying the extent to which the objective of financial sustainability of the IF 
has been reached or is likely to be reached (see the first box of the results column of the IL). In this sense it also touches on 
sustainability, not in terms of the lasting effects/impact of specific operations but rather in a broader sense of the capacity of the IF 
to create the necessary conditions to continue to provide financing in the long run and thus obtain long-term results and impacts.  
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Judgement criteria and indicators            
JC8.1 Compatibility of EIB’s selection and processing 
of projects with Cotonou Agreements 
           
I-
8.1.1 
Indicators related to JC 1.2            
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I-
8.1.2 
Indicators related to JC 1.2            
JC 
8.2 
 EIB’s risk management systems and policies are 
aimed at long-term sustainability of the IF 
           
I-
8.2.1 
Pricing of loans and of guarantees EIB documents x          
I-
8.2.2 
Spectrum of risks/benefits between equity (and quasi-
equity) and loan operations (taking subsidies into 
account) 
EIB documents x          
I-
8.2.3 
Exposure limits by sector, country, type of 
borrower/investee, instruments 
EIB documents x          
I-
8.2.4 
Country and risk assessment EIB documents x          
I-
8.2.5 
Provisioning policies EIB documents x          
I-
8.2.6 
Mix of IF and OR EIB documents x          
JC 
8.3 
IF’s inflows and reflows (fees and interest, 
reimbursements, equity sales) are providing, or 
are expected to provide, a revolving character to 
the IF 
           
I-
8.3.1 
Balance sheet and portfolio management EIB documents and 
opinions of interviewees
x x x       x 
I-
8.3.2 
Income statement: profitability by asset class; key 
profit drivers; actual and projected returns 
EIB final and 
evaluation reports 
x         x 
JC 
8.4 
The IF manages to reconcile its development 
mandate and its objective of financial health and 
sustainability 
           
I-
8.4.1 
Utilisation of IF’s and OR’s risk-bearing capacity for 
higher development impact 
EIB documents and 
opinions of interviewees
x x x       x 
I- Use of subsidies EIB documents and x x x       x 
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8.4.2 opinions of interviewees
I-
8.4.3 
Use of TA to strengthen investee companies EIB documents and 
opinions of interviewees
x x x        
JC 
8.5 
The IF’s financial sustainability is being ensured 
through management of the portfolio as a whole 
and not only on a project-by-project basis 
           
I-
8.5.1 
Balancing of risk through the whole portfolio EIB documents and 
opinions of interviewees
x x x        
I-
8.5.2 
Risk reporting EIB documents x          
I-
8.5.3 
Risk forecasts in three-year business plan EIB documents x          
I-
8.5.4 
Income recognition policies EIB documents x          
I-
8.5.5 
Budget forecasts; ration analysis EIB documents x          
I-
8.5.6 
Risk profile of OR operations in terms of coherence in 
relation to IF’s risk profile 
EIB documents x          
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EQ 9 To what extent did the use of human and financial resources, and the regulatory and administrative framework, allow 
reaching results to be achieved in a timely manner and at a reasonable cost?  
 
EQ9-EFF EQ 9 on  Efficiency 
Rationale 
and 
coverage 
of the 
question 
The question aims at verifying to what extent the means the EIB had at its disposal were optimal to fulfilment of its mandate. The 
question focuses on whether EIB’s current capacity is conducive to fulfilment of its mandate, the term “capacity” encompassing 
funding, human resources, administrative set-up and internal organisation.  
Link with 
IL and 
evaluation 
criteria 
This question addresses efficiency which mainly applies to the relationship between inputs and outputs.  
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Judgement criteria and indicators            
JC 
9.1 
The IF/OR operations remain in line with 
planning and are cost-effective 
           
I-
9.1.1 
Comparison of planning of operations and effective 
implementation 
EIB project progress, 
final and evaluation 
reports 
x         x 
I-
9.1.2 
Specific patterns in observed delays, if any, and factors 
explaining them 
EIB project progress, 
final and evaluation 
reports, and opinion of 
interviewees 
x  x    x x x x 
MID-TERM EVALUATION OF THE IF AND EIB OR OPERATIONS IN ACP/OCTS 
ADE - EGEVAL II  
Final Report  September 2010 Annexe 5/Page 27 
I-
9.1.3 
Trend in ratio of IF/OR administrative expenses to 
volume of operations  
EIB project progress, 
final and evaluation 
reports 
x         x 
I-
9.1.4 
Evidence from IF/OR investees on administrative 
costs linked to EIB operations 
Opinion of 
interviewees 
      x x x  
JC 
9.2 
The “regulatory and administrative” framework 
for IF/OR operations enhances timeliness and 
cost reduction 
           
I-
9.2.1 
The guidelines are explicitly geared to timeliness and 
cost reduction 
EIB documents x          
I-
9.2.2 
Evidence that the regulatory and administrative 
framework is conducive to enhanced timeliness and 
cost reduction 
Opinions of 
interviewees 
 x x    x x x  
I-
9.2.3 
Evidence that the guidelines are applied systematically EIB project progress, 
final and evaluation 
reports, and opinion of 
interviewees 
x x x    x x x x 
JC 
9.3 
Sufficient resources are available for EIB to take a 
proactive, as opposed to reactive, approach in 
project generation, and to enhance timeliness and 
cost-effectiveness.  
           
I-
9.3.1 
IF/OR approach in project generation (reactive versus 
proactive) 
EIB project progress, 
final and evaluation 
reports, and opinion of 
interviewees 
x x x    x x x x 
I-
9.3.2 
Trend in ratio of full-time equivalent staff to volume 
of operations 
EIB documents x          
I-
9.3.3 
Evidence from staff on availability of HR to fulfil the 
mandate 
Opinions of 
interviewees 
 x x    x x x x 
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EQ 10 To what extent were IF/OR operations complementary to and coordinated with those of the EC and EU MS and of other 
international and bilateral institutions and agencies?  
 
EQ10-GC EQ 10 on  Coordination and Complementarity 
Rationale and 
coverage of the 
question 
The IF/OR operations intervene in the broader context of partnership and association agreements with the ACP and OCT countries. They are 
deployed in a context in which the Commission and the EU MS also intervene. In this respect, chapter 7 of the Cotonou Agreement, and 
particularly Art. 76, enumerates the array of instruments deployed for supporting private sector development, including funds managed by the 
EIB. Coordination and complementarity between these instruments is a core issue. It is also expected that complementarity and coordination 
with other international and bilateral institutions has been in evidence.  
The question aims to assess the extent to which such coordination and complementarity was in evidence at two levels: at strategic level (the 
IF/OR instruments), and at the level of the operations. To do so, it will examine which initiatives were taken by the EIB in this respect or in 
which initiatives it has participated.  
Link with IL and 
evaluation 
criteria 
The present question addresses coordination and complementarity. In the intervention logic, it focuses at the input level.  
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Judgement criteria and indicators            
JC 10.1 Prior to financing one or several operations in a country or a 
sector, the EIB consults the other institutions and agencies 
active in the field/country, and in particular the EC and the 
EU MS, with a view to enhancing complementarity of 
operations 
           
I-10.1.1 The EIB meets the Commission, EU MS and other agencies 
(including IFIs) during the appraisal of its operations so as to 
promote complementarities between interventions 
EIB project documents 
and opinions of 
interviewees 
x x x x x x    x 
I-10.1.2 The EIB is active, during the appraisal of its operations, in the 
search for synergies with the Commission, EU MS and other 
agencies’ (including IFIs) interventions 
EIB project documents 
and opinions of 
interviewees 
x x x x x x    x 
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JC 10.2 EIB did participate in mechanisms that ensure coordination 
throughout the preparation and implementation process 
           
I-10.2.1 Existence of donor coordination mechanisms at the design and 
implementation stages 
Documents and 
opinions of interviewees
x x x x x x     
I-10.2.2 At design stage, the EIB is active in existing donor coordination 
mechanisms  
Documents and 
opinions of interviewees
x x x x x x     
I-10.2.3 At implementation stage, the EIB is active in existing donor 
coordination mechanisms 
Documents and 
opinions of interviewees
x x x x x x     
JC 10.3 EIB operations are complementary to those of other 
institutions and agencies with similar objectives 
           
I-10.3.1 EIB operations and those of other institutions and agencies 
(including IFIs) support the same objectives 
EIB and other 
institutions project 
documents 
x         x 
I-10.3.2 Evidence of synergies between EIB operations and those of 
other institutions and agencies (including IFIs) supporting the 
same objectives 
EIB and other 
institutions project 
documents, and 
opinions of interviewees
x x x x x x    x 
I-10.3.3 Evidence of conflicts, duplication or overlapping between EIB 
operations and those of other institutions and agencies (including 
IFIs) supporting the same objectives 
EIB and other 
institutions project 
documents, and 
opinions of interviewees
x x x x x x    x 
I-10.3.4 Evidence of an EIB’s leadership in the promotion of cooperation 
and complementarities with interventions supported by other 
institutions and agencies (including IFIs) 
Opinions of 
interviewees 
   x x x     
JC 10.4 The mandates of the EIB IF and OR envelope are distinct 
and complementary, and well coordinated 
           
I-10.4.1 The mandates of the EIB IF and OR envelope pursue different EIB documents x          
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objectives 
I-10.4.2 The mandates of the EIF IF and OR envelope promote a search 
for synergies between instruments 
EIB documents and 
opinions of interviewees
x x x x x x    x 
I-10.4.3 The mandates of the EIF IF and OR envelope avoid duplication 
between instruments 
EIB documents and 
opinions of interviewees
x x x x x x    x 
JC 10.5 EIB has a satisfactory interface with other EU initiatives to 
foster investment as well as the business climate in the ACP 
countries and OCTs 
           
I-10.5.1 The EU deployed specific instruments/initiatives to support 
private sector development in the ACP and OCTs.  
EU initiatives (to 
support PSD) 
documents 
x          
I-10.5.2 Evidence that EIB and EU initiatives to foster private sector 
development promote a search for synergies  
Documents and 
opinions of interviewees
x x x x x     x 
I-10.5.3 Evidence that EIB and EU initiatives to foster private sector 
development avoid duplication. 
Documents and 
opinions of interviewees
x x x x x     x 
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Annexe 6 – Coverage of Terms of Reference by Evaluation 
Questions 
TOR ref. TOR phrasing Concise 
overview 
EQ 1 EQ 2 EQ 3 EQ 4 EQ 5 EQ 6 EQ 7 EQ 8 EQ 9 EQ 10
4.1 It will review the portfolio in terms of 
project financing volumes (approvals, 
signatures and disbursements), by 
sector and by country/region, and 
instruments used,  as well as technical 
assistance and interest rates subsidies.  
X x                   
4.1. i) in-depth evaluation of the relevance 
(…) of EIB operations against their 
specific objectives as originally set 
within the Cotonou Agreement; 
  X                   
  in-depth evaluation of the 
performance (effectiveness) of EIB 
operations against their specific 
objectives as originally set within the 
Cotonou Agreement; 
    X X X X x x X     
  in-depth evaluation of (…) the 
performance (...efficiency...) of EIB 
operations against their specific 
objectives as originally set within the 
Cotonou Agreement; 
                  X   
  in-depth evaluation of (…) the 
performance (...sustainability) of EIB 
operations against their specific 
objectives as originally set within the 
Cotonou Agreement; 
X X X X x X
4.1.ii) the assessment of consistency with the 
national and regional EU development 
policies and strategies in ACP 
countries, as well as with national 
policies of the partner countries (…) 
  X                   
  the assessment of (…) the value added 
of EIB operations since 2003.  
X X X X X
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TOR ref. TOR phrasing Concise 
overview 
EQ 1 EQ 2 EQ 3 EQ 4 EQ 5 EQ 6 EQ 7 EQ 8 EQ 9 EQ 10
  In the assessment, the value-added of 
EIB operations will be measured 
against three elements: support of EU 
policy objectives and those of the 
Cotonou Agreement (…) 
X   
  In the assessment, the value-added of 
EIB operations will be measured 
against three elements: (...) the quality 
of the projects themselves and the 
financial and non-financial advantages 
brought in by the EIB operations 
compared to potential alternative 
sources of financing.  
    X X X X           
  ‐ selective analysis of the financial 
needs of the ACP and OCT 
beneficiaries, their absorption 
capacity and the availability of 
other sources of private or public 
financing for the relevant 
investments; 
X   
  ‐ the assessment of the cooperation 
and complementarity of actions 
between the EIB and the 
Commission, 
                    X 
  ‐ the assessment of the cooperation 
and synergies between the EIB 
and international and bilateral 
finance institutions and agencies. 
  X
  ‐ the assessment of the long term 
financial sustainability of the IF in 
the specific ACP environment 
related to its expected 
development impact[1].  
                X     
  ‐ the assessment of the risk profile 
of EIB's own resources operations 
and their performance, impact as 
well as coherence in relation to IF 
                X      
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TOR ref. TOR phrasing Concise 
overview 
EQ 1 EQ 2 EQ 3 EQ 4 EQ 5 EQ 6 EQ 7 EQ 8 EQ 9 EQ 10
measures 
4.3 Achievement of main impacts/effects: 
the Consultants shall identify all 
recorded results and impacts, including 
any unintended ones, and compare 
these to the intended results and/or 
impacts. The Consultants will also 
identify the changes, which occurred 
in the areas in which the EIB 
interventions - through IF or OR 
investments - were supposed to 
produce an impact, including at a 
sectoral and/or country as well as 
regional level  
        X X X X       
  ‐ Relevance: The extent to which 
the Programme's objectives are 
pertinent to the needs, priorities, 
problems and issues it was 
designed to address and, more 
generally, to broader EU policies 
and strategies; and the 
optimisation of the relevance of 
the Programme is to be assessed. 
It will further consider the way in 
which activities are prioritised and 
a pipeline developed, including the 
role of key stakeholders in the 
ACP partner countries and the 
EIB identifying projects. 
  X                   
  ‐ Effectiveness: The extent to which 
the Programme has contributed to 
the EU development policy 
objectives and specific objectives 
assigned to the EIB under its 
mandated, as specified in the 
    X X X X           
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TOR ref. TOR phrasing Concise 
overview 
EQ 1 EQ 2 EQ 3 EQ 4 EQ 5 EQ 6 EQ 7 EQ 8 EQ 9 EQ 10
Cotonou Agreement, and in 
particular in Annex II thereof. 
  ‐ Efficiency: For the activities which 
were effective, it will be necessary 
to question to what extent 
funding, human resources, 
regulatory and/or administrative 
resources available contributed to, 
or hindered the achievement of 
the objectives and results.  
                  X   
  ‐ Sustainability:  an analysis of the 
extent to which the results and 
impacts are being, or are likely to 
be maintained over time. 
      X X X X   X     
  ‐ Co-ordination and 
complementarity: The extent to 
which (i) the intervention logic of 
the Investment Facility and EIB 
own resources investments are 
coherent with and complementary 
to EC and/or Member State 
interventions that are designed to 
contribute to the EU external 
policy objectives, and (...) 
  X
  ‐ Co-ordination and 
complementarity: The extent to 
which (i) (…), and (ii) there is a 
logical distinction in the mandates 
and in practice between the 
function of the own resources 
envelope and the IF. 
  X                 x 
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Annexe 7 – EIB coordination with the 
Commission and other 
donors in the ACP countries 
1. Objectives and legal basis for the coordination 
The EIB is established under the EU law and it is legally bound to act within the limits of 
the Treaty establishing the European Community and its own statute which gives it a legal, 
financial and administrative personality.  
 
As the long-term lending institution of the EU, the EIB is specially mandated under the 
Partnership Agreement between the ACP and the European Communities1, to manage 
resources made available by the EU Member States for the Investment Facility and to use a 
predetermined amount of its own resources to provide financing in support of the policy 
objectives of the EU in the ACP countries. 
 
The Cotonou Agreement states that the EIB shall “act in accordance with the objectives of 
this Agreement” which are defined as “reducing and eventually eradicating poverty 
consistent with the objective of sustainable development and the gradual integration of 
ACP countries into the world economy”2. It is clear that this provision cannot be fulfilled 
without a close coordination between the EIB, the Commission, main operator of the EDF 
fund, and other donors and development financial institutions , in particular those of the 
EU. The (in) formal dialogue foreseen by the Cotonou Agreement is aimed at sharing 
information, fostering mutual understanding and facilitating the establishment of agreed 
priorities and shared agendas. In particular it allows recognizing existing links between the 
different aspects of the relations between the Parties and the various areas of coordination 
as laid down in this Agreement.  Beyond these general provisions of the Cotonou 
Agreement the Council Regulation 617/2007/EC sets the rules for the implementation of 
the 10th EDF and specifies formal mechanisms ensuring the coordination between the 
Commission, the Member States and the EIB3.  
 
Moreover, in order to preserve coherence between EU priorities and the operations 
conducted under the Investment Facility, an IF Committee has been set up under the 
auspices of the EIB according to Article 9 of the Internal Agreement between the 
Representatives of the Governments of the Member States on the financing of the 
Community Aid.  
 
                                                 
1  Cotonou Agreement 
2  Article 1 of Cotonou Agreement. 
3  For the 9th EDF, see Financial Regulation of the 27 March 2003 applicable to the 9th European Development Fund. 
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Finally, the EIB engages in close and continuous consultation and coordination with the 
European institutions and all Member states pursuing the Union’s policy objectives but 
also closely cooperates with other international financial institutions and civil society 
organizations. 
 
The next section describes the main coordination mechanisms and formal requirements as 
they result from these regulations, agreements and guidelines.  
2. Coordination mechanisms  
Coordination between the EIB, the Commission and the MS is foreseen to operate at three 
levels: 
 at general level through exchanges of views on the agreements and protocols and their 
annexes and on horizontal issues such as debt restructuring;  
 at country level, in the preparation phase, involving exchange of views and information  
on the economic situation and joint field missions or discussions on eligibility to 
mechanisms such as the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative (HIPC);  
 at project implementation level, the coordination is governed more by informal 
practices than by formal provisions, the latter concerning mainly monitoring and 
evaluation.   
 
The following diagram schematically describes the formal coordination steps foreseen at 
each phase of the project cycle. 
 
Preparation 
phase
• CSP/RSP prepared by Commission in coordination with MS and 
EIB
• NIP/RIP submitted to EDF Committee; EIB participation 
foreseen as observer and limited due to resource constraints
Implementation 
phase
• Annual action programmes established in coordination 
Commission-EIB with identification of EIB activities
• IF Committee approves programming of IF activities
• IF Committee, duly informed by EIB, delivers option on interest 
subsidy, etc.
• EIB informs the Commission and submits annual reports to the 
EDF Committee
Monitoring-
Evaluation phase
• Commission and EIB monitor the use of their assistance and 
conduct regular evaluations
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The following table elaborates on the various steps of the above formal coordination and 
describes the guidelines established by the EIB to frame its operations in conformity with 
these formal principles.  
 
Phases 
Coordination mechanism foreseen by 
governing instruments for 
Commission 
Coordination mechanism 
foreseen by governing 
instruments for EIB/IF 
Preparati
on 
 Preparation of the Country Strategy 
Paper and the Regional Strategy Paper 
(CSP and RSP) by the Commission in 
coordination with the MS locally 
represented and the EIB for matters 
relative to its operations and those of the 
IF4. 
 The EDF Committee (in which the EIB 
takes part of the exchange of views5) 
shall give its opinion in accordance with 
the management procedure on the 
resources allocation presented by the 
Commission6. 
 Preparation and adoption of an 
indicative program for implementing the 
CSP or RSP shall be subject of an 
exchange of views with the EIB in the 
framework of the EDF Committee7.  
 The multiannual indicative program shall 
ensure complementarity and coherence 
with operations financed by other 
donors and shall be adopted by the 
Commission. The EIB is invited to the 
exchange of views in case of joint 
preparation process8. 
 Change in CSP or RSP and its 
multiannual indicative programmes due 
to their reviews shall be adopted by the 
Commission taken into account the 
EDF Committee’s opinion9. 
 “The EIB, as manager of the IF 
and provider of loans from its 
own resources, will closely co-
ordinate its activities with the 
Commission, specifically its CSP 
and RSP, its private sector 
instruments and macro-
economic support activities,…” 
OG01 
 The EIB in co-operation with 
the Member States and the 
Commission drafts and updates 
credit risk guidelines, policies 
and procedure for IF operations. 
OG03 
Impleme
ntation 
 The annual action programmes shall be 
prepared by the Commission in 
coordination with the EIB, notably in 
cases of joint preparation. These 
 The EIB informs the 
Commission about the 
environmental issues for each 
project. OG15 
                                                 
4  Council Regulation 617/2007, article 2, §3(b) and Internal Agreement 10688/1/00 REV 1, article 15, §2, Council of 
the European Union 
5  Council Regulation 617/2007, article 11, §3 
6  Council Regulation 617/2007, article 3, §3 
7  Council Regulation 617/2007, article 4, §5 
8  Council Regulation 617/2007, article 4 §3 
9  Council Regulation 617/2007, article 5 §6 
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Phases 
Coordination mechanism foreseen by 
governing instruments for 
Commission 
Coordination mechanism 
foreseen by governing 
instruments for EIB/IF 
documents shall state how the EIB 
activities will be taken into account10. 
Amendments to these programmes shall 
be adopted in respect with the EDF 
Committee’s opinion11. 
 The EIB is regularly informed by the 
Commission on the projects and 
programmes implementation and the 
EIB regularly informs the Commission 
about the coordination activities that 
they are implementing or preparing12. 
 The IF Committee approves the 
operational guidelines on the 
implementation of the IF, the 
investment strategies and business plans 
of the IF, the annual reports of the IF as 
well as any general policy document 
related to the IF. Moreover it delivers an 
opinion on proposals to grant interest 
subsidy, proposals for an IF investment 
for any project for which the EC has 
delivered a negative opinion and other 
proposals related to IF. In that respect, 
the EIB is responsible to submit to the 
IF Committee any matters that require 
its approval or its opinion13. 
 The EIB shall prepare or revise jointly 
with the Commission guidelines on the 
implementation of the IF14. 
 The EIB shall request the Commission’s 
opinion beforehand on investment 
strategies, business plans and general 
policy documents.15 
 The EIB shall request the Commission’s 
opinion at the appraisal stage of a 
project on the conformity of projects 
with the relevant CSP or RSP or with 
the general objectives of the IF16. 
 The EIB shall request the agreement of 
the Commission at the appraisal stage of 
                                                 
10 Council Regulation 617/2007, article 7, §2 
11  Council Regulation 617/2007, article 7, §4 
12  Council Regulation 617/2007, article 7, §6 
13  Internal Agreement 10688/1/00 REV 1, article 30, §1-2-3, Council of the European Union 
14  Council Regulation 617/2007, article 13, §5 (a) 
15  Council Regulation 617/2007, article 13, §5 (b) 
16  Council Regulation 617/2007, article 13, §5 (c) 
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Phases 
Coordination mechanism foreseen by 
governing instruments for 
Commission 
Coordination mechanism 
foreseen by governing 
instruments for EIB/IF 
a project on any proposal made to the IF 
Committee for an interest subsidy. In 
case of the Commission gives a negative 
opinion, the EIB has to have a favorable 
opinion from the IF Committee in order 
to proceed. In that respect, the EIB shall 
periodically inform the Commission and 
the IF Committee if it decides not to 
proceed17. 
 The EIB shall periodically inform the 
Commission regarding the 
implementation of projects financed 
from the 10th EDF resources it 
administers. In that respect, an annual 
report shall be submitted to the EDF 
Committee for an exchange of views18. 
Monitori
ng – 
Evaluati
on 
 The Commission and the EIB monitor, 
each to the extent to which it concerned, 
the use of the EDF assistance by the 
beneficiaries19.  
 Information related to the progress 
towards the objectives of the IF shall be 
sent by the EIB to the IF Committee. 
The report of the performance of the IF 
shall also be submitted to the IF 
Committee20.   
 The EC and the EIB cooperate in order 
to regularly evaluate the results and the 
effectiveness of the projects 
implemented. If necessary, the 
evaluation takes the form of 
independent external evaluations21.  
 These evaluations are undertaken in 
collaboration with partner countries 
(regions) as well as with the EU MS 
locally represented22. The report finally 
edited is communicated to the Council, 
the EDF Committee and the EIB for 
information. 
 Through the ESIAF, the EIB 
reports on the expected impact 
of the individual projects as well 
as of the overall portfolio to the 
Commission, amongst others.  
OG12 
 The DIAF, which improve the 
Bank’s understanding and 
assessment of project quality 
and soundness, has benefited 
from internal discussions as well 
as from comments made by the 
EU MS and the Commission. 
They have welcomed the 
adoption of such framework. 
OG13 
 Ex-post evaluations are carried 
out by independent evaluators, 
under the supervision of the 
EIB’s Evaluation Department. 
The evaluation reports are 
submitted to the IF Committee 
and made available for the ACP 
countries concerned. OG01 
                                                 
17  Council Regulation 617/2007, article 13, §5 (d) and article 6 
18  Council Regulation 617/2007, article 14, §2 
19  Council Regulation 617/2007, article 14, §1 
20  Council Regulation 617/2007, article 14, §4 
21  Council Regulation 617/2007, article 15, §1 
22  Council Regulation 617/2007, article 15, §2 
MID-TERM EVALUATION OF THE IF AND EIB OR OPERATIONS IN ACP/OCTS 
ADE - EGEVAL II  
Final Report  September 2010 Annexe 7/Page 6 
3. Coordination in practice 
The EIB has opened Regional Representations in the ACP region in order to be closer to 
the partner countries and to increase its synergies with the Commission and other 
development partners. According to the EIB, these Regional Representations allow “to 
strengthen and deepen the strategic role it plays in contributing to sustainable economic 
growth across the entire range of ACP and OCT countries.23” 
 
The EIB currently has five regional offices in the ACP region: 
 Dakar office serving Western Africa 
 Nairobi office serving East and Central Africa 
 Pretoria office serving Southern Africa 
 Fort de France office serving the Caribbean region 
 Sydney serving the Pacific region 
 
A detailed assessment of EIB-Commission coordination in practice is provided under the 
answer to EQ10 of the main report (see section 4.10). 
                                                 
23  « Activity and corporate report responsibility report », Annual report volume 1, EIB.  
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Annexe 8 – Operation Fiches 
This Annexe presents a brief description of the operations selected for desk and field 
studies, in the form of a summary table per intervention. It provides a mere description of 
the operations; their evaluative assessment as such is presented in the Data Collection Grid in 
Annexe 9 in an unprocessed form, at the level of each indicator. 
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2000_MAGADI SODA 
Operation Title MAGADI SODA PURE ASH PROJECT (2000-Magadi Soda) 
Country/Region Kenya, Region Central and Eastern Africa
EIB Ref. 20000279
Operation Start 
date & End date 
Signed 18/11/2003 
Time table:   Apparaisal   Completion 
Start of works   01/10/2003  01/04/2004 
End of works   30/06/2006  31/12/2008 
 
Financing 
Committed 
A: €  8 930 000 Senior Loan on OR
B: € 11 265 500 Senior Loan under IF  
C: €  1 654 719 Subordinated loan under IF 
 
The total project estimated project cost is €121.7 M. (See detail in Appraisal Report, January 2002, 
Appendix A.) 
Amount 
cancelled 
 
Budget disbursed 2000_Magadi Soda 
N° projet   20000279 20000279 20000279 
Dénomination de l'opération   MAGADI SODA 
PURE ASH 
PROJECT / A 
MAGADI 
SODA 
PURE ASH 
PROJECT / 
B (IF) 
MAGADI 
SODA PURE 
ASH 
PROJECT / 
C (IF) 
Nom du pays de la transaction   KENYA 
Type   OR IF IF 
Date de signature   07/04/2004 07/04/2004 07/04/2004
montant signé   8 930 000.00 11 365 
500.00 
1 654 718.56
montant augmentation     0.00 31 078.56
DECAISSEMEMTS 
2003 0.00 0.00 0.00
2004 608 863.64 608 618.03 133 490.22
2005 5 236 227.30 5 331 173.13 1 174 634.16
2006 3 084 909.06 3 081 348.88 346 594.18
2007 0.00 2 243 326.10 0.00
2008 0.00 0.00 0.00
2009 0.00 0.00 0.00
TOTAL 8 930 000.00 11 264 
466.14 
1 654 718.56
 
Beneficiary The borrower and promoter is Magadi Soda Company Ltd 
Operation’s 
Description and 
Project 
Background & 
History 
The operation consists in  
1) $US 11 M ordinary load on OR, tenor 10 years, grace 3 years 
2) € equivalent of $US 14 M maximum ordinary loan on IF, tenor 10 years, grace 3 years 
3) € equivalent of $US 2 M maximum subordinated loan on IF, term 10 years, two bullet repayments 
at the end of years 9 and 10. 
 
The project consists in the expansion of soda ash mining and processing (soda ash is used primarily in 
the manufacture of glass, detergents and in the chemical industry).  
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The project is located at Lake Magadi in south-western Kenya, some 100 km south-west of Nairobi.
The total project cost is estimated $US 103 (€ 112) (cf. Appraisal Report, 2002) 
The promoter is Magadi Soda Company Ltd, Kenya (MSC), a 100% affiliate of Brunner Mont Ltd of 
Great Britain. MSC dredges trona from Lake Magadi since 1911. Processing consists of washing, 
calcination, milling and sizing. The production is railed to Mombasa by its subsidiary Magadi Rail which 
operates partly on the Kenya Railways system. 
MSC was established in the 1920s in Kenya where it possesses the world’s largest naturally occurring 
surface deposits of material for producing soda ash. The Magadi plant is the largest single exporting 
company in Kenya. 
The project implementation took more time (2.5 years) than expected due to technical problems with a 
combustion chamber. Nevertheless, the promoter, the project, the resource, its location and the market 
proved so attractive that the Tata Group has taken over the promoter in 2007, before project 
completion. The new owner prematurely paid back in 20008 the the outstanding loan to the EIB and 
refinanced the whole financing package.  
Overall 
objectives 
 
Specific 
objectives 
To maintain competitiveness by improving the quality of the soda ash product (reduction of impurities, 
particularly sodium fluoride) and by increasing capacity from actual (en 2000) 240 000 t/a to 365 000 
t/a.  
Expected results To valorise use of a local resources and to foster growth through positive employment effects and an 
increase of foreign exchange.  
Activities MSC’s principal product is soda ash. The production process involves dredging trona from Lake 
Magadi at a rate of about 2 tons per ton of final product, pumping it to a washery onshore to generate 
crushed refined soda, which then passes a rotary kiln for calcination and a dust remover, before the 
final product is sent on a 602 km railway journey to Mombassa, of which the first 146 km on track 
owned by MSC’s railway subsidiary. Current production (in 2003) stands at 325 000 tons p.a. soda ash. 
Almost all of MSC’s soda ash production is destined for export, to South-East Asia, the Middle East 
and Africa. The company is a small player on the international soda ash markets. It sustains a discount 
on world market prices of about 20 % due to its soda ash not matching top quality criteria in terms of 
content of sodium fluoride, insolubles and dust as well as whiteness. Due to this lower quality, and also 
to avoid direct competition with the dominant US exporters, MSC is currently selling soda ash 
exclusively to manufacturers of container glass as opposed to sheet glass used in construction.  
The project comprises construction of high purity soda ash plant to generate soda ash that meets the 
market’s top quality criteria. 
Main 
achievements 
The project benefitted from the boom of demand for soda ash. The new facilities were quasi fully 
completed in 2008. The project proved sound and likely to lead to healthy financial and economic 
prospects. From an environmental point of view it is sustainable as current resource replenishment is 
well above exploitation levels. 
Project's main 
weak points 
Implementation was hampered by unsuitable design of a low tech component, a simple combustion 
chamber. This delayed early operation and the project was not fully completed. 
Issues  The project was supported by the EIB and other lenders with due attention to its developmental 
aspects. The fact that it was so successful that the promoter was taken over by a large international 
group was not anticipated and therefore there is no guarantee that the project will be further conducted 
in a similar spirit. 
Documentary     EIB: Relevé quotidien. New Project Kenya-Magadi Soda. Luxembourg 24th July 2000, 
OP3/ACPII/2000-960/Agora:20000279/DW/hb 
 EIB: Fact Sheet A: proposal to appraise new operation. Magadi Soda Ltd, Luxembourg 6th 
September 2001. OP3/ACPII/Agora:20000279/DW/hb 
 Note to OP3. Opinion for Appraisal Authorisation. Project Magadi Soda, country Kenya. 
Luxembourg 24/10/2000, PJ/I&S/2000-1186/GCE/SHW/ms 
 EIB Fact Sheet B: financing proposal. Magadi Soda Pure Ash Project, Kenya, Luxembourg, 9th 
October 2003, Ops B/ACP-IF-2/2000-0279/MG 
  EIB Magadi Soda Pure Ash Project. Ops B Financial report. 9th October 2004 
  EIB Magadi Soda Pure Ash Project, RM/CRD Opinion, 22/1/2004 
 ADE:  Mid-term evaluation of the Investment Facility and EIB own resources operations in ACP 
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countries and the OCTS, Inception Report, Annex 3: List of EIB operations in ACP countries and 
the OCTs, November 2009. 
 Kenya-European Community, Country Strategy Paper for the period 2003-2007. 15th October 
2003. 
 Republic of Kenya - European Community, Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative 
Programme for the period 2008-2013, 9th December 2007. 
 Region of Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean - European Community Regional 
Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme for the Period 2002 – 2007, June 2002. 
  Region of Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean - European Community Regional 
Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme for the Period 2008 – 2013, 15th November 
2008. 
 EIB. Appraisal Report, Magadi Soda, Luxembourg 29/1/2002. (PJ/I&S/GCE/KAI/scm) 
 EIB Update to the PJ Appraisal Report of 29/1/2002 (PJ/I&S/GCE/KAI/scm) 
 EIB PJ-PPR Summary Report (2007 
  EIB Magadi Soda Pure Ash Project, Project completion Report, Luxembourg 23/4/2008. 
 EIB. Board of Directors. Magadi Soda Pure Ash Project (Kenya). 9/10/2003 
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2001_MOMA TITANIUM 
Operation Title MOMA TITANIUM (2001 Moma Titanium) 
Country/Region Mozambique / Region Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
EIB Ref. 20010242
Operation Start 
date & End date 
Signed 29/4/2003 
 
Project implementation to start 2d quarter of 2003 and to last for a period of 24 months, followed by 
commissioning and a ramp-up period of another 12 months. Full production therefore foreseen for 2d 
quarter of 2006 (Source Appraisal Report February 2003) 
Financing 
Committed 
€ 15 000 000 Senior loan from IF resources
€ 40 000 000 Subordinated loan from IF resources 
€  2 750 000 Subordinated loan from IF resources.  
 
The total investment cost is $US 314.1m or € 290.4 m. (status early 2003) 
Source: ADE Mid Term Evaluation of IF and EIB OR, Inception Report, Annex 3 
Amount 
cancelled 
 
Budget disbursed 
N° projet
Dénomination de l'opération MOMA TITANIUM 
MINERALS
MOMA 
TITANIUM 
MINERALS
MOMA 
TITANIUM C
Nom du pays de la transaction
Type IF IF IF
Date de signature 18/06/2004 18/06/2004 30/06/2005
montant signé 15 000 000.00 40 000 000.00 2 750 000.00
montant augmentation 0.00 0.00 0.00
2003 0.00
2004 0.00
2005 0.00
2006 0.00
2007 2 750 000.00
2008 0.00
2009 0.00
TOTAL 2 750 000.0055 000 000.00
DECAISSEMEMTS
2001_Moma Titanium
20010242
MOZAMBIQUE
0.00
29 469 548.00
15 217 952.00
7 500 000.00
2 812 500.00
0.00
Beneficiary Borrowers: Kenmare Moma Mining Ltd (KMML) and Kenmare Moma Processing Ltd (KMPL) which 
are local subsidiaries of Kenmare Resources PLC, Ireland.  
Operation’s 
Description and 
Project 
Background & 
History 
Operation:
A senior loan from IF resources (€ 15 M), tenor 13 years including 3-year grace period. 
A subordinated loan from IF resources (€40 M), tenor ³15 years including 5-year grace period. The 
loans bears a fixed interest of 10%p/a capitalized until financial completion. Remuneration also 
comprises US$4 M shares in Kenmare Resources plc  (at the 2003 rights issue price), and pre-payment 
premium of +30% of the outstanding loan in the event of sale of Kenmare or the project.  The IF 
finances 17% of the total project cost estimated €325.4 M. 
A further standby facility was provided by EIB and two other lenders in June 2005 for a total of $US 
7.5M to which the Bank contributed with € 2.75 M. (Source Project Progres Report 2007) 
 
The project concerns the development of the Moma heavy mineral sands project on the coast of 
Nampula Province in Northern Mozambique and comprises its detailed engineering, procurement, 
construction, implementation, commissioning and operation. It is initially based on some 400 Mt of 
exploitable sands grading 4.3% heavy minerals, composed of ilmenite, zircon and rutile. The facilities 
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are planned with a capacity to dredge 22 Mt/a of sand for a period of 20 years, with a final 
concentraction and separation capacity of some 625 000 t/a ilmenite, 24 000 t/a zircon and 12 000 t/a 
rutile. Ilmenite (main product), rutile and zircon (by products) are used primarily in the paint industry, 
as titaniuèm oxide pigments. 
The project comprises the following main components: 
 The exploration and the predevelopment of the deposit 
 A new dredge, a used concentrator and a used mineral separation plant as well as their adaptation 
to the project specific conditions 
 The tailings handling system 
 The necessary infrastructure including the export facilities (conveyor, jetty, barge), housing, power 
generation and distribution 
 A new 170 km long 110 kV power line connection from the existing national grid at Nampula 
Chronology: 
June 2004: finance contracts were signed in by the group of lenders (EIB, ADB, KfW, FMO, EAIF 
and ABSA) along side new capital raised by equity in the market.  
2004: Main Engineering, Procurement and Construction (EPC) was awarded to a joint venture between 
Bateman of South Africa and Multiplex Australia. 
April 2007: beginning of mining and heavy concentrate production at Moma. Expected annual 
production levels of 800 000 tonnes of ilmenite, 21 000 tons or rutile and 56 000 tons of zircon.  
Kenmare has extension plans to increase production levels of ilmenite and co-products by end of 2009 
July 2007, the project was regarded as by and large completed (Cf.EIB Project Progress Report, Moma 
Titanium (Serapis 200010242), Luxembourg 25 July 2007, OPS B/ACP-IF-3/2007-1460/mh.) (4 
month delay to the initial plan). Delays in the ramp-up phase do not yet (2010) permit the mine to 
reach full production capacity.  
The project cost has increased from $US 314.1 at appraisal stage to $US 401.9 (30/11/2009), i.e. 28% 
increase, covered by additional subordinated debt provided by EIB and FMO in 2005. 
Commercial production started in January 2008 although the  project was not fully completed; it was 
expected to be completed in June 2009 but various events (cyclone, missed deadlines by the 
construction contractors, faulty equipment, poor management by Kenmare) led to the postponement 
of the technical completion till December 2010.  
These developments had led Kenmare to initiate in September 2008 a dialogue with the lender in view 
of preserving liquidity. The lenders, including the Bank, agree to a deferment of capital repayments 
during 2009. Kenmare issued additional equity shares ($15 million); the willingness of other DFI to 
participate in this share issue was such that the Bank did not have to participate.  
Overall 
objectives 
Strengthening the productive base and private sector of the Mozambique economy, reduce poverty in 
the Nampula Province in Northern Mozambique 
Specific 
objectives 
To stimulate the regional economy and infrastructure in Northern Mozambique, a particularly poor are, 
which currently lacks investment.  
Expected results The Moma Titanium Minerals production site (Northern Mozambique) is developed with a profitable 
production capacity of 625 000 t/year of ilmenite (used by pigment industry)  24 000 t/year of Zircon 
and 12 000 t/year of rutile as by-products.  
Activities Engineering, implementation, commissioning and operation of a production facility for ilmenite of 
titania-feedstock-marl<el grade, wilh zircon and rutile as by-products. It comprises a suction dredge, a 
floating barge, a wei feed preparation and a concentration plant 10 produce some 900 000 t/a mixed 
concentrate, and a land based wet and dry separation plant to separate and 10 clean the various valuable 
minerals. An ilmenite fluid bed roaster is included in order to reduce the unwanted chromium content. 
A 2.5 km long overland conveyor with a capacity of 1000 t/h will transport the products from the 
separation plant 10 a 720 m long marine jetty. The  products will then be transhipped to a mooring 
point - for ocean-going vessels sorne 10 km offshore - through a 4000 dwt self-propelled, self-
unloading barge. The project further includes adequate storage, support, administration and 
infrastructural facilities, including a 170 km long 110 kV power line and a back-up diesel generation 
station on site. 
Main 
achievements 
The project is regarded as an example of innovation in project financing and has won several awards: 
“The African Mining Deal of the Year “(in 2004), “Most Effective Financing of a Mine or Expansion 
Project”, and is presented as a case study in many universities world wide (Source : EIB Project 
Progress Report, Moma Titanium (Serapis 200010242), Luxembourg 25 July 2007, OPS B/ACP-IF-
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3/2007-1460/mh.) 
Project's main 
weak points 
Kenmare, the promoter, was a small company to undertake such a large project. This created difficulty 
in organising the project’s financial montage for the project should have required more resources 
upfront. However, this was resolved because additional finance could be obtained at a later stage, as 
had been anticipated by the Bank.  
At the end of the ramp up phase the project did not achieve 100% of the production target and faced 
difficulties in honouring its debts. Creditors had to postpone 2 instalments and also postponed the date 
of completion. 
The profitability of the Moma mine remains uncertain at the end of 2009. However, the promoter 
expect relatively high returns in the future  
Issues   
Documentary     EIB, Relevé quotidien, Luxembourg, 2d April 2001, OP3/ACP-III/AGORA n°20010242/GSF-
rm 
 EIB Fact Sheet A: proposal to appraise new operation, Luxembourg 28th February 2002, Ops 
B/ACP-3/A° 2001-0242 
 EIB Note to OP3. Opinion for Appraisal Authorisation, Luxembourg, 15th May 2001, 
PJ/I&S/2001-0556/GCE/IK/sp 
 EIB Fact Sheet B: financing proposal, Moma Titanium Mozambique, Luxembourg, 27th February 
2003. Ops B/ACT-IF-3/2001-0242 
 EIB Mozambique Moma Titanium, Ops B – Financial Report, Luxembourg27th March 2003, 
OpsB/ACP-IF-3/2003-320Q/GSF (Agora n°2001 0242 Investment Facility) 
 EIB Moma Titanium Project Mozambique, RM/CRD on operation already approved, 27th March 
2003. 
 EIB Appraisal Report, Moma Titanium, Luxembourg 27th February 2003, PJ/I&S/2003-
259/GCE/MUG/ms 
 EIB Moma Titanium Mozambique. Environmental Summary (no date 
 EIB Moma Titanium Mozambique: map and process flowsheed. February 2003 
  EIB Project Progress Report, Moma Titanium (Serapis 200010242), Luxembourg 25 July 2007, 
OPS B/ACP-IF-3/2007-1460/mh. 
 Mozambique-European Community, Country Strategy Paper for the period 2001-2007 (not dated). 
 Mozambique - European Community, Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme 
for the period 2008-2013, 9th December 2007. 
 Southern African Development Community - European Community. Regional Strategy Paper and 
Regional Indicative Programme for the Period 2002 – 2007, Draft, (not dated).Addendum to the  
 Southern African Development Community - European Community. Regional Strategy Paper and 
Regional Indicative Programme for the Period 2002 – 2007, Draft, 10/01/2007. 
 Southern African Development Community - European Community Regional Strategy Paper and 
Regional Indicative Programme for the Period 2008 – 2013, (18/9/2008). 
 ADE:  Mid-term evaluation of the Investment Facility and EIB own resources operations in ACP 
countries and the OCTS, Inception Report, Annex 3: List of EIB operations in ACP countries and 
the OCTs, November 2009. 
 EIB: Cotonou Risk Report 31st December 2009, 3/2/2010. 
 EIB Appraisal Report Moma Titanium. Luxembourg 27, 2003. PJ/I&S/2003-
259/GCE/MUG/ms. (NB complementary to D24). 
 EIB.  Moma Titanium. PJ-PPR, Summary Report, 12/10/2009 
 EIB. MOZAMBIQUE- MOMA TITANIUM (FI No, 22604, 22605 and 23084; Serapis No 2001-
0242) Finance contract signed between the EIB and Kenmare Moma Processing (Mauritius) Ltd 
and Kenmare Moma Mining (Mauritius) Ltd on 18'" June 2004, 18'" June 2004 and 30th June 2005 
respectively. Luxembourg, 30/11/2009 
 EIB. Moma Titanium Minerals. Change to operation after Board Approval. Luxembourg 
5/2/2010, Refs: Ops B/ACP-IF-3/OP-2010-223.  
 SRK Consulting. Moma Titanium Minerals Project: December 2009 Project Update. Report 
Prepared for the Lenders, February 2010. 
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 EIB. Mozambique Moma Titanium. Project Progress Report, 25/7/2007. OpsB/ACP-IF-3/2007-
1460/mh 
 EIB. Board of Directors. Moma Titanium Mozambique, 29 April 2003. Doc. 03/181. 
 EIB. Moma Titanium C. Note Conjointe N° FI/2004-695; Operation number: 2001-0242, 
Luxembourg 30/6/2005. 
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2003_BOAD PG IV 
                                                 
1  Sources : « Relevé quotidien (RQ) » (for this operation), EIB, 9 April 2003 ; « Fact Sheet B : proposition de 
financement », EIB, 11 mars 2004 
2  Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS or UEMOA in French): Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Sanegal and Togo 
Intervention Title Banque Ouest Africaine de Développement PG IV1 
Country/Region West Africa (regional) 
EIB Ref. OPS B/ACPIF-1/n°20030186/MM
Project Start date 
& End date 
Signature date: 10/12/2004
Term loan: 15 years maximum, of which grace period of 5 years maximum 
Term guarantee: 10 years maximum 
Financing 
committed 
This operation consists of a global loan, a guarantee facility, and an equity participation for the 
following maximum amounts (on both OR and  the IF): 
a) Global loan (on OR): €25m  
b) Guarantee facility (on IF):  €25m 
c) Participation to capital increase (equity investment on IF): €4.6m 
Amount 
cancelled 
a) Global loan (on OR): n/a
b) Guarantee facility (on IF):  Amount allocated: 0 (according to the IF Annual Report 2008) 
c) Participation to capital increase (on IF):  n/a 
Budget disbursed  
Beneficiary Borrower: Banque Ouest Africaine de Développement (BOAD)
Final beneficiaries : Private sector companies in countries of intervention of the BOAD2  and operating 
in the following sectors : industry, agro-business, mining, tourism, transportation, communications, 
services related to those sectors and health and education 
Project 
Background & 
History 
The BOAD is the reference regional development bank in the ECOWAS zone. This is the fourth 
global loan with the EIB.  
See also the information  below under “Activities”.  
Overall 
objectives 
Favouring private sector companies of the ECOWAS zone
Specific 
objectives 
Reinforcing the financial sector 
Expected results See the information  below under “Activities”.
Activities This operation consists of the following:
a) a new global loan on OR of €25m aimed at medium to long term support in favour of private sector 
companies of the UEMOA zone. This loans come after three earlier loans to the BOAD amounting to 
a total of €37m (e.g. BOAD III signed in 1998); 
b) a €25m guarantee facility (on the IF) for counter- or co-guaranteeing partially (i) bond issuance for 
private companies guaranteed by the BOAD ; (ii) BOAD loans to private companies ; and (iii) credit 
lines in favour of local financial institutions specialised in micro-finance. Note. This was the first 
guarantee operation under the Cotonou Agreement’s IF. It was undertaken with a trusted partner.  The 
regional local financial market regulation requires that bond issues be guaranteed at 100%; 
c) a participation to the BOAD capital increase, through a €4.6m equity investment on IF resources 
increasing the EIB’s share in the BOAD from 0.3% to 0.6%, or from 1 to 2 billion FCFA (+ €1.5m) 
for taking it to the same level as the other BOAD’s B shareholders.  The EIB participation to the 
capital increase marks its support to this institution which seeks rating in the future.   
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Documentary     Operation’s « Relevé quotidien (RQ) » (for this operation 2003_BOAD PG IV), EIB, 9 April 2003 
 Operation’s « Fact Sheet B : proposition de financement », EIB, 11 mars 2004 
 Operation’s « Fact Sheet A : Proposition portant sur l'instruction d'une nouvelle opération », EIB, 
26 September 2003 
 Operation’s “Note conjointe”, EIB, 2 December 2004
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2003_Mauritius Container 
Intervention Title MAURITIUS CONTAINER TERMINAL II 
 
Country/Region Mauritius
EIB Ref. 2003 0167
Project Start date 
& End date 
14/12/2004 – The projects is expected to be fully completed by end of July 2009.  
Financing 
committed 
€14 million (EIB’s own resources) – 49.47% of total cost
Amount 
cancelled 
No indication 
Amount 
disbursed 
€14 million. Thanks to favourable EUR/USD exchange rate, the Bank’s loan exceeded the cost of the 
EIB-financed component of the initial project. Therefore the Bank agreed to use the balance (€3.7 
million) to partly finance additional equipments.  
Beneficiary Direct beneficiary: Cargo Handling Corporation Ltd (CHCL) is responsible for the management of 
all port handling operations, notably containers. It is owned to the level of 40% by the Mauritius Port 
Authority (MPA) and 60% by the Mauritian State Investment Corporation. Although thus a parastatal, 
it’s incorporated and operates as a private sector company.  
Project 
Background & 
History 
The Mauritius Container Terminal (MCT) was commissioned in 1999 as a result of the EIB (and 
IBRD) financed Port Louis Container Terminal I project. As MCT initially had spare capacity, CHCL 
decided to aggressively market the terminal for trans-shipment, which subsequently has increased 
dramatically from some 3 551 TEUs in 2000/2001 to 72 103 TEUs in 2002/2003. As a result the MCT 
has become congested by trans-shipped containers and required urgent expansion. However, even 
without trans-shipment, MCT would require a substantial increase in capacity. 
The purpose of this project is to provide this capacity increase, while making sure that the trans-
shipment traffic is profitable to the Mauritian economy. The project comprises various components 
such as paving of container stacking area and purchase of container handling equipment. The EIB’s 
financing would be allocated towards 2 ship-to-shores, post panama, rail mounted gantry cranes. 
Overall 
objectives 
The overall objective is to increase efficiency of maritime transport in order to enable Mauritius to play 
a full part in international trade (one of the fundamental objectives of the Cotonou agreement). 
As all trade of Mauritius goes through Port-Louis and the most part of trade is containerised, the 
Mauritius Container Terminal is a key component in the economic development of that country. 
Through its new hub function the Mauritius Container Terminal contributes to regional integration 
thereby bringing economic benefits not only to Mauritius but also to its neighbouring countries. 
Specific 
objectives 
The extension of the Mauritius Container Terminal was made in order to double its capacity by 
providing: (i) additional paved areas for container stacking; and (ii) additional container handling 
equipment on the quayside and landside. MCT is located in the only commercial port in Mauritius, near 
the capital city of Port Louis. 
Expected results As a result, the area of the container yard will approximately double, but its capacity will increase 1.5 
times from about 2,500 to 6,200 TEU (twenty foot equivalent container unit) slots (over a height of 2.5 
levels), and the annual throughput (counting trans-shipped containers twice, in and out) will increase 
from about 200,000 to 500,000 TEUs (currently part of the unpaved stacking area must be used). 
However, in order to achieve this throughput, the fleet of 6 RTGs, 10 tractors and 13 trailers will need 
to be increased to 8 RTGs, 20 tractors and 26 trailers after about three years, and a rubber-tyred, 
mobile quay crane added in about five years, so that the terminal can reach its full capacity. 
Activities More specifically, the project includes:
 pavement (with concrete blocks) of a 6.4 ha area for container stacking, including 144 reefer 
points (for refrigerated containers), drainage and lighting poles; 
 provision of 2 ship-to-shore, post-panamax, rail-mounted gantry cranes with a 47.5m reach 
and a 41-ton lifting capacity;  
 provision of 6 rubber-tyred, yard gantry cranes (RTGs) straddling six container rows (plus a 
truck lane) over four levels (plus one for container movement) for stacking containers in the 
yard; and 
 provision of 10 tractors and 13 trailers for transporting forty-foot containers in the yard. 
MID-TERM EVALUATION OF THE IF AND EIB OR OPERATIONS IN ACP/OCTS 
ADE - EGEVAL II 
Final Report  September 2010 Annexe 8/Page 13 
Main 
achievements 
No information available in that respect.
 
Project's main 
weak points 
Main risks: 
 Concession Risk: The concession contract between MPA and CHCL is for renewable periods 
of 5 years only.  
 Market risk: International container shipment/handling is a competitive business, and “worst 
case” projections for CHCL, with adverse volume and tariff assumptions, indicate financial 
losses for CHCL over the next seven years.  
Mitigants:  
 As part of the loan documentation the Bank will seek satisfactory arrangements being in place 
to ensure that in the event of termination of the concession, the Borrower will be in a position 
to repay the amounts outstanding under the loan;  
 The MCT will always need an operator; should the concession be terminated early, the 
shareholding structure (whereby both institutions in the port sector are in fine fully 
government owned) can be considered as a strong mitigant for an orderly solution being 
found and implemented. 
 Mitigants of the market risks are that (i) import/export container handling for the Mauritius 
market is a captive activity and (ii) MCT has a number of comparative advantages to keep it 
competitive in the transhipment business (location, efficiency, space). 
 
Issues  Positive 
 As evidenced by the relevant RFT (“Ce projet dont les objectifs étaient très ambitieux est 
pour l’heure un succès”) the previous project has been implemented in a satisfactory manner. 
The successful reorganisation of the Mauritian port sector and the investments realised (part 
financed by the Bank) have resulted in an increased efficiency, substantially increased traffic 
and a generally sound development of the entities involved; these facts augur well for the 
proposed extension project.  
 CHCL’s professionalism, technical capacity and experience should ensure a successful project 
implementation and allow to attract remunerative transhipment traffic. 
 EIB will bring considerable value added through its requirement to carry out a tariff study by 
an international consultant to clarify what the optimum level of charges by MPA and CHCL 
should be for each type of traffic (imports/exports and trans-shipment). 
 
Documentary    « Preliminary Information Note », EIB, 2004
« Fact sheet A : proposal to appraise a new operation », EIB, 2004 
« Fact sheet B: financing proposal », EIB, 2004 
« Mauritius: Mauritius Container Terminal II Project. Extension of the Mauritius Container Terminal. 
Cotonou Agreement-Loan from the Bank’s own resources. Ops B Financial report», EIB, 2004 
« Appraisal Report – Mauritius Container Terminal II – Mauritius », EIB, 2004 
« Note conjointe », EIB, 2004 
« Conseil d’administration. Projet MAURITIUS CONTAINER TERMINAL II », EIB, 2004 
« Ops B Monitoring report 2009 », EIB, 2009 
« Mauritius – European Community. Country Strategy Paper and Indicative programme for the period 
2001-2007 », EC,  
« Republic of Mauritius - European Community. Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative 
programme for the period 2008-2013 », EC, 
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2003_Dakar-Ziguinchor 
Intervention Title Liaison Maritime Dakar-Ziguinchor
Country/Region Senegal 
EIB Ref. OPS B/ACPIF-I/2003-0142/MM (n°23093)
Project Start date 
& End date 
Signature date: 1 July 2005 
Term: 18 years 
The project itself is expected to last 30 months.  
Financing 
committed 
 Senior loan of €10m on the IF 
 Annual interest rate subsidy of 3%3 
Amount 
cancelled 
€7. 85m has been disbursed (out of €10m). The remainder is cancelled. 
Budget disbursed See line above 
Beneficiary Direct beneficiary: Republic of Senegal
Intermediary beneficiary : Ministry of Infrastructure, Equipment and Transport4 
Project 
Background & 
History 
The Senegalese Government asked to the EIB to cofinance this sea link project which is supported by 
the whole international community in its effort to reinsert the Casamance region in the Senegalese 
economy. 
As mentioned in its 2004 Fact Sheet A: “the sea link Dakar - Ziguinchor is a complement indispensable 
to the highway which crosses Gambia. It is only capable of assuring the transport of the travellers with 
big luggage or diverse goods. It is a key element for the realization of the economic and social recovery 
plan of the Casamance that is part of the peace agreement with the Movement of Democratic Forces of 
Casamance. In conformance with the "territorial continuity ", the government considers this sea link as 
a priority. Since the tragic wreck of the "Le Joola" ferry in September, 2002, the sea link is not any 
more assured. However, the economic profitability is average, and the financial profitability is low or 
even negative (relating to a rather low fee taking into account the limited purchasing power of the 
population and the competition of road transport by the informal sector). It is thus necessary that the 
government takes care of the quasi-totality of the acquisition cost of the ship”. 
It is the first EIB operation with this (intermediary) beneficiary. 
The project should allow the disengagement of the State for the operation of this strategic transport 
line because the operation and the management of this ship would be entrusted to a private operator. 
An IF interest rate subsidy has been granted (justification: HIPC).  
Overall 
objectives 
Reinsert the Casamance region in the Senegalese economy, by opening up a region recovering from 
crisis, assuring the continuity of the national territory, supporting the agricultural, fishery and 
horticultural production intended for the internal market, promoting tourism and developing the 
national coastal navigation. 
Specific 
objectives 
Restoring of the sea link Dakar-Ziguinchor
Expected results - Acquisition of a roll-on/roll-off ship for the transport of passengers and goods between Dakar 
and the region of the Casamance 
- Related harbour developments 
Activities The total cost of the project amounts to €31.5m (originally €22.5m but rapidly increased with another 
€10m). The €22.5m original budget consisted in the construction of the ship (€14m), the purchase of  
freight handling and packaging equipment (€1m), of developments in the harbour of Dakar and of 
Ziguinchor and in the island of Carabane (€5m), and miscellaneous and unforeseen costs for €1m. 
The financial plan relating to the €31.5m budget was the following: 
- €10m (32%) senior loan by the EIB on resources from the Investment Facility 
- €10.7m (34%) grants of the KfW for the acquisition of the boat  
- €3.15m (10%) grants of the AFD for works on the harbor of Ziguinchor and the island of Carabane 
- €6m (19%) of the Government, and  
- €1.575m (5%) of the Autonomous Harbor of Dakar  
                                                 
3  Interest rate of 2.28% = 4.51% base rate + 77bp margin – 3% interest rate subsidy 
4  Direction de la Marine Marchande (DMM) du Ministère de l’Infrastructure, de l’Equipement et des Transports (MIET) 
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Main 
achievements 
- The boat was delivered on time on 14 December 2007 and started operations.  
- All harbour developments have been realised (only Dakar’s sea station was not operational in 
November 2009). 
Project's main 
weak points 
The operator bears the operational risks, including personnel, fuel, and maintenance costs. 
The commercial risk is important: the forecasts regarding the passengers and merchandise traffic have 
been established on cautious hypothesis. However the filling rate of each boat travel should be lower 
than expected implying that the financial results should be also lower than expected. 
 The commercial, financial and technical controls are very important in order to ensure the economic 
viability of the project as well as the safety of all passengers (in order to avoid any disaster like “Le 
Joola”).  
Issues  - The Senegalese State changed the boat operator in 2008 without consultation of the EIB, which 
was not in line with contractual obligations. EIB and KfW subsequent verifications showed that 
conditions were only partially met, in terms of safety, tariff policy and profitability. Furthermore, 
the condition precedent of having finished sea station developments was not met. Initial business 
plan objectives were not met. The sea link is still heavily dependent from State grants, which is in 
contradiction with the spirit of the financing contract with the EIB.  
- The Senegalese State did pay the last invoice, without the last tranche of EIB financing. The EIB 
will hence cancel the non-disbursed part of the loan.  
Documentary     Opeation’s « Fact Sheet A : Proposition portant sur l'instruction d'une nouvelle opération », EIB, 
26 March 2004 
 Investment Facility Annual Report 2008, EIB 
 Operation’s « RM/CRD opinion », EIB, 2004 
 Operation’s « Relevé quotidian (RQ) », EIB, 2003 
 « Monitoring 2009 », EIB, 2009 
 Operation’s « Conseil d’administration. Prêt sur les ressources de la FI. Projet Liaison maritime 
Dakar-Ziguinchor (Sénégal) », EIB, 2004 
 « Rapport financier OpsB », EIB, 2004 
 « Rapport d’instruction », EIB, 2004 
 « Etude de faisabilité pour la desserte maritime entre Dakar et Ziguinchor -ANNEXES », HPC 
Hamburg Port Consulting GmbH, 
 
MID-TERM EVALUATION OF THE IF AND EIB OR OPERATIONS IN ACP/OCTS 
ADE - EGEVAL II 
Final Report  September 2010 Annexe 8/Page 16 
2004_LUMWANA 
Operation Title Lumwana Copper Project (2004_Lumwana) 
Country/Region Zambia/ Eastern and Southern Africa Region
EIB Ref. 20040146
Operation Start 
date & End date 
Operation signed 26/9/2006
 
Financial close (=project start) is foreseen end 2006; the overall construction period for the project is 
estimated to be 24 months and production start-up is anticipated for late 2007. (Sources: D6, D3 
Financing 
Committed 
Net amount signed 
Project A: € 48 M subordinated loan from IF resources 
Project B: € 19 M senior loan from IF resources 
Project C: € 18 M senior loan from own resources 
 
Amount 
cancelled 
 
Budget disbursed  
Beneficiary Lumwana Mining Cy Ltd (100% Zambian subsidiary of Equinox  Minerals Ltd, an exploration 
company listed on the Australian Stock exchange since 1994.) 
Operation’s 
Description and 
Project 
Background & 
History 
Operation:
€ 67 M (9.45% of project cost), split into EUR equivalent of  a US$ 50 M subordinated loan from IF 
resources (project A), a ÛS $20M senior loan from IF resources (Project B), and a US$ 20 M from own 
resources. Loans disbursed and repaid in US$.  
Term 10 years, grace 2 years 
Economic life between 10 and 15 years.  
The promoter is Equinox Minerals Ltd, a Canadian – originally Australian – junior exploration/mine 
development company listed on the Canadian and Australian stock exchange. The borrower is 
Lumwana Mining Cy (see beneficiary) incorporated in Zambia. 
Project:  
The project concerns the development of a new, large-scale copper mine with two open pits, the 
construction and operation of a conventional ore processing plant (crushing, grinding, flotation) and 
the related infrastructure. It foresees a production of some 140,000 t/a of copper in the form of 
concentrate for a period of 14 years from proven and probable reserves of 280 Mt with an average 
N° projet
Dénomination de l'opération LUMWANA 
COPPER 
PROJECT A
LUMWANA 
COPPER 
PROJECT B
LUMWANA 
COPPER 
PROJECT C
Nom du pays de la transaction
Type IF IF OR
Date de signature 29/11/2006 29/11/2006 29/11/2006
montant signé 48 000 000.00 19 000 000.00 18 000 000.00
montant augmentation 0.00 0.00
2003 0.00 0.00 0.00
2004 0.00 0.00 0.00
2005 0.00 0.00 0.00
2006 0.00 0.00 0.00
2007 37 299 515.11 6 588 919.33 8 056 604.83
2008 0.00 6 888 069.17 7 654 041.60
2009 0.00 0.00 0.00
TOTAL 37 299 515.11 13 476 988.50 15 710 646.43
2004 0146 
2004_Lumwana
ZAMBIE
DECAISSEMEMTS
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copper grade of 0.75%. Additional inferred resources provide for the possibility of a considerable 
lifetime extension. The project is located near Lumwana, some 500 km north-west of the Zambian 
capital Lusaka and some 65 km west of Solwezi, the capital of the North-Western Province. The area is 
sparsely populated and barely developed. 
The project has been preceded by a in depth feasibility study (€15.5 m) to which the Bank contributed 
with €7m. from IF. 
The project implementation developed well until 2008 where there was a fire in the mine (weeks before 
project completion). Provoked a delay of several months. Project completion with delayed till 2008 
coinciding with a sharp fall in commodity prices. The financial model of the company could therefore 
not sustain the debt repayment. First capital repayment due was about 40% of total project which 
proved no longer feasible. So the Bank was asked to revise the schedule of repayments and the first 
repayment was brought down to 20%. The loans A and B have been downgraded and the project put 
on the Watch list in 2008. 
Initially the project was entirely geared to the production of copper. However, the mines includes other 
metals among which uranium. Nowadays, in a context of resumed interest for nuclear energy (Kyoto 
targets), the company decided to process the uranium ore, and asked if the lenders would be ready to 
support. Uranium is a delicate issue and not all lenders were ready to finance its production. Therefore 
Equinox decided to repay all (pari passu) all official lenders to get more freedom to manoeuvre with 
commercial banks who are now interested in financing this operation.  
 
NB: note that estimated project cost and consequently financing needs are, as one could expect,  highly 
fluctuating in the preparation period. In this case for instance, total project cost is estimated to be €300 
M in the PIN (dated 15/3/2005), €417M in Factsheet A(dated 8/7/2005), €708.63 M in Factsheet B 
(dated 19/7/2006) 
Overall 
objectives 
To contribute to poverty reduction and levelling economic disparities between regions. 
Specific 
objectives 
To develop the Lumwana region, about 500 km north-west of Lusaka and 65 km west of Solwezi, 
capital of the North-Western Province. The area, outside the copperbelt, is sparsely populated and 
barely developed. The project is viewed as a step in the development of a new copper province in 
Northwest Zambia to even out economic disparities between the regions, and contribute to poverty 
reduction. 
Expected results The project will value an indigenous natural resource and add to Zambia’s annual export revenues 
(depending on copper prices) and generate direct income for the country through mining royalties 
(0.6% of revenues) and corporate taxes (25%). The project is expected to create some 1000 direct jobs, 
with only a small number being expatriates, and some 3 times as many indirect jobs. The contribution 
to Zambia’s GDP will depend on where the concentrates will be processed. Through the training of 
local employees, the project will further contribute to the development of the local skill base. 
Source: Note to OPS B, 2005, §3 
Activities Engineering,  implementation, commissioning and mining/operation of the Lumwana copper deposits. 
Main 
achievements 
The project permitted the development of what has become one of the largest copper mines in the 
world, outside the copper belt. This was made possible by an imaginative financial engineering in which 
the EIB was determinant, in providing quasi equity. Particpation of several DFI together with EIB 
made the project possible. Development impact is significant the project being implemented outside 
the copper belt in an area without other significant economic activities. 
Project's main 
weak points 
The project, as usual with mining project, was very vulnerable to price fluctuations and this materialised 
with sharp fall of copper prices in 2008, however, prices resumed and have reached a high level in the 
beginning of 2010, mitigating the initial risks.  
Issues  NA 
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Documentary    Documents on the feasibility study:
 EIB Fact Sheet A, Proposal to appraise new operation: Zambia Lumwana Feasibility Study, 
Luxembourg, 31/1/2001, OP3/ACPIII/AGORAn°20010013/SAK/ar. 
 EIB. Appraisal Report, Lumwana study, Feasibility study for a copper mining project, 
Luxembourg 23/3/2001, PJ/I&S/2001-338/GCE/VMJ/ms 
 EIB Annex to Fact Sheet  B. Board of Directors, Lumwana Feasibility Study,2/4/2001 
  EIB Lumwana Feasibility study Project. Finance Contract between EIB and Equinox Cooper 
Ventures Ltd(Zambia). Luxembourg, Paris, 2/10/2001 
Other documentation: 
 EIB PIN (Preliminary Information Note), Lumwana Copper Project, Luxembourg 15/3/2005. 
OPS B/ACPIF-3SouthAfrica,0.Ind/2004-0146/BrandSchmitzWaltraud 
  EIB Fact Sheet A: proposal to appraise new operation. Luxembourg 08/07/2005. OPS 
B/ACPIF-3SouthAfrica,0.Ind/2004-0146/BrandSchmitzWaltraud  
 EIB Note to Ops B/ACP-IF-3 Opinion for Appraisal, Luxembourg 27/5/2005. PJ/I&S/2005-
598/GCE/MJ/aa 
  EIB Fact Sheet A. RM/CRD Opinion. Lumwana Copper project,12/7/2005 Ref. Ops B/ACPIF-
3/2004-0146/WB  
 EIB Fact Sheet B: financing proposal, Luxembourg 19/7/2006. 2004- OPS B/ACPIF 
0146/BrandSchmitzWaltraud 
 EIB Lumwana Copper Project, Appraisal report, Luxembourg 30/6/2006, PJ/I&S/2006-
675/GCE/VMJ/aa 
 Zambia-European Community, Country Strategy Paper for the period 2001-2007 (not dated) 
 Zambia - European Community, Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme for 
the period 2008-2013, 9th December 2007. 
  Region of Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean - European Community Regional 
Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme for the Period 2002 – 2007, June 2002. 
 Region of Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean - European Community Regional 
Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme for the Period 2008 – 2013, 15th November 
2008. 
 ADE:  Mid-term evaluation of the Investment Facility and EIB own resources operations in ACP 
countries and the OCTS, Inception Report, Annex 3: List of EIB operations in ACP countries and 
the OCTs, November 2009. 
 EIB: Cotonou Risk Report 31st December 2009, 3/2/2010. 
  EIB? Lumwana Study Zambia. Fact Sheet B: financing proposal.  Luxembourg 2/4/2001 
  
  EIB Lumwana Copper Project. Finance Contracts n°23717,13718 and 23719 signed on 
November 2006, Luxembourg, 23 Décember 2008. 
  Lumwana Mining Company, Monthly Project Report, Executive Summary, December 2009. 
  Lumwana Mining Company, Monthly Project Report, January 2010) 
  EIB. Board of Directors, Lumwana Copper Project. Luxembourg 26 septembre 2006, Document 
06/354. 
 EIB: Fact Sheet B Ope B1ACPIF-3/2004-0146IWB ,18 juillet 2006. 
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2004_OLKARIA 
Operation Title Olkaria II Extension (2004_OLKARIA) 
Country/Region Kenya, Region Central and Eastern Africa
EIB Ref. 20040255
Operation Start 
date & End date 
Operation signed 13/4/2005 
 
Financing 
Committed 
The project cost was initially estimated at  €50M and initially the EIB intervention at € 25M. (Source: 
PIN). Final estimation of total cost  is €67.8 M (details in Appraisal Report 2005, Appendix A).  
Net amount signed: € 32.5 (according to Factsheet B)  
It is an ordinary loan under the IF. Term 20 years, grace 5 years. 
Amount 
cancelled 
 
Budget 
disbursed 
Situation end 2009: 
2004_OLKARIA 
N° projet   20040255 
Dénomination de l'opération   OLKARIA II 
EXTENSION 
Nom du pays de la transaction   KENYA 
Type   IF 
Date de signature   31/05/2005
montant signé   32 500 000.00
montant augmentation   0.00
DECAISSEMEMTS 
2003 0.00
2004 0.00
2005 0.00
2006 0.00
2007 0.00
2008 0.00
2009 0.00
TOTAL 0.00
 
Beneficiary Kenya Electricity Generating Company Ltd “KenGen”. Is a wholly government owned company, 
established in 1998 as a successor to the Kenya Power Company (KPC). The was the consequence of 
an electricity sector reform that separated electricity generation (attributed to KPC)from transmission 
and generation attributed to KPLC (Kenya Power and Lightning Company). 
Operation’s 
Description and 
Project 
Background & 
History 
A senior secured loan of up to the equivalent of EUR 32.5 million to the 100% state-owned Kenya 
Electricity Generating Company Ltd. (KenGen), to be disbursed in either EUR or USD. Term is 20 
years, including a 5-year grace period.  
EIB funding is 42.92% of total estimated project cost. 
EIB’s standard interest rate for lending outside the EU – fixed rate as at signature or at the date of each 
disbursement, or variable spread floating rate based on EURIBOR or LIBOR –  increased by a credit 
spread of 207 bp, or 171 bp with financial covenants, and by the cost of hedging the possible USD 
exposure for the IF.  
 
The project is an extension of the Olkaria II geothermal power station of 64 MWe capacity, co-
financed by the EIB through a previous own resources loan to the Republic of Kenya. The new project 
is part of Kenya’s Energy Sector Recovery Project, spearheaded by the World Bank (IDA), aimed at 
increasing the technical capacity and strengthening the economic viability of the sector. It includes the 
modernisation and extension of the distribution network – to be co financed by the EIB under separate 
financing proposal – in the framework of profound restructuring of the State-owned distribution 
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company, as well as preparatory studies, technical services and capacity building. 
The project consists of the drilling of wells, the extension of the existing geothermal power station 
building, substation and switchboard, and the installation of a 35 MW steam turbine to extend the 
capacity of the EIB financed Olkaria geothermal power station. The generating capacity of the 
extension has been chosen according to the reservoir size andcapacity and fits weil to the two existing 
35 MWe steam turbine/generator sets.Total cost of the project is currently estimated at EUR 68 
million. The IF would finance about 48% of this amount. The balance would be funded by a 
concessional World Bank/IDA loan to the Government (31% of the project cost) and KenGen’s own 
funds (21% of the project cost). 
The project implementation has fallen behind schedule by close to three years following a delay in 
awarding the turnkey contract. This €2was due to a time consuming procurement process. The contract 
was eventually awarded at a higher cost than anticipated and imposed a revision of the financial plan 
with the introduction of AfD as cofinancier with € 20M. and an increase of the EIB loan from €32.5 to 
€36.8 M (In December 2009 that increase had not been decided yet) 
 
Overall 
objectives 
Increasing the technical capacity and strengthening the economic viability of the electricity sector in 
Kenya 
 
Specific 
objectives 
Extension of the capacity of the EIB financed Olkaria geothermal power station, by adding  35 MWe to 
the existing 70 MWe 
 
Expected results Reduce the dependency of Kenya power production on imports of petroleum products through 
enhanced exploitation of an indigenous natural resource, underground steam. 
Reduce the fluctuations in the availability of hydro-based electricity.  
 
Activities • Extension of the power station, comprising:
- Civil works and structure 
- Technical installations such as: one 35 MW. steam turbine/generator set, steam condenser & gas 
extractor, cooling water system, transformers, cabling, switch gear, instrumentation, safety 
installations, ancillaries, 
- Substation and switch yard, 
• Geothermal field development, comprising 
-  Drilling, equipping and connecting 7 geothermal and 2 rein je ct ion wells (already carried out) 
- Adaptation of the existing steam-field layout 
• Infrastructure, comprising the rehabilitation of the access road, 
• Supervision by an independent project engineer 
Main 
achievements 
The main achievement should be to reduce the vulnerability of KenGen to hydrological conditions 
(droughts). In 2008/09 a severe drought forced KenGen to increase thermal generation to compensate 
for the loss of hydro-based power. An indirect but substantial benefit is the adaptaion of the tariff 
under new Power Purchased Agreements with KPLC. 
Project's main 
weak points 
The long delays in implementation due to the time consumed on the procurement and attribution of 
the turnkey contract, the resulting increase in total cost that rendered necessary a change in the  
financing plan. 
Issues   State of fulfilment of the objectives of the initial Olkaria II project; 
 Optimal geothermal reservoir use; 
 Environmental impact on Hell’s Gate National Park and potential need to up-date environmental 
studies; 
 KenGen’s sound financial prospects; 
 Government’s willingness to promote increased efficiency in the electricity sector and full cost 
recovery through adequate pricing; 
 Capacity to absorb the currency risk inherent to the Bank’s lending. 
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Documentary     EIB PIN (Preliminary Information Note), Olkaria Extension, Luxembourg 23/9/2004. OPS 
B/ACPIF-2CENT&EASTAFR/2004-0255/GOUNOT MARCEL 
 EIB Fact Sheet A: proposal to appraise new operation. Luxembourg 19/11/2004. OPS B/ACPIF-
2CENT&EASTAFR/2004-0255/GOUNOT MARCEL 
 EIB Note to Ops B/ACP-IF-2 Opinion for Appraisal, Luxembourg 14/9/2004. 
PJ/ENERCOM/I&S/2004-965/EG/fe 
 EIB Fact Sheet B: financing proposal, Luxembourg 24/2/2005. OPS B/ACPIF-
2CENT&EASTAFR/2004-0255/GOUNOT MARCEL 
 EIB Olkaria II Extension Kenya. RM/CRD Opinion. Ref. Fact Sheet B OPS B/ACPIF-
2CENT&EASTAFR/2004-0255 
 ADE:  Mid-term evaluation of the Investment Facility and EIB own resources operations in ACP 
countries and the OCTS, Inception Report, Annex 3: List of EIB operations in ACP countries and 
the OCTs, November 2009. 
 Kenya-European Community, Country Strategy Paper for the period 2003-2007. 15th October 
2003.. 
 Republic of Kenya - European Community, Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative 
Programme for the period 2008-2013, 9th December 2007. 
 Region of Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean - European Community Regional 
Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme for the Period 2002 – 2007, June 2002. 
 Region of Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean - European Community Regional 
Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme for the Period 2008 – 2013, 15th November 
2008. 
 Olkaria II Extension. Note do the File. Monitoring Exercise 2009, Nairobi 01/12/2009. 
OpsB/ACP-IF-2/2009/NN. 
 EIB. Apparaisal Report. Olkaria II Extension. Extension of a geothermal power station. 
Luxembourg 18/1/2005. PJ/Enercom/I&S/2005-25/EH/EG/fe. 
 BEI. CA. Projet Olkaria II Extsnsion. CA/423/09. 3 février 2009. Document 09/53. 
 Olkaria II. Extension.Value Added Pillar 1. OpsB/ACPIF-2/2004-0255/gounot. 
 Note conjointe. Olkaria II Extension. Luxembourg 26/5/2005. Note conjointe n° FI/2004-523, 
Operation 2004-0255. 
 EIB. Project Progress Report, Olkaria II Extentions.Luxembourg 10/6/2009. PPR 23027 
 EIB. Apparaisal Report. Olkaria II Extension. Extension of a geothermal power station. 
Luxembourg 18/1/2005. PJ/Enercom/I&S/2005-25/EH/EG/fe. 
 Wetang’ula, G. & Kubo, B.: Environmental Management at Olkaria Geothermal Power Project, 
Kenya, KenGen. (no date). 
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2004_ WAGP  
Operation Title West African gas Pipeline (2004_WAGP) 
Country/Region Republic of Ghana (promoter).  Region West Africa (pipeline system will involve Nigeria, Ghana, Togo 
and Benin) 
EIB Ref. 20040026 
Operation Start 
date & End date 
Operation started 12/12/2006. 
Project phasing of expenditures: 
 
Source: D6, appendix E 
Financing 
committed 
According to financing proposal ):
€75 million committed. 
Term 20 years, grace 3 years 
Amount 
cancelled 
 
Budget disbursed 
 
Beneficiary Borrower is the Republic of Ghana
The beneficiary is the Volta River Authority, a public company wholly owned by the Government of 
Ghana.  
Operation 
description and 
Project 
Background & 
History 
The operation consists in an ordinary loan of up to €75 M. (13.6%  of total project cost) A tenor of up 
to 20 years (including a 3 year grace period. The loan is meant to partly re-finance a 16% equity 
participation and shareholder loan of the Government of Ghana in West African Gas Pipeline 
Company (WAGPCo), a company set up to build, own and operate the West African Gas Pipeline 
(WAGP). WAPCo is a Bermuda incorporated joint venture of private international energy companies 
(ChevronTexaco, Shell) and state-owned corporations of the four countries involved (Nigeria National 
Petroleum Company, Volta river Authority – VRA - , Société Beninoise du Gaz, Société Togolaise du 
Gaz). To comply with the HIPC conditionality (35% grant element) the interest rate is reduced by a 
subsidy; the resources freed are used for poverty reduction activities agreed with the government of 
N° projet 20 040 026
Dénomination de l'opération WEST 
AFRICAN GAS 
PIPELINE 
(WAGP)
Nom du pays de la transaction GHANA
Type OR
Date de signature 14/12/2006
montant signé 75 000 000.00
montant augmentation 0.00
2003 0.00
2004 0.00
2005 0.00
2006 0.00
2007 0.00
2008 31 688 188.23
2009 24 530 646.39
TOTAL 56 218 834.62
2004_WAGP
DECAISSEMEMTS
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Ghana and the IMF.  
The conditions for the third disbursement (a written confirmation from VRA that the conversion of 
the second unit of the Takoradi Power Plant to gas powered units had been certified by the Ghanean 
Environmental Protection Agency) was not met due to the unavailability of the gas from Nigeria 
(although the second unit has been converted). For this reason the contract has been amended in end 
2009 and the delay for submission of a certified copy of the GEPA evaluation postponed until June 
2010. 
 
The project consists of a 678 km gas pipeline that extends from the existing Escravos-Lagos gas 
pipeline at the Alagbado “Tee” to a new compressor station in Ajido near Lagos Beach and from there 
follows the coastline some 15 km offshore to the Takoradi power plant in west Ghana. It also includes 
lateral connections from the offshore line to onshore gas-receiving stations at Cotonou, Lomé, and 
Tema.  The project foundation customers (VRA and Communauté Electrique du Benin – CEB) have 
entered into a long-term gas purchase agreement with a group of gas producers in Nigeria and a long-
term transportation agreement with WAPCo; these agreements underpin the financial viability of the 
project. 
 
The Project is a cross-border private-public partnership between the four governments involved 
(Nigeria, Ghana Togo and Benin) and private oil companies. The Volta River Authority, a public 
company wholly owned by the Government of Ghana will initially be the principal buyer of gas 
exported through the WAGP. 
 
Total Project cost is estimated at EUR 570m. This has been contributed/ committed by the four 
countries and the private oil companies who are all (directly or indirectly) shareholders of  WAGPCo. 
 
The project completion was delayed by more than two years due to construction issues and political 
unrest in the Niger Delta that have affected the flow of supplies to the project.  
Overall 
objectives 
To reduce the cost of electricity supply in Ghana, Togo and Benin by replacing oil with gas imported 
from Nigeria.  
Specific 
objectives 
The construction and operation of a regional high-pressure gas transmission system that will supply 
natural gas produced in Nigeria to thermal power stations in Benin, Togo and Ghana. 
Expected results The following pipeline sections and above ground facilities will be built and operated: 
 a 56 km, 36 inches in diameter, onshore pipeline section from Alagbado to Lagos Beach in 
Nigeria, connecting to a new gas compressor station with two centrifugal units of 10 MW each. 
 a 569-km,  20 inches in diameter,  offshore pipeline section running parallel to the coastline from 
the Nigerian shore to a landfall near the Takoradi power plant in west Ghana with 36 km lateral 
connections (8 to 18 inches in diameter) to Cotonou, Lomé,  and Tema. 
 onshore land pipelines in Benin (14.9  km), Togo (1.0 km) and Ghana (1.4 km), connecting the 
offshore lateral lines to in-country gas receiving and metering stations. 
Activities Construction of the pipe line
Main 
achievements 
Notwithstanding the difficult situation and the troubles in the Niger Delta the physical elements of the 
projects (construction of the pipe line, conversion of some power  units) have progressed and could be 
completed in the first quarter of 2010. According to a World Bank Mission of June 2009 the 
environmental management is satisfactory and the participatory community development approach 
adopted by WAPCo is producing  positive and encouraging results.  
 
Project's main 
weak points 
Main risks 
- risk of social unrest and pipeline sabotage in Nigeria;
- environmental risk. The project has been submitted to rigorous environmental and social impact 
assessments and is generally supported by affected communities and NGOs with the exception of 
some communities and NGOs in Nigeria who are campaigning against it; 
- insufficient electricity tariffs could jeopardise the ability of electricity companies to meet their 
obligations in terms of gas purchase and transportation agreement. 
By end 2009 the financial flows showed that the company (VRA) is not viable without Government 
help, due to the fact that tariffs are not in line with expenses.  
Issues   
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Documentary     Relevé quotidien, WAGP, Luxembourg 13 mai 2004, OPSB/ACP-F-1/20040026/EW. 
  EIB, Fact Sheet A: proposal to appraise new operation, Luxembourg 17/2/2005, 
(OPS/B/ACPIF-1 WestAfr & Sahel/20040026/Walter Eve) 
 EIB, Note to Ops B, Opinion for Appraisal, Luxembourg 4/2/2005 (PJ/ENERCOM/2005-
0124/FT/GF/mh) 
 EIB, Fact Sheet B: financing proposal, Luxembourg 18/10/2006 (OPS B/Afr., Caribbean, 
Pacific,-IF/2004-0026/Walter Eve 
 EIB, West African Gas Pipeline, Ghana, RM/CRD Opinion (Fact Sheet B Ops B/ACP-IF-
1/2004-0026/EW) 
 EIB, Appraisal Report, West African Gas Pipeline, Ghana. Luxembourg, 02/10/2006 
 ADE:  Mid-term evaluation of the Investment Facility and EIB own resources operations in ACP 
countries and the OCTS, Inception Report, Annex 3: List of EIB operations in ACP countries and 
the OCTs, November 2009. 
 Republic of Ghana – European Community: Country Strategy Paper and Indicative Programme 
for the period 2002-2007. DEV 054-2002-EN. 
  Ghana-European, Community: Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme for 
the period 2008-2013, 9 December 2007. 
 Afrique de l’Ouest – Communauté européenne : Document de stratégie de coopération régionale 
et Programme indicatif régional pour la période 2002-2007 (no date) 
 Addendum au document de stratégie de coopération et au programme indicatif régional 2002-
2007, Communauté européenne et région de l’Afrique de l’Ouest.  
 Communauté européenne-Afrique de l’Ouest : Document de stratégie régionale et Pprogramme 
indicatif régional 2008-2013, 15/11/2008. 
 BEI. CA Pret bonifié sur resources propres, projet WAGP, 12/12/2006, Document 06/517. 
  PPR, WAGP, Luxembourg 19th November 2009, OpsB/ACP-IF1/2009/FFC. 
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2004_GIGEL GEB 
Intervention Title GILGEL GIBE II HYDROPOWER PLANT 
 
Country/Region Ethiopia 
EIB Ref. 2004 0290
Project Start date 
& End date 
03/03 2005 until 30/06/2008
Financing 
committed 
The initial financing was amounted at €60-90 million depending on other sources of finance available 
and the amount of subsidy required. 
Amount 
cancelled 
A part of the financing has been cancelled due to the subsidy available to reach the 35% requisite grant 
element for loan to a HIPC country. 
Amount 
disbursed 
€50 million under IF (ordinary loan)
Beneficiary The promoter is the Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation (EEPCO) which is the state owned utility 
responsible for power generation, transmission and distribution in Ethiopia. 
The borrower is the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. 
Project 
Background & 
History 
The project consists of a large-scale hydro Power plant with a capacity of 420 MW and 300 km of 230 
kV overhead transmission lines and substations. The project is cascaded with the Gilgel Gibe I project, 
recently commissioned. 
 
Gilgel Gibe II consists of a tunnel which channels water from Gilgel Gibe reservoir through a 25 
kilometres tunnel to turbines downstream and empties near the confluence with the Gibe River. 
The main components of the power plant are a small intake structure, 25 km of tunnel, a power plant 
with a substation and outlets structures; it does not imply the construction of another dam.  
Overall 
objectives 
The project aims at providing additional capacity to meet the fast growing demand in the country.
“Currently, about 15% of Ethiopia’s population lives in areas that are electrified, with only 6% 
directly connected. The objective of Government under the Universal Electricity Access 
Program is to increase the 15% figure to 50% over the next 5 to 10 years. It is expected that 
the provision of electricity for productive purposes and social services will have a significant 
impact on improving the social and economic well being of the rural population.” (“Ethiopia - Country 
strategy paper and indicative programme for the period 2008-2013”, European Community, 2007, p 51) 
Specific 
objectives 
 
 
Expected results  
Activities  
Main 
achievements 
No information available in that respect.
 
Project's main 
weak points 
 The loan has full recourse to the Republic of Ethiopia. The payment obligations are borne by 
the Government of Ethiopia independently of the project performance. 
 High growth assumptions in electricity demand used by the promoter leading to the risk of a 
premature project implementation. 
 The least cost expansion plan, which identifies the project as a priority investment, is being 
revised to address a number of weaknesses (unusually short planning horizon, lack of thermal 
candidates, and assumptions that some hydro plants are already committed) raised by the 
World Bank. 
 Absence of open tendering procedures for the EPC contract for the hydro-power scheme, not 
providing evidence for competitive cost level for this component. 
Issues  On the financial aspect: 
 Financial sustainability of EEPCO and tariff evolution taking into account the ambitious 
power system expansion programme. 
 Determination of final amount of the EIB loan, taking into account the IF guidelines on 
MID-TERM EVALUATION OF THE IF AND EIB OR OPERATIONS IN ACP/OCTS 
ADE - EGEVAL II 
Final Report  September 2010 Annexe 8/Page 26 
interest subsidization and the 35% requisite grant element (HIPC country). 
Documentary    “Preliminary Information Note”, EIB, 2004
“Fact sheet A: proposal to appraise new operation”, EIB, 2004 
“Fact sheet B: financing proposal”, EIB, 2005 
“Ops B: Project Progress Report”, EIB, 2009 
“Board of Directors. Gilgel Gibe II Hydro Power Plant (Ethiopia)”, EIB, 2005 
“Note conjointe”, EIB, 2005 
“Note to Ops b/Opinion for appraisal”, EIB, 2004 
“Ops B Financial Note. Gilgel Gibe II Hydropower Plant”, EIB, 2005 
“Financial Value Added (FVA) Sheet”, EIB 
“The Gilgel Gibe Affair. An analysis of the Gilgel Gibe hydroelectric projects in Ethiopia.”, Counter 
Balance, 2008 
“Ethiopia - Country strategy paper and indicative programme for the period 2002-2007”, European 
Community 
“Ethiopia - Country strategy paper and indicative programme for the period 2008-2013”, European 
Community, 2007 
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2005_ACPGLOB ADEMI 
Intervention Title ADEMI V, V B, V C
Country/Region Dominican Republic 
EIB Ref. 20050544
Project Start date 
& End date 
ADEMI V: 01/02/2006; ADEMI V B: 19/12/2006; ADEMI V C: 10/10/2007 
Completed:  
Financing 
committed 
ADEMI V and ADEMI V C:  equity totalling EUR 0.75 m.  ADEMI V B: credit line of EUR 3m. 
(Global senior loan) 
Amount 
cancelled 
EUR 0.01 m under ADEMI V; EUR 0.03 m. under ADEMI V C
 
Amount 
disbursed 
Total disbursed : EUR 3.71 m.
(ADEMI V: EUR 0.22 m.; ADEMI V B: EUR 3 m.; ADEMI V C: EUR 0.49 m.) 
 
Beneficiaries Banco de Ahorro y Crédito Ademi S.A. and micro and small enterprises financed by it 
Project 
Background & 
History 
This is a repeat operation, following EIB financing of EUR. 3 m. in 1997 and 15 m. in 2001.  EIB is 
among the founding shareholders of Ademi. 
ADEMI V and ADEMI V C are capital increase subscriptions totalling EUR 750 m.  to improve 
Ademi’s capital base and solvency ratio to allow for a higher lending capacity, and maintaining EIB’s 
proportionate shareholding in Ademi at 17%. EIB’s equity investments have yielded a dividend. 
ADEMI V B is a credit line. 
Banco Ademi is the largest development bank in the country w/total assets of EUR 93 m. , rated BBB 
by Fitch. It is a savings and credit bank specialised in financing micro and small enterprises. Banco 
Ademi is a socially motivated private initiative. 
 
Overall 
objectives 
 Development of the private sector, and SMEs in particular 
 Development of the financial sector 
 
Specific 
objectives 
Support Ademi’s growth and extension
Provide wider access to term credit for smaller SMEs, which play a crucial role in job creation. 
Expected results Results have been achieved, as described below under “Main achievements”. 
Activities  
Main 
achievements 
Under the previous ADEMI Projects, EIB has supported the creation, launching and growth of an 
important player in the financial sector and SME support. 
Continued support by EIB to the growth of an important financial institution. The amount as well as 
the duration of loans was enlarged, along w/ the dynamic growth of many of Ademi’s customers. 
Employment creation of 408 jobs was achieved in several sectors. 
Good Ademi asset quality. Low ratio of NPLs, partly provisioned. 
Good use of funds in less than the prescribed time 
Possibility of exiting the equity investments  
 
End 2008, Ademi has obtained a grant from IDB to strengthen several aspects of its operations. 
 
It is noteworthy that Banco Ademi is partially employee owned. 
Project's main 
weak points 
Foreign exchange exposure/risk due to its large foreign currency source of funding.  But Ademi hedges 
part of this risk, and EIB initially included a foreign exchange risk sharing mechanism. 
Issues  None that is not attended to.
Documentary    OPS B – Project Progress Report  8/2008 ADEMI V, Contract ID 23402
OPS B – Project Progress Report  8/2008 ADEMI V B, Contract ID 23811 
Monitoring Exercise  8/2008 ADEMI V, ADEMI V A, ADEMI V C- OPS B Project Progress Report 
CARIBBEAN FORUM OF ACP STATES (CARIFORUM)/EC- REGIONAL STRATEGY 
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PAPER AND REGIONAL INDICATIVE PROGRAMME (RIP) for the period 2003 – 2007
ADDENDUM to the above 
 
9th EDF- REPUBLIQUE DOMINICAINE / CE :  STRATEGIE DE COOPERATION et 
PROGRAMME INDICATIF  2001 – 2007 
 
EIB (DEAS) Financial Sector Strategy for the Dominican Republic [undated] 
IDB website re: Ademi TA Project 
Field visit Dominican Republic 26-29 April 2010 
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2005_ACPGLOB CA2006 
Intervention Title BPI KENYA SME FUND  
Country/Region Kenya 
EIB Ref. 20050584
Project Start date 
& End date 
03/09/2006 
Ongoing 
Financing 
committed 
EUR 4.24 m 
2005_BPI KENYA 
N° projet   20050584 
Dénomination de 
l'opération 
  BPI KENYA 
SME FUND 
Nom du pays de la 
transaction 
  KENYA 
Type   IF 
Date de signature   03/08/2006
montant signé   4 240 000.00
montant augmentation   0.00
DECAISSEMEMTS 
2003 0.00
2004 0.00
2005 0.00
2006 0.00
2007 1 292 874.33
2008 0.00
2009 438 957.02
TOT
AL 
1 731 831.35
 
Amount 
cancelled 
- 
Amount 
disbursed 
EUR 1.73 m 
Beneficiary BUSINESS PARTNERS INTERNATIONAL KENYA SME FUND  and 
Local Kenyan SMEs 
Project 
Background & 
History 
This Project is similar to BPI MADAGASCAR SME FUND, also reviewed as part of this selection.
Business Partners International Kenya SME Fund is a subsidiary of Business Partners Ltd of South 
Africa. It is a EUR 14.1m (target amount)  quasi-equity risk capital fund established in Kenya. 
The Fund is managed by Business Partners International Kenya SME Fun, and its local team of 
professional staff. 
Shareholders include (committed capital): IFC (US$ 5 m.), EIB (EUR 4.24 m.), CDC (UD$ 1.6  m.), 
and two local investors: EADB (US$ 1 m.) and Trans-Century (US$ 1.5 m). 
 
The Fund is a subcomponent of a large MSME (Micro, Small & Medium Enterprises) Competitiveness 
Project implemented through the Ministry of Trade and Industry with the support of the World Bank. 
The full MSME comprises the following: 
Component 1: Access to Finance 
  Sub-component A: Financial sector deepening 
  Sub-component B: SME Risk Capital & Technical Assistance fund (this project) 
Component 2: Strengthening Enterprises Skills and Market Linkages 
  Sub-component A: Pilot Value Chain Based Matching Grant Program 
  Sub-component B: Global Business Schools Network 
  Sub-component C: Restructuring of the Industrial Training Levy Scheme 
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  Sub-component D: Business Plan/Innovation Competition
Component 3: Improving the Business Environment. 
 
The Fund invests in local SMEs. The Fund invests primarily in quasi-equity and debt instruments in the 
range of US$ 0.050 m – 0.5 m per investment. 
The Fund also provides technical assistance funding, through the Technical Assistance Facility. 
Technical assistance is provided to investee SMEs though a network of mentors, accountants and 
consultants.  The Technical Assistance Facility is a US$2.5 m fund set up by the Government of Kenya 
through the World Bank. 
IFC have played an important role in developing the Fund concept and their Kenyan SME Solutions 
Centre in Nairobi will provide support to and house the fund management team. 
 
The fund started operations in January 2007 with the objective ti invest $US 14.1. By end 2009 61 deals 
have been concluded for a total amount of $US12.4. The table provides the distribution of the loans 
granted by the fund: 
Overall 
objectives 
Reach SMEs in a spectrum currently not targeted by venture capital funds operating in Kenya
Specific 
objectives 
Make about 180 investments over a 5 year period
Adapting instruments to the needs of customers 
Expected results High development impact in terms of creation and strengthening of SMEs which are particularly 
underserved in Kenya by lack of investors 
Activities Invest in smaller Kenyan SMEs, and operational support to investee companies. 
The Project is currently on the Watch List: 
The Fund has posted losses consistently since commencing investment activity in 2007. In addition, 
projections indicate that, should the Fund continue performing at current levels of activity, it would not 
fully utilize the committed capital. The poor financial performance is attributed to slower than 
anticipated growth in the Fund’s income stream as uptake of funds by final beneficiaries has been 
disappointing. A high lapse rate of approved investments during the first 12 months of investment 
activity was also experienced. In addition, the Fund has been hit by foreign currency losses and a 
significant bad debt write-off related to a single loan in a leather tanning company whose key client 
went bankrupt following the financial crisis. 
Main 
achievements 
It is an achievement of the IFC and Business Partners South Africa Ltd (BPSA) to set up a venture 
capital fund in Kenya - the investment is inherently risky, take-up uncertain and financial returns 
uncertain.  Exit risk is reduced since amortizing investment instruments will be used (not clear if 
actually used). 
Strong experience and track record of the promoter, BPSA, and willingness to set up a Kenyan fund. 
Industry Classification Number % Value %
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry & Fishing 2  3% 301 210   2%
Mining 2  3% 708 222   6%
MNF – Food & Beverages 6  10% 1 630 000    13%
MNF – Textiles 3  5% 531 769   4%
MNF - Wood Products 2  3% 157 632   1%
MNF - Chemicals & Rubber 1  2% 238 000   2%
MNF - Other non-metallic products -  0% -   0%
MNF - Iron, Steel, Mach, Equip, Transport Equip 2  3% 345 000   3%
MNF – Furniture -  0% -   0%
Construction 9  15% 1 674 000    13%
Wholesale & Repair – Personal, Household Goods 3  5% 323 000   3%
Retail & Repair - Personal, Household Goods 2  3% 417 888   3%
Sale, Maint & Repair of vehicles, Retail Auto 4  7% 899 000   7%
Hotels & Restaurants 2  3% 372 470   3%
Transport, Storage & Communication 5  8% 1 040 000    8%
Business Services 16  26% 3 460 812    28%
Social & Personal Services 2  3% 301 210   2%
Private Households, Exterr. Organisations -  0% -   0%
Total 61  100% 12 400 213   100%
Business Plans Gross Approved by Industry Classification 
Since Inception
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Non-financial support to investee companies, including TA and “mentoring”. 
Strong backing by IFC (financial and non-financial). 
Staff in EIB’s Nairobi office could prove to be extremely valuable in monitoring the Fund as well as 
contributing towards the success of the Fund.  They will be able to do so via the Advisory Board and 
the Investment Committee. 
Project's main 
weak points 
Vulnerability due to small size of management team (despite key-man clauses) 
EIB does not sit on the Investment Committee (though it has a seat on the Advisory Board which 
seemingly must approve flow of funds arrangements) 
High management fee 
Proceeds during the investment period do not revert to shareholders but may be reinvested  
Issues  Inherent risks, and exit possibly difficult.
Currency risk, as all investments will be denominated in local currency. 
Possibly low level of demand from good-quality sub-projects. 
To be sustainable, BPI needs (according to Project docs) to raise at least one additional fund (in 
addition to this Fund and the BPI Madagascar SME Fund). 
Poor performance of equity funds in Africa 
Slow take-up of equity funds in Africa 
Level of demand by good quality SMEs 
Competition of other investors 
Documentary     PIN (Preliminary Information Note) 24/01/2006 
 Fact Sheet B: financing proposal 08/03/2006 
 BPI KENYA SME FUND Kenya RM/CRD OPINION 01/03/2006 
 Note Conjointe  31/07/2006 
 Report to Management Committee 16/2/ 2006 
 Project Progress Report, 13/1/2010 
 9th EDF- Kenya-EC Country Strategy Paper for the period 2003-2007 
 10th EDF- Kenya-EC Country Strategy Paper and Indicative Programme for the period 2008-2013 
 Website of BUSINESS PARTNERS INTERNATIONAL KENYA SME FUND at  
 http://www.businesspartners.co.za/BPI/Kenya/AboutKenya.asp 
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2005_EMP AFRICA FUND II 
Intervention Title EMP AFRICA FUND II 
Country/Region Regional Africa and ACP States
EIB Ref. 20050319
Project Start date 
& End date 
15/05/2006 
Ongoing 
Financing 
committed 
-EUR 40 m in equity 
Amount 
cancelled 
- 
Amount 
disbursed 
EUR 31.71 m. 
Beneficiary EMP Africa Fund II LLCC (incorporated in Mauritius); Targeted investee companies
Project 
Background & 
History 
From ECP Website:  
Africa Fund II is the successor to the successful AIG African Fund Infrastructure Fund LLC ("Africa Fund I") which 
had a total of US$407.6 million in investor commitments and completed 14 investments throughout Africa, primarily in 
infrastructure and related industries. EIB was an investor in the Africa Fund I, alongside several IFIs. 
Africa Fund II targets numerous sectors throughout the African continent including: Telecoms, Natural Resources, 
Financial Services, Power and Water, Agribusiness and Transportation among others. The Fund seeks to invest 
alongside of world-class international or local partners with extensive operational experience, a demonstrated track record 
of accomplishment, a superb business reputation and a history of financial and technical success. Africa Fund II seeks 
either majority or minority positions through equity, quasi-equity and convertible debt instruments. The Fund's 
investments typically range in size from $15 million to $50 million with a maximum of 20% of the Fund's total size 
available per transaction. Target companies are generally EBITDA positive and have total valuations in the range of 
$40 million to over $500 million. 
Africa Fund II investments are reported on: 
http://www.ecpinvestments.com/portfolio.xml?f=fund&q=1005&id=1005&view=fund&medi
a=history&_sort=date&p=1012 
 
From Project Docts: 
 
The fund’s size is now USD 453m; alongside EIB’s investment, commitments have been made by five 
IFIs (AfDB, IFU, Proparco, SwedFund and CDC), and 12 local investors. EIB, together with IFU, 
Proparco and SwedFund entered into a MoU on 26 January 2007, by which was agreed to nominate for 
two years one representative for the “European Group” to represent it in the Committees of Africa 
Fund II (Project Docts) 
 
The Fund is managed by Emerging Market Partners (EMP), Washington, D.C.  jointly owned by 
EMP Global LLC (“the Sponsor”) and Emerging Capital Partners (“ECP”). EMP Global is a large 
international private equity firm focused exclusively on emerging markets. ECP is owned by the 
professionals of the EMP Africa team.  Emerging Capital Partners (ECP) is the first private equity group to 
raise more than $1.6 billion for investment in companies across the African continent. The ECP team has been 
investing in Africa since 2000. Today, the firm has a ten-year track-record of investing in Africa through six 
successful funds. ECP Africa Fund II PCC ("Africa Fund II") was established in December 2005, to capitalize 
on the numerous investment opportunities throughout the continent of Africa. Africa Fund II currently has $523 
million in commitments from investors. The Fund has a five-year commitment period and a ten-year term. 
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Overall 
objectives 
The aim was to participate as a limited partner in a fund established to make direct and indirect equity 
investments in companies at expansion stage with good growth potential on the African continent. 
Specific 
objectives 
Channel equity funding through an established equity fund with proven track record. 
Provide access to equity funding (not readily available) to strong enterprises 
Target the continent’s “best performing” countries 
Expected results Development impact : (see BoD Report) 
The operation will a) encourage private initiative in infrastructure and service related investments; b) 
contribute to the development of local financial markets and improvement of corporate governance; c) 
promote private sector growth; d) create new jobs and improve the general economic situation in 
Africa by raising finance for important infrastructure and other investments and e) highlight to 
investors the opportunities the African continent offers for investment. These objectives are in line 
with the strategy for equity investments defined in the IF Equity Strategy paper sent to the Board for 
information in June 2005. 
Activities ECP Africa Fund II PCC has committed to fifteen portfolio companies so far, out of which three are 
currently performing very well (1,4,5), three are performing well (7,8,11), three are performing 
satisfactorily (2,6,14), four are not performing yet as they are in their start-up phase still (12,10,9,3) and 
the remaining two (13,15) have not been disbursed yet. 
 
Main 
achievements 
Demonstration of attractive investment opportunities in Africa offering attractive rates of return.
 
Project's main 
weak points 
CRD observation: 
It should also be noted that in addition to the high degree of risk associated with this operation, the foreign exchange rate 
risk, which the IF would take on, is twofold. While the IF is denominated in EUR, the Fund is denominated in USD 
and individual investments are likely to be in local currencies. 
Issues  EIB additionality ?  Perhaps justified learning curve, sustainability
Question: Has EIB exited from AAIF?  What is EIB’s approach re: exits  [see Guidelines for Equity ...] 
Documentary    PIN (Preliminary Information Note) 05/07/2005
Fact Sheet A: Proposal to Appraise New Operation 29/09/2005 
Fact Sheet B: financing proposal 26/10/2005 
EMP AFRICA FUND II Regional Africa RM/CRD OPINION 29/09/2005 
Monitoring ECP Africa Fund II PCC  Monitoring Exercise 2008, including: PPR 14/05/2008 
Board of Directors Report 13 /12/2005 
Project Progress report (PPR) Monitoring Exercise 2008 
ECP Website: http://www.ecpinvestments.com/ 
 
MID-TERM EVALUATION OF THE IF AND EIB OR OPERATIONS IN ACP/OCTS 
ADE - EGEVAL II 
Final Report  September 2010 Annexe 8/Page 34 
2005_ACPGLOB CA2004  
Intervention Title BPI MADAGASCAR SME FUND
Country/Region Madagascar 
EIB Ref. 20050310
Project Start date 
& End date 
15/05/2006 
Draw down expected in 5 years 
Financing 
committed 
EUR 2 m
Amount 
cancelled 
- 
Amount 
disbursed 
EUR 1.09 m 
Beneficiary BUSINESS PARTNERS INTERNATIONAL MADAGASCAR INVESTMENT FUND LLC  and 
local Malagasy SMEs 
Project 
Background & 
History 
Business Partners International Madagascar SME Fund is a EUR 8.5 m (target amount)  quasi-equity 
risk capital fund established in Madagascar. 
The Fund is managed by Business Partners International Madagascar, and its local team of professional 
staff. 
Shareholders include (committed capital): IFC (EUR 2.75 m.), EIB (EUR 2 m.), ARO (EUR 1.7 m.), 
Norfund (EUR 1.2 m.) and DOEN (EUR 0.85 m.) 
The Fund invests in local Malagasy SMEs. The Fund invests primarily in quasi-equity and debt 
instruments in the range of US$ 0.050 m – 0.5 m per investment. 
The Fund also provides technical assistance funding, through the Technical Assistance Facility. 
Technical assistance is provided to investee SMEs though a network of mentors, accountants  and 
consultants.  The Technical Assistance Facility is a US$2 m fund set up by the Government of 
Madagascar through the World Bank. 
Overall 
objectives 
Reach SMEs in a spectrum currently not targeted by venture capital funds operating in Madagascar.
 
The Complementary Information on the Financing Proposal     15/09/2005 provides some limited information 
on the concerned SME market  
Specific 
objectives 
Make about 120 investments over a 5 year period
Adapting instruments to the needs of customers 
Expected results High development impact in terms of creation and strengthening of SMEs which are particularly 
vulnerable in Madagascar by lack of investors 
Activities Invest in smaller Malagasy SMEs, and operational support to investee companies. 
Main 
achievements 
It is an achievement of the IFC and Business Partners South Africa Ltd (BPSA) to set up a venture 
capital fund in one of the least developed countries in the world, meaning that the investment is 
inherently risky, take-up uncertain and financial returns uncertain.  
Strong experience and track record of the promoter, BPSA, and willingness to set up a Malagasy fund. 
Non-financial support to investee companies, including TA and “mentoring”. 
Strong backing by IFC (financial and non-financial). 
Project's main 
weak points 
Vulnerability due to small size of management team (despite key-man clauses) 
EIB does not sit on the Investment Committee (though it has a seat on the Advisory Board which 
seemingly must approve flow of funds arrangements) 
High management fee 
 
Issues  Inherent risks, and exit possibly difficult.
Currency risk, as all investments will be denominated in local currency. 
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Political and economic stability of Madagascar.
Possibly low level of demand from good-quality sub-projects. 
Due to regulatory requirements, the Fund could not operate before December 2007 and its marketing 
was substantially delayed. 
The Fund has made a total of 26 investments (11/2008- no later PPR) 
 
Documentary    PIN (Preliminary Information Note) 20/06/2005
Fact Sheet B: financing proposal 20/09/2005 
Complementary Information on the Financing Proposal     15/09/2005 
OPS B – Project Progress Report      20/11/2010 
BPI MADAGASCAR SME FUND Madagascar RM/CRD OPINION 20 September 2005 
Note Conjointe 10/02/2006                   
EC- Southern African Region: RSP and RIP 2008-2013 
Addendum thereto 
9th EDF : Madagascar-CE STRATEGIE DE COOPERATION ET PROGRAMME INDICATIF 2002-
2007 
10th EDF : Madagascar-CE Document de stratégie pays et programme indicative national 2008-2013 
 
Website of BUSINESS PARTNERS INTERNATIONAL MADAGASCAR SME FUND at  
http://www.businesspartners.co.za/BPI/Madagascar/MadaDefault.htm 
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2005_Pacific Islands Financing Facilities (PIFF I& II) 
Two similar global loans have been provided by the EIB in the Pacific Islands: 
 Pacific Islands Financing Facility I, SERAPIS n° 2004 0138, a global loan of up to € 
20m, approved in 2004, mainly targeted to financial institutions of Samoa, Tonga and 
Fiji.  
 Pacific Islands Facility II, SERAPIS n° 2005 0362, a global loan of up to € 25m was set 
up in 2005 to widen the geographical scope of the initial facility and was mainly 
targeted to financial institutions of Papua New Guinea, Cook Islands, Palau, Niue. 
 
PIFF II is part of the evaluation’s selection of 20 projects selected for this evaluation but it 
has operations in the Pacific countries visited (Fiji and Samoa), whereas PIFF I has a 
contract with the Development Bank of Samoa. Given this particular situation and the 
similarities between the two projects it appeared reasonable to include both facilities in this 
descriptive fiche, while making under every item a clear distinction between PIFF I and 
PIFF II. 
 
Intervention Title Pacific Islands Financing Facilities I & II 
 (PIFF -  n° SERAPIS  2004 0138) 
(PIFF II -  n° SERAPIS 2005 0362) 
Country/Region Regional Pacific 
EIB Ref. PIFF I : N° SERAPIS 2004 0138
PIFF II: N° SERAPIS 20050362 
Project Start date & 
End date 
PIFF I: 
Signature (First contract, with DBS) 15/10/2005 
(Note. EIB Board meeting for discussing and possibly accepting this operation was planned on 14/10/2004) 
PIFF II:  
Signature (first tranche): 10/12/2006 
Term of the global loan: maximum 15 years (incl. max. 3 years grace period) 
Term of the guarantees:  7 to 10 years (depending on the underlying loans) 
Financing 
committed 
PIFF I: 
EIB Operation Amount: envelope of €20m (out of a total Project Cost of €40m).  
This operation is a global loan facility, aimed at financing long-term loans in the Pacific region.  
Note. The Fact Sheet A shows that this operation was initially envisaged with more instruments: 
also a Guarantee Facility (up to €10m) and Equity through Venture Capital Funds (up to €5m)5, in 
addition to global loans. The equity operations have eventually been conducted through specific 
contracts.  
 
The facility materialized in a single contract, of €7m with the DBS, the Development Bank of 
Samoa (EIB contract ID: 23209). It was signed on 15/10/2005. It has a fixed interest rate, a 15-
year term and a grace period of 4 years 
 
A contract of €10m with the Fiji Development Bank (FDB) is approved but not signed.. 
 
A contract of €3m with the Tonga Development Bank (TDB) was signed in December 2005. 
 
                                                 
5  Samoa Venture Capital Fund and Kula II.  
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PIFF II: 
This operation was initially envisaged as a financial package under the IF comprising6: 
(a) Global loan facility: A regional EUR or USD7 denominated global loan facility of €25m from 
the EIB (out of a total Project Cost of €50m), targeting four or more banks in the Pacific. 
Tenors would be up to 15 years including a grace period of up to 3 years;  
o Interest rate subsidy for the allocation to the NDB of max. €0.6m (on a 
global loan of max. €2m) 
(b) Guarantee facility: A regional and/or national local currency denominated guarantee facility in 
favour of three commercial banks. Guarantees issued would have a life of 7 to 10 years 
(depending on the underlying loans).  
 
The report to the Board of Directors mentioned on p2 that €1m was also envisaged for TA for the 
PIFF and PIFF II. 
 
The facility resulted in a first contract of €5m with the NDBP, the National Development Bank 
of Palau (EIB contract ID: 23754). It was signed on 05/12/2006 and has an allocation limit of 
05/12/2009. It has a fixed interest rate, a 15-year term and a grace period of 3 years. This bank is a 
relatively small financial institution, with nine employees including the President, 5 of which are 
involved in loan operations (see annexes to this operation’s report to the Board of the EIB).  
 
A second contract was signed on 23/02/2007 for €2m (referred to as “Pacific Islands Financing 
Facility II B”, contract n° 23895) with the Niue Development Bank (NDB). Its disbursement 
was conditional to the sanitation of the partly impaired portfolio of assets of the NDB; EIB has 
provided TA to this end but the conditions are not satisfied yet.  
 
A contract of €3m with the Federated States of Micronesia Development Bank (FSMDB) is 
approved and its signature is pending.  
 
A contract of €3m with the Bank of the Cook Islands Ltd (BCIL) has been approved and 
signature is pending. 
 
 
The Guarantee facility envisaged has not been used. 
 
The use of the €1m provision for TA is currently envisaged for the funding of (small sized) 
services provided by consultants to existing and potential customers of the global loans at the 
development banks under PIFF II.  
 
Amount cancelled  
Budget disbursed PIFF I: 
Disbursements relating to the contract with the Development Bank of Samoa:  the full €7m for this 
contract have been disbursed by 15 June 2009, which was made possible by a 9-month extension to 
the initial contractual deadline for allocations and disbursement requests of 09.12.2008 to allow 
DBS to access the remaining €2m under this facility. 
 
PIFF II: 
Disbursements currently relate only to the €5m contract with the NDBP (out of the €25m facility). 
The total amount allocated and disbursed was €3,26m (64% of €5m); this represents 13% of the 
total €25m envelope envisaged for this facility. This consisted of two disbursements: USD 
3,016,465.00 on 23.01.2009, and USD 1,391,285.00 on 03.08.2009. The un-disbursed balanced is 
hence of €1,739,426.56. The 2009 Project Progress Report mentions that “It is very unlikely that 
                                                 
6  Source: Report to the Board of Directors; Fact Sheet A – RM/CRD Opinion, 25/10/2005 
7  If available, regional currencies (such as AUD or NZD) could also be considered. It is, however, understood that any 
non-EUR exposure to the IF will be hedged. 
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NDBP will draw down the remaining amount within the current deadlines (5 December 2009 for allocations 
proposals and disbursement requests). Furthermore, as the repayment of principal is to start in March 2010, it is 
most probable that those deadlines will not be extended.” 
 
The following table summarises the situation of disbursement as of end 2009. 
 
Beneficiary PIFF I:  
Direct beneficiaries:  
While Fact Sheet A mentioned a number of financial institutions to benefit from global loans, 
portfolio guarantee and equity investment8, the Fact Sheet B only named two institutions and only 
for global loans, namely the Tonga Development Bank and the Development Bank of Samoa. As a 
global loan, the operation was left open for other beneficiaries (Further intermediaries will, if they meet 
the Bank’s criteria and qualifying standards, possibly join the scheme at a later stage, upon approval of the 
Management Committee”)9 
Indicative amounts per bank foresaw a range of €4-6m for the Tonga Development Bank and €5-
7m for the Development Bank of Samoa (€7m were contracted). 
 
Final beneficiaries:  
Small, Medium and Microsized Companies (SMMIs). 
Allocations to SMEs would be up to EUR 500.000, distributed on a first come first served basis by 
the banks to ensure an efficient overall fund utilisation. 
 
PIFF II: 
Direct beneficiaries (borrowers) initially envisaged10:  
 Bank South Pacific (BSP) in Papua New Guinea (preliminary breakdown: €8m-€10m) 
 Bank of the Cook Islands Limited (BCIL) in the Cook Islands (€2m-€3m)  
 National Development Bank of Palau (NDBP) in the Republic of Palau (€3m-€5m) 
 Niue Development Bank (NDB) in Niue (€1m-€2m) 
 Additional intermediaries from other Pacific countries, which would have been able to benefit 
from the facility at a later stage, subject to satisfactory appraisal and approval by the 
Management Committees11. 
                                                 
8  Fiji Development Bank, Bank of the Cook Islands, Bank of Samoa and Tonga Development Bank for global loans; 
proposed two commercial banks (ANZ, Westpac) for portfolio guarantee product; and Samoa Venture Capital Fund 
and Kula II for equity investment 
9  Source: “Fact Sheet B – Financing Proposal” (of the operation), EIB, 21/10/2004 (p1) 
10  Source : “Fact Sheet B – Financing Proposal” (of the operation), EIB, 11/10/2006 (p1)  
N° projet
Dénomination de l'opération PACIFIC 
ISLANDS 
FINANCING 
FACILITY
PACIFIC 
ISLANDS 
FINANCING 
FACILITY B
PACIFIC 
ISLANDS 
FINANCING 
FACILITY II
PACIFIC 
ISLANDS 
FINANCING 
FACILITY II
Nom du pays de la transaction
Type IF IF IF IF
Date de signature 15/10/2005 15/12/2005 05/12/2006 23/02/2007
Montant signé 7 000 000.00 6 000 000.00 5 000 000.00 2 000 000.00
Montant augmentation 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2003 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2004 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2005 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2006 2 095 477.73 0.00 0.00 0.00
2007 1 238 089.52 0.00 0.00 0.00
2008 2 299 610.51 70 824.88 0.00 0.00
2009 1 366 822.24 0.00 3 260 573.44 0.00
TOTAL 7 000 000.00 70 824.88 3 260 573.44 0.00
REGIONAL - PACIFIQUE
2004 0138 2005 0362
Pacific Islands Fiancial Facility
DECAISSEMEMTS
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Final beneficiaries initially envisaged: SMEs and micro-sized initiatives in the Pacific region 
operating in eligible sectors under Cotonou 
 
In practice, the only direct beneficiary was the NDBP (€5m contract). Its final beneficiaries were, as 
mentioned in the Project Progress Report, “SMEs and micro-sized initiatives in the Republic of 
Palau in the productive and human capital sectors (private sector)”.  
Project Background 
& History 
PIFF I:  
This first financing facility for the Pacific Islands aimed at addressing a gap in the market in terms 
of term financing that precluded many SME from obtaining suitable funding from local sources. 
The EIB aimed to cooperate with a (first) series of development banks in the Pacific region. It had 
already relations with several banks falling in the scope of this facility, mainly in countries which are 
historically part of the ACP agreements (e.g. Tonga, Fiji, and Samoa). 
 
PIFF II:  
The global loan would be a follow up of the first Pacific Financing Facility under Cotonou, 
approved by the CA on 14 October 2004 (CA/381/04). The first facility had been fully allocated 
and this second facility aimed at appraising further banks in the region.  
Through the proposed combined facility approach the Bank aimed to cooperate with several 
financial intermediaries in the Pacific region, similar to what had already been done under the first 
Pacific Islands Financing Facility, and in a number of large individual countries in other parts of the 
ACPs. The maximum amounts available for the initial participating banks were €10m for BSP, €3m 
for BCIL, €5m for NDBP and €2m for NDB. 
Details on the proposed guarantee facility were not available but the aim was to make available 
different types of credit lines to private sector companies in the Pacific region by sharing risks with 
commercial banks. Guarantees could possibly cover: (i) short term domestic trade credits (ii) 
medium term finance in the form of equipment lease, (iii) corporate loans, (iv) home loans and/or 
(v) medium term finance to exporters and tourism operators. 
Note. There were previously global loans with the Development Bank of Kiribati. No previous 
relationship with the proposed development bank in Palau, which is a new ACP country and no 
direct relationship with the Rural Development Bank in PNG. There were existing contacts with 
the Bank of the South Pacific and Westpac. There was co-financing with ANZ but no financing 
facilities to date with any of them. 
Overall objectives Support the private sector 
Specific objectives Provide loans and technical assistance to SMEs and micro-sized initiatives in different Pacific 
countries 
Expected results See activities 
Activities The size of allocations under the facilities would be limited to €0.5m.  
See also above under the lines “Financing Committed” and “Project Background & History”. 
Main achievements PIFF I:  
For the contract with the Development Bank of Samoa, the January 2009 PPR mentions the 
following achievements to date:  
“15 Projects (small and medium sized projects each requiring an investment by the Bank comprised between EUR 
70,000 and EUR 500,000) and 184 Portfolio Projects (projects below EUR 70,000) have been allocated and 
disbursed (15 disbursements have occurred). 724 jobs have been created. More than a third (35%) of the GL has 
been allocated to hotels and restaurants, 20% to wholesale and retail trade, 10% to transport, storage and 
communication, 9% to manufacturing and 8% to agriculture, hunting and forestry.” 
 
The following tables provides the sector distribution of the credits granted by DBS with the lobal 
loan: 
                                                                                                                                               
11  Three commercial banks were proposed in 2005 to be eligible under the guarantee facility: Australian and New 
Zeeland Banking Group (“ANZ”), Westpac Banking Corporation (“Westpac”), and BSP. ANZ and Westpac are 
rated Aa3 by Moody’s. BSP is not rated by any of the rating agencies. Exposure limits set out in the IF CRPG will 
apply. Source: “Fact Sheet A – RM/CRD Opinion), EIB, 25/10/2005 (p1) 
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On (weighted) average the EIB global loan contributed to 38% of the value of these loans. 
 
PIFF II: 
The facility resulted in a first contract of €5m with the NDBP. The 2009 Project Progress Report of 
this contract provides the following score for project progress: “Good – 2”. It mentions the 
following achievements: “9 projects (small and medium sized projects each requiring an investment by the Bank 
comprised between EUR 70,000 and EUR 500,000) totalling USD 2.3M and 70 portfolio projects (below EUR 
70,000) totalling USD 2.1M have been allocated and disbursed. Over a fourth of the GL has been allocated to 
construction (28.61%), another fourth (25.68%) to social housing (classified under real estate, renting and business 
activities), 18% to hotels and restaurants, 17% to wholesale and retail trade, 5.6% to transport, 2.2% to electricity, 
gas and water supply and 2.6% to other community, social and personal service activities.” 
It further reports that 194 jobs have been created (without providing more details). 
 
For both facilities the main achievement has been no provide numerous relatively small to medium 
loans to small and micro enterprises. The channeling of the resources provided by the Investment 
Facility through local development banks proved an effective way of having a widespread 
distribution of credit. Widespread sector wise, but also geographically because the development car 
reach actors in remote areas such as the outer islands which are seldom covered by the commercial 
banks.  
Project's main weak 
points 
Nothing to point to, except the lack of collaterals, see issues hereunder. 
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Issues  PIFF I: 
Disbursing the full loan it contracted will be an issue for DBS because of the absence of collateral 
offered by the borrowers. Indeed the main collateral for MSME is land but it Samoa it is mostly 
“customary land”, meaning land own by communities and belonging to the village, not to the 
individuals. It can therefore not be sold and it not usable as a  security.   Moreover, contrarily to the 
situation in Fiji, banks in Samoa are not prepared to accept land lease as collateral (in fact land lease 
is not widespread in Samoa).  
 
PIFF II: 
The 2009 Project Progress Report mention the following issues for the single contract from this 
facility (with the NDBP), in particular delays in fulfilling condition precedents: 
“Disbursements under this global loan (tranche with National Development Bank of Palau) started two years after 
the signature of the Finance Contract. The first reason of this delay was the time elapsed between the signature of the 
Finance Contract (December 2006), the signature of the Guarantee and Indemnity Agreement with the Republic of 
Palau (September 2007) and the receipt by the Bank (April 2008) of the Senate Joint Resolution approving the 
entry by the Republic of Palau into the Guarantee and Indemnity Agreement. The second reason was that one of the 
conditions precedent for the first disbursement was fulfilled only in January 2009, namely the letter confirming the 
acceptance of the process Agent. To date, 65% of this global loan has been allocated and disbursed (in USD). It is 
very unlikely that NDBP will draw down the remaining amount within the current deadlines (5 December 2009 for 
allocations proposals and disbursement requests). Furthermore, as the repayment of principal is to start in March 
2010, it is most probable that those deadlines will not be extended.” 
Documentary PIFF I: 
 “Fact Sheet A – Proposal to appraise new operations” (of the operation), EIB, 05/03/2004 
 “Relevé Quotidien (RQ)”, EIB, 26/02/2004 
 “Fact Sheet B – Financing Proposal” (of the operation), EIB, 21/10/2004 
 “Project Progress Report” (of the operation’s contract n° 23209 with the DBS), EIB, 
07/01/2009. 
 
PIFF II:  
 “Fact Sheet A – Proposal to appraise new operations” (of the operation), EIB, 29/09/2005 
 “Fact Sheet A – RM/CRD Opinion” (of the operation), EIB, 25/05/2005 
 “Fact Sheet B – Financing Proposal” (of the operation), EIB, 11/10/2006 
 “Financial Report Ops B”(of the operation), EIB, date not specified 
 “Board of Directors, Global authorisation from IF resources” (for the operation), EIB, 
21/11/2006 
 “Project Progress Report” (of the operation), EIB, 01/12/2009 
 “Note to the Management committee, PIFF II: Proposal to approve A) an additional 
intermediary and B) the technical assistance scheme under the Facility”, EIB 19/4/2010 
 
Both Facilities: 
 Pacific Regional Office, Quarterly Report, QIV: October-December 2010 
 Qarterly Report 2010. 
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2006_EAU SENEGAL 
Intervention Title PROGRAMME EAU SENEGAL
Country/Region Senegal
EIB Ref. 2006 0566 
Project Start date 
& End date 
09/05/2007 (signature 29/11/2007) – 2011 (expected end of the project) 
Financing 
committed 
15 million EUR (EIB own resources) – 25% of total cost
Amount cancelled No indication 
Amount disbursed 15 million EUR (maximum)
Beneficiary Direct beneficiary: SONES: Sociéré nationale des eaux du Sénégal, a public company wholly 
owned by the Republic of Senegal 
Project 
Background & 
History 
The project, falling under the Programme d’eau Potable et Assainissement Millénaire (PEPAM) and 
covering the period 2006-2011, comprises the construction and/or rehabilitation of the water 
treatment facilities, reservoirs and improvement of distribution network in Dakar, Senegal. More 
precisely, PEPAM is concentrated on Dakar and on the most important urban centres in the country 
according to the following points: production, storage and distribution.  
PEPAM follows on from the PSE (Water Sector Project) and PELT (Long-Term Water Project), 
both of which the Bank helped to finance. 
Overall objectives PEPAM aims to achieve the UN Millennium Development Goals for 2015.
The objectives of the first phase of PEPAM 2006-2011 are to increase the rate of domestic drinking 
water connections, improve the quality of the water supply, bolster the policy of subsidised 
connections and strengthen the institutional reform of the public health engineering programme 
embarked upon in 1996. 
The additional connection to drinking water is expected to have a positive effect on the health by 
reducing the risk of water diseases. Furthermore the impact on the nature’s protection is needed to 
assess. 
Specific objectives The main objective of PEPAM for sanitation and drinking water is the improvement of the drinking 
water’s access: 64% to 82% by 2015 in rural area, 95.7% in Dakar and 84.3% in the other urban 
centres.  
Expected results In order to achieve the overall objectives described above, SONES had to allow 51 000 new social 
connections to water up to 2011.  This should have represented 540 000 additional persons who 
should have access to safe drinking water in Senegal. 
 
A positive social impact is expected by reducing the risks of water-borne diseases. Once the domestic 
connections or standpipes have been installed, it will also relieve women and children of the daily 
chore of fetching water, leaving them with more time for gainful activities and for the children to 
attend school. The improvement in living conditions and job creation resulting from the involvement 
of local people in the project will also help stem the flow of people into more densely populated 
areas.  
Activities The overall project (estimated at 60 million EUR) includes the following parts: 
 Production (for the urban centres only): 16 boreholes to be created, 3 boreholes to be 
renovated, and 2 water intakes to be created; 
  Treatment: for the urban centres, 4 treatment plants; and for Dakar, an iron removal plant; 
 Storage: for the urban centres, 22 reservoirs with a total capacity of 19 000 m³ and 2 
structures to be renovated for Dakar, 3 reservoirs with a total capacity of 5000 m³; 
 Distribution: installation of 51 000 subsidised connections, upgrading of 30 000 
connections, installation of 365 standpipes, network extensions (434 km) and network 
upgrading (215 km); 
 Technical assistance: client assistance and institutional support. 
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Main 
achievements 
No information available in that respect.
 
Project's main 
weak points 
The documents do not provide any information in that respect
Issues  The price paid by the Senegalese for the water was the higher in the UEMOA zone. Consequently, 
the household’s capacity to pay needed to be evaluated in order to ensure the viability of the project. 
 
Promoter’s capacity to set up an ambitious investment program which implied that the MDG related 
to water will be reached. 
 
Settle the backward of the public authorities. 
Documentary    “Fact sheet B: financing proposal”, EIB, 2007
“Note à Ops B/ACPIF-1. Avis pour instruction », BEI, 2007 
« Programme eau Senegal. RM/CRD opinion” Fact sheet A Ops B/ACP-IF/2006-0566, BEI, 2007 
“Fact sheet A: Appraisal Authorisation”, EIB, 2007 
“Rapport financier. Projet: Programme eau Sénégal”, EIB, 2007 
“Appendix Development Impact Assessment Framework”, EIB  
“Conseil d’administration. Prêt à l’investissement bonifié sur ressources propres. Projet 
PROGRAMME EAU », EIB, 2007 
“Document de stratégie de coopération et programme indicative pour la période 2002-2007” 
European Community,  
« Document de stratégie pays et programme indicatif national pour la période 2008-2013 », European 
Community, 2007 
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2007_ACPGLOB SOCREDO 
Intervention Title SOCREDO – LIGNE DE CREDIT ENVIRONNEMENT 
 
Country/Region French Polynesia 
EIB Ref. 2007-0328
Project Start date 
& End date 
31/01/2006 until  
Financing 
committed 
€5 million under IF (ordinary loan)
Amount 
cancelled 
No indication 
Amount 
disbursed 
€5 million
Beneficiary Direct beneficiary: SOCREDO Bank (Société de Crédit et de développement de l’Océanie) is aimed at 
contributing to the economic and social development of French Polynesia. As from its creation, the 
shareholders of the bank are the Territory of French Polynesia (50%) and the AFD (50%). 
Project 
Background & 
History 
The project consisted of providing SOCREDO with long-term financing needed in order to finance 
projects in the environmental and renewable energy sector in French Polynesia for 2 years. In that 
respect, SOCREDO submitted to the EIB specific partial financing demands for projects in that field 
presented by enterprises. A technical expert from the EIB based in Sydney office is a key element to 
perform a complete analysis of the eligibility criteria for the projects presented. 
 
In the previous years, the EIB has signed 5 contracts with SOCREDO. The most part of the loans has 
been satisfactory used. 
Overall 
objectives 
The EIB’s line of credit is aimed at financing small and medium sized projects in the environmental 
and renewable energy sector in French Polynesia. 
Specific 
objectives 
Strengthen the financial sector as well as the private sector (SMEs in environmental sector) 
Develop the environmental sector as well as the renewable energy sector by according a better access to 
long-term financing via the interest subsidy.  
Expected results  
Activities 
Main 
achievements 
No information available in that respect.
 
Project's main 
weak points 
Issues  SOCREDO risk: business concentration in a small local market, risky portfolio segments, weak 
diversification of the portfolio and transition to a shareholder structure. 
 
Under-utilization of credit line: the financing committed is small regarding the potential eligible 
projects identified by SOCREDO. The latter estimated the financing need of €20 million in that 
respect. 
 
Documentary    “Fact sheet B: financing proposal”, EIB, 2007
“SOCREDO-ligne de crédit environnement (2007-328)”, EIB, 2007 
« Note conjointe, SOCREDO ligne de crédit environnement », EIB, 2007 
« RM opinion », EIB, 2007 
« French Polynesia : Financial Sector Review », EIB, 2007 
“Value Added Sheet for Global Loan Operations under COTONOU Agreement (IF/OR)”, EIB,  
“Operational Strategy for the financial sector. New Caledonia and French Polynesia”, EIB, 2007 
“SOCREDO – ligne de crédit environnement. Résumé de l’opération proposée », EIB, 2007 
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TA2007_ACP 
Intervention Title TA microfinance facility : MicroCred Madagascar and MicroCred Senegal and 3rd country
Country/Region Regional ACP – Madagascar and Senegal
EIB Ref. TA2007002 RO IF1 
Project Start date 
& End date 
21/10/2008  - ongoing (end foreseen on 31/12/2010)
Financing 
committed 
€2 million 
The total funding approved was distributed as follows: €800 000 to MircoCred Madagascar, €600 000 
to MicroCred Senegal and the rest to a third MicroCred microfinance institution in another ACP 
country. 
Amount 
cancelled 
No indication 
Amount 
disbursed 
€1 999 857
Beneficiary MicroCred SA 
Project 
Background & 
History 
Participation in the capital increase of MicroCred. MicroCred is a microfinance investment company 
sponsored by Planet Finance, an international microfinance group with operations in more than 60 
countries. MicroCred’s investment objective is to achieve a commercially acceptable return in the 
microfinance area, and a social return through the deployment of equity or convertible debt to new 
microfinance institutions (MFIs) or financial institutions providing financial services to 
microentrepreneurs in developing countries. Since its creation in 2005, MicroCred has created six 
microfinance banks and non bank financial institutions in Madagascar, Senegal, Mexico China, Nigeria 
and Côte d’Ivoire. In the next years, MicroCred intends to grow its portfolio in Africa, the Middle East, 
China and Latin America with the ultimate goal of 15 investments by 2015. 
Overall 
objectives 
This operation aims to meet the objectives of the Cotonou Agreement for the eradication of poverty by 
supporting the improvement in the quality, availability and accessibility of financial services and the 
development of modern financial institutions and sustainable microfinance operations. 
 
  
Specific 
objectives 
This operation is aimed at supporting the development of greenfield microfinance institutions in sub-
Saharan Africa. TA is aimed at supporting MicroCred’s capacity building and institutional strengthening 
activities targeting microfinance institutions in ACP countries. 
 
The strategic objectives aimed at through this operation are: 
 Creation of new Greenfield investments in Africa; 
 Support of the private sector, both directly and indirectly, by investing through MicroCred in 
MFIs; 
 Provision of credit to micro and small enterprises through MFIs created by MicroCred. 
Expected results  
Activities 
Main 
achievements 
The TA funding provided by the EIB enabled MicroCred’s subsidiaries in Madagascar and Senegal to 
expand the range of financial products and services offered for productive purposes. More specifically, 
the provision of TA support serves to fund expenses incurred to train local employees. 
Project's main 
weak points 
 
Issues   
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Documentary    « Note to the management Committee », EIB, 2007
“TA MicroCred Madagascar – Milestones for 2008”, EIB, 2008 
“TA MicroCred Senegal – Milestones for 2008”, EIB, 2008 
“TA operation progress sheet, December 2009”, EIB, 2009 
“Project Progress Report. Monitoring exercise 2009”, EIB, 2009 
“Ops B – Project Progress Report”, EIB,  
“Microfinance Institutions/affiliates. Performance indicators as at September 2009”, EIB, 2009 
“MicroCred Senegal. Technical Assistance Plan 2010.”, MicroCred, January 2010 
“MicroCred Senegal. Technical Assistance Plan 2009.”, MicroCred, March 2009 
“MicroCred Madagascar. Technical Assistance Plan 2009.”, MicroCred, May 2009 
“Quarterly Performance Report on Technical Assistance. MicroCred Senegal. Quarter 4, 2009.”, 
MicroCred, February 2010 
“Quarterly Performance Report on Technical Assistance. MicroCred Senegal. Quarter 3, 2009.”, 
MicroCred, November 2009 
“Quarterly Performance Report on Technical Assistance. MicroCred Senegal. Quarter 2, 2009.”, 
MicroCred, August 2009 
“Quarterly Performance Report on Technical Assistance. MicroCred Senegal. Quarter 1, 2009.”, 
MicroCred, April 2009 
“Quarterly Performance Report on Technical Assistance. MicroCred Senegal. Quarter 3, 2008.”, 
MicroCred, October 2008 
“Quarterly Performance Report on Technical Assistance. MicroCred Madagascar. Quarter 4, 2009.”, 
MicroCred, February 2010 
“Quarterly Performance Report on Technical Assistance. MicroCred Madagascar. Quarter 3, 2009.”, 
MicroCred, November 2009 
“Quarterly Performance Report on Technical Assistance. MicroCred Madagascar. Quarter 2, 2009.”, 
MicroCred, August 2009 
“Quarterly Performance Report on Technical Assistance. MicroCred Madagascar. Quarter 1, 2009.”, 
MicroCred, April 2009 
“Quarterly Performance Report on Technical Assistance. MicroCred Madagascar. Quarter 4, 2008.”, 
MicroCred, January 2009 
“Quarterly Performance Report on Technical Assistance. MicroCred Madagascar. Quarter 3, 2008.”, 
MicroCred, October 2008 
“Quarterly Performance Report on Technical Assistance. MicroCred Madagascar. Quarter 1, 2008.”, 
MicroCred, April 2008 
“Cotonou Technical Assistance – Annual Report 2009”, EIB, 2010 
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TA2008_DOM REP 
Intervention Title TA Programme to Financial Institutions in the Dominican Republic for institutional capacity 
building – Phase I (preparation) & II (implementation) 
Country/Region Dominican Republic 
EIB Ref. TA2008033 DO IF2 
Project Start date 
& End date 
Phase I – preparation: 04/12/2008 to 31/01/2009
Phase II – implementation: n/a (not signed so far) 
Financing 
committed 
€1 484 900 (34 900 for phase I and 1 450 000 for phase II). The amount foreseen for phase II is not yet 
signed. 
Amount 
cancelled 
 
Amount 
disbursed 
 
N° projet TA2008033 DO 
IF2
TA2008034 
DO IF2
Dénomination de l'opération TA Programme 
to Financial 
Institutions in 
the Dominican 
Republic for 
institutional 
capacity 
building, Phase 
I - Preparation
TA Programme 
to Financial 
Institutions in 
the Dominican 
Republic for 
institutional 
capacity 
building, Phase 
II - 
Implementation
Nom du pays de la transaction Domenican 
Repubblic
Domenican 
Republic
Type IF IF
Date de signature 30/12/2004 22/10/2008
Montant signé 34 900.00 n/a
Montant augmentation 0.00 0.00
2003 0.00 0.00
2004 0.00 0.00
2005 0.00 0.00
2006 0.00 0.00
2007 0.00 0.00
2008 0.00 0.00
2009 34 900.00 0.00
TOTAL 34 900.00 0.00
TA2008_DOM Rep
DECAISSEMEMTS
 
Beneficiary Banco ADEMI, Banco ADOPEM and FONDESA
Project 
Background & 
History 
The EIB has been involved in the Dominican Republic microfinance sector for the last 12 years and 
has supported two institutions in their transformation from non profit organisations into regulated 
financial institutions (Banco ADEMI and Banco ADOPEM). The two banks have requested further 
financing in local currency and technical assistance to finance their portfolio growth in the next 3 years. 
At the same time, there are other smaller NGOs and Savings Banks specialized in microfinance that 
have also requested local currency financing, equity and technical assistance to increase their lending 
capacity, improve their governance and procedures and grow into regulated institutions following the 
example of Banco ADEMI and Banco ADOPEM. Similar TA is also being provided to FONDESA 
which likewise will transform into a regulated bank. 
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Overall 
objectives 
The overall objective of the TA is to support the modernization of financial intermediaries that service 
micro, small and medium-sized enterprises in the Dominican Republic. Support for final beneficiaries 
over the project cycle will also be explored. The project will be split in two phases.  
Phase 1 will consist of an initial analysis of the intermediaries’ technical assistance requests and a 
diagnosis and prioritisation of their needs and will have as a final result the drafting of the detailed 
Terms of Reference (ToR) for the future technical assistance programme (phase 2).  
Phase 2 will consist on the implementation of the TA programme.  
 
Specific 
objectives 
The specific objectives of the envisaged Technical Assistance programme are as follows: 
 
 to contribute to the  capacity building of the intermediaries by transferring best industry 
practice in the areas of micro and small and medium sized enterprises lending, project 
appraisal, credit risk evaluation, credit portfolio management, exchange rate risk and interest 
rate risk management, human resources development  as well as MIS and data software.  The 
need for improvements in the institutions’ AML/CFT will be assessed and addressed if 
necessary;  
 to help a more effective and efficient use of the EIB line of credit; 
 to support potential final beneficiaries of the lines of credit during the preparation and 
implementation of their investment projects to be financed by the intermediaries. 
 
Expected results The expected results of phase 1 are: 1) the identification of the intermediaries’ and financial 
beneficiaries’ needs and gaps related to internal procedures, 2) prioritisation of the needs, 3) definition 
of TA response to improve the gaps 4) preparation of Terms of Reference to select consultant(s) or 
consulting company to implement the second phase. 
 
Activities 
Main 
achievements 
 
Project's main 
weak points 
 
Issues   
Documentary    “Draft Terms of reference”, EIB, 2008
“A financial sector strategy for the Dominican Republic” 
“Programma de assistencia tecnica para el fortalecimiento institucional de entidades financieras que 
intermedian con las MIPYME en la Republica Dominicana. Terminos de referencia », EIB,  
“Cotonou Technical Assistance – Annual Report 2009”, EIB, 2010
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2008_EDFI 
Intervention Title EDFI EUROPEAN FINANCING PARTNERS III, III B, III C 
Country/Region All 
EIB Ref. 20080786
Project start date  07/04/2009; ongoing 
Financing 
committed  
EFP III: EUR  90 m;  EFP III B: EUR 5 m; EFP III C: EUR 5 m
Amount 
cancelled 
- 
Amount 
disbursed 
- 
Beneficiaries Private corporates and financial institutions in ACP States proposed by a Promoting Partner and 
approved by EFP’s IC 
Project 
Background & 
History 
Repeat operation- third contribution to EFP. Follows 2003- EFP EUR 90+0.01 m (fully disb’d); 2005-
EFP II EUR 90+5+5 m (14.6 disb’d) 
EFP initiative created 2003-2004. EFP III preceded by EFP and EFP II.  EFP is a SPV in corporate 
form, with a BoD and an IC.  The EFP is governed by an agency agreement between 14 EDFI 
members and EIB; hereunder, one EDFI acts as an agent for other institutions.  For a given operation, 
delegation is made to a Promoting Partner of project management, from identification to completion 
and including contractual arrangements. Financing and risk taking is distributed pari passu among 
participants (25% promoting partner, 50% EIB---IF and 25% all other committing partners). EIB 
contribution is an ordinary loan to EFP w/ max. term of 12 y. But EDFI promoting partner may apply 
different financial instruments.  EDFIs’ credit guidelines apply, except on exposure limits, and in case 
of an EIB contribution above EUR 8 m. Disbursements and repayments back to back with underlying 
projects. 
Overall 
objectives 
(A) Promoting sustainable development of the private sector in ACP States 
(B) Strengthening co-operation between eligible EDFIs and EIB 
Specific 
objectives 
Capitalize on EDFIs’ expertise
Sharing of financial risk of operations funded 
Leveraging the size of operations 
Sharing of knowledge between EIB and EDFIs 
 
Expected results Catalytic effect and leveraging IF financing
Visible coherence/harmonization of aid, namely at operational level, between EIB and EDFIs 
Quality project generation  
Activities Promoting partners at participating EDFIs propose projects to EFP which obtain financing from IF 
and other EDFIs.  Appraisal, processing and monitoring done by promoting partner, with reporting to 
EIB. 
EFP III has not yet generated projects, but will allow a continuation of the successful previous 
cooperation for project generation. 
Main 
achievements 
EFP III is not yet on stream and no disbursement has occurred. This evaluation therefor also relies on 
an evaluation of the preceding two EFB operations by EV, namely EIB Group Operations Evaluation, 
Synthesis Report : Evaluation of activities under the European Financing Partners (EFP) Agreement, January 2009 
JU Opinion on Fact Sheet B 23/02/2009 
RM/CRD Opinion 24/02/2009 
Board of Directors Report [no date] 
 
Strengthening of cooperation between EIB with 14 EDFIs, and among these EDFIs mainly DEG, 
FMO and PROPARCO. 
Sharing of information (Partners consider EFP IC meetings valuable) 
Projects above the size feasible for financing by one EDFI obtain financing 
Portfolio of the first two EFP operations is largely successful (see also below)  
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Project's main 
weak points 
EFP III is not yet on stream- hence no weak points are identified. 
It is unclear if the issue of the level of management fee to be paid to a promoting partner has been 
resolved. 
 
Under a previous EFP, one project failure occurred due to shortcomings in its design. 
 
The continuation of quality project generation will need to be watched, so that no dilution of IF 
standards occurs through delegation of project processing to EDFIs, particularly smaller EDFIs. 
 
Issues  EFP and EFP II were highly concentrated on three Partners: DEG, FMO and PROPARCO and this 
situation is likely to persist under EFP III. However, this situation is accepted by all Partners, and EIB 
evaluation finds that financial risks are sufficiently spread. 
Insufficient reporting requirements at closing of project, particularly in terms of development value, 
were addressed by requiring annual monitoring according to template satisfactory to EIB. 
Ambiguity as to whether EFP and EFP II could be used for Financial Sector (FS) projects was resolved 
under EFP III- FS operations should adhere to the IF’s FS strategy orientations and final SME 
beneficiaries adequately identified. 
Additionality issues between EIB and EDFIs also resolved under EFP III, namely EIB can cofinance 
larger projects w/ EFP. 
Documentary    Previous EFP operations: 
EIB Group Operations Evaluation 
Synthesis Report : Evaluation of activities under the European Financing Partners (EFP) Agreement, January 2009 
 
EFP III: 
Fact Sheet A: Appraisal Authorization 
Fact Sheet B: financing proposal 
RM/CRD Opinion 
 
EDI website    http://www.edfi.be/efp.htm 
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2009_MICROFINANCE 
Intervention Title MICROFINANCE ENHANCEMENT FACILITY 
Country/Region Regional - ACP 
EIB Ref. 2009 0021
Project Start date 
& End date 
07/04/2009 – ongoing (27/02/2015: maturity date which corresponds to the ultimate exit date)
Financing 
committed 
Up to €50 million to subscribe shares in the fund (10% of Project cost)
Amount 
cancelled 
No indication 
Amount 
disbursed 
Up to €50 million (probability of disbursement: 75-100%)
Beneficiary Direct: Microfinance Enhancement Facility (MEF), a specialized investment fund in Luxembourg, 
provides emergency liquidity support to microfinance institutions for a limited period of time. 
Indirect: Regulated and non-regulated MFIs, local banks and other financial institutions providing 
funding to micro-enterprises. 
 
Project 
Background & 
History 
The Fund will be an investment company organised under the laws of the Grand Duchy of 
Luxembourg in the form of a public limited company (a "société anonyme") qualifying as a société 
d'investissement à capital variable – fonds d’investissement spécialisé ("SICAV - FIS"). 
 
This specialised investment fund has been structured along the lines of the European Fund for 
Southeast Europe (EFSE), the largest microfinance investment fund worldwide in which EIB is an 
investor, and REGMIFA, a prospective microfinance fund for sub-Saharan Africa in which EIB is also 
considering an investment. 
 
Overall 
objectives 
MEF is a global initiative promoted by IFC and KfW aimed at providing liquidity support to 
sustainable microfinance institutions (MFIs) experiencing credit and other liquidity shortages in the 
context of the financial crisis, due to bank lines being pulled, deposit erosion, impossibility to roll out 
lines, or financings that otherwise would have been available to support short term funding of MFIs. 
Specific 
objectives 
 
Expected results  
Activities 
Main 
achievements 
 
Project's main 
weak points 
 
Issues  ACP Clause: since the majority of initial MEF deals are located outside of ACPs, the Bank subscribes 
on a condition that the fund invests at least an equivalent amount in ACP countries within a 
predetermined period of time. 
 
Structure: MEF will be a multi-tier structure consisting of different classes of shares. The Bank will 
review the proposed structure, as well as legal aspects. The Bank will also assess the risk-return profile 
of the proposed investment and will evaluate its contribution to the sustainability of the IF’s portfolio. 
 
Governance and Management: Since the Fund’s investments will be managed by external fund 
managers, the Bank will ensure that satisfactory governance mechanisms and legal safeguards are put in 
place in order to ensure supervision of the selected Managers and protection of shareholder interests. 
 
Initial Deal-Flow: The Bank will review the initial deal-flow of proposed investments and will ensure 
that a sufficient allocation is provided for MFIs in sub-Saharan Africa. 
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Documentary    “Fact sheet A: Appraisal Autorisation ”, EIB, 2009
“Fact sheet B: financing proposal”, EIB, 2009 
“Note conjointe”, EIB, 2009 
“RM/CRD opinion”, EIB, 2009 
“Microfinance enhancement facility. OCCO opinion”, EIB, 2009 
“JU opinion on fact sheet B”, EIB, 2009 
 “Board of Directors. Microfinance Enhancement Facility”, EIB,  
“Commitments and subscriptions as of 30 November 2009”, EIB 
“ESIAF report”, EIB 
“Portfolio on investments as of 30 October 2009” EIB 
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Annexe 9 – Data Collection Grid 
The information gathered in the data collection grid below has been gathered at the level of 
the indicators and judgement criteria of each Evaluation Question for the EIB IF/OR 
operations analysed during this evaluation. It is displayed in a basic, unprocessed form. As 
explained in the main report, it is important to note that the aim was to gather information 
that served as a basis for deriving findings with a view to answer to the Evaluation 
Questions (see chapter 4 of the main report). 
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EQ1 To what extent were the IF/OR operations focused on the development needs of the 
countries/regions in which they intervened, and to what extent did they remain in line with 
the national, regional and overall EU development policies relating to ACP/OCTs? 
JC 1.1 The EIB has explicit policies and guidelines to ensure that IF/OR operations financed are 
in line with development needs and EU development policies in ACP and OCTs and 
applies these guidelines 
I-1.1.1 Existence and coverage of specific guidelines 
General Different guidelines that apply to IF/OR operations exist, among which:  
- OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES OF THE INVESTMENT FACILITY, dated 17 
October 2002 which contain major core policies of the IF (“EIB-IF OpGuid”);  
- RISK MANAGEMENT- CREDIT RISK POLICY GUIDELINES FOR OPERATIONS 
OUTSIDE THE EUROPEAN UNION dated March 2009 (“Non-EU CRPG”) 
- CREDIT RISK POLICY GUIDELINES AND PROCEDURES FOR OPERATIONS 
WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE COTONOU INVESTMENT FACILITY-  
Board of Directors-  June 2006 (“IF CRPGs”) 
- NOTE TO THE MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE (OPSB/ACP-IF-7/2004-572) – 
FOREIGN EXCHANGE RISK HEDGING FOR LOANS IN HARD CURRENCIES  
- TECHNICAL NOTE ON THE USE OF INTEREST SUBSIDIES IN THE ACP- 
Development Economics Advisory Service- 
- NOTE TO THE MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE (OPSB/DEAS/2004-526) – 
INTEREST SUBSIDIES FOR OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE PUBLIC 
SECTOR IN LOW-INCOME ACP COUNTRIES 
- Guidelines for EQUITY INVESTMENTS UNDER THE INVESTMENT FACILITY 
(IF) and  if - EQUITY INVESTMENT STRATEGY – Board of Directors- June  2005 
- OPERATIONAL PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 
GUARANTEES UNDER THE INVESTMENT FACILITY (if)- Board of Directors- 
October 2004 
- EIB STRATEGIC ORIENTATIONS FOR FINANCIAL SECTOR OPERATIONS IN 
ACP COUNTRIES- Board of Directors- February 2008 
- ACP-IF Prêts en monnaie locale et orientations pour leur mise en œuvre  
- EIB PARTICIPATION IN REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS IN THE ACP- 
Board of Directors- April 2007 
- DEVELOPMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK OF IF PROJECTS- Board 
of Directors - April 2005 
- DEVELOPMENT IMPACT AND VALUE ADDED OF INVESTMENT LOANS IN 
ACP COUNTRIES - Board of Directors – December 2006 
- EXTENSION AND ADAPTATION OF THE ECONOMIC & SOCIAL IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK (ex-DIAF) TO ALL OPERATIONS (INCLUDING 
FINANCIAL SECTOR OPERATIONS) OUTSDIDE THE EU AND PRE-
ACCESSION COUNTRIES- Board of Directors- February 2008 
- ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL PRACTICES HANDBOOK- Sustainable 
Development Unit- September 2007 
- SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES IN MICROFINANCE AND OPERATIONAL 
OUTLOOK- Board of Directors- November 2007 
- THE ACP-EU WATER FACILITY AND EIB’S INVOLVEMENT IN ACP WATER 
AND SANITATION SECTORS 
 
These guidelines contain to various degrees specific requirements to make sur that IF/OR 
operations are in line with development needs and EU development policies.  
 
In particular the Operational Guidelines of the Investment Facility, contain specific and 
explicit references in this respect.  
In terms of focus on development needs, the following elements could be mentioned. The 
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guidelines indeed start with referring to the objectives of the Cotonou Agreement, more 
specifically Article 19.1 "the central objective of ACP-EU co-operation is poverty reduction and ultimately its 
eradication; sustainable development; and progressive integration of the ACP countries in the world economy." and 
Article 20.1 “ACP-EU co-operation strategy shall aim at [...] achieving rapid and sustained job-creating economic 
growth, developing the private sector, increasing employment, improving access to productive economic activities and 
resources, and fostering regional co-operation and integration". It further specifies that the EU should use its 
two instruments of financial co-operation to contribute to these objectives: the long term 
development enveloppe “to fund on grant resources projects for which non-reimbursable aid is appropriate”; and 
the Investment Facility, “to invest in commercially viable projects in productive sectors, notably in order to 
promote private sector development in the ACPs”. It further explains that the private sector has a central 
role in the promotion of sustainable growth, which is seen as a determinant factor in 
reducing poverty, specifying that  “historical evidence world-wide is that economic growth is a necessary 
(though not sufficient) condition for sustained poverty alleviation”.   
Referring to Article 21.5 of the Cotonou Agreement, "support for investment and private sector development 
shall integrate actions and initiatives at macro, meso and micro economic levels", it further states that the “IF 
shall mainly focus on the latter”. It is furthermore specified that “investments will be in support of 
countries' poverty reduction strategies through a direct and/or indirect  contribution to 
improving the livelihood of the poor”  and that “attention will be given to promote investment to least 
developed countries, as well as to countries committed to undertake economic reforms, to adjust in a post conflict 
situation, and/or to improve their governance”. It is further specified that “a balance will have to be struck 
between the developmental objective  and the requirement for  financial  viability”, which is also reflected in the 
section on project appraisal underlining two prerequisites to be met:  
- “economic viability must be clearly demonstrated to ensure that the project contributes to the growth of the 
local economy and thereby to poverty alleviation.  Projects are expected to yield a satisfactory ex ante 
economic rate of return (ERR), which should also be robust to reasonable variations in the major 
assumptions underpinning the analysis”.   
- every effort will be made to identify and include in the project definition elements benefitting the poorer 
segments of the population, in particular those that will improve employment and have an impact on local 
enterprises, as well as income distribution. As a minimum requirement, it will be ascertained that projects 
will not have an adverse effect on the poorer segments of the population 
In terms of evaluation, it is also mentioned that “considering the development focus of the IF, it is 
particularly important to assess, at least on a selective basis, the performance and, more broadly, the development 
impact of the projects it will finance”.  
The Operational Guidelines also refer to the importance of being in line with EU development 
policies in ACP and OCTs, notably by stating that “the policy at country or regional level will not be 
inconsistent with the EC country or regional strategy”. In terms of project appraisal, explicit reference is 
made to “consistency with relevant country and regional support strategies established under the Cotonou Agreement. 
The Cotonou Agreement stresses the need to establish a development strategy for each ACP country and to foster 
closer collaboration among donors to enhance the effectiveness of aid.  This broad policy is encompassed in the Country 
Support Strategy papers, which are periodically updated to reflect new developments.  Each operation financed 
on IF resources will not be inconsistent with the relevant EU country or regional support 
strategy.  Conformity with national legislation will also be ensured.” 
 
In the same line the 2005 Development Impact Assessment Framework of Investment 
Facility Projects ,aims at outlining “ways to better assess how Investment Facility Operations contribute to the 
Cotonou Agreement's objectives. In a pragmatic and holistic approach the Development Impact Assessment 
Framework outlines the focus on seven areas; the financial, economic, social and environmental performance, 
governance, and contribution to the Investment Facility strategy and to the Millennium Development Goals to make 
a judgement on the development impact of individual projects.” The background section explains in this 
respect the following: “With about half its members officially on the list of “Least Developed Countries” 
(LDCs) and many more at a low level of development, the ACP group includes the majority of the poorest countries 
in the world. Over the past ten years, this reality has pushed the international community to increasingly focus its 
efforts on the overarching objective of reducing poverty, which is also the central objective of the Cotonou Agreement. 
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This has implications on what is expected of development institutions, and the IF. In particular, while there is a 
presumption that projects in the ACP countries will typically have a significant development impact (because of the 
economic status of these countries) there is also an expectation on the part of stakeholders (Commission, Member 
States, beneficiary countries, NGOs) that IF operations would yield substantial social benefits and improve the 
welfare of the poorer segments of the population. Indeed, by financing productive and economically and financially 
viable projects, the IF contributes to economic growth, which, as is widely recognised, is a prerequisite for poverty 
alleviation. Academic research also recognises that no sustainable poverty reduction can be achieved without 
substantial economic growth. Private sector projects in particular, which are the primary focus of the IF, can make a 
powerful contribution to poverty reduction if the policy context is appropriate,2 by their direct contribution to economic 
growth. The accelerated economic growth that is necessary to achieve the Millenium Development Goals (MDGs) 
and, 
just as importantly, to sustain them over time, can only be driven by the private sector. Because of the 
pressure of competition - to which it is difficult to subject the public sector - private sector investment tends 
to make an efficient use of resources, raising employment and incomes. Furthermore, incremental incomes 
can be taxed, providing resources for the sustainable financing of direct poverty alleviation measures 
(income transfers and/or provision of goods and services to the poor)3. 
The importance of growth as a major contributing factor to sustainable poverty reduction – and hence the 
contribution made by EIB financed private sector projects – can hardly be overemphasised. It is commonly 
stated that growth is a necessary but not sufficient condition for poverty reduction. This is analytically correct 
– one can think of instances where growth can be associated temporarily with increases in poverty due to, 
say, the transitional negative impact on employment of trade liberalisation or privatisation. 
There is substantial empirical evidence which shows that economic growth in developing countries is 
usually also beneficial for the poorest segment of population. Furthermore, even if the poor benefit less than 
proportionately from economic growth, they stand a much better chance of benefiting from some growth 
rather than from no growth at all or from per capita income decline. In the latter two cases, reductions in 
poverty would have to rely exclusively on income redistribution policies. Such policies, however, have been 
largely unsuccessful in improving the lot of the poor sustainably within a context of economic stagnation or 
decline.” The strategic objective of the DIAF framework is precisely to enforce a more systematic, 
comprehensive, transparent and pragmatic approach in assessing the development impact of IF 
project.  
 
The DIAF has later on been extended in a 2008 document on the Extens and Adaptation of the 
Economic and Social Impact Assessment Framework (ex-DIAF) to all operations (including financial sector 
operations) outside the EU and the Pre-Accession countries. “The Economic & Social Impact Assessment 
Framework or ESIAF, (formerly known as DIAF) is a framework for assessing, at approval stage, 
some of the key features of projects financed by the EIB outside the EU. The ESIAF relies on the 
three pillars of (i) consistency with policy objectives, (ii) quality and soundness of project (or 
operation) and (iii) contribution of the EIB.” 
 
Other guidelines (e.g. the above-mentioned Credit Policy Guidelines and Procedures for operations 
within the framework of the Cotonou Investment Facility), also refer in various degrees to the 
development needs and EU development policies.  
 
The EIB relies on EU strategies developed by the Commission and endorsed by the Council and 
the Parliament. As a result, and contrary to other DFIs, it does not develop internalstrategies at 
regional or country level with prioritization of actions between different sectors. 
 
Source: MN 900 
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General (Lomé IV) There were few guidelines for project selection by the EIB under the Lomé IV Convention; this 
was expected to improve under the Cotonou Agreement: “Besides a set of more general developmental 
objectives, the Lomé IV Convention and the NIPs do not provide specific and operational objectives to guide the EIB 
in selecting lending operations. This “hands-off” approach to detailed programming leaves the Bank with a high 
degree of flexibility when selecting projects to meet quantitative lending targets.  
However, the large range of value added provided by the EIB – in particular non-financial value added – indicates 
that a more focused approach to project selection should result in the delivery of higher value added. Under the new 
Cotonou Agreement, regular reporting should be carried out on sector and geographical distribution of the projects 
financed, both on the objectives and on the results achieved. This would also provide useful information when 
discussing these issues in the appropriate forum: the Investment Facility Committee.” 
Source: Evaluation of EIB financing through individual loans under the Lomé IV Convention, 
EIB, 2006 (p1). 
 
That evaluation also notes the following with regard to the EIB’s flexible guidelines for selection of 
projects, lack of benchmarking exercises on internal rates of return, and importance of adequate 
project identification, conditionalities and monitoring:  
“The increasingly flexible approach taken to programming under the Lomé convention, and carried on into the 
Cotonou agreement, makes it easier for the Bank to identify and select appropriate projects for EIB funding. 
However, such an approach may not result in a maximisation of the value added the Bank could provide. 
Because of the relatively lean, streamlined appraisal and approval procedures of the Bank, identified projects are 
usually quickly appraised and lending operations approved by the EIB Board. An area for improvement is the 
general lack of benchmarking exercises for the financial and economic internal rates of return used when accepting or 
rejecting appraised projects. 
As mentioned above, a more detailed monitoring of project implementation and operation and a more forceful follow-
up of identified constraints seems at times to be necessary in support of EIB financed projects. This should involve the 
cancellation of approved loans or the request for immediate repayment (default) if agreed covenants required to ensure 
the successful implementation and operation of a project have been violated. Proper monitoring of agreed covenants 
should lead to effective decisions when they are not fulfilled.” 
Source: Evaluation of EIB financing through individual loans under the Lomé IV Convention, 
EIB, 2006 (p3). 
 
That evaluation recommended establishing detailed lending priorities related to geographical and 
sector allocations that aim at maximising EIB value added. The EIB comments to these 
recommendations (incorporating early experience under Cotonou’s IF) are provided next to it 
in the below table, and notably the EIB requirements for sufficient flexibility:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MID-TERM EVALUATION OF THE IF AND EIB OR OPERATIONS IN ACP/OCTS 
ADE - EGEVAL II  
Final Report  September 2010 Annexe 9/Page 7 
 
EIB Evaluation’s 
recommendation 1 
EIB Services’ Comments 
The Bank, in close co-
operation with other 
parties concerned, 
should establish and 
report on detailed 
lending priorities 
related to geographical 
and sector allocations, 
particularly in the 
public sector, that aim 
at maximising the value 
added the EIB could 
provide. This may 
involve regular 
reporting to the IF 
Committee. (Sections 
2.2 and 6.1)  
The Bank keeps in close and continuous contact both with the ACP 
authorities in the States concerned and with the European 
Commission regarding the preparation and the implementation of its 
lending programmes (which are reflected in the relevant Country 
Strategy papers to which the Bank contributes at programming stage). 
These inputs form some of the building blocks for the annual 
business plan, which, bearing in mind that the IF has the remit to 
operate in all ACP regions, defines strategic, geographical and sectoral 
orientations for the Investment Facility, in close consultation with the 
IF Committee. The Bank is further aiming to improve portfolio 
coherence through regular reporting to the IF Committee on the 
implementation of the business plan and on results achieved, through 
the annual activity reports and portfolio reports, which is in line with 
EV recommendations.  
While expected to demonstrate its contribution to the development 
objectives of the Cotonou Agreement, the IF has been designed as a 
revolving mechanism that over time must generate reflows for 
reinvestment. This objective of financial sustainability, combined with 
the private sector and market related orientation of the IF 
nevertheless require that the Bank maintains sufficient flexibility in 
the implementation of its mandate and of the business plan, and 
reacts in an efficient and prompt way to market conditions and 
opportunities.  
Source: Evaluation of EIB financing through individual loans under the Lomé IV Convention, 
EIB, 2006 (p4). 
 
On the appraisal of projects, see also I-9.2.2. with a Lomé IV Evaluation’s recommendation for 
more careful analysis of institutional issues at appraisal in order to strengthen the project 
implementation and management capacities, in particular of public sector promoters, and including 
appropriate measures as loan conditions. 
I-1.1.2 Utilisation of these guidelines in selection and design of operations 
General “IF operations can be expected to be concentrated in countries where the business environment is 
propitious to the expansion of private investment, as identified in the business plan, although a 
geographical diversification of the portfolio will be sought.  Attention will be given to promote 
investment to least developed countries, as well as to countries committed to undertake economic 
reforms, to adjust in a post conflict situation, and/or to improve their governance.” 
“Operational guidelines of the IF”, BEI, p5 
 
“Sector priorities are discussed in the context of the programming process (Country Support 
Strategy and Regional Support Strategy papers) and set out in the IF's business plans.”  
“Operational guidelines of the IF”, BEI, p5 
 
“The policy to meet market opportunities, coupled with the requirement for the financial self-
sustainability of the IF, implies that there cannot be a pre-determined allocation of resources (e,g., 
by country, sector, type of operation, type of financial instruments).  The policy at country or 
regional level will not be inconsistent with the EC country or regional strategy.” 
“Operational guidelines of the IF”, BEI, p6 
 
According to a COUNTER BALANCE report in ACP countries, the EIB operates under the 
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mandate of the Cotonou Agreement which aims at poverty reduction and sustainable development. 
The report points to the fact that the financing of the Tenke Fugurume Mining project does not 
respond to these objectives. 
 
Source: Counter Balance, Réformer la Banque Européenne d’investissement, “Terrain miné, l’implication de la BEI 
dans le projet minier de Tenke-Fugurume en RDC », Août 2008 
2004_WAGP Several sources indicate that the operation’s preparation and appraisal has followed explicit EIB 
guidelines and procedures as evidenced by preparatory documents: 
EIB, Fact Sheet A: proposal to appraise new operation, Luxembourg 17/2/2005, (OPS/B/ACPIF-
1 WestAfr & Sahel/20040026/Walter Eve) 
 EIB, Note to Ops B, Opinion for Appraisal, Luxembourg 4/2/2005 (PJ/ENERCOM/2005-
0124/FT/GF/mh) 
 EIB, Fact Sheet B: financing proposal, Luxembourg 18/10/2006 (OPS B/Afr., Caribbean, 
Pacific,-IF/2004-0026/Walter Eve 
 EIB, West African Gas Pipeline, Ghana, RM/CRD Opinion (Fact Sheet B Ops B/ACP-IF-
1/2004-0026/EW) 
 EIB, Appraisal Report, West African Gas Pipeline, Ghana. Luxembourg, 02/10/2006 
2003_Dakar-
Ziguinchor 
The operation’s 2004 “fact sheet A” does not refer direct to selection guidelines. It nevertheless 
justifies as follows the « economic interest » of the project in a specific section: 
« La liaison maritime Dakar – Ziguinchor est un complément indispensable à la voie routière qui traverse la 
Gambie. Elle est seule capable d’assurer le transport des voyageurs avec gros bagages ou des marchandises diverses. 
C’est un élément clé pour la réalisation du plan de redressement économique et social de la Casamance qui est un volet 
de l’accord de paix avec le Mouvement des forces démocratiques de Casamance. Au titre de la « continuité territoriale 
», le gouvernement considère cette liaison maritime comme prioritaire. Depuis le tragique naufrage du ferry « Le Joola 
», en septembre 2002, elle n’est plus assurée. Toutefois, la rentabilité économique est moyenne, et la rentabilité 
financière faible voir négative (liée à un tarif assez bas tenant compte du faible pouvoir d’achat de la population et de 
la concurrence du transport par la route assuré par le secteur informel). Il est donc nécessaire que le gouvernement 
prenne en charge la quasi-totalité du coût d’acquisition du navire. » 
Source : « Fact Sheet A : Proposition portant sur l'instruction d'une nouvelle opération » (of the 
operation), EIB, 26 March 2004 (p2) 
2003_MAURITIUS 
CONTAINER 
There is no reference to specific guidelines. Nevertheless, the reference to the objectives of the 
Cotonou Agreement is put forward to justify the loan. In that respect and according to the EIB, 
this project is consistent with the Cotonou Agreement and the mandate given to the Bank in that 
respect. Indeed, the increase of maritime transport’s efficiency enables the country to play a full 
part in international trade.« Mauritius: Mauritius Container Terminal II Project. Extension of the Mauritius 
Container Terminal. Cotonou Agreement-Loan from the Bank’s own resources. Ops B Financial report», EIB, 
2004” p8 
 
According to the appraisal report, the project is compliant with two first pillars of the Bank’s three-
pillar-based value added approach (1.consistency with policy objectives, 2.quality and soundness of 
project and 3. contribution of the EIB). More precisely, the project fully meets the objectives of the 
Cotonou Agreement to foster development in Senegal (pillar 1). The second pillar for which the 
project is compliant gives more importance to technological aspects. « Appraisal Report – Mauritius 
Container Terminal II – Mauritius », EIB, 2004, p5 
 
There is no indication related to the utilisation of these guidelines in the selection and design of 
operations. 
2003_GILGEL 
GIBE 
The project is referenced under the mandate of Cotonou Agreement. No further explanation is 
provided. The project documents do not explicitly show how this project meets the Cotonou 
Agreement’s objectives. 
 
There is only a reference to the conformity with the EU environmental and social policy and 
standards: 
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“All studies and the proposed mitigating measures will be subject to further appraisal by the Bank 
to ensure that the project complies with all relevant national and international laws and is in line 
with EU environmental and social policy and standards, and has no significant negative impact on 
protected zones.”  “Fact sheet A: proposal to appraise new operation”, EIB, 2004, p2 
 
“The project is consistent with EU objectives as specified in the Cotonou agreement and the 
mandate given to the Bank under the Investment Facility. It further contributes to the EU and 
Bank’s environmental policy, tackling climate changes and promoting sustainable use of renewable 
natural resources.” “Fact sheet B: financing proposal”, EIB, 2005, p4 
2004_OLKARIA The project is in  line with the EIB’s policy on sustainable development (renewable energy) 
Source: EIB Note to Ops B/ACP-IF-2 Opinion for Appraisal, Luxembourg 14/9/2004. 
PJ/ENERCOM/I&S/2004-965/EG/fe 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2006 
Relevant guidelines were adhered to. 
2005_EMP 
AFRICA FUND II 
Relevant guidelines were adhered to, in the sense of being “in line with” development needs.  From 
project documentation it does not appear, however, that any prioritization for maximizing 
development impact occurred in selecting the operation 
2005_ACPGLOB 
ADEMI 
Relevant guidelines were adhered to, in the sense of being “in line with” development needs.   
This operation, additionally, followed the EIB STRATEGIC ORIENTATIONS FOR 
FINANCIAL SECTOR OPERATIONS IN ACP COUNTRIES- BOARD OF DIRECTORS- 
FEBRUARY 2008. A prioritization occurred, based inter alia on a Country Financial Sector 
Strategy for the Dominican Republic prepared in accordance with said Strategic Orientations. 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2004 
Relevant guidelines were adhered to, in the sense of being “in line with” development needs.  From 
project documentation it does not appear, however, that any prioritization for maximizing 
development impact occurred in selecting the operation 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2006 
Relevant guidelines were adhered to, in the sense of being “in line with” development needs.  From 
project documentation it does not appear, however, that any prioritization for maximizing 
development impact occurred in selecting the operation 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
The value added of the project is considered within the internal Bank’s documents. In that respect, 
the EIB justifies the appropriateness of the project regarding the poverty reduction and the access 
to drinking water for the poorest populations. The project is then considered in line with the 
objectives of the Cotonou Agreement.  “Fact sheet A: Appraisal Authorisation”, EIB, 2007, p 2 
2007_ACPGLOG 
SOCREDO 
The environmental benefits identification is a prerequisite to the EIB funding. An EIB expert is 
deemed to provide the Bank with a form including this information. The compliance with the 
Community legislation is also included in this form. 
 
The guidelines are therefore applied in the projects selection. 
 
“SOCREDO-ligne de crédit environnement (2007-328)”, EIB, 2007, p 8 
 
The Overseas Association Decision (Coucil decision 2001/822/CE) foresees €20 million budget 
for the IF (managed by the EIB) to promote commercial enterprises in private sector in OCT. In 
that respect, the Commission has put priorities on renewable energy and energy efficiency. 
 
The global loan of €5 million has been granted to SOCREDO to onlend to small and medium-
sized environmental projects in French Polynesia. In that respect, SOCREDO suggested projects 
to the EIB. Then the EIB checked if each project is in line with the internal guidelines in terms of 
environment. The EIB had the possibility to request additional analysis to ensure that the 
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environmental impact expected of the project is compliant with the EIB’s guidelines in terms of 
environment promotion. 
 
The EIB has to make sure that the project presented by the intermediary bank is compliant with the 
Council decision and is in line with its environment policy. 
 
“SOCREDO-ligne de crédit environnement (2007-328)”, EIB, 2007, p 7 
2008_EDFI This last of three successive EDFI EUROPEAN FINANCING PARTNERS (EFP) operations, 
while allowing a large degree of delegation to the promoting partner, requires application of the 
EIB Strategic Orientations for Financial Sector Operations in ACP Countries- February 2008, 
including adequate identification of prospective SME beneficiaries, as well as application of the IF 
CRPGs for financing above EUR 8 m. 
2009_MICRO 
FINANCE_ACP 
The Bank has taken into account the guidelines established by the Cotonou Agreement. The EIB 
estimated that it is in line with the investment and private sector development of the Cotonou 
Agreement. According to the EIB analysis,  
“the investment in MEF is fully in line with Article 21 “Investment and Private Sector Development” of the 
Cotonou Agreement, which calls for “[…] support in improving the quality, availability, and accessibility of financial 
and non-financial services to private enterprises, both formal and informal, by […] developing a modern financial 
sector, including a capital market, financial institutions and sustainable microfinance operations.” 
 
“Fact sheet A : Appraisal Autorisation ”, EIB, 2009, p 3 
I-1.1.3 Opinions of EIB staff and other stakeholders (Commission Services, other donors, …) on 
appropriateness of the guidelines 
General In terms of appropriateness of guidelines it is interesting to note that representatives from other IFI 
explained that in their view, EIB guidelines are less stringent than those of e.g. IFC or IDB who 
seek depper development impact. Source:  MN 400, MN 410, MN 406 
 
According to several interviewees, EIB guidelines are less stringent than those of e.g. IFC or IDB 
who seek depper development impact. A review of IFC and IDB Guidelines and a discussion of 
AFD’s approaches conducted in the Dominican Republic leads to the observation that IFC, IDB 
(incl. MIF) and AFD have more detailed guidelines on setting higher development impact priorities 
than EIB. An example of the effect of this is that IDB and IFC will not do a project like Westin 
Roco Ki hotel for lack of local economic and social impact- AFD has done similar projects, but 
controversy about justification. 
 
Source:  MN 400, MN 410, MN  406 
JC 1.2 The IF/OR selection of operations takes place on the basis of analyses of the 
countries’/regions’ development needs, which take into account stakeholders’ views and 
effectively reflect country needs 
General According to a COUNTER BALANCE report, EIB’s capital allocation across the ACP countries 
was clearly biased towards bankable countries. The EIB does not enough consider whether 
proposed operations fit with national development plans. EIB operations do not reflect the sectors 
in which the recipient governments want to engage the EIB. 
 
The EIB does not prioritise sectors and intervention types that are appropriate for each region and 
country where it operates. The prioritisation is not driven by needs on the ground, as set out in 
national development plans and similar country-led strategies. The EIB is not taking into account 
what the other official development agencies are planning or offering in the country.  
 
The report further lists several EIB operations with little obvious developmental, poverty reduction 
benefits : Westin Roco Ki Beach and Golf Resort in Dominican Republic, the Albion Resort and 
the Bel Ombre Hotel in Mauritius, the Lesotho Highlands Water Project and the Chad Cameroon 
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oil pipeline, etc. 
 
Source: Counter Balance, Challenging the EIB, “Corporate welfare and development deceptions : why the EIB is 
failing to deliver outside the EU?”, February 2010 
 
General Pacific: BEI, contrairement à BM et BAsD, n’a pas de stratégie régionale ou nationale. La raison est que 
BM et BAsD ont un dialogue de politique ce que la BEI n’a pas car elle finance uniquement des 
projets et peu répondre de manière très flexible à des demandes. 
Privilégie : infrastructure (énergie renouvelable, infrastructure de réseau : tpt, télécom), appui au 
secteur privé. 
 
MN313 
2002_WAGP Obviously analyses of the countries context, the situation of the sector and the environment issues 
have been conducted or used by the EIB. The completion of the appraisal fiches and reports 
evidences this, however, without quoting sources nor elaborating on these analyses.  
It is also worth noting that in none of the preparatory documents mention is made of the 
Commission country/regional strategies and/or analyses.  
Sources: Preparatory documents, as for I-111 
I-1.2.1 Existence of country/region development needs analyses for the countries/regions of 
intervention (prepared by EIB or other authorities) 
General These analyses should have been prepared in collaboration with stakeholders (e.g. national/regional 
authorities and private sector representative institutions). 
 
“...the strategic orientations for financial sector operations must be developed at two levels:  
(i) some basic principles should apply to financial sector operations of the IF in general (keeping in 
mind the issue of flexibility mentioned above),  
(ii) specific country circumstances should lead to the definition of country-specific strategic 
guidelines against which each specific operation should be assessed, recognising that financial 
sector development is not homogeneous across countries.”  
“EIB strategic orientations for financial sector operations in ACP countries”, EIB, p5 
 
 
A Commission representative notes that the EIB and EC are not that much coordinated for CSPs: 
“EIB is understaffed”: probably it’s true. The EIB is a very lean & efficient institution, and the EU wants to keep 
it as it is. If we recommend that more staff is needed, we have to take into account that the EC is behind the EIB. 
The EIB might be more involved in CSP/RSP, etc., for instance with one paragraph dedicated to the EIB, but the 
EIB should rely on EC policies etc., not duplicating the work. EIB is not just another IFI; it is the bank for the 
EU. Normally the EC should conduct analysis.  I acknowledge that the EIB is not really taken on board. But now 
EIB is much more on the spot in recent years. RELEX understands it better now. Normally the EC should 
prepare the strategy for the EIB; only the very end, which is deciding on projects, should be left to the EIB.  
In practice it depends actually on the geographical areas. Now under Community guarantee we have a structured 
dialogue (RELEX, ECFIN, etc. with EIB). Before that (and even now): lots of inputs; not streamlined for the 
time being. They talk to each other, but not streamlined. We started to change this situation.” 
It appears also from that meeting that there is apparently little triangular coordination involving 
also EU MS.  
Source: MN 020 
 
An EIB staff member mentions that the EIB has increasingly had a strategic approach in the 
financial sector:  
“Egalement dimension secteur financier, surtout au niveau opérationnel, un peu également au niveau stratégique 
(mais pas assez). Nos macro économistes participent directement aux équipes, intervenant avec plusieurs rôles (point 
de base : analyse du secteur financier – structure etc.- mais également pour évaluer la qualité de l’environnement et de 
la supervision bancaires etc. ; aussi avec une dimension risque en particulier). Un peu sur la micro-finance. Depuis 
MID-TERM EVALUATION OF THE IF AND EIB OR OPERATIONS IN ACP/OCTS 
ADE - EGEVAL II  
Final Report  September 2010 Annexe 9/Page 12 
2006-2007 : contribuons également à des stratégies dans le secteur financier. Increasingly une approche stratégique : 
ex. quelles peuvent –être des manques (gaps) ou des secteurs prioritaires. Ex. opérations de prêts globaux. Une des 
idées: Avec élément novateur en plus d’opérations standard. Ce sont des idées, ce n’est pas pour cela que cela marche 
dans la réalité (ambitieux).” 
Source : MN 007 
 
An EIB staff member noted that the EIB does not have a programmatic, money-spending 
approach, although this does not impede it from defining priorities: 
 “Remember that the Bank is not a promoter, but it tries to have priorities. Example: energy financing. EIB has 
clear priority to finance clean energy. This is an area where the Bank will place full priority. With additional 
instruments like TA etc… the Bank is also supporting technical advice and improving the preparation phase. The 
Bank is no a promoter but is strengthening the promoter. The Commission’s aid is programme aid, with grants. A 
totally different dymamic. It is giving away free money. The Bank is not giving away free money.” 
Source: MN 024 
 
 
An EIB source mentioned that the paradigm of the Cotonou Agreement shifted over the years, 
recognising that the private sector alone cannot save the world: “The Cotonou Agreement was negotiated 
at a time when the international financial community believed that private sector investment in infrastructure, notably 
in the form of PPPs, represented the solution to Africa’s woes. The Agreement was thus negotiated as an instrument 
primarily geared for the private sector. Concessionary funds, a regular feature under the former Lomé Conventions, 
generally had been judged a failure and were to a large extent phased out and the Bank found itself with financial 
resources, the IF and OR, both intended to meet the needs of the private sector. As subsequent events have 
demonstrated, however, the increase in private sector interest and investment in the ACPs was short-lived, essentially 
because the fragile institutional framework, weak legal systems and excessive red tape did not offer sufficient 
guarantees to foreign investment. Soon the pendulum started swinging to the other side, as it became manifest to the 
international community that the public sector was going to have to remain an important player in economic 
development as a provider of basic infrastructure and, as a result, would require considerable concessionary financial 
resources. Because economic reality fell short of expectations, the Bank now finds itself not particularly well equipped 
(certainly compared to its main peers) in terms of financial instruments to face the new 
situation. Adaptations to the financial resources have been made, notably by making possible own resource lending for 
all public sector projects, including in the weaker countries. However, even this solution obviously does not have 
wholehearted shareholder support, as recently evidenced by the decision of the Board to split the financing of the Inga 
Rehabilitation project in the Democratic Republic of Congo on IF and OR respectively, contrary to the Bank 
proposal to finance the project entirely from its own resources, which was fully in line with the modalities approved in 
June 2007. It is indeed becoming evident that Member States are not at all comfortable with the idea of bearing the 
unpredictable political risk associated with lending in the weaker ACP countries through the OR guarantee 
mechanism. They prefer by far the Bank to make use of the IF, i.e. budgetary funds for which they have the necessary 
procedural system in place, rather than the contingent liabilities inherent in their guarantee.” 
Source: MN 027 
 
An EIB source mentioned that there are incoherencies between initial mandates arrangements 
and geo-political evolution in the targeted regions (Africa / Caribbean / Pacific): “Recent 
developments, notably in the context of the lengthy EC–ACP discussions on the trade-related Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPAs), have clearly evidenced the emergence of regional interests - or sometimes even divergences - within 
the ACP group; the Caribbean and Pacific regions are in some way being marginalised vs. sub-Saharan Africa, 
while at the same time Africa (i.e. including Northern Africa and South Africa) is becoming more prominent on the 
international scene. In a way, the EU has already acknowledged this major geo-political change at the time of 
establishing the EU-Africa Partnership back in 2007, which was followed by separate declarations for the 
Caribbean and Pacific regions. Africa as a whole, notably through the African Union, is now willing to be seen as a 
partner, while at the same time the more prominent and advanced African countries, such as South Africa or Libya, 
are playing an increasing role on the continent. Cooperation with institutions in these countries is being sought – e.g. 
with the Libya Africa Portfolio (LAP) – or reinforced, like with the Development Bank of Southern Africa or 
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South African financial institutions expanding regionally. In the latter case, however, the process is hampered by 
legalistic considerations related to the non-eligibility of South African institutions for Cotonou funding, an issue for 
which the Bank intends to approach the EC. This is probably the most 
obvious illustration of currently prevailing incoherencies between the mandates arrangements 
and geo-political evolution in the targeted regions.” 
Source: MN 027 
2004-WAGP A short analytical description of Ghana’ situation is provided in D2. Assessment of the 
environmental and social impact of the projects have reportedly been conducted, with consultation 
of stakeholders and local communities in the case of the environment impact Sources:  
EIB, West African Gas Pipeline, Ghana, RM/CRD Opinion (Fact Sheet B Ops B/ACP-IF-
1/2004-0026/EW) 
D6: EIB, Appraisal Report, West African Gas Pipeline, Ghana. Luxembourg, 02/10/2006 
 
2004_LUMWANA The  project has been the object and is the result of a full feasibility study that cost € 14 M, to 
which EIB contributed  €7M under Lome IV.  
Sources: 
EIB PIN (Preliminary Information Note), Lumwana Copper Project, Luxembourg 15/3/2005. 
OPS B/ACPIF-3SouthAfrica,0.Ind/2004-0146/BrandSchmitzWaltraud 
EIB Note to Ops B/ACP-IF-3 Opinion for Appraisal, Luxembourg 27/5/2005. PJ/I&S/2005-
598/GCE/MJ/aa 
2001_MOMA  
TITANIUM 
Annex G of EIB Appraisal Report Moma Titanium. Luxembourg 27, 2003. PJ/I&S/2003-
259/GCE/MUG/ms.  provides a succinct but up to the point analysis of the Mozambique 
situation and development strategy together with an analysis of the situation of educaton, health, 
water and sanitation, environment at the location of the project. Two points my be highlighted: 
“The current balance between meeting people’s survival needs and the sustainability of the natural 
resource base appears to be pivotally balanced”, and  
“As part of the project's Environmental Management Programme (EMP), it is envisaged that a 
development fund will be set up with the financial support of the promoter. Its main task will be to 
assist the local population in coping with changes in the course of the project. Although being 
mainly sponsored by the promoter, ail stakeholder groups as weil as local administration will be 
represented in the development fund in an equitable manner.” 
Source EIB Appraisal Report Moma Titanium. Luxembourg 27, 2003. PJ/I&S/2003-
259/GCE/MUG/ms.  
 
The project is located in a remote area without significant economic activity and is therefore the 
only potential resource of development for a very large region. 
Source: MN302 
2003_MAURITIUS 
CONTAINER 
The internal EIB documents describe the country situation, the trans-shipment sector and its 
importance for the Mauritius economy. The key role of the port is also identified to support the 
investment foreseen. The market (import and export) and the demand related are also examined in 
order to ensure the financial viability of the project. Figures are presented to support the facts 
described in the country analysis as well as in the trans-shipment sector. 
 
“Fact sheet A: proposal to appraise a new operation”, EIB, p2  
« Appraisal Report – Mauritius Container Terminal II – Mauritius », EIB, 2004 
 
The CSPs always present the country situation and the development needs. However these papers 
are not designed in order to analyse a specific sector/project in which the EIB is implied. 
 
« Mauritius – European Community. Country Strategy Paper and Indicative programme for the period 2001-
2007 », EC,  
« Republic of Mauritius - European Community. Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative programme for 
the period 2008-2013 », EC, 
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2003_GILGEL 
GIBE 
The internal EIB documents only present briefly the country’s situation but this presentation is not 
linked with the sector tackled by the project. 
 
“Fact sheet A: proposal to appraise new operation”, EIB, 2004, p2 
 
The CSPs always present the country situation and the development needs. However these papers 
are not designed in order to analyse a specific sector/project in which the EIB is implied. 
 
“Ethiopia - Country strategy paper and indicative programme for the period 2002-2007”, European Community 
“Ethiopia - Country strategy paper and indicative programme for the period 2008-2013”, European Community, 
2007 
 
A study prepared by Counter Balance in 2008 described the Ethiopian energy sector. According to 
this paper, “Ethiopia has one of the world’s lowest levels of access to modern energy services, and 
relies primarily on traditional biomass”. This situation is established according to population 
statistics from the World Bank’s Little Data Book on Africa 2007. 
Furthermore the electricity cost is relatively high in Ethiopia and the development of hydropower 
(as Gilgel Gibe II project) is a heavily politicised issue. 
 
“The Gilgel Gibe Affair. An analysis of the Gilgel Gibe hydroelectric projects in Ethiopia.”, Counter Balance, 
2008, p 4 
 
According to a COUNTER BALANCE report, in the case of the Gilgel Gibe dam project (EIB 
loans of €41m for Gilgel Gibe I and €50m for Gilgel Gibe II), the EIB has not carried out an 
evaluation of the development impact. Gilgel Gibe I, operational since 2004, caused the 
resettlements of almost half a million people. The agriculture of the area will also be damaged by 
the project while the impacts on the quality of the water and fisheries will be important. Neither the 
government nor the EIB have put in place measures to monitor the situation of the resettled 
people.  
 
Source: Counter Balance, Challenging the EIB, “Corporate welfare and development deceptions : why the EIB is 
failing to deliver outside the EU?”, February 2010 
2003_BOAD PG IV There is no evidence of a development needs analysis for the ECOWAS region (scope of this 
operation) specifically geared towards possible IF / OR operations. 
2003_Dakar- 
Ziguinchor 
There is no evidence of a development needs analysis for Senegal specifically geared towards 
possible IF / OR operations. 
 
The European Commission’s Country Strategy Paper for the period 2002-2007 provides general 
background information tackling country’s needs.  
Its section describing coherence of Commission policies with EIB policies/operations (p23) 
remains broad  on possible areas of EIB support:  
“ L’appui aux investissements des entreprises privées constitue l’orientation prioritaire de la BEI dans le cadre de la 
mise en œuvre de l’Accord de Cotonou. Son action au Sénégal sera ciblée sur les secteurs industrie, mines, pêche, 
tourisme et services liés – tels que transports, génie civil ou services utilisant les nouvelles technologies – mais elle 
pourrait également étudier d’éventuels projets privés dans les secteurs de l’éducation et de la santé.  
Compte tenu de la dimension souvent réduite des investissements des entreprises privées, la BEI cherchera à renforcer 
sa collaboration avec les banques du pays qui possèdent l’avantage de la proximité, par la mise en place de 
mécanismes financiers, tels que les lignes de crédit, les garanties et prises de participation.. Elle se propose d’optimiser 
les instruments de cette collaboration de façon à limiter l’appui aux projets d’investissement de petite et très petite 
dimension. Pour les investissements privés de taille importante, elle pourra intervenir en direct, en cherchant à 
exploiter le potentiel de participation des banques locales sous forme de cofinancements ou de schémas de partage de 
risque.  
De par la nature non programmable des investissements privés, le niveau global et la répartition sectorielle des 
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interventions de la BEI ne seront pas déterminés d’avance, mais résulteront des demandes de financement, approuvées 
en fonction de la qualité des dossiers. Le niveau d’intervention sera tributaire du rythme global de l’investissement 
privé au Sénégal, conditionné par la stabilité du cadre macro-économique et politique et par 
l’aboutissement des réformes gouvernementales entreprises pour créer un climat favorable à l’investissement national et 
étranger.  
Par ailleurs, la Banque reste disposée à participer au financement des infrastructures de base 
vitales pour l’économie dans les secteurs électricité, télécommunications et eau potable, 
réalisées par des promoteurs privés ou dont la réalisation s’inscrit dans un contexte de 
partenariat public-privé ou de privatisation. Elle participera aux côtés d’autres bailleurs de 
fonds à l’instruction du projet de réhabilitation, dans le cadre d’une privatisation, du chemin 
de fer Dakar-Bamako, voie capitale pour les échanges du pays avec la sous-région et pour les 
perspectives de croissance de son activité économique.» 
Source : « Sénégal-Communauté européenne – Document de stratégie de coopération et 
programme indicatif pour la période 2002-2007 », European Commission, 2002  
 
The EIB provides with a country analysis which explains how this sea link Dakar-Ziguinchor is 
important for the people who would like to travel between these two important cities. It appears 
that the air transport is too expensive for the local population and the three roads linking these two 
cities are subject to corruption by the custom officers and the roads are in poor condition. 
Consequently, the sae link is necessary to ensure a more safety liaison between the cities available 
for the all population and to ensure the merchandise transportation.  
Source : Operation’s « Conseil d’administration. Prêt sur les ressources de la FI. Projet Liaison 
maritime  
Dakar-Ziguinchor (Sénégal) », EIB, 2004, p5 
2004_OLKARIA Analysis of country situation is briefly reported in D2.  There are no  indication that it has been 
conducted with others, notably the Commission. 
 
The EC-Kenya CSP for the tenth EDF includes a description of the EIB’s response strategy to the 
needs of the country. For infrastructure, it states among the following objectives: 
 Financing infrastructure projects in the energy, water and sewerage, transport and 
telecommunication sectors, where the emphasis will be to help increase the efficiency of public 
utilities and encourage participation of the private sector  if appropriate. 
 
Source: Republic of Kenya - European Community, Country Strategy Paper and National 
Indicative Programme for the period 2008-2013, 9th December 2007., p. 164 
2005_ACPGLOB 
ADEMI 
There is a Country Financial Sector Strategy for the Dominican Republic and this analysis was used 
to select this operation 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2004 
Madagascar 
No Country Financial Sector Strategy was obtained for Madagascar 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2006 Kenya 
No Country Financial Sector Strategy was obtained for Kenya 
BOAD  
Microfinance Enh 
Fac 
No relating Country Financial Sector Strategies were obtained  
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2006 
The CSP/NIP 2003-2007 for Kenya, in a section devoted to PSD, refers to: 
 Kenya’s privatization strategy (“EIB will follow the privatisation process to identify 
opportunities”, with emphasis on infrastructure 
 The Micro-enterprises support programme (MESP) and the establishment of a Micro-
credit Trust Fund.  However, there is no clear connection between such effort and EIB’s 
effort to reach micro-enterprises under this Project.  It is not clear if EIB could utilize this 
Trust Fund in relation to its operations in this field. 
The CSP/NIP 2008 for Kenya on the other hand contains an expanded PSD review, namely: 
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 The Private-Sector Development Strategy is anchored in five strategic goals, all related to 
the business environment 
 PSD medium-term policy objectives of a general nature (competitiveness of SMEs, 
infrastructure development, capacity building, Kenyan ownership, reposition the PS to 
contribute substantially to employment and GDP, developing entrepreneurship) 
 The EC financed Micro-Enterprises Support Programme Trust Fund (MESPT), but the 
link with EIB operations in this field is not made. 
 A Technical Cooperation Facility (TCF) of € 4.6 m to implement EC assistance, “notably 
covering technical studies, project formulation, implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation”, but seemingly without a connection with EIB operations. 
A two page Annex on EIB FINANCING OPERATIONS IN KENYA lists EIB targeted activities 
in Kenya at that point of time- i.e. not necessarily valid in further years.  However, this indicates 
that EIB has a relatively detailed country approach in this case. 
2005_Pacific 
Islands 
There is no evidence of a development needs analysis for the Pacific region specifically geared 
towards possible IF / OR operations. 
 
Nevertheless, the EIB has carried out in the context of the PIFF II a “Financial Report”. This 28 
pages document (+ annexes) essentially describes in a few pages the financial sector in the region 
and provides specific information on the different borrowing banks for this operation (~4 pages 
per bank).  
 
The operation’s 2005 fact sheet A provides two paragraphs on the “country situation” which 
provides indication on a few country needs: 
« The Pacific country signatories to the Cotonou Agreement are spread across a vast area, yet in themselves display 
certain similarities in the development challenges they face, being mostly small island states with small resource bases. 
Located in the more temperate parts of the world with relatively easy access by air to wealthier countries, high value 
tourism has been a growth area for many and promises to continue to expand despite recent short-term setbacks 
linked to concerns over the safety of air travel. However, a number of areas other than tourism also offer potential for 
supporting development, particularly in the context of small and medium scale industries serving local economies. In 
addition the Pacific region as a whole has considerable fisheries industry potential, particularly with species such as 
tuna where stocks are plentiful.  
PNG has stabilised and investment in the country is recovering. The effect of lower interest rates was evident in an 
increase in lending in 2004 and the first quarter of 2005. The country also currently runs a budget surplus arising 
not only from higher world market prices for mineral resources but also from an improved fiscal management, in 
addition to low inflation and a relatively stable exchange rate. Nevertheless, remoteness continues to set limits on 
growth in many countries and periodic rogue climatic conditions remain a destructive threat throughout. » 
 
Source: “Fact Sheet A – Proposal to appraise new operations” (of the operation), EIB, 29/09/2005 
(p2) 
 
The report to the Board provides further a half page description of the “economic and financial 
situation” of each of the four pacific islands in scope of the PIFF II.  
The description for Palau is provided here as an example:  
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Source: “Board of Directors, Global authorisation from IF resources” (for the operation), EIB, 21/11/2006 (p16-
17) 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
The internal EIB documents only briefly refer to the country situation. The CSPs (9th and 10th 
FED), prepared in collaboration with the EIB, describe the economic, politic and social situation of 
the country. However the information is not presented from a specific project point of view. The 
sanitation and drinking water issue is also briefly tackled in these papers. 
 
The country’s situation is tackled by the Board of Directors paper from the EIB. The population 
needs are described and the opportunity of the project is explained taken into account the 
country/region specificities.  
 
“Fact sheet B: financing proposal”, EIB, 2007 
“Fact sheet A: Appraisal Authorisation”, EIB, 2007 
“Conseil d’administration. Prêt à l’investissement bonifié sur ressources propres. Projet 
PROGRAMME EAU », EIB, 2007, p7, 9, 10 
“Document de strategie de cooperation et programme indicative pour la période 2002-2007” European Community,  
« Document de stratégie pays et programme indicatif national pour la période 2008-2013 », European Community, 
2007 
2007_ACPGLOG 
SOCREDO 
The EIB is provided with an analysis of the environmental sector in French Polynesia as well as an 
economic and financial situation of the country. 
These analyses are well documented. 
 
 “SOCREDO-ligne de crédit environnement (2007-328)”, EIB, 2007, p9-10 
 
In October 2007, the French Polynesia financial sector and the economic environment of that 
country are deeply analysed by the EIB. 
 
« French Polynesia : Financial Sector Review », EIB, 2007 
 
2009_MICRO 
FINANCE_ACP 
No evidence has been found so far. 
I-1.2.2 These analyses have been prepared in collaboration with stakeholders (e.g. 
national/regional authorities and private sector representative institutions) 
General Other IFIs/DFIs observe that EIB is not equipped for contacts with local private sector 
stakeholders, by lack of country representations. 
A pro-active approach requires deeper knowledge of the local environment and local actors, but 
allows seizing development opportunities.  A reactive approach overlooks opportunities.  An 
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example is the major difference between AFD/Proparco’s, IFC’s and IDB’s approaches e.g. in the 
tourism and health sectors in the DR. 
While there is generally a check of the conformity with the development needs in the broad sense 
(see the “3 pillars”), this is a far cry to maximizing proactively development impact.   
Programming:  IDB, IFC, AFD/Proparco have Country and/or Sector Strategy approach with 
clear measurable priorities. 
IDB and IFC have, compared to EIB, a considerably deeper strategy for local social impact. 
EIB handicapped in this respect by lack of local presence. 
Source:  MN 400, MN 410, MN 406  
 
Several interlocutors underlined that the EIB was not visible enough. Stakeholders do not know 
very well the EIB. Such visibility might be important, for instance for the pirvate sector to know 
what the EIB can offer. (e.g. MN 263, MN 257).  
General EIB staff indicate that all financial sector operations are prepared on the basis of Country Financial 
Sector Strategies which are prepared by DEAS in collaboration with financial sector stakeholders in 
the relevant countries.  
There is a Country Financial Sector Strategy for the Dominican Republic.  Absent for Senegal (and 
absent in all other countries in the West Africa Region, except Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire) 
2003_Dakar- 
Ziguinchor 
Indicator not really relevant for this operation as there is no evidence of such specific analysis (see I-1.2.2) 
 
The “Rapport d’instruction” prepared by the EIB refers to two missions which should have been 
taken place in March 2003 for the identification phase and in February 2004 for the evaluation 
phase. Furthermore, several contact persons are referred in this report. Consequently, some 
contacts with stakeholders should have been taken place. However no evidence has been found 
that meeting or communication have effectively taken place between the EIB and the stakeholders. 
 
Source : « Rapport d’instruction », EIB, 2004, Annex I 
 
Beneficiaries local autorities have been consulted, according to the relevant ministry. (MN 263) 
2003_MAURITIUS 
CONTAINER 
The majority of the information related to these analyses is found in the appraisal report edited by 
the EIB. This report contains an appendix I in which all contacts/reference persons have been 
listed. They represent the Mauritius government, the Mauritius Ports authority and CHCL. They 
have been met by an EIB representative in the appraisal stage of the project. 
 
« Appraisal Report – Mauritius Container Terminal II – Mauritius », EIB, 2004, appendix I 
 
The CSPs have been subject to discussion with others donors (including the EIB) and non public 
bodies in order to permit to the EC to take into account several factors in its cooperation strategy. 
This implies that the EIB should have been consulted in order to prioritize the EC interventions.   
 
 
2003_GILGEL 
GIBE 
The CSPs have been subject to discussion with others donors (including the EIB) and non public 
bodies in order to permit to the EC to take into account several factors in its cooperation strategy. 
This implies that the EIB should have been consulted in order to prioritize the EC interventions.   
 
2004-LUMWANA We do not have  the feasibility study but it is referred to in the project preparatory documents and 
these indicates that the study involved a consultation with the stakeholders. 
Source: : EIB Fact Sheet A: proposal to appraise new operation. Luxembourg 08/07/2005. OPS 
B/ACPIF-3SouthAfrica,0.Ind/2004-0146/BrandSchmitzWaltraud 
 
“It (i.e. the Environment Impact Assessment) includes also the relevant social aspects, public 
consultation, a preliminary rehabilitation plan and an environmental management plan and has 
lately been supplemented by an indigenous peoples development plan (IPDP). In total, it conforms 
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both to EU and WB standards”. 
Source: EIB Lumwana Copper Project, Appraisal report, Luxembourg 30/6/2006, PJ/I&S/2006-
675/GCE/VMJ/aa 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
The CSPs have been subject to discussion with others donors (including the EIB) and non public 
bodies in order to permit to the EC to take into account several factors in its cooperation strategy. 
This implies that the EIB should have been consulted in order to prioritize the EC interventions.   
« Document de stratégie pays et programme indicatif national pour la période 2008-2013 », 
European Community, 2007, p3 and 17 
 
Beneficiaries local autorities have been consulted, according to the relevant ministry. (MN 263) 
2007_ACPGLOG 
SOCREDO 
Apparently the Commission and French Polynesia did not express any objection regarding this 
project as stated in the Fact sheet B of the EIB: “Commission opinion: no objection as the 
Commission deems to have rendered a favourable opinion under the Internal Agreement 
procedures.”  
 
 
“Fact sheet B: financing proposal”, EIB, 2007, p3 
“SOCREDO-ligne de crédit environnement (2007-328)”, EIB, 2007, p1 
 
I-1.2.3 Country/region needs are reflected in these analyses in a way that can be used by the EIB 
General EC country/regional documents such as RSPs, CSPs and RIPs/NIPs for the Caribbean, 
Dominican Republic, Madagascar, Kenya, do not cover the needs of the private sector or the 
financial sector (other than sporadically, or in respect of the enabling environment).  Only in 
respect of infrastructure are they of use to EIB. 
Source:  RSPs, CSPs and RIPs/NIPs obtained for relevant countries of 20 selected operations 
 
 Note. A Commission staff member notes that the EIB has had regional projects, but not aiming 
directly at regional integration, these are rather multi-country projects:  
“Réflexion interne : La BEI a de nombreux projets régionaux, mais ce ne sont pas des programmes d’intégration 
régionale. Rapport Annuel : « 41% investis dans des programmes d’intégration régionale » : ce n’est pas vraiment le 
cas. On crée une entité régionale, mais c’est plutôt du multi-pays. Exemple positif: barrage transfrontalier qui donne 
de l’énergie aux pays alentours, ou water & sanitation projet avec effets positifs dans la région, ou projets en 
transports. Ceux-là si ont un impact sur l’intégration régionale (il faut dialogue, procédés et règles communes, etc.).  
Contre-exemple: Quand on investit dans un fonds régional qui place de l’argent dans des pays différents, il n’y a pas 
de liens entre les pays. Sujet actuel dans le cadre des APE (accords de commerce élargis) ; vérifier si intégration 
régionale est un objectif de Cotonou ».  
Source : MN 023 
2001_Moma 
Titanium 
Cf. I121 
2003_BOAD PG IV Indicator not really relevant for this operation as there is no evidence of such specific analysis (see I-1.2.2) 
2003_Dakar- 
Ziguinchor 
Indicator not really relevant for this operation as there is no evidence of such specific analysis (see I-1.2.2) 
2003_MAURITIUS 
CONTAINER 
The country/region needs are mainly analyzed from a financial point of view which is the most 
interesting from a Bank point of view. The tariffs/operating costs, the production generated, the 
investment costs, the financial and economic profitability are some major points tackled by the 
appraisal report. The technical aspects are also described in order to allocate cost to specific part of 
the project. The container traffic is also well described for several years. The import and the export 
are evaluated in order to see the trend in the traffic.  
All these information allow the Bank to have a global view of the project and fiinally to assess the 
risk linked to the project financing.  
 
« Appraisal Report – Mauritius Container Terminal II – Mauritius », EIB, 2004, 
2003_GILGEL No evidence has been found so far. 
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GIBE 
2007_ACPGLOG 
SOCREDO 
As the EIB should have to assess the appropriateness of the project in terms of environment 
benefits, the sector analysis provided the EIB with a lot of information. 
 
“SOCREDO-ligne de crédit environnement (2007-328)”, EIB, 2007, p9-10 
 
2009_MICRO 
FINANCE_ACP 
No evidence has been found so far. 
I-1.2.4 Stakeholders agree that the analyses used are valid 
2003_BOAD PG IV Indicator not really relevant for this operation as there is no evidence of such specific analysis (see I-1.2.2) 
2003_Dakar- 
Ziguinchor 
Indicator not really relevant for this operation as there is no evidence of such specific analysis (see I-1.2.2) 
2003_MAURITIUS 
CONTAINER 
The appraisal report refers to several reference contact names. It can be supposed that these 
persons have been contacted in order to provide project’s information. Consequently, it can be 
argued that analyses from the appraisal report have taken into account the stakeholders’ views.  
 
« Appraisal Report – Mauritius Container Terminal II – Mauritius », EIB, 2004 
 
2003_GILGEL 
GIBE 
No evidence in that respect was found as so far. 
2004-Lumwana Some NGOs are critical of the EIB approach, and in particular its selection of the mining sector as 
a target for its financing: “EIB financing in Zambia falls under the Cotonou Agreement. This 
means that the Bank is supposed to support the local private sector as a means to promote the 
“social, economic, political, cultural and environmental aspects of sustainable development” as a 
contribution to poverty reduction. The European Union’s country strategy paper for Zambia, as 
with other countries, identifies the actions and sectors in need of priority support. Zambia and the 
EU signed a new Country Strategy Paper for 2008-13with a budget of nearly €500 million. The 
strategy lists transport, infrastructure and human development - with an emphasis on health - as the 
key areas for action. Nowhere does the country strategy mention support for mining as a strategic 
priority. Yet this is what the EIB has chosen to fund – providing over €150 million in loans to the 
mining sector between 2005 and 2008, an amount representing three quarters of its active portfolio 
in Zambia” (Source: Corporate welfare and development deceptions, Counter Balance: Challenging the EIB, 
February 2010). The argumentation is, however not convincing.  Mining is definitely a crucial sector 
for the Zambian economy and , therefore, it is not necessary a disfunctioning to have a division of 
labour between the Commission and the EIB letting the latter intervene in important sectors where 
the former is not active. 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
No evidence in that respect was found as so far. 
2007_ACPGLOG 
SOCREDO 
No evidence in that respect was found as so far. 
2009_MICRO 
FINANCE_ACP 
No evidence has been found so far. 
I-1.2.5 Documents relating to individual operations explicitly refer to these analyses 
General EIB Operational Project Progress reports contain a Section ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL 
SITUATION OF THE COUNTRY. However, no analysis of country needs was found in project 
preparation docts for 2005_ACPGLOB CA2006 Kenya,  2005_ACPGLOB CA2004 Madagascar, but 
was found in  2005_ACPGLOB ADEMI. EIB’s Business Plan does not refer in detail to such 
analyses. 
2003_BOAD PG IV Indicator not really relevant for this operation as there is no evidence of such specific analysis (see I-1.2.2) 
2003_Dakar- 
Ziguinchor 
Indicator not really relevant for this operation as there is no evidence of such specific analysis (see I-1.2.2) 
2003_MAURITIUS The internal EIB documents describe the country situation, the trans-shipment sector and its 
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CONTAINER importance for the Mauritius economy. The key role of the port is also identified to support the 
investment foreseen. The market (import and export) and the demand related are also examined in 
order to ensure the financial viability of the project. Figures are presented to support the facts 
described in the country analysis as well as in the trans-shipment sector. 
 
“Fact sheet A: proposal to appraise a new operation”, EIB, p2  
« Appraisal Report – Mauritius Container Terminal II – Mauritius », EIB, 2004 
 
The CSPs always present the country situation and the development needs. However these papers 
are not designed in order to analyse a specific sector/project in which the EIB is implied. 
 
« Mauritius – European Community. Country Strategy Paper and Indicative programme for the period 2001-
2007 », EC,  
« Republic of Mauritius - European Community. Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative programme for 
the period 2008-2013 », EC, 
2003_GILGEL 
GIBE 
N/A 
2004_OLKARIA Cf. I122 
2005_Pacific 
Islands 
The report to the Board for the operation’s contract in Palau provides information on the context 
of the operation, notably on the limits of financial market liquidity in the Pacific islands. “(…) The 
development of SMEs and micro-sized initiatives is one of the keys to sustained employment growth in the Pacific 
region and is crucial to both poverty reduction and the building of stable democratic societies, and enjoys full support of 
the relevant Pacific Governments. 
Financial market liquidity in the Pacific Islands, where it exists, is primarily of a short term nature and the lack of 
longer term financing precludes many projects from obtaining suitable funding from local sources. In the same way as 
the first PIFF operation, PIFF II focuses on SMEs and micro-sized businesses and the key value-added component 
is to encourage the development of a large number of micro-, small and medium-sized initiatives in the private sector 
throughout the Pacific region. It increases employment across a wide range of sectors. It also addresses micro-finance 
needs by giving the least privileged strata of the population access to appropriate credit facilities.” 
 
Source: “Board of Directors, Global authorisation from IF resources” (for the operation), EIB, 21/11/2006 (p3) 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
The internal documents from the EIB do not refer to the CSPs or any other analysis of 
region/country development needs. 
2007_ACPGLOG 
SOCREDO 
These analyses are included in the project documents. However, no information is delivered 
regarding individual projects that will be suggested by the direct beneficiary. As the EIB foresees to 
undertake a deeply analysis of each project, these kinds of analyses are expected to be prepared. 
 
 “SOCREDO-ligne de crédit environnement (2007-328)”, EIB, 2007, p 8 
 
2009_MICRO 
FINANCE_ACP 
No evidence has been found so far. 
JC 1.3 Operations have been prioritised with a view to addressing development needs, and taking 
stakeholders’ views into account 
I-1.3.1 A pipeline based on region/country/sector needs exists 
General Some EIB representatives explain that the EIB does not really have the means to conduct policy or 
instiutionnal dialogue nor to restructure an entire sector. They do not have sufficient resource to 
enter into a political and technical dialogue with the Governments. They cannot make country 
strategies and this would have no sense given the size of their projects. An advantage is that this 
responsibilizes more the counterparts: they are responsible.   (MN 266) 
 
For 2010, the EIB wants to prioritise the identification and launch of projects and initiatives 
pertaining to : 
- The infrastructure sector : challenging cross-border and regional trade corridors, keeping 
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climate change-related activities in the spotlight 
- Financial sector development, with equity and micro-finance playing a key role. Initiatives 
targeting SMEs and the enhancement of local capital and financial markets will also remain 
centre stage 
- Public sector investment 
- Climate change : energy efficiency project or adjustment to climate change 
Source: MN 901 
 
Under the Business Plan, a pipeline exists only for the two focus areas. 
 
Counterbalance notes in this respect that “the EIB does not select its projects according to how it can best use 
public money to maximise poverty reduction and environmental protection for thos who need it most”. Source: Counter 
Balance, Challenging the EIB, “Corporate welfare and development deceptions : why the EIB is failing to deliver 
outside the EU?”, February 2010 
 
2003_BOAD PG IV There is no evidence on prioritisation of this operation. 
2003_Dakar- 
Ziguinchor 
There is no evidence on prioritisation of this operation. 
2003_MAURITIUS 
CONTAINER 
The extension of the Mauritius Container Terminal has been seen as a key component in the 
economic development of Mauritius. However, there is no evidence that the EIB establishes a 
pipeline based on region/country/sector needs. 
 
« Mauritius: Mauritius Container Terminal II Project. Extension of the Mauritius Container Terminal. Cotonou 
Agreement-Loan from the Bank’s own resources. Ops B Financial report», EIB, 2004 
 
2003_GILGEL 
GIBE 
No evidence was found in that respect. 
2004-OLKARIA The present project is a continuation of previous programmes in the electricity sector. The EIB 
intervention in the sector dates back from previous EDFs and the project is inscribed in the 
continuity of a consistent support to the energy sector. The new project is part of Kenya’s Energy 
Sector Recovery Project, spearheaded by the World Bank. 
The project aims at the development of a competitive, indigenous, environmentally friendly energy 
Sources: 
 EIB PIN (Preliminary Information Note), Olkaria Extension, Luxembourg 23/9/2004. OPS 
B/ACPIF-2CENT&EASTAFR/2004-0255/GOUNOT MARCEL,  
EIB Fact Sheet A: proposal to appraise new operation. Luxembourg 19/11/2004. OPS B/ACPIF-
2CENT&EASTAFR/2004-0255/GOUNOT MARCEL  
Kenya-European Community, Country Strategy Paper for the period 2003-2007. 15th October 
2003.. 
 p.23., 
EIB. Apparaisal Report. Olkaria II Extension. Extension of a geothermal power station. 
Luxembourg 18/1/2005. PJ/Enercom/I&S/2005-25/EH/EG/fe.  
EIB. Apparaisal Report. Olkaria II Extension. Extension of a geothermal power station. 
Luxembourg 18/1/2005. PJ/Enercom/I&S/2005-25/EH/EG/fe. 
Wetang’ula, G. & Kubo, B.: Environmental Management at Olkaria Geothermal Power Project, 
Kenya, KenGen. (no date). 
Olkaria II. Extension.Value Added Pillar 1. OpsB/ACPIF-2/2004-0255/gounot. 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
According the documents analysed, there is no evidence that the EIB establishes a pipeline based 
on region/country/sector needs. 
2007_ACPGLOG 
SOCREDO 
The eligibility of each operations financed has to be deeply examined by the EIB, a pipeline based 
on region/country/sector needs should have been prepared in order to prioritize the operations. 
 
“SOCREDO-ligne de crédit environnement (2007-328)”, EIB, 2007, p 8 
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2009_MICRO 
FINANCE_ACP 
No evidence has been found so far. 
I-1.3.2 EIB pro-actively generates projects that address development needs 
General By investing in the regional development banks, the EIB use their regional specialisation and 
integration into their specific regions. They can demonstrate more focussed analytical, project and 
program approaches.  
Furthermore these banks have generally lower project preparation and monitoring costs. There are 
niches where only they can operate on a sustainable basis (e;g. Smaller projects and countries). 
 
“EIB participation in regional development banks in the ACP” EIB document 07/133 p4 
 
Some EIB representatives met consider that the EIB cannot have a real programme approach and 
that this is indeed for the better. Their role is to react to demands. In some sectors however (eg. 
infrastructure) they go beyong responding to the markes, also for the financial sector they have 
country strategies. (MN 266) 
 
An EIB staff member underlined that the EIB aims at doing things that have a developmental 
aspect. The EIB will not do anything that is out of the programmatic plan of the country. There are 
however different possibilities and concretely this boils down to choosing between different 
possibilities that are relevant in terms of addressing development needs. Other criteria that are 
essential to take into account are whether the project is commercially viable and that the EIB needs 
to have a real value added. In this perspective the EIB is rather responsive and pragmatic than pro-
active and strategic (while remaining in line with the general strategic lines of its business plan). 
People come to the EIB with a project. The EIB cannot afford, notably in terms of resources, to 
make a programme specific to the country, although there is a slight evolution in this respect. 
Poverty reduction is also more an indirect benefit they are looking for. They look more directly at 
environmental benefits and the generation of wealth. The EIB tries to create conditions from 
which everybody should benefit. (see MN 331) 
Commission staff representatives also raised the question to know to what extent EIB projects 
were not only addressing development needs, but were also strategic in this respect. Indeed they 
considered that the EIB was financing operations that were needed in terms of development needs, 
but had more questions on the issue to know whether these were the most needed ones and 
whether the EIB sufficiently looked at the broader picture in this respect (see MN 332).  
Several stakeholders underlined that in their view the EIB was acting mainly as an Investement 
Banks, having priorities in terms of profit generating and much less in terms of development. They 
consider that “the constraint tends to become the objective”.  This reasoning was applied to “Development 
Banks” in general, not only to the EIB. (eg. MN 322). 
 
The NGO group Counterbalance is critical about the EIB effectively addressing development 
needs. According to Counterbalance, concerning the Grand Inga hydroelectricity project in 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) : although fewer than 7% of the population of the DRC 
have access to electricity, the project aims to export most of its power. The project seems more 
oriented towards EU’s interests than DRC development needs. Source: Counter Balance, Challenging the 
EIB, “Corporate welfare and development deceptions : why the EIB is failing to deliver outside the EU?”, February 
2010 
 
The Bankwatch network on its side considers that the EIB has done little to ensure its lending 
meets the needs of the poor countries in which it funds some of its biggest infrastructure projects. 
There is little indication that EIB lending activities have contributed to the goal of EU strategies for 
poverty alleviation and social development. The report details several examples of EIB financed 
projects that support this statement. For example, the Nam Theum 2 Dam project in Laos will have 
serious impacts on the lives and livelihoods of tens of thousands of Laotian farmers. Past 
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experience with dam projects in Laos indicates that villagers will lose farmlands, forests, fisheries 
and water resources on which they depend. The EIB mentions that it supports the investment 
because of the project’s high development impact and the enhancement of regional integration. 
However, the report stresses that in a country notorious for corruption, financial mismanagement 
and a lack of transparency, there is little evidence to support EIB’s assertions.Source: CEE bankwatch 
network, “Raising the bar on big dams, Making the case for dam policy reform at the European Investment Bank”, 
November 2007 
2003_BOAD PG IV There is no evidence on pro-active EIB generation of this operation. 
2003_Dakar- 
Ziguinchor 
The Senegalese Government sent an official request to the EIB in order to partly finance the 
project. Consequently, the EIB has not pro-actively generated this project. 
 
Operation’s « Conseil d’administration. Prêt sur les ressources de la FI. Projet Liaison maritime 
Dakar- 
Ziguinchor (Sénégal) », EIB, 2004, p1 
 
It seems that the Senegalese government has requested the EIB’s financing because the project 
concerns quasi-infrastructure and the EC support wouldn’t probably be possible for this kind of 
project. 
Source: MN017 
2003_MAURITIUS 
CONTAINER 
The EIB has previously worked with the borrower (CHCL) for Port Louis Container Terminal I 
project. Therefore, the EIB has not pro-actively generated this project in order to meet the demand 
requirement in terms of trans-shipment. 
  
« Fact sheet A : proposal to appraise a new operation », EIB, 2004, p 1 
2003_GILGEL 
GIBE 
This project is the third loan to EEPCO (Gilgel Gibe project and EEPCO Urban Power 
Distribution & Load Dispatch project). This first one is completed and the implantation of the 
second was proceeding in a satisfactory manner at the time of project selection. 
 
No evidence that that the EIB has pro-actively acted in that field. 
 
However, the Bank contacted the Etjhipian Government in order to prepare direct lending to the 
local private promoters. 
 
“Nevertheless, under the Cotonou Agreement, the Bank has the specific mandate to finance the 
private sector as well as the commercially-run public sector at market rates. In order for Ethiopia to 
get the full benefit from the financing under the Cotonou Agreement,  contacts with the 
Ethiopian authorities were started with a view to agree on the principle of direct lending to 
the local private promoters.” 
 
“Ethiopia - Country strategy paper and indicative programme for the period 2008-2013”, European Community, 
2007, p 47 
 
2004-WAGP There is no evidence that the EIB has plaid a proactive role in this project. It refinances the 
Government of Ghana who seems to have been the major proactive player.  
Sources: Factsheet A and B, Appraisal Report. 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2006 
Project addresses development need, but was not generated by EIB 
2005_EMP 
AFRICA FUND II 
Project addresses development need, but was not generated by EIB 
2005_ACPGLOB 
ADEMI 
Project addresses development need, but was not generated by EIB though EIB played a strong 
role in its design and in placing Banco Ademi on a growth path 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2004 
Project addresses development need, but was not generated by EIB 
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2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2006 
Project addresses development need, but was not generated by EIB 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
The water reform undertaken in Senegal was lead by the Government in collaboration with donors, 
namely the World Bank, AFD and EIB. The EIB has taken part of water investment program in 
Senegal. 
 
“Rapport financier. Projet: Programme eau Sénégal”, EIB, 2007, p2 
 
An EIB staff member mentioned that the EIB has convinced the Commission of the importance 
of the water sector in Senegal. Even if the Commission has taken the initiative, the EIB has played 
an important role in this project setting-up. 
 
Source: MN016  
2007_ACPGLOG 
SOCREDO 
This line of credit oriented to environmental operations is the first project in this filed for the EIB 
(except a similar credit line in New Caledonia). This is considered as a pilot project. 
 
Therefore the EIB tends to target a new “market” and thus generates new projects. 
 
“Fact sheet B: financing proposal”, EIB, 2007, p3 
 
2008_EDFI The EDFIs generate projects that addresses development needs 
2009_MICRO 
FINANCE_ACP 
The internal EIB documents stated that this investment is an emergency response of IFC and KfW 
to the financial crisis. Then it appears that the Bank has not pro-actively generated this project. 
 
“Fact sheet A : Appraisal Autorisation ”, EIB, 2009, p 3 
I-1.3.3 Project identification/appraisal documents demonstrate conformity with development 
needs and stakeholders’ support 
Operation 
/General 
Some stakeholders representatives (NGOs), explained that the consultation of populations was 
weak or not really a true consultation. They also considered that the communication with the 
Governement was often weak, as well as engagement with other stakeholders. A suggestion made 
in this respect was to conduct consultations in two phase: first a consultation during the EIA 
process (done in the present configuration), the a sharing with the consulted population of the EIA 
and collecting their reactions on it.  (MN 322)  
 
Similar views are also expressed in Counter Balance reports: “There is significant evidence that EIB-
backed projects have negative impacts on the ground. Many people living in the project areas feel marginalised from 
decision-making and are not benefiting from the projects. People living in project areas fell marginalised from decision-
making and are not benefiting from EIB operations.”Source: Counter Balance, Challenging the EIB, “Corporate 
welfare and development deceptions : why the EIB is failing to deliver outside the EU?”, February 2010 
 As regards the Tenke Fugurume Mining project in DRC, according to the report, the interests of 
the Government as well as those of local populations have not been major preoccupations during 
the formulation of the project. In particular, within this area, a large proportion of the population 
does not know how to read nor write, and the project documents have not been translated in 
Swahili hereby preventing the population to understand the documents. Moreover, some actions of 
the project aimed at addressing development aspects (access to water, to electricity, to education, 
etc.) but their implementation did not take into account the local situation and the real needs of the 
populations. Source: Counter Balance, Réformer la Banque Européenne d’investissement, “Terrain miné, 
l’implication de la BEI dans le projet minier de Tenke-Fugurume en RDC », Août 2008 (pages 7 and 17) 
 
Striking during country visits was that many stakeholders explained that their knowledge of the EIB 
(its activities, the type of support it can offer, its approach within a project) was limited. This 
concerned national counterparts, notably a Ministry of Industrialisation that had never met the 
EIB. Interlocutors had some knowledge of the EIB activities, but not at what terms (MN 347) or a 
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Ministry of Environment, that considered that contacts with the EIB were minimal (no direct 
contact), the EIB being working mainly with promotors. It was underlined that contacts with other 
agencies, such as the WB, were much more frequent. Also contacts with the European Commission 
were more frequent, but the EIB activities were not discussed during these contacts. Interlocutors 
also underlined that they wished that engagement would be enhanced (MN 342). . , Within specific 
operations the presence and participation of the EIB was on the other hand much valued (eg. MN 
352). 
2003_BOAD PG IV Information available for this operation does not assess development needs as such. Descriptions 
in some paragraphs provide nevertheless indirect information on this (see project fiche).  
No direct reference however to any “development needs analysis” or to the Commission’s CSPs . 
2003_Dakar- 
Ziguinchor 
Information available for this operation does not assess the development needs as such. 
Descriptions in some paragraphs provide nevertheless indirect information on this (see project fiche).  
No direct reference however to any “development needs analysis” or to the Commission’s CSPs. 
 
The value added identification’s analysis carried out by the EIB described the conformity of the 
project to the EU priority objectives as established in the Cotonou Agreement (pillar 1). Indeed, the 
project should restore the sea link Dakar-Ziguinchor which is an important element for economic 
and social recovery plan for the Casamance region. One of objectives is to reintegrate this region 
within the Senegalese economy. 
No further details are provided regarding how this objective will be effectively achieved. 
Source : Operation’s « Conseil d’administration. Prêt sur les ressources de la FI. Projet Liaison 
maritime  
Dakar Ziguinchor (Sénégal) », EIB, 2004, p2 
2003_MAURITIUS 
CONTAINER  
The project identification document as well as the financial report justify the importance of this 
project in terms of Senegal’s development needs. For example, this below text is issued from the 
financial report: 
 
“By its island situation practically all trade of Mauritius goes through Port-Louis, its sole 
commercial port. As furthermore 75% of trade is nowadays containerised, the Mauritius Container 
Terminal is a key component in the economic development of Mauritius. Benefiting from its 
geographical position Mauritius has furthermore managed to attract transhipment traffic; as 
transhipment implies the use of large container ships, freight charges are minimized and transport 
duration for imports and exports reduced. Finally through its new hub function the Mauritius 
Container Terminal contributes to regional integration thereby bringing economic benefits not only 
to Mauritius but also to its neighbouring countries. The project thus fully meets the objectives of 
the Cotonou Agreement to foster development in the ACP partner countries of the EU” 
 
« Mauritius: Mauritius Container Terminal II Project. Extension of the Mauritius Container Terminal. Cotonou 
Agreement-Loan from the Bank’s own resources. Ops B Financial report», EIB, 2004, p 8 
 
2003_GILGEL 
GIBE 
As the projects documents do not present a development needs analysis, it is difficult to answer this 
question. 
 
However the EIB justifies this project as follows: 
“Expansion of hydro generation capacity will help to meet demand growth and improve the 
quality and reliability of supply. EEPCO is pursuing ambitious targets to expand the coverage of 
electricity supply, starting from the current low levels of service provided to less than 15% of 
the population, and to improve the efficiency of the system by connecting towns that are 
currently run as isolated systems. The economic viability of the project, taking account of 
alternative demand scenarios and investment options, will be verified during appraisal.” 
 
“Fact sheet A: proposal to appraise new operation”, EIB, 2004, p2 
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According to a report of the Delegation of the EC to Ethiopia in August 2007, “the Project was 
defined without a comprehensive sector support strategy. Possible negative consequences are: 
limited coordination and policy influence for the long-term sector development in synergy with 
other interconnected sectors; limited scope for supporting best practices with regard to (socio) 
environmental impacts of large infrastructure projects; 
absence of an accompanying programme for social development and capacity building; de-link with 
grant programmes and projects financed by the Italian Development Cooperation in Ethiopia” 
 
“The Gilgel Gibe Affair. An analysis of the Gilgel Gibe hydroelectric projects in Ethiopia.”, Counter Balance, 
2008, p16 
2004-WAGP Yes. The developmental potential of the project is highlighted as well as its benefits in terms of cost 
of power generation, cleaner generation process (based on gas instead of oil). 
Sources Factsheet A and B, Appraisal Report. 
2004_LUMWANA The project is a mining project and important for the development of productive sector activities in 
Zambia but it is also likely to develop a region that has suffered from a lack of regional 
infrastructure because it is far from the capital town and from the Copperbelt.  The government is 
assisting with infrastructure and the present project is an additional step in the development of a 
new copper province in North West Zambia to even economic disparities between regions. 
The mine development will include a village with clinic, schooling and other facilities. 
Sources:  
EIB Fact Sheet A: proposal to appraise new operation. Luxembourg 08/07/2005. OPS B/ACPIF-
3SouthAfrica,0.Ind/2004-0146/BrandSchmitzWaltraud  
EIB Note to Ops B/ACP-IF-3 Opinion for Appraisal, Luxembourg 27/5/2005. PJ/I&S/2005-
598/GCE/MJ/aa 
 
Apart from income and profits for the promoter, le project will bring the following benefits to the 
country:  
 Valorisation of a so far unused competitive indigenous natural resource, 
 The project has a significant development impact for the North-Western Province of Zambia, 
 Export revenues and income from taxation and royalties for Zambia, 
 Expected creation of employment, transfer of management, mining and copper processing 
skills to the local population, and the related investments in health and education will give a 
boost to the human capital in the region. 
Source EIB Lumwana Copper Project, Appraisal report, Luxembourg 30/6/2006, PJ/I&S/2006-
675/GCE/VMJ/aa 
2001_MOMA_ 
Titanium 
The Moma project will stimulate the regional economy and infrastructure in Northern 
Mozambique, a particularly poor area, which currently lacks foreign investment. Preliminary 
calculations by the promoter indicate that the net present value generated from the mining 
operations is estimated to be much greater than the existing land use. In terms of employment, 
while small losses will be suffered by sacrificing the current subsistence agriculture/hunting 
activities, the net estimated job creation should be in excess of 400 permanent jobs as well as 
several temporary jobs during construction. According to promoter’s documents, the project has 
strong support from national and local authorities as well as acceptance from the local population 
although with some reservations regarding relocation of people and loss of natural resources. The 
appraisal is expected to shed more light on the costs and benefits for the region coming from the 
project. 
Source: EIB Note to OP3. Opinion for Appraisal Authorisation, Luxembourg, 15th May 2001, 
PJ/I&S/2001-0556/GCE/IK/sp 
 
Despite the significant mineral resources of Mozambique, mining contributed less than 1% to the 
country’s GDP in 2000. The project appears consistent with the government policy of 
Mozambique in the mining sector to attract international investors in the country. 
Source: : EIB Fact Sheet A: proposal to appraise new operation, Luxembourg 28th February 2002, 
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Ops B/ACP-3/A° 2001-0242 
2005_Pacific 
Islands 
Information available for this operation does not assess development needs as such. 
Nevertheless, the operation’s 2005 fact sheet A mentions the following as “economic benefits” for 
the “rationale for financing”:  
« Diversification:  provision in an efficient manner of global loans and possibly guarantees to help support the growth 
of smaller projects in the Pacific region and a broadening of local financial markets. 
Employment: A higher rate of employment in the SME sector. 
National Income: Higher tax incomes primarily due to an increase of SME businesses and a lower rate of 
unemployment.  » 
 
The Fact Sheet A further mentions as EIB value-added:  
“The Facility would (i) build new capacity in the finance sector (ii) provide a cost-effective window 
for EIB financing operations in the region (iii) potentially assist in the development of new financial 
products under Cotonou.” 
 
Source: “Fact Sheet A – Proposal to appraise new operations” (of the operation), EIB, 29/09/2005 (p2) 
 
The report to the Board for the operation’s contract in Palau specifies that the project is in 
accordance with Cotonou, in particular the focus on private sector development. It also provides 
contextual information with regard to limits of financial market liquidity in the country (partly 
provided above under I-2.1.5). “The second Pacific Islands Financing Facility is in accordance with the objectives set 
out for the Investment Facility in the Cotonou Agreement, in particular the focus on private sector development. The 
development of SMEs and micro-sized initiatives is one of the keys to sustained employment growth in the Pacific 
region and is crucial to both poverty reduction and the building of stable democratic societies, and enjoys full support of 
the relevant Pacific Governments. 
Financial market liquidity in the Pacific Islands, where it exists, is primarily of a short term nature and the lack of 
longer term financing precludes many projects from obtaining suitable funding from local sources. In the same way as 
the first PIFF operation, PIFF II focuses on SMEs and micro-sized businesses and the key value-added component 
is to encourage the development of a large number of micro-, small and medium-sized initiatives in the private sector 
throughout the Pacific region. It increases employment across a wide range of sectors. It also addresses micro-finance 
needs by giving the least privileged strata of the population access to appropriate credit facilities.” 
This same information is provided in the 2009 PPR in the “Development Impact” area.  
 
Source: “Board of Directors, Global authorisation from IF resources” (for the operation), EIB, 21/11/2006 (p3) 
PIFF I - Samoa The 2009 PPR for the contract with the Development Bank of Samoa under the first PIFF 
provides information similar to what was provided in the PPR relating to the contract with the 
NDBP under the PIFF II:  
“The Pacific Financing Facility under which this loan has been signed is in accordance with the objectives set out for 
the Investment Facility in the Cotonou Agreement in particular the focus on private sector development. The 
development of SMMI businesses is one of the keys to sustained employment growth in such countries, and is crucial 
to both poverty reduction and the building of stable democratic societies, and enjoys full support of the relevant Pacific 
Governments. 
Financial market liquidity in the Pacific Islands, where it exists, is primarily of a short term nature and the lack of 
longer term financing precludes many SMMI projects from obtaining suitable funding from local sources. This facility 
is clearly targeting the SMMI sector and the key value added component is to encourage the development of a large 
number of SMMI projects in the private sector. It has increased employment across a wide range of sectors and has 
constituted an important component of long term external funding to the respective banking sectors. It also addresses 
micro-finance needs by giving the least privileged strata of the population access to appropriate credit facilities.” 
Source: “Project Progress Report” (of the operation’s contract n° 23209 with the DBS), EIB, 07/01/2009 (p2) 
 
The Fact Sheet A for the operation further mentions as EIB value-added, with exactly the same 
wording as for the PIFF II:  
“The Facility would (i) build new capacity in the finance sector (ii) provide a cost-effective window 
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for EIB financing operations in the region (iii) potentially assist in the development of new financial 
products under Cotonou.” 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
The appraisal authorisation from the EIB only mentions the conformity of the project with the 
objectives of the Cotonou agreement.  
 
“Fact sheet A: Appraisal Authorisation”, EIB, 2007 p2 
 
The financial report edited by the EIB described the project in the context of the national water 
reform. The population needs are explicitly described as well as the institutional development of the 
sector.  
 
The actors who have intervened or will intervene in the water reform are identified by the EIB. The 
Bank provides a large analysis of these actors (in terms of financial viability, institutional capacities, 
technical capacities...). 
 
“Rapport financier. Projet: Programme eau Sénégal”, EIB, 2007, p 9 
2007_ACPGLOG 
SOCREDO 
At the time when the IF was approved by the EIB, specific environmental projects were not yet 
defined. However, as regards the project selection process described, the conformity with the 
development needs should be respected. 
 
With respect to the stakeholder’s point of views, no evidence was found in that respect. 
 
“SOCREDO-ligne de crédit environnement (2007-328)”, EIB, 2007, p8 
 
2009_MICRO 
FINANCE_ACP 
As no country/regions development needs have been identified, the conformity with the 
development needs can not be assessed. However the documents take into account the 
stakeholders’ support only in terms of financial support.   
 
Class* Institution Amount, USD** m %
C - class BMZ 39 9%
IFC 150 36%
KfW 130 31%
EIB 50 12%
Dev. Bank of Austria 26 6%
FMO 20 5%
415 100%
B - class
Total post-Second Close  
 
“Fact sheet B: financing proposal”, EIB, 2009, p 1 
 
I-1.3.4 Final beneficiaries are identified in project documentation 
General An EIB staff member mentioned that final beneficiaries are not considered as such in terms of 
impact in ESIAF:  
“Dans le cadre actuel (ex ante) on ne dit rien sur les bénéficiaires finaux. Cela dit toutefois quelque chose sur (i) la 
qualité des intermédiaires financiers et l’environnement macro-financier, (iii) l’impact spécifique en termes de 
développement et (iii) les éventuelles dimensions développement spécifiques1. Mais vu que c’est ex ante, on ne peut dire 
grand-chose sur l’impact (emplois créés etc.) de façon ex ante. Mais ce n’est pas tant ce qu’on nous demande dans 
l’IF. Lorsqu’on a fait l’évaluation il y a qqs années (Lomé IV), quand on avait visité un quart des bénéficiaires, on 
avait dit que ce serait l’unité d’évaluation de la BEI (EV) qui serait chargée de faire ce type de rapport, car mesure 
ex-post. On le trouvera donc dans le rapport ACP sur les lignes de crédit. » 
Source : MN 007 
                                                 
1  Éléments qualitatifs dans la conception de l’intervention (ciblage, instrument, etc. éventuellement novateur sur le 
marché spécifique, impact spécifique, effort spécifique, etc.) 
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An EIB staff member considers that Cotonou does not mention that EIB operations themselves 
should target the poor:  
“Lots of emphasis on “targeting the poor in the operations”. I know it is an objective of the Cotonou Agreement. But 
Cotonou does not mention that EIB operations themselves should target the poor. Targeting the poorest segments of 
the population is also difficult with instruments supposed to be revolving (vs. grants). That is a tricky exercise.” “It 
should also be differentiated between the EU and the IF development objectives.” Source: MN 020 
 
2003_BOAD PG IV Final beneficiaries are identified of this loan to a regional bank BOAD, namely:  
private sector companies in countries of intervention of the BOAD  and operating in the following 
sectors : industry, agro-business, mining, tourism, transportation, communications, services related 
to those sectors and health and education2.  
Source : « Fact Sheet A : Proposition portant sur l'instruction d'une nouvelle opération » (of the 
operation), EIB, 26 September 2003 (p1) 
2003_Dakar- 
Ziguinchor 
The direct beneficiaries are the Republic of Senegal through its Ministry of Infrastructure, 
Equipment and Transport.  
 
According to an EIB staff member, the final beneficiaries can be identified through the economic 
rate of return. The rail and roads are considered as dangerous and their utilization is sometimes 
impossible. Consequently, the sea link allows the local population to travel more safely and easily 
between Dakar and Ziguinchor. Furthermore the children take the boat in order to go to school. 
The trade should also be facilitated. 
 
The PJ reports estimated an economic rate of return at 14%. This includes the savings in vehicle 
transport costs, savings in road tear and wear and gains in the producer surplus of the boat 
operator. 
 
Even if the final beneficiaries are suggested by the PJ report, there is no explicit reference to them. 
No evidence has been found regarding the effective impact on the local population. 
 
Sources : MN017 & « Rapport d’instruction », EIB, 2004, Annex F 
2003_MAURITIUS 
CONTAINER 
In all documents prepared by the EIB, the beneficiary is clearly identified. From the EIB’s point of 
view, the final beneficiary corresponds to the borrower. 
Regarding the final beneficiaries in terms of development needs, the EIB does not clearly identify 
them. 
 
« Preliminary Information Note », EIB, 2004 
« Fact sheet A : proposal to appraise a new operation », EIB, 2004 
« Fact sheet B: financing proposal », EIB, 2004 
« Mauritius: Mauritius Container Terminal II Project. Extension of the Mauritius Container Terminal. Cotonou 
Agreement-Loan from the Bank’s own resources. Ops B Financial report», EIB, 2004 
« Appraisal Report – Mauritius Container Terminal II – Mauritius », EIB, 2004 
« Note conjointe », EIB, 2004 
2003_GILGEL 
GIBE 
The beneficiary in terms of financing is well defined. However, the population targeted by the 
project is not identified through the EIB’s internal documents. 
 
Only the European Community mentions the beneficiary in terms of economic and social 
development. 
                                                 
2  « Entreprises du secteur privé d’un des pays d’intervention de la BOAD (Union Économique et Monétaire Ouest 
Africaine : Bénin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinée-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Sénégal et Togo) opérant dans les secteurs 
de l’industrie, de l’agro-industrie, les mines, le tourisme, les transports, les communications et les services liés à ces 
secteurs ainsi que l’éducation et la santé ». 
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“Currently, about 15% of Ethiopia’s population lives in areas that are electrified, with only 6% 
directly connected. The objective of Government under the Universal Electricity Access Program is 
to increase the 15% figure to 50% over the next 5 to 10 years. It is expected that the provision of 
electricity for productive purposes and social services will have a significant impact on improving 
the social and economic well being of the rural population.”  
 
“Ethiopia - Country strategy paper and indicative programme for the period 2008-2013”, European Community, 
2007, p 51 
2004-WAGP The beneficiaries are the VRA and other electricity companies. The final beneficiaries, their clients, 
are not explicitly identified in the project documents. 
Sources Factsheet A and B, Appraisal Report. 
2001_Moma 
Titanium 
For this kind of project the main benefit, beyond that of the promoter, is the economic activity it 
generates and its spill over on the local populations. These aspects  are duly taken into account (e.g. 
in EIB Appraisal Report Moma Titanium. Luxembourg 27, 2003. PJ/I&S/2003-
259/GCE/MUG/ms. (NB complementary to D24) but no target population is defined in advance 
of the project implementation that would allow to verify that the anticipated benefits have 
effectively materialised for that population. 
 
2004_Lumwana For this kind of project the main benefit, beyond that of the promoter, is the economic activity it 
generates and its spill over on the local populations. These aspects  are duly taken into account in 
the case of the Lumwana project, both by the EIB(e.g. in EIB. Board of Directors, Lumwana 
Copper Project. Luxembourg 26 septembre 2006, Document 06/354., section 2.11) and by the 
promoter in their regular activity reports (cf.  Lumwana Mining Company, Monthly Project Report, 
January 2010) 
sections on health safety, environment and human resources) but no target population is defined in 
advance of the project implementation that would allow to verify that the anticipated benefits have 
effectively materialised for that population. 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2006 
Final beneficiaries (in this case the lower end of SMEs) 
2005_EMP 
AFRICA FUND II 
Final beneficiaries (in this case investee companies) are identified in terms of sectors and eligibility 
only for financing by this financial intermediary. 
Actual beneficiaries are identified only in project monitoring reports. 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2004 
Final individual beneficiaries (in this case the lower end of SMEs) are not identified ex ante, and 
this is normal for this type of operation 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2006 
Final beneficiaries (in this case the lower end of SMEs)  
2005_ACPGLOB 
ADEMI 
Final beneficiaries (in this case micro and small enterprises) are not identified ex ante, and this is 
normal for this type of operation. They are identified in terms of category and eligibility only for 
financing by this financial intermediary. 
Actual beneficiaries are identified only in project monitoring reports. 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
The facts sheets established by the EIB identify clearly the final beneficiary of the programme, i.e. 
Société Nationale des Eaux du Sénégal”.  From the EIB’s point of view, the final beneficiary 
corresponds to the borrower. 
Regarding the final beneficiaries in terms of development needs, the EIB does not clearly identify 
them. Only the expected result in terms of new social connections to drinking water is evaluated in 
the appraisal authorisation.   
 
“Fact sheet B: financing proposal”, EIB, 2007, p1 
“Fact sheet A: Appraisal Authorisation”, EIB, 2007 p1-2 
 
In its financial report, the EIB considers that new water connections allowed by the project will 
mainly concern the poorest population. However, this is highlighted in the specific context of 
potential risks linked to the evolution of drinking water demand. Indeed, as the beneficiaries will 
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mainly correspond to the poorest population, the revenues growth of SONES could be less than 
expected. 
 
“Rapport financier. Projet: Programme eau Sénégal”, EIB, 2007, p13  
2007_ACPGLOG 
SOCREDO 
The borrower, as the direct beneficiary, is identified in each project documents provided.  
The identification of other beneficiaries is not stated in the documents. 
 
As the eligible projects are classified by the EIB under the following categories: renewable energies, 
waste water treatment, wastes collect and treatment, investment allowing a better energy 
management, investment allowing pollution reduction. Consequently, the local projects financed 
are deemed to benefit to all population in French Polynesia as well as the population throughout 
the entire world.  
2008_EDFI Final beneficiaries are identified only ex-post 
2009_MICRO 
FINANCE_ACP 
The direct beneficiary is clearly identified by the EIB.  
As stated, the EIB’s objective through this project is to ensure that microfinance institutions 
continue to provide financial services to micro-enterprises and low-income economically 
active people. 
 
“Fact sheet A : Appraisal Autorisation ”, EIB, 2009, p 3 
  
JC 1.4 The logical distinction in the sub-mandates and functioning of the IF/OR envelope allows 
financing development needs that the Bank could not cover with its own resources 
I-1.4.1 Extent to which the IF allows to finance  development needs that would be too risky to be 
funded with OR 
General See the example of Inga under I-1.2.2 
Operation 
/General 
See I-1.4.2 
General According to an EIB staff member, the fact that an operation is financed through IF or OR comes 
from an internal decision. However the EIB is transparent in its decision vis-a-vis the 
client/borrower. The final choice regarding the type of financing is related to the characteristic of 
the project and the sector. 
 
Source: MN016  
General Inter alia IF allows equity and less than senior loans, which OR does not 
 
2003_MAURITIUS 
CONTAINER 
N/A 
2003_GILGEL 
GIBE 
No evidence was found in that respect. 
2003_BOAD PG IV The loan of this operation was funded on OR, with the guarantee and the equity investment on the 
IF. No justification was found on the choice of OR vs. the IF.  
 
An internal 2003 note mentions as observation that an IF loan might be requested for a parallel 
BOAD activity relating to new financial instruments developed for the private sector:  
« La BOAD a par ailleurs développé de nouveaux outils financiers (garanties, émissions, syndications, etc.) en 
faveurs des opérateurs du secteur privé et pour cette activité souhaiterait également bénéficier du soutien de la Banque. 
Il est donc envisagé d’offrir parallèlement à un prêt global classique sur ressources propres, un concours sur la Facilité 
d’Investissement. Le détail des modalités de cet éventuel concours sera présentée lors de la présentation du FSA. »» 
Source : « Relevé quotidien (RQ) » (for this operation), EIB, 9 April 2003 (p1) 
2003_Dakar-
Ziguinchor 
The operation’s 2004 “fact sheet A” mentions that an interest rate subsidy was under 
consideration for this IF senior loan (which has materialized according to the IF’s latest Annual 
Reports). It mentions that this subsidy was necessary for having the EIB participating to this 
project with undisputable development impact: 
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«L’octroi d’une bonification est donc justifié compte tenu des caractéristiques de ce projet mais également nécessaire 
pour que l’Etat du Sénégal puisse respecter les engagements pris vis-à-vis du FMI au titre de la Facilité Réduction de 
la Pauvreté et de Croissance. En effet, pour être conforme, les conditions de l’intervention de la Banque devront inclure 
un taux  minimum de concessionalité de 35%. 
La Banque a demandé l’avis de la Commission pour l’application d’une bonification à ce projet.» 
 
 « Pour que la Banque puisse envisager de participer à ce projet, qui a un impact sur le développement de la 
Casamance indiscutable, bien que difficilement quantifiable, il est nécessaire et justifié qu’elle puisse affecter à son 
concours une bonification d’intérêt.  L’avis de la Commission à ce propos a été sollicité. » 
 
Source : « Fact Sheet A : Proposition portant sur l'instruction d'une nouvelle opération » (of the 
operation), EIB, 26 March 2004 (p2 and 3) 
 
That document also mentions that it was a difficult and risky project (see I-8.1.2), reason for which it 
was probably funded on the IF instead of on OR.  
 
According to an EIB staff member, this project presented a higher risk level due to the fact that it 
involves a new boat with a new operator. Furthermore the Joola disaster shows that the 
government is not so effective in respect with the management of this kind of project. This 
explains the utilization of the IF. 
Source: MN017 
2004-WAGP In this case the operations was initially envisaged as a risk capital operations funded under  the IF 
(cf. EIB, Fact Sheet A: proposal to appraise new operation, Luxembourg 17/2/2005, 
(OPS/B/ACPIF-1 WestAfr & Sahel/20040026/Walter Eve) 
); eventually it was implemented as an ordinary loan to the Government of Ghana. This was 
possible with the agreement of the MS and given the fact that the sovereign risk was reduced by the 
guarantee of the government of Ghana and that of MIGA and IBRD. 
Source EIB, Appraisal Report, West African Gas Pipeline, Ghana. Luxembourg, 02/10/2006 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2006 
OR cannot accept equity 
2005_EMP 
AFRICA FUND II 
OR cannot accept equity 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2004 
OR cannot accept equity 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2006 
OR cannot accept equity 
2005_ACPGLOB 
ADEMI 
 
The IF allowed EIB to take successive equity positions in Banco Ademi which would have been 
too risky for OR (no equity under OR).  Line of credit to Ademi not secured, and presumably not 
acceptable to OR. 
2005_Pacific 
islands 
The loan to the NDB (Niue’s DFI), as part of the global loan to this facility, benefited from an 
interest rate subsidy, as this country recovered from a natural disaster:  
“As a result of Hurricane Heta which devastated Niue in 2004, the island is presently still in a recovery phase. 
NDB being Niue’s development finance institution, it is playing a key role in the island’s recovery through its lending 
activities. As foreseen under Cotonou for countries recovering from natural disasters, NDB will be able to benefit 
from an interest subsidy of up to 3% per annum on the allocations for infrastructure projects. The estimated present 
value amount of subsidy for the golbal loan to NDB over the duration of the loan is estimated to be a maximum of 
EUR 600 000” 
Source: “Fact Sheet B – Financing Proposal” (of the operation), EIB, 11/10/2006 (p2) 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
According to an EIB staff member, this project was evaluated as not too risky which implies that 
the OR have been used. Several factors have been used by the EIB staff in order to prove the 
“low” risk of the financing to the legal department. These factors can be found in the Financial 
report. 
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Source: MN016 
“Rapport financier. Projet: Programme eau Sénégal”, EIB, 2007, p 13 
2007_ACPGLOG 
SOCREDO 
The requirements established by the Council Directive 2001/822/CE in respect with the IF 
utilization are fulfilled. But it is not stated that the operation would be too risky to be funded with 
OR. 
 
“Fact sheet B: financing proposal”, EIB, 2007, p 3 
 
2009_MICRO 
FINANCE_ACP 
No evidence has been found so far. 
I-1.4.2 Accordingly, different prioritisation approaches exist for IF and OR operations 
General There is an issue of OR and IF eligibility in the water and sanitation sector in Senegal.
EIB was involved in this soft sector already under Lomé. 
Cotonou says: Commercially run public sector entities- and same for IF or OR.   In addition: can 
OR take non-commercial risk, which IF cannot? 
 
 Programme Eau- this is a OR loan to SONES, a commercially run public entity.  But issue 
of State guarantee, i.e. degree of security of EIB loans 
It is not clear why EIB accepts to make a loan to SONES without State guarantee, whereas other 
IFIs (such as WB) always have State guarantee.  MinFin says: simply because EIB doesn’t ask for it 
(and a “letter of comfort is not equivalent to a State Guarantee in financial terms.  Why should EIB 
be junior to the WB or ADB when applying OR resources?   EIB is a twilight zone between WB 
and IFC.   
Source: MN 263  
          MN 265  
 Assainissement Dakar- this is a OR loan to the State, passed on to ONAS as subsidy.  
ONAS is perhaps expected to be commercially run, but is not financially viable. 
 Dépollution de la Baie de Hann- same as above. 
 Laison Dakar-Ziguinchor- this is under IF- the project is not viable a such. 
In the sanitation sector, EIB is in effect providing budgetary support to the State.  Is this the role of 
EIB-OR?   The whole financing package is soft- onlending by the State will never be reimbursed.  
What about sustainability of the IF? The debtor is the State of Senegal.  In this case, IF should 
master the scene of sustainability of State debt, which IF does not do.  A different approach is 
called for in the case of non-viable sectors, and questions arise if this is EIB’s area at all.  
General It  does not seem that there is a different prioritisation approach for IF or OR. According to 
documents and interviews, project are identifies with the view to maximise their development 
impact under constraint of financial viability. The financing modalities, IF and OR are then decided 
on the basis of the type of risk and with an attempt to contribute as much as possible to the 
financial viability of the project. 
2003_BOAD PG IV See I-1.4.2 
2003_Dakar-
Ziguinchor 
See I-1.4.2 
2003_MAURITIUS 
CONTAINER 
N/A 
2003_GILGEL 
GIBE 
No evidence was found in that respect. 
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2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
N/A 
2007_ACPGLOG 
SOCREDO 
No evidence was found in that respect. 
2009_MICRO 
FINANCE_ACP 
No evidence has been found so far. 
I-1.4.3 In addressing different types (in terms of financial risk involved) of development needs IF 
and OR are complementary (between operations or within an individual operation), 
enhancing responsiveness to development needs 
General The use of the Bank’s own resources is constrained by the requirements of the Bank’s Statutes for 
first class guarantees, and the own resources can only be granted in the form of senior loans and 
not as risk bearing instruments. The IF is described as risk-sharing instrument. These two types of 
financing instruments are combined when the financing plan calls for straightforward loans. 
 
“Operational Guidelines of the IF”, EIB, p8 
2000_MAGADI_ 
SODA 
An interest subsidy on the own resources loan would be hived off and used to pay for 
infrastructure (e.g. water supplies, schoolrooms) in the Maasai communities around lake Magadi.  
Source: D2 
Source: EIB: Fact Sheet A: proposal to appraise new operation. Magadi Soda Ltd, Luxembourg 6th 
September 2001. OP3/ACPII/Agora:20000279/DW/hb 
2003_MAURITIUS 
CONTAINER 
No evidence was found in that respect. 
2003_GILGEL 
GIBE 
No evidence was found in that respect. 
2004-WAGP Complementarity is provided by associating the ordinary loan on OR with an interest subsidy under 
the IF. 
Source 
EIB, West African Gas Pipeline, Ghana, RM/CRD Opinion (Fact Sheet B Ops B/ACP-IF-
1/2004-0026/EW) 
D6: EIB, Appraisal Report, West African Gas Pipeline, Ghana. Luxembourg, 02/10/2006 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
No evidence was found in that respect. 
2007_ACPGLOG 
SOCREDO 
No evidence was found in that respect. 
2009_MICRO 
FINANCE_ACP 
No evidence has been found so far. 
JC 1.5 Operations examined aim at addressing countries’/regions’ needs 
2000_MAGADI_ 
SODA 
The project will improve the utilisation of a unique natural resource thereby contributing to reduce 
the country’s trade deficit by expanding export revenues both by higher product prices (through 
product quality improvements) and by increased production. Thereby the project will contribute to 
improve the competitiveness of the promoter and will consolidate and create job opportunities in a 
sector where Kenya enjoys a competitive advantage. 
Source: D3 
Source: : Note to OP3. Opinion for Appraisal Authorisation. Project Magadi Soda, country Kenya. 
Luxembourg 24/10/2000, PJ/I&S/2000-1186/GCE/SHW/ms 
2004_WAGP The project is the first in the West Africa to develop regional exports of natural gas and is fully 
supported by the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and by ECOWAS. It will 
promote regional economic and political integration. 
Source: EIB, Appraisal Report, West African Gas Pipeline, Ghana. Luxembourg, 02/10/2006 
, §3.1 
I-1.5.1 Committee’s portfolio reviews show that operations address countries’/regions’ needs 
General An EIB source mentioned that the IF was criticised for not being sufficiently ‘developmental’:  
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“ACP operations are now subject to much greater stakeholder scrutiny than in the past, be it from the shareholders, 
other EU institutions (Commission, Parliament and Court of Auditors) and, above all civil society and in particular 
NGOs, with the result that the Bank is now required to unambiguously demonstrate the value added of each 
individual operation. As attended to above, there seems to be a perception that the Bank has so far focused mainly on 
identifying and financing good private sector projects, which in itself is already not an easy task in the ACP context 
and in that respect, the Bank has been fundamentally in line with the letter of its Cotonou mandate. However it is 
also being criticised to various degrees, by NGOs, but also by the Commission and by at least one influential Member 
State for not being sufficiently “developmental” and for being too risk averse.” 
Source: MN 027 
 
An EIB staff member noted that one should not forget that the EIB can contribute to Cotonou 
only as a Bank:  
“It should be taken account of our specificity with regard to achieving Cotonou objectives: we are a bank. One should 
not be too wide in terms of what we can do. It should be considered whether we are (or should be) just a “finance 
provider” or a “development bank”. Example: SMEs: it is not such an easy example as it may seem. How can we 
increase VA in field of SME? Sometimes you have to support large projects to be able to support them, where there 
is a need for long-term money. Other example: micro-finance. Do we need to put more and more money in 
microfinance? We would need to have more information beforehand to know where we should act (as a bank). 
Always thinking on the chain of events we want to have.” 
“Remember that the Bank is not a promoter, but it tries to have priorities. Example: energy financing. EIB has 
clear priority to finance clean energy. This is an area where the Bank will place full priority. With additional 
instruments like TA etc… the Bank is also supporting technical advice and improving the preparation phase. The 
Bank is no a promoter but is strengthening the promoter. The Commission’s aid is programme aid, with grants. A 
totally different dymamic. It is giving away free money. The Bank is not giving away free money.” 
Source: MN 024 
 
A COUNTER BALANCE report considers that EIB’s policies and practices are not properly 
integrated and coherent with EU approaches. There is an ongoing dispute between the European 
Council, the Commission and the European Parliament about what exactly are and should be the 
objectives of the EIB. In late 2008, the European Court of Justice ruled that the EIB had to 
implement the anti-poverty and sustainable development provisions of the EU Treaty. It annulled 
the legal basis for EIB lending outside the EU because it found the EIB was basing its activities on 
a narrow interpretation of the EU Treaty. The Parliament also insisted that the EIB apply a 
developmental, poverty reduction mandate in its lending to Africa and ALA countries. The new 
Lisbon Treaty also reinforces that aspect, spelling out that poverty reduction must be the focus of 
all EU policies likely to affect developing countries.  
 
According to this report, the EIB has conflicting objectives (cf table hereunder) which prevent it 
from focusing entirely on development-related aspects. 
 
Development objectives EU-self interest objective 
Sustainable economic and social development 
of the developing countries, and more 
particularly the most disadvantaged among 
them 
Support EU presence through Foreign Direct 
Investment 
Campaign against poverty in developing 
countries 
Cost recovery and rapid financial return 
Improvement or protection of the 
environment 
Energy security for the EU and raw material 
supply for the EU 
 
According to this report, the EIB lacks clear operational strategies, priorities and processes that 
ensure that its money will be spend on projects selected to maximise development results. In 
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particular, it lacks sufficiently clear and pro-active lending strategies and is often at the mercy of 
whatever private sector project promoters brings to its attention. As a result, the operations are 
distorted in favour of larger projects sponsored by major European companies. The report also 
stresses that the EIB does not consider enough whether proposed projects fit sufficiently with the 
Country Strategies of the Commission and other European funding bodies. Furthermore, the EIB 
is not active enough in the discussions the Commission initiated to encourage different public 
finance bodies to prioritise particular countries and sectors. 
 
Source: Counter Balance, Challenging the EIB, “Corporate welfare and development deceptions : why the EIB is 
failing to deliver outside the EU?”, February 2010 
 
General No such review or portfolio impact assessment was obtained 
2003_BOAD PG IV No evidence so far on how the operation addressed country/region needs– see also I-1.2.1 on little 
analysis of country needs and I-1.4.1 on tackling development issues. 
2003_Dakar-
Ziguinchor 
No evidence so far on how the operation addressed country/region needs– see also I-1.2.1 on little 
analysis of country needs and I-1.4.1 on tackling development issues. 
2003_MAURITIUS 
CONTAINER 
The project is only mentioned in the appendix related to portfolio of signed own resources 
operations. The Bank does not show how this project addresses country’s/region’s needs.  
 
“Annual Report 2004 – Investment Facility” EIB 
“Annual Report 2005 – Investment Facility” EIB 
“Annual Report 2006 – Investment Facility” EIB 
2003_GILGEL 
GIBE 
No evidence was found in that respect. 
2004-WAGP EIB preparatory documents do so. 
Sources Factsheet A and B, Appraisal Report. 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
The annual report of the EIB only mentions this project but it does not explain how this project 
addresses region/country needs.  
 
“Annual Report 2007 – Investment Facility” EIB, p31 
2007_ACPGLOG 
SOCREDO 
No evidence was found in that respect. 
2009_MICRO 
FINANCE_ACP 
No evidence was found in that respect. 
I-1.5.2 Stakeholders consider that operations address countries’/regions’ needs 
General Possibly, certain countries’ needs (Ethiopia, Somalia, ...) are better addressed by the EC, whereas 
countries with a more mature business environment offer a larger role for EIB. 
(MN 201- 2010-01-29 – EIB Luxembourg) 
2003_MAURITIUS 
CONTAINER 
The EIB have contacted several stakeholders to prepare the appraisal report. Through this 
document, the country’s /sector’s needs have been evaluated. However, no indication regarding the 
implication of each stakeholder is provided. Therefore there is no explicit evidence that they 
consider that project in line with the country’s needs. 
 
The appraisal report refers to several reference contact names. It can be supposed that these 
persons have been contacted in order to provide project’s information. Consequently, it can be 
argued that analyses from the appraisal report have taken into account the stakeholders’ views.  
 
« Appraisal Report – Mauritius Container Terminal II – Mauritius », EIB, 2004 
2003_GILGEL 
GIBE 
No evidence was found in that respect. 
2004-WAGP It is certainly the case of the Governments involved but there is no evidence about other 
stakeholders. In particular there is no mention of the views of the Commission and the MS. 
2004_Lumwana Cf I124 
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2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
No evidence was explicitly found in that respect. 
2007_ACPGLOG 
SOCREDO 
The SOCREDO’s activities are compared to an ordinary commercial bank, but it is clearly oriented 
to the development needs of the local population in French Polynesia. The SOCREDO’ bank has 
to suggest operations related to environmental issues in order to benefit from the EIB’s funding. 
Consequently, it can be reasonably stated that the direct beneficiary considers that operations lead 
address country’s/region’s needs.  
 
Apart from SOCREDO, no evidence on other stakeholders’ point of view/considerations has been 
found. 
 
“SOCREDO-ligne de crédit environnement (2007-328)”, EIB, 2007, p5 
 
2009_MICRO 
FINANCE_ACP 
No evidence was found in that respect. 
JC 1.6 EIB IF/OR operations are designed and implemented with a view to alignment with 
Commission development policies in ACP/OCTs 
Prelim. Findings  
Hypothesis to test EIB policy docts require that IF/OR Ops be in line w/ devt needs and EU development policies.   
In line w/ EU development policies: what does that mean?  Yes perhaps for infrastructure, but 
practically no EU PS development policies.  Explain WHY they need to be aligned ? (Ref Paris 
Decl.).  If EC has very weak PS devt policies in place, difficult to argue that EIB should align. 
2004-WAGP 
Findings 
There is no explicit mention of such alignment in Factsheet A and B,  or in appraisal Report. 
I-1.6.1 The objectives of IF/OR operations support Commission development policy objectives 
General The report highlights the fact that EIB operations do not reflect the development priorities as 
expressed in the Country Strategy Papers of the Commission. It presents the example of 6 African 
countries where funding from the EIB to the mining sector between 2000 and 2006 has been 
significant while the mining sector was not one of the focal or non-focal sectors or was not even 
mentioned in the strategy document. Examples include Congo Brazzaville, Kenya, Mauritania, 
Mozambique and Zambia. 
 
Source: Counter Balance, Challenging the EIB, “The European Investment Bank in the ACP countries – critical 
points for the mid-term review of the Investment Facility”, March 2010 
 
The consistency and contribution to EU policy objectives of EIB operations outside the EU but 
excluding ACP countries is generally assessed as good or satisfactory. 
 
Source: MN 900 
General According to the indicators developed in order to assess the first pillar of the Development Impact 
Assessment Framework (DIAF), the Commission development policy objectives are taken into 
account. This first pillar are composed by operational objectives of the mandate, which correspond 
to the priority area of intervention, and by broader policy objectives of the EU as environment, 
regional integration,...  
“Development impact and value added of investment loans in ACP loans”, EIB, appendix 3 
General One major obstacle to better alignment is that the EC functions on the basis of 5-year 
programming (which then becomes immovable) whereas EIB functions on shorter horizons. 
(MN 201- 2010-01-29 – EIB Luxembourg) 
General EC country/regional documents such as RSPs, CSPs and RIPs/NIPs for the Caribbean, 
Dominican Republic, Madagascar, Kenya, do not cover the needs of the private sector or the 
financial sector (other than sporadically, or in respect of the enabling environment).  Only in 
respect of infrastructure are they of use to EIB. 
Source:  RSPs, CSPs and RIPs/NIPs obtained for relevant countries of 20 selected operations 
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2003_MAURITIUS 
CONTAINER 
The EIB has considered this project in accordance with the objectives of the Cotonou agreement 
established by the European Community. 
A particular point relating the consistency with EU priority objectives (Pillar1) was drawn up in the 
internal EIB document. 
“Consistency with EU priority objectives (Pillar 1) 
One of the fundamental objectives of the Cotonou Agreement is to enable the ACP States to play a 
main role in international trade. Through increased efficiency of maritime transport the project 
directly contributes to this objective. Due to its island situation, practically all Mauritius trade passes 
through Port Louis, its sole commercial port. Furthermore, as 75% of trade is containerised 
nowadays, the Mauritius Container Terminal is a key component in the economic development of 
Mauritius. Benefiting from its geographical position, Mauritius has also managed to attract trans-
shipment traffic. As trans-shipment implies the use of large container ships, freight charges are 
minimised and transport duration for imports and exports reduced. Finally, through its new hub 
function, the Mauritius Container Terminal contributes to regional integration thereby bringing 
economic benefits not only to Mauritius but also to its neighbouring countries. The project 
therefore fully meets the objectives of the Cotonou Agreement to foster development in the ACP 
Partner Countries of the EU.” 
 
« Mauritius: Mauritius Container Terminal II Project. Extension of the Mauritius Container Terminal. Cotonou 
Agreement-Loan from the Bank’s own resources. Ops B Financial report», EIB, 2004, p 8 
« Appraisal Report – Mauritius Container Terminal II – Mauritius », EIB, 2004, p 5 
 
2003_GILGEL 
GIBE 
This project is undertaken under the Cotonou Agreement. In that respect, the project is expected to 
address the Commission development policy objectives.  
 
“The project is consistent with EU objectives as specified in the Cotonou agreement and the 
mandate given to the Bank under the Investment Facility. It further contributes to the EU and 
Bank’s environmental policy, tackling climate changes and promoting sustainable use of renewable 
natural resources.” 
 
“Fact sheet B: financing proposal”, EIB, 2005, p1-4  
2003_BOAD PG IV No direct reference found to Commission policy objectives. 
2003_Dakar- 
Ziguinchor 
No direct reference to the Commission’s CSP.  
In its 2002-2007 CSP, the Commission considers “road transport” as its second (of three) focal 
sectors. This project falls in the transport sector, but actually not in “road transport” as it relates to 
marine transport. 
2004_OLKARIA EC_Kenya 9th EDF  CSP identifies energy as one of the priority sector of the PRSP and 
Government policy.  
Source Kenya-European Community, Country Strategy Paper for the period 2003-2007. 15th 
October 2003.. p.4  and p.17.; annex 4, p. 16 
EC Kenya 10th EDF does not include energy infrastructure into the focal or non focal sectors but 
mentions EIB support to the sector. 
Source Republic of Kenya - European Community, Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative 
Programme for the period 2008-2013, 9th December 2007., p. 28 
The 9thth EDF RSP  mentions “The European Investment Bank has identified a number of 
possible interventions that it would implement either alone or in co-operation with the European 
Commission and other institutional (bilateral and multilateral) and commercial financiers. These 
projects are in the sectors of agriculture, infrastructure, mineral resources, tourism and the financial 
sector. Regional benefits will certainly be of crucial importance for many projects such as 
telecommunications, railways as well as energy generation and distribution. These areas of activities 
are fully in line or complementary with the priorities set out in this RSP.” 
Source: Region of Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean - European Community 
Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme for the Period 2002 – 2007, June 2002. 
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, §131 
The 10th EDF RSP does not place particular emphasis on infrastructure but relies more on the 
creation in 2006 of the EU-Africa Partnership on infrastructure meant to leverage EDF, EIB, and 
EU MS resources to address infrastructure networks (including energy) and harmonise policies.  
Source Region of Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean - European Community 
Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme for the Period 2008 – 2013, 15th 
November 2008. 
2004-WAGP Neither in the 9th EDF nor in the 10th Energy is a focal sector. However, the 9th EDF country 
strategy explicity mentions that the bank will focus on three areas of intervention, one of which 
being: “Infrastructure. …, power transmission and transport …. could be considered for support 
depending upon the identified needs. In line with the EC Response Strategy, synergies could be 
developed in particular through investments in power transmission with positive impact on the 
improvement of physical infrastructures in rural areas. …. The EIB will target the improved 
efficiency of publicly owned companies and encourage private sector participation where 
appropriate.” (Republic of Ghana – European Community: Country Strategy Paper and Indicative 
Programme for the period 2002-2007. DEV 054-2002-EN.). The current project fits into this 
description.  
The 9th EDF Regional strategy and RIP neither identifies energy as a focal sector. However, the 
focus is on regional integration and the current project obviously fits into that priority.  
The 10th EDF Regional strategy and RIP maintains the focus on regional integration and also 
points to energy transportation and power generation as potential sector for support, notably with 
EIB resources.  
Sources :   
Republic of Ghana – European Community: Country Strategy Paper and Indicative Programme for 
the period 2002-2007. DEV 054-2002-EN. 
Ghana-European, Community: Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme for the 
period 2008-2013, 9 December 2007. 
Afrique de l’Ouest – Communauté européenne : Document de stratégie de coopération régionale et 
Programme indicatif régional pour la période 2002-2007 (no date) 
Addendum au document de stratégie de coopération et au programme indicatif régional 2002-2007, 
Communauté européenne et région de l’Afrique de l’Ouest.  
 Communauté européenne-Afrique de l’Ouest : Document de stratégie régionale et Pprogramme 
indicatif régional 2008-2013, 15/11/2008. 
The EIB analysis is that adequate power supply being key to private sector development and 
economic growth in Ghana, Togo and Benin, the financing of the project would contribute toards 
one of the main objectives of the Cotonou Agreement.  
Source: EIB, Fact Sheet A: proposal to appraise new operation, Luxembourg 17/2/2005, 
(OPS/B/ACPIF-1 WestAfr & Sahel/20040026/Walter Eve) 
2004_LUMWANA The contribution of the EIB to the development finance co-operation with Zambia will be the 
provision of long-term assistance to promote private sector growth and in helping to mobilise 
domestic and foreign capital for this purpose. In this respect, the EIB  support will be 
complementary and instrumental for the implementation of the second core area of focal sector 2: 
i.e. Institutional Reform and Capacity Building: private sector development and non state activities.  
Source: Zambia-European Community, Country Strategy Paper for the period 2001-2007 (not 
dated), p. 20 
Considering the specificities of Zambia’s economic situation as well as EIB’s past experience in the 
country, EIB will focus on three main areas of intervention. First, close co-operation with local 
financial intermediaries to support small and medium scale enterprises through global loans or 
equity funds. The aim will be to further widen the range of intermediaries and to increase the 
number of financial instruments on offer. 
Second, financing infrastructure projects in the power, water and sewerage, transport and 
telecommunications sectors. This will help increase the efficiency of public utilities and encourage 
private sector participation, where appropriate. Third, direct funding of large individual projects, 
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where the Bank can contribute value added in the technical and/or financial structuring of the 
investment. These projects will be carefully selected in the main sectors of the economy. 
The EIB approach in supporting investments in Zambia will be demand driven. The extent to 
which the EIB will be able to commit resources to the economy will largely depend on the 
macroeconomic framework and on the business environment, itself largely determined by the 
economic policy of the Government. While the liberal and business-friendly policy environment 
prevails, the prospects for EIB operations in Zambia remain favourable. 
Source: Zambia-European Community, Country Strategy Paper for the period 2001-2007 (not 
dated); p. 21 
The 10th EDF pursues along the same lines for what regards the complementarity between the 
Commission and the EIB response strategies.  
For the 9th and 10th EDF RSPS, see I162 for the 2004_OLKARIA project.  
2001_MOMA_ 
Titanium 
The 9th EDF CSP for Mozambique states “The contribution of the EIB in the framework of the 
Cotonou Agreement will be the provision of long-term financial resources other than grants, to 
assist in promoting growth in the private sector and in helping to mobilise domestic and foreign 
capital for this purpose. The support will be in the form of risk capital from the Investment Facility 
or as loans from EIB’s own resources.” Mozambique-European Community, Country Strategy 
Paper for the period 2001-2007 (not dated)., p. 22) 
It may be worth noting that 9th and 10th EDF CSPS, although they review briefly the EIB activity in 
the country, do not mention the Bank’s Intervention in the mining sector, and in particular the 
MOMA_TITANIUM project.  
Like the CSPs , the 9th and 10th RSPs remind the potential offered by the EIB to support private 
sector development and infrastructure investment, but do not specifically mention the present 
operation nor regard the mining sector as a particular priority. 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
The EIB has considered this project in accordance with the objectives of the Cotonou agreement 
established by the European Community. 
“Fact sheet A: Appraisal Authorisation”, EIB, 2007, p2 
 
The EU ACP Water Facility (European Commission external cooperation programmes) was set up 
in order to provide water and basic sanitation to the poor, and to improve water management 
governance in African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. The EIB provided loan to 
complement this EU program. 
“Working in close cooperation with SONES and Agence Française de Développement, the EIB 
helped to prepare a grant request under the EU ACP Water Facility, which was subsequently 
approved for EUR 8.7m.The Water Facility grant for this development project will be 
complemented by a EUR 15.0m subsidised long term loan provided by the EIB.” 
“Annual Report 2007 – Investment Facility” EIB, p31 
2007_ACPGLOG 
SOCREDO 
The Overseas Association Decision (Coucil decision 2001/822/CE) foresees €20 million budget 
for the IF (managed by the EIB) to promote commercial enterprises in private sector in OCT. In 
that respect, the Commission has put priorities on renewable energy and energy efficiency. 
 
The global loan of €5 million has been granted to SOCREDO to onlend to small and medium-
sized environmental projects in French Polynesia. In that respect, SOCREDO suggested projects 
to the EIB. Then the EIB checked if each project is in line with the internal guidelines in terms of 
environment. The EIB had the possibility to request additional analysis to ensure that the 
environmental impact expected of the project is compliant with the EIB’s guidelines in terms of 
environment promotion. 
 
The EIB has to make sure that the project presented by the intermediary bank is compliant with the 
Council decision and is in line with its environment policy. 
 
This project is in line with the Commission strategy in OCT countries. The commission suggests a 
“blue-green” theme oriented on environment and renewable energies.  
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“SOCREDO-ligne de crédit environnement (2007-328)”, EIB, 2007, p2 -7 
 
2009_MICRO 
FINANCE_ACP 
Obviously, the Bank has taken into account the guidelines established by the Cotonou Agreement. 
The EIB estimated that it is in line with the investment and private sector development of the 
Cotonou Agreement. 
 
According to the EIB analysis,  
“the investment in MEF is fully in line with Article 21 “Investment and Private Sector Development” of the 
Cotonou Agreement, which calls for “[…] support in improving the quality, availability, and accessibility of financial 
and non-financial services to private enterprises, both formal and informal, by […] developing a modern financial 
sector, including a capital market, financial institutions and sustainable microfinance operations.” 
 
“Fact sheet A : Appraisal Autorisation ”, EIB, 2009, p 3 
 
I-1.6.2 These objectives were maintained during implementation 
General During the evaluation of the projects implemented according to the indicators of the DIAF, the 
EIB considers the fact that the projects are well implemented respectful of the broad EU 
objectives.  
“Development impact and value added of investment loans in ACP loans”, EIB, appendix 3 
 
2003_MAURITIUS 
CONTAINER 
The EIB has foreseen a follow-up of the project’s implantation with the administrative manager of 
CHCL. In that respect, the manager should have provided with short annual reports describing the 
progress of the project. These reports should have included container traffic statistics for the 
container terminal.  
Furthermore a project completion report should have been also provided to the EIB. This report 
included the following information: 
 the actual investment cost of the project, and reasons for major changes if any; 
 the actual implementation period of the project, and reasons for major changes if any; 
 the actual latest annual throughput of the Mauritius Container Terminal (imports, exports 
and trans-shipments for full and empty containers); 
 the average unit revenues (broken down as above) and, if available, unit operating costs of 
MCT (broken down as above);  
 the permanent employment generated at CHCL by the project; and 
 the additional investments planned for the short and medium-term at MCT. 
These reports are not included in the internal documents provided. Therefore, it is difficult to attest 
that the EU policy objectives have been maintained during the implementation phase. 
 
« Appraisal Report – Mauritius Container Terminal II – Mauritius », EIB, 2004, Appendix A.2 
 
2003_GILGEL 
GIBE 
In the project progress report, the EIB tackled the development impact of the project. Therefore 
the development arguments used to support the project are taken into account during the 
implementation phase review made regularly by the EIB.  
 
More precisely, the development impact is described in this report as follows:  
“Expansion of hydro generation capacity will help to replace thermal plants and meet rapidly growing demand. The 
project benefits must be seen in the context of the wider programme of investment in the electricity supply system. The 
extension of supply will deliver economic and social benefits in a situation where only a small part of the population is 
currently served. Moreover, connection of isolated systems to the grid will improve services that are currently limited in 
terms of capacity, quality, and in some instance restricted to certain hours of the day. By developing indigenous 
renewable energy resources, the project will contribute to the reduction of the atmospheric emissions of thermal 
generation alternatives.” 
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“Ops B: Project Progress Report”, EIB, 2009, p1-2 
 
2003_BOAD PG IV No evidence on maintenance of development objectives during implementation could be found. 
2003_Dakar- 
Ziguinchor 
No evidence on maintenance of development objectives during implementation could be found. 
2004_WAGP  They are not explicity repeated in the 10th EDF country strategy but implicitely they are maintained 
via the overall willingness to stimulate regional integration and alleviate constraints to private sector 
activity ( which evidently includes availability and cost of power ). 
Source : 
Republic of Ghana – European Community: Country Strategy Paper and Indicative Programme for 
the period 2002-2007. DEV 054-2002-EN. 
 Ghana-European, Community: Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme for the 
period 2008-2013, 9 December 2007. 
Afrique de l’Ouest – Communauté européenne : Document de stratégie de coopération régionale et 
Programme indicatif régional pour la période 2002-2007 (no date) 
 Addendum au document de stratégie de coopération et au programme indicatif régional 2002-
2007, Communauté européenne et région de l’Afrique de l’Ouest.  
Communauté européenne-Afrique de l’Ouest : Document de stratégie régionale et Pprogramme 
indicatif régional 2008-2013, 15/11/2008. 
2004_OLKARIA See I161 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
As so far, no evidence has been identified that these objectives are maintained during the 
implantation phase. 
2007_ACPGLOG 
SOCREDO 
The operations funded by the EIB are environment related and thus they are related to the 
development needs expressed by the Commission. 
The objectives are therefore maintained during the implantation stage. 
 
2009_MICRO 
FINANCE_ACP 
No evidence was found in that respect. 
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EQ2 To what extent did IF/OR operations improve, without market distortion, access by enterprises 
to finance that would otherwise have been unavailable under the prevailing market conditions?  
JC 2.1 The IF/OR operations have met a substantial share of the financing needs of individual 
enterprises or, more broadly, a commensurate share of the productive sector 
General See annexe 2 for a descriptive analysis of the Bank’s operations under the Cotonou mandate, the sectors 
targeted and the instruments used. 
 
I-2.1.1 Financial needs of the ACP and OCT enterprises as identified by country/sector reviews 
General According to the EIB,  
 Any country strategy should include a review of the local financial sector diagnosing the key 
issues and gaps. 
 Promoting change, rather than “business as usual”, and being open to a range of alternative 
options should be high on the agenda.  
  Identification of potential areas of intervention should recognise the situation and state in the 
market, while also taking into account the activities of other players and the instruments and 
resources available to the IF.  
 Designing a strategy will require allocating adequate staff time and promoting team work and 
internal consultation.  
 Last but not least, a country-level financial sector strategy means focus on objectives and 
prioritisation of possible operations. This can only have a meaning if operational choices 
subsequently reflect such objectives and priorities.  
“EIB strategic orientations for financial sector operations in ACP countries” EIB, document 08/53, 2008, p2, 
 
In practice, in the financial sector, EIB, through DEAS, conducts Country Financial Sector Strategies 
identifying priority needs.  These include the needs of SMEs and MSMEs which can be addressed 
through financial intermediaries. 
However, this is not uniformly applied (see JC 1.2 and underlying Indicators) 
2003_MAURITIUS 
CONTAINER 
The financial needs of CHCL are well documented. The CHCL’s activities are described as well as 
its evolution. Its financial figures for several years are presented and commented by the EIB. The 
financial statements 2001-2004 are presented in the annexes. 
“In conclusion CHCL’s financial situation shows an overall satisfactory financial structure whereby the 
relatively low, but still acceptable level of capitalisation is compensated by solid other features such as 
low level of LT interest bearing debt, a strong liquidity, cash flow and debt service coverage.”  
Furthermore financial projections are prepared including different scenarios (base, worst and best case) 
in order to assess the financial viability of the project. The details of the projections are presented in the 
annexes. 
« Mauritius: Mauritius Container Terminal II Project. Extension of the Mauritius Container Terminal. Cotonou 
Agreement-Loan from the Bank’s own resources. Ops B Financial report», EIB, 2004, p 4-5 
2003_GILGEL 
GIBE 
No evidence was found in that respect. 
2005_ACPGLOB 
ADEMI 
Dominican Republic Country Financial Sector Strategy identifies SMEs/MSMEs as being insufficiently 
served 
2005_Pacific 
islands 
The EIB has carried out in the context of the PIFF II a “Financial Report”. This 28 pages document (+ 
annexes) essentially describes in a few pages the financial sector in the region and provides specific 
information on the different borrowing banks for this operation (~4 pages per bank).  
 
Regarding the contract with NDBP, as mentioned above under I-1.2.5, the report to the Board of the 
contract in Palau provides information on the context of the operation, notably on the limits of financial 
market liquidity for SMEs in the Pacific islands. “(…) The development of SMEs and micro-sized initiatives is 
one of the keys to sustained employment growth in the Pacific region and is crucial to both poverty reduction and the 
building of stable democratic societies, and enjoys full support of the relevant Pacific Governments.  
Financial market liquidity in the Pacific Islands, where it exists, is primarily of a short term nature and the lack of longer 
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term financing precludes many projects from obtaining suitable funding from local sources. In the same way as the first 
PIFF operation, PIFF II focuses on SMEs and micro-sized businesses and the key value-added component is to encourage 
the development of a large number of micro-, small and medium-sized initiatives in the private sector throughout the Pacific 
region. It increases employment across a wide range of sectors. It also addresses micro-finance needs by giving the least 
privileged strata of the population access to appropriate credit facilities.” 
 
Source: “Board of Directors, Global authorisation from IF resources” (for the operation), EIB, 21/11/2006 (p3) 
2000_MAGADI 
SODA 
The financial needs of the beneficiary in relation with the project are well documented and analysed in 
the preparatory documents. Activities and organization of the company are presented; historical 
financial data provided.  Projections of financial flows are provided to verify the capacity of the project 
to bear the cost of the loan.  
Sources: OPS B Financial Report; Board Report. 
2001 MOMA 
TITANIUM 
The financial needs of the beneficiary in relation with the project are well documented and analysed in 
the preparatory documents. Projections of financial flows.  
Sources: OPS B Financial Report; Board Report 
2004_LUMWANA Standard analysis conducted: activities, organization and financial situation of the borrower; projections 
of the financial flows in relation with the investment and the financing modalities.  
Sources: Board Report.  
2004_OLKARIA It is a senior loan to the electricity company. The project preparatory documents state that  “the loan 
size will be determined upon final assessment of the project cost and of the extent to which KenGen 
will be able to bear interest charges at commercial rates without having to increase the price of power 
sales to KPLC and threaten the financial equilibrium of the power sector”.  
Sources: Factsheet A 
2004_WAGP The financing needs of the borrower (Republic of Ghana) is obvious in this case. The loan is meant to 
refinance the participation of the Republic of Ghana in WAPCO, this participation was previously 
financed with short term expensive borrowing. Preparatory documents include full financial analysis of 
the project with projection of financial flows and historical data. The financial situation of WAPCo is 
analysed.  
Source: Factsheet B Financing Proposal, Board Report. 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
The EIB presents the situation of the drinking water distribution in the country and the evolution of the 
sector. Furthermore the EIB is active in that sector for more than 10 years in Senegal. Consequently, it 
has analyzed the results achieved during this period and it has a deep knowledge of that sector in 
Senegal. 
Regarding SONES, its financial situation is broadly documented by the EIB in order to correctly 
estimate its reimbursement capacity and its financial viability. Consequently the EIB has a correct view 
of the SONES financial needs. 
 
“Rapport financier. Projet: Programme eau Sénégal”, EIB, 2007, p2-4-8-13 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2006 
The preparatory documents show that this operation responded to an opportunity to develop a new 
product in Kenya with partners having a valuable experience in the sector. The board report includes a 
short analysis of the Kenyan private equity market and SME sector in Kenya and concludes that there is 
a real need for the operation proposed: “There has, until recently, been a gap in the market for 
companies seeking equity investments of less than USD1m (see section 4.9 - Competition). This gap has 
been partially filled by local banks providing loans to clients whose risk profile is higher than they might 
otherwise like to lend to. However, it seems that man y young businesses simply cannot access any 
external funds and have to rely on investments by founders and informal sources of funds. There is also 
a belief that the private equity / venture capital model is not appropriate to address the means of young 
SMEs. Pure equity investment may be appropriate for some small Kenyan businesses, but a more 
sophisticated approach, such as that proposed by BPI-K is required to address the needs of and the 
risks presented by the majority. In summary, BPI is offering a fresh approach to addressing a diffcult 
challenge.. 
Source: Report to the Management Committee, 16/2/2006  
2007_ACPGLOG The EIB has identified the activities of SOCREDO as well as its position on the financial sector in 
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SOCREDO French Polynesia. The analysis is well documented. 
 
“SOCREDO-ligne de crédit environnement (2007-328)”, EIB, 2007, p5 
2009_MICRO 
FINANCE_ACP 
No evidence was found in that respect. 
I-2.1.2 EIB’s documented strategy (concentration, diversification, …) in terms of addressing financing 
needs of enterprises 
Pacific General The strategy of the Bank is mostly to use global loans to support the private sector. Local development 
banks have been privileged by the EIB to channel these global loan because of their capacity to reach 
segments and regions of the economy (for instance outer islands) that are not the object of the 
prospection of the commercial bank.  
Source: MN313 
2003_Dakar-
Ziguinchor 
Upon a KfW request, a feasibility study has been undertaken by HPC Hamburg Port Consulting GmbH 
regarding the sea link Dakar-Ziguinchor. This study is aimed at conducting a financial and economic 
appraisal of the project, including an estimation of both financial and economic rates of return. 
However, the evaluators have only been provided with the annexes of this study. 
 
Apparently, the PJ based its financial and economic appraisal on the research conducted by the firm. 
 
Sources: « Rapport d’instruction », EIB, 2004, Annex F & « Etude de faisabilité pour la desserte 
maritime entre Dakar et Ziguinchor -ANNEXES », HPC Hamburg Port Consulting GmbH, 
2003_MAURITIUS 
CONTAINER 
An EIB’s internal procedure is followed in order to assess the appropriateness of the financing. In that 
respect, the EIB’s team in charge of the financing proposal described the situation as it is and the 
benefits resulted from the project. The team described the main issues at stake as well as the credit risk. 
Then the team concluded with a favourable opinion on that project but several conditions should be 
met (such as a tariff study needed to be carried out). 
 
In terms of financing sources, the financing plan is added and it is commented by the EIB as follows: 
 
“The financing plan is largely dominated by funding provided by MPA. Due to its healthy financial 
situation MPA is providing aprox. EUR 5.3m out of the EUR 6.0m own funds and in addition is 
granting a 10 year loan to CHCL at an attractive (average of 6.75%) interest rate in local currency. Note 
that the Bank’s 20 year funding has been given preference by the promoter over a more 
diversified (but shorter term) loan structure from the local banking market as it allows to spread 
the financial implications of the investment over a longer period with corresponding favourable 
effects on cost reflective tariffs. While a guarantee by the Republic of Mauritius remains available for 
the project, the possibility of a first class commercial bank guarantee has recently arisen as alternative 
option; the Bank will evaluate the various aspects of such alternative guarantee arrangement in close 
contact with Government of Mauritius, the promoter and the commercial bank (Barclays) concerned.” 
 
Source : « Mauritius: Mauritius Container Terminal II Project. Extension of the Mauritius Container Terminal. 
Cotonou Agreement-Loan from the Bank’s own resources. Ops B Financial report», EIB, 2004, p 7 
 
2003_GILGEL 
GIBE 
No evidence was found in that respect. 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
This project is falling under the Programme d’eau Potable et Assainissement Millénaire (PEPAM). The 
latter follows the PSE (Project Sectoriel Eau) and the PELT (Projet Eau Long Terme). These both 
projects were also co-financed by the EIB. Therefore the EIB tends to be active in the Senegalese 
sanitation sector on the long run. However the project documents do not refer to a specific strategy of 
the EIB regarding the financing in this sector.  
Source: “Fact sheet A: Appraisal Authorisation”, EIB, 2007, p1 
2007_ACPGLOG 
SOCREDO 
No evidence was found in that respect. 
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2009_MICRO 
FINANCE_ACP 
No evidence was found in that respect. 
I-2.1.3 Coverage by IF/OR operations of needs at country / sector / sub-sector / individual enterprise 
levels  
General A difference must be made between loan operations and equity investments.  For loan finance, EIB 
financing satisfies a need for long term finance that “serves” a given operation.  For equity finance, 
parameters are different: the availability of equity finance allows for greenfield projects or expansion of 
existing operations that are made possible by such equity finance. 
A difference must also be made as to whether the operation ios a direct one or an indirect one (through 
financial intermediaries) 
2003_BOAD PG 
IV 
It is not clear to what extent this triple loan+guarantee+equity operation responded to needs at the 
country / sector / sub-sector levels. This is partly due to the absence of a needs analysis (see I-1.2.1).  
 
Nevertheless, at the level of the financial institution, project documents mention that the EIB 
participation to the BOAD’s capital increase was important in terms of image and for future ranking of 
this regional bank: “Contribution relativement modeste et symbolique mais toutefois très importante pour la BOAD en 
terme d’image et dans la perspective de son « rating » à  terme. (…). Bien que modeste, cette augmentation de capital est 
particulièrement importante pour la Direction Générale de la BOAD qui considère les trois volets (package deal) comme 
l’expression du caractère stratégique du partenariat BOAD-BEI. » 
Source : « Fact Sheet B : proposition de financement » (of the operation 2003_BOAD PG IV), EIB, 11 
mars 2004 (p3) 
2003_Dakar-
Ziguinchor 
This operation clearly covered needs at the level of the country and of the Casamance region, as it aimed 
at re-establishing the sea link Dakar - Ziguinchor which was not any more assured since the tragic wreck 
of the "Le Joola" ferry in September 2002. Given the limited profitability, and other difficulties and 
risks, it was necessary to benefit from support of the Government and of co-financiers.  
Source : « Fact Sheet A : Proposition portant sur l'instruction d'une nouvelle opération » (of the 
operation), EIB, 26 March 2004 (p2) 
2003_MAURITIUS 
CONTAINER 
The needs are assessed at country level, sector and individual enterprise levels. 
 
“The harbour of Port Louis plays a key role in the Mauritian economy as the main thoroughfare for 
over 95% of the country’s international trade.” P 4 
“Due to its island situation, practically all Mauritius trade passes through Port Louis, its sole commercial 
port. Furthermore, as 75% of trade is containerised nowadays, the Mauritius Container Terminal is a key 
component in the economic development of Mauritius.”  
 
“Captive traffic (domestic imports and exports) developed at a fast pace of about 9% per year in the 
period 1996-2003. This trend is expected to continue, although at a slightly lower speed of 7% per year, 
in the period 2004-2010, and then at 6% until 2012 when the terminal is expected to reach full capacity. 
[...] Trans-shipment traffic is more difficult to forecast since it is a volatile market, dependent on tariffs 
and the level of service offered in competing markets. The nearby ports of Port-Est (Réunion Island) 
and Tamatave (Madagascar) are not real competitors, the former because of its high operating costs and 
poor working practices, the latter as it is in dire need of rehabilitation. In any case, both lack sufficient 
container stacking space. The competition will come from South Africa (Durban, currently fairly 
congested but improving, and the new port of Coega near Port Elisabeth).  
 
“However, as MCT still had spare capacity, CHCL decided to aggressively market the terminal for trans-
shipment traffic in the region in 2001, offering very attractive rates to maritime companies. Within two 
years, MCT has become congested by trans-shipped containers, and requires urgent expansion. 
However, even without trans-shipment, MCT would very soon require a substantial increase in 
capacity.” 
 
Source:  « Appraisal Report – Mauritius Container Terminal II – Mauritius », EIB, 2004, p4-5-7 
2003_GILGEL The projects documents state that this project is necessary to ensure that the power generation capacity 
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GIBE of the country meets the increasing electricity demand in the country at all times. The coverage at a 
country level is so identified. 
 
At the enterprise level, the EIB states that domestic long-term funding is not available. 
“The expansion of the power sector is an essential prerequisite for the country’s development. Since no 
domestic long-term funding is available in Ethiopia, the provision of concessional EIB funding will help 
the promoter to modernize the sector without impairing Ethiopia’s debt sustainability as a HIPC 
country.” 
 
Sources: 
“Preliminary Information Note”, EIB, 2004, p1 
“Fact sheet B: financing proposal”, EIB, 2005, p4 
 
2005_ACPGLOB 
ADEMI 
EIB supported Banco Ademi in view of its focus on financing the smaller end of SMEs which were 
insufficiently served (according to EIB’s Project docts), in particular in relation to longer term finance 
2005_EMP 
AFRICA FUND II 
Since this fund invests in highly profitable enterprises, the question is difficult to answer.  Equity finance 
is always needed for growth, but it cannot be established if the investee companies would not have 
obtained investment funding from commercial sources. 
The additionality of EIB in investing in this fund is uncertain, as without EIB the fund may have 
obtained commercial investment in seek of high returns. 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2004 
Venture capital was (according to EIB’s Project docts) not available for the lower end of SMEs in 
Madagascar 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2006 
Venture capital was (according to EIB’s Project docts) not available for the lower end of SMEs in 
Kenya 
2005_Pacific 
islands 
The loan to the NDB (Niue’s DFI), as part of the global loan to this facility, responded to country 
recovery needs following a natural disaster, according to the financial proposal:  
“As a result of Hurricane Heta which devastated Niue in 2004, the island is presently still in a recovery phase. NDB 
being Niue’s development finance institution, it is playing a key role in the island’s recovery through its lending activities.” 
Source: “Fact Sheet B – Financing Proposal” (of the operation), EIB, 11/10/2006 (p2) 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
The EIB presents the situation of the drinking water distribution in the country and the evolution of the 
sector. Furthermore the EIB is active in that sector for more than 10 years in Senegal. Consequently, it 
has analyzed the results achieved during this period and it has a deep knowledge of that sector in 
Senegal. 
Regarding SONES, its financial situation is broadly documented by the EIB in order to correctly 
estimate its reimbursement capacity and its financial viability. Consequently the EIB has a correct view 
of the SONES financial needs. 
 
“Rapport financier. Projet: Programme eau Sénégal”, EIB, 2007, p2-4-8-13 
2007_ACPGLOG 
SOCREDO 
The needs expressed at individual enterprise level are covered by the IF operations. It is the substance 
of the project financed by the EIB.  
2009_MICRO 
FINANCE_ACP 
No evidence was found in that respect. 
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JC 2.2 IF/OR financing did address segments that are not, or are insufficiently, served 
2005 
Pacifric_Islands 
 
The table shows the distribution of credits granted by DBS from the EIB global loans. In terms value, 
tourism is the main beneficiary. In terms of number it is wholesale and retail and agriculture. Both 
sectors are chracterised by the very small size of the credits which make them costly for the banks. 
Nevertheless DBS has been targeting these sectors because they are insufficiencly covered by traditional 
banks and involve a large share of the population.  
 
The geographic distribution of DBS credits extends to the second island, less important economically 
and improperly covered by commercial banks, but in practice not to outer islands were no significant 
economic activity is taking place. 
 
Source MN33 and  PIFF I “Project Progress Report” (of the operation), EIB, 01/12/2009 
I-2.2.1 Prior to the financing of the operations, a selective analysis of the financial needs of the ACP 
and OCT beneficiaries and their absorption capacity has taken place 
2003_MAURITIUS 
CONTAINER 
The financial needs of CHCL are well documented by the EIB. In that respect, the Bank has also 
collaborated with the local stakeholders. 
The EIB evaluated the financial situation of CHCL as well as the transhipment tariffs. In that respect, 
the EIB has granted the OR loan under a particular undertaking: a tariff study by an international 
consultant needs to be undertaken in order to clarify what the optimum level of charges should be for 
each type of traffic (imports/exports and transhipment). 
 
Source: « Mauritius: Mauritius Container Terminal II Project. Extension of the Mauritius Container Terminal. Cotonou 
Agreement-Loan from the Bank’s own resources. Ops B Financial report», EIB, 2004, p1-8 
2003_GILGEL 
GIBE 
The EIB observes that EEPCO capability of carrying out its expansion programmes and means of 
financing it should be appraised. No further document describing the financial situation and need of the 
company was found. 
 
“Fact sheet A: proposal to appraise new operation”, EIB, 2004, p4 
 
Independent analysis of the promoter’s Master Plan as well as tariff should have been performed. The 
results should have been transmitted to the Bank. That kind of documents was no found as so far. 
 
Source: “Fact sheet B: financing proposal”, EIB, 2005, p4  
2003_BOAD PG There is no evidence of such analysis. 
Amount in 
€
% Number % Average 
value of 
credit (€)
Agriculture and fishing 414 092  7.8% 50 24.8% 8 282 
Mining and quarrying 156 159  3.0% 1 0.5% 156 159 
Manufacturing 605 897  11.5% 18 8.9% 33 661 
Elec., gas and water supply 132 593  2.5% 4 2.0% 33 148 
Construction 305 646  5.8% 6 3.0% 50 941 
Wholesale and retail 959 693  18.1% 64 31.7% 14 995 
Hotels and restaurants 2 006 459 37.9% 21 10.4% 95 546 
Transport and storage 491 390  9.3% 21 10.4% 23 400 
Real estate, renting, business act. 163 016  3.1% 9 4.5% 18 113 
Other community activities 55 160  1.0% 8 4.0% 6 895 
Total 5 290 105 100.0% 202 100.0% 26 189 
Distribution of  credits by sector 
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IV 
2003_Dakar-
Ziguinchor 
There is no evidence of such analysis. 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
The RM and the CRD give their opinion and formulate recommendation on the specific project. In that 
respect, a review of the beneficiary accounts and financial standing should take place in order to confirm 
a sound balance sheet and positive operating cash flow. The confirmation of full funding project as well 
as the beneficiary’s ability to generate cash flow is requested. 
Apart from these recommendations, the financial needs were not appropriately assessed by the EIB 
according to the documents provided. 
Source: « Programme eau Senegal. RM/CRD opinion” Fact sheet A Ops B/ACP-IF/2006-0566, BEI, 2007 
 
The EIB presents the situation of the drinking water distribution in the country and the evolution of the 
sector. Furthermore the EIB is active in that sector for more than 10 years in Senegal. Consequently, it 
has analyzed the results achieved during this period and it has a deep knowledge of that sector in 
Senegal. 
Regarding SONES, its financial situation is broadly documented by the EIB in order to correctly 
estimate its reimbursement capacity and its financial viability. Consequently the EIB has a correct view 
of the SONES financial needs. 
 
Source: “Rapport financier. Projet: Programme eau Sénégal”, EIB, 2007, p2-4-8-13  
2007_ACPGLOG 
SOCREDO 
At project level 
The financial needs of SOCREDO are identified in internal project documents. The balance sheets are 
provided as well as the financial forecasts. 
 
Source: “SOCREDO-ligne de crédit environnement (2007-328)”, EIB, 2007, p5 
TA2008_Dom Rep. The EIB provided the evaluators with a financial sector strategy for the Dominican Republic. In this 
paper, the financial sector is analyzed as well as the microfinance sector. Furthermore, the potential EIB 
intervention in microfinance sector is presented. This allowed the Bank to evaluate its contribution to 
the sector. 
 
Source: “EIB, A financial sector strategy for the Dominican Republic” 
2009_MICRO 
FINANCE_ACP 
No evidence was found in that respect. 
I-2.2.2 Prior to the financing of the operations, a selective analysis of other sources of private and 
public financing for the relevant investments has taken place  
2000_MAGADI 
SODA 
The financing scheme shows the distribution between own funds of MSC (43%) and external debt, as 
well as the composition of the latter:  
 
 USD ‘000 EUR ‘000*) % total 
Own funds spent or held in reserve 20,900 17,885 21%
Own funds to be generated 21,374 18,290 22%
Total own funds: 42,274 36,175 43%
Senior debt:   
EIB 25,000 21,393 26%
IFC 22,000 18,826 23%
Subordinated debt: 0  
IFC 4,000 3,423 4%
EIB 2,000 1,711 2%
FMO 2,000 1,711 2%
Total debt: 55,000 47,065 57%
 0  
Total financing: 97,274 83,240 100%
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*) converted from USD at the rate of 1.1686 USD to 1 EUR 
 
Source: EIB. Board of Directors. Magadi Soda Pure Ash Project (Kenya). 9/10/2003 
2003_BOAD PG 
IV 
There is no evidence of this type of analysis as such. 
Nevertheless, the operation’s March 2004 fact sheet mentioned the following (comparative) information 
with regard to the pricing of this operation combining an OR global loan, IF guarantee, and IF equity 
investment (see extracts from original table below and under I-8.2.1).  
 
Operation a) Prêt Global (on OR) :EUR 25 millions 
b) Facilité de garantie (on IF) : EUR 25 millions  
c) Participation à l’augmentation de capital (on IF) pour un montant 
maximum de EUR 4.6 millions 
Coût, pour 
l’emprunteur, d’un 
financement de 
substitution 
a)  Le coût moyen pondéré de la dernière émission obligataire dans la 
zone UEMOA, en FCFA, de la BOAD (durée 7 ans, 2 ans de 
différé) s’établit à 5.48%. 
b) du même ordre que celui des garanties obtenues auprès des fonds de 
garanties locaux (1.5 to 3%), qui ont des limites de taille. 
c)  n.a. 
Source : « Fact Sheet B : proposition de financement », EIB, 11 mars 2004 (p1) 
 
Note. According to a 2004 note, the guarantee facility has an “open rate”, with the interest rate not being 
determined at signature.  
Source: “Note conjointe”, EIB, 02/12/2004 (p2) 
 
This operation has further been developed in coordination with the WB and the European Commission: 
see I-10.2.1 
2003_Dakar-
Ziguinchor 
There is no evidence of this type of analysis as such. 
Nevertheless, the operation was carried out in coordination with notably the KfW and the AFD (see I-
10.2.1). 
2003_MAURITIUS 
CONTAINER 
No evidence has been found regarding an analysis of other sources of private and/or public financing. 
This kind of analysis does not seem to be included in the decision process of the EIB. 
2003_GILGEL 
GIBE 
No evidence has been found regarding an analysis of other sources of private and/or public financing. 
This kind of analysis does not seem to be included in the decision process of the EIB. 
2004_LUMWANA Financing plan (as of July 2005) 
USD m 
Equity from Equinox 60 
EIB subordinated loan   50 
Sub-total equity/quasi-equity 110 
Senior Loans: 
AfDB 40 
EIB, EDFIs 90 
Export Credit Agencies 80 
Commercial banks led by  
Standard Bank 75 
Sub-total Senior Loans 285 
 
Financing identified 395 
Source : EIB Fact Sheet A: proposal to appraise new operation. Luxembourg 08/07/2005. OPS 
B/ACPIF-3SouthAfrica,0.Ind/2004-0146/BrandSchmitzWaltraud 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
No evidence has been found regarding an analysis of other sources of private and/or public financing. 
This kind of analysis does not seem to be included in the decision process of the EIB. 
2004_WAGP The project is a joint venture of private international energy corporations and state owned companies of  
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the 4 states involved in the pipe line development. The EIB loan is meant to partly refinance the 
participation of the Government of Ghana in WAGPCo. The preparatory documents do not include an 
analysis of alternative sources of financing, but as it is a loan with an interest subsidy it is likely to 
compare favourably. 
Sources: EIB Fact sheet B: Financing proposal, 2006. BEI Rapport au Conseil d’Administration, 2006. 
2007_ACPGLOG 
SOCREDO 
An EIB environmental specialist based in the EIB Pacific Regional Office monitored the eligibility of 
the proposed projects. In that respect he is provided the EIB with a summary of the envisaged 
operation, notably explaining the alternative financing available to the company. 
 
Source: “SOCREDO-ligne de crédit environnement (2007-328)”, EIB, 2007, p 8 
 
2009_MICRO 
FINANCE_ACP 
As the project was initiated by IFC and KfW, the EIb knew the other sources of financing before taken 
a decision on its project’s involvement. 
 
Source: “Fact sheet A : Appraisal Autorisation ”, EIB, 2009, p1 
 
I-2.2.3 Evidence that without the EIB the operation would not, or would insufficiently, have been 
served 
General  
General Due to the characteristics of its products (long term, risk capital, possibility to extend loans in local 
currency) the Bank has contributed to alleviate constraints on the local financial markets and to allow 
projects that would not have had access to finance.  As the constraints become more binding with the 
financial crisis, the demand for EIB product increases.  The two paragraphs hereafter illustrate these 
mpoints. 
 
The IF has the possibility to extend loans in local ACP currencies and take the foreign exchange risk. 
This option is aimed at helping SMEs and very small businesses which do not perform international 
transactions. Loans in local currencies are priced on a relevant local interest rate and can only be 
implemented in countries applying sound macro-economic policies and where interest rate are market 
determined. 
This allows the financing of certain projects which would not be implemented otherwise due to the 
reluctance of financial intermediaries and enterprises to incur debt in foreign currencies. 
“Operational Guidelines of the IF”, EIB, p13 
“ACP-IF prêts en monnaie locale et orientations pour leur mise en œuvre” p1 
 
An EIB source noted that EIB funding demands have increased owing to the difficulties of getting 
commercial financing in the current crisis context: “The impact of the current financial and economic crisis on the 
existing portfolio can already be felt both in the increase in the number of financing requests presented to the Bank for 
projects initially foreseen to be commercially funded and in the need to put more time and effort on post-signature activities 
involving i.a. more comprehensive monitoring of the existing portfolio and in particular projects in distress.” 
Source: MN 027 
2000_MAGADI_ 
SODA 
The scale and long term nature of funding required for this industrial project which is the largest carried 
out in Kenya in at least a decade would be beyond the resources of the local financial sector.  
Source. EIB: Fact Sheet A: proposal to appraise new operation. Magadi Soda Ltd, Luxembourg 6th 
September 2001. OP3/ACPII/Agora:20000279/DW/hb 
The nature and dimension of the investment and the borrower’s forecast cash flow profile make finance 
of 10-year duration, with a grace period meeting the construction time, a prerequisite to project success. 
The Bank is providing such finance, which the promoter could otherwise not access on the local or 
international financial markets. The long grace period of the subordinated loan will help overcome cash 
constraints during the more risky early years after plant commissioning.  
Source EIB. Board of Directors. Magadi Soda Pure Ash Project (Kenya). 9/10/2003 
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2003_MAURITIUS 
CONTAINER 
Without the EIB’s intervention, this project would probably sufficiently be served. In fact, it is the 
borrower who has given its preference to a Bank’s 20 year funding over a more diversified loan structure 
from the local banking market. 
According to the EIB, 20 year long-term financing is not available in Mauritius. Therefore the EIB’s loan 
allows spreading the financial implications of this heavy investment over a long period.  
 
Source: « Mauritius: Mauritius Container Terminal II Project. Extension of the Mauritius Container Terminal. Cotonou 
Agreement-Loan from the Bank’s own resources. Ops B Financial report», EIB, 2004, p 2-7 
2003_GILGEL 
GIBE 
According to project documents established by the EIB, local long-term funding is not available in 
Ethiopia. Consequently, the EIB’s loan is judged necessary to help the promoter to modernize the sector 
without impairing Ethiopia’s debt sustainability as a HIPC country. 
 
Source: “Fact sheet B: financing proposal”, EIB, 2005, p4 
2003_BOAD PG 
IV 
The March 2004 fact sheet of this operation combining (a) an OR global loan, (b) IF guarantee, and (c) 
IF equity investment), mentioned that the EIB Global Loan will allow the beneficiary bank to “diversify 
long-term financing sources”, and the Guarantee to “provide it headroom”:  
Global loan : « Le Prêt Global permettra à la BOAD de diversifier ses sources de financement long terme pour le 
financement d’opération de taille importante du secteur privé à des conditions financières raisonnables. »  
Guarantee facility : « Cette Facilité de Garantie permettra à la BOAD d’intervenir en financement d’opérations pour 
des montants supérieurs à ses propres limites statutaires qui aujourd’hui limitent ses interventions (FCFA  9 milliards 
maximum par emprunteur). En d’autres termes, elle offrira de la marge de manœuvre (du headroom) à cette institution» 
Source : “ Fact Sheet B : proposition de financement » (of operation 2003_BOAD PG IV), EIB, 11 mars 
2004 (p3) 
2003_Dakar-
Ziguinchor 
The operation’s 2004 “fact sheet A” mentions the following value-added from the EIB loan in this 
operation (notably that it was a necessary condition for the AFD grant): 
«La contribution de la Banque au financement de ce projet est, en l’état de nos informations, une 
condition nécessaire pour le déblocage par la KfW de sa subvention.  Par ailleurs, la Banque apporte une 
expérience précieuse en matière de contrat de gestion dans le domaine maritime. Enfin la Banque 
attachera une importance particulière :   i) à une répartition équitable des risques et des retours sur 
investissements entre la société privée de gestion du navire et l’Etat dans le cadre des négociations à 
venir et ii) à ce que la privatisation de la gestion soit irréversible.» 
Source : « Fact Sheet A : Proposition portant sur l'instruction d'une nouvelle opération » (of the 
operation), EIB, 26 March 2004 (p2) 
 
See also I-2.1.3 on the limited profitability and high risks of the project.  
 
According to the EIB, the Senegalese government did not find alternative financing sources with similar 
conditions. 
Source : Operation’s « Conseil d’administration. Prêt sur les ressources de la FI. Projet Liaison maritime  
Dakar-Ziguinchor (Sénégal) », EIB, 2004, p3 
2004_WAPG See I313 
2004_LUMWANA The subordinated loan/quasi-equity to be provided by the Bank is critical for the financing of the 
project, given the relatively small capital base of the promoter. Without support from the IF, the project 
would have great difficulty to go ahead. 
 
Source: EIB Fact Sheet B: financing proposal, Luxembourg 19/7/2006. 2004- OPS B/ACPIF 
0146/BrandSchmitzWaltraud 
 
2001_MOMA_ 
TITANIUM 
Access to long-term funding for this type of project is essentially limited to the international financing 
agencies and export credit agencies (ECAs). 
Source EIB Fact Sheet B: financing proposal, Moma Titanium Mozambique, Luxembourg, 27th February 
2003. Ops B/ACT-IF-3/2001-0242 
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Without the Bank’s efforts the project would hardly materialize because, in addition to the senior 
lenders’ security requirements the sponse will have to raise additional equity to complete the financing 
for the project. The EIB was undoubtedly the leader of the negotiations on the terms for the 
subordinated debt but came into a difficult stand when trying to achieve consensus with on the one side 
the equity partner, which defended the capability of raising further equity as opposed to the Bank’s 
expectations to increase and improve the upsides linked to possible interest rates and conversion rights, 
and on the other side the senior lenders trying to equate the subordinated debt to equity when securities 
were discussed. In fact, the Bank acts in this project closer to an equity holder (with a EUR 40m 
subordinated loan) than to a traditional lender (EUR 10m of senior loan). This fact obliged the Bank to 
defend different views – and eventually opposite interests - regarding the mitigation of risks under the 
dual characteristics of its lending exposure. In fact the Bank was somehow squeezed between the 
legitimate interests of the senior lenders – of which the Bank is a part as well – wishing to crystallise the 
project proceeds in order to improve their security, and the need to have the Bank’s subordinated loan 
repaid as soon as financially possible including additional upsides under certain events.  
Source EIB Mozambique Moma Titanium, Ops B – Financial Report, Luxembourg27th March 2003, 
OpsB/ACP-IF-3/2003-320Q/GSF (Agora n°2001 0242 Investment Facility) 
2004_OLKARIA See I313 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2006 
Venture capital was (according to EIB’s Project docts) not available for the lower end of SMEs in Kenya
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
No evidence has been found so far. 
2007_ACPGLOG 
SOCREDO 
No evidence has been found in that respect. 
TA2008_Dom Rep. The long-term funding offered by the EIB is missing on the financial sector in that country. The EIB 
intervention will relieve this constraint and allow the MFIs to find long-term funding and generate more 
microcredit to SMEs.  
 
“It is also relevant that the value-added of the EIB’s intervention is considerably higher here than 
elsewhere. MFIs can only partly rely on deposits to finance their activities and are thus in demand of 
long-term funding.” 
 
Source: “EIB,A financial sector strategy for the Dominican Republic”, p2 
2009_MICRO 
FINANCE_ACP 
No evidence has been found in that respect. 
JC 2.3 IF/OR operations have not created distortions on local markets and have not displaced private 
sources of finance 
2000_MAGADI_ 
SODA 
For the Bank’s senior loan on IF resources, the following mark up would apply according to the master-
table for loan pricing on IF resources: 
Risk dimension Mark-up 
(bp) 
Operating environment: Kenya – no investment grade, medium risk 80 
Borrower and project quality:   
Management – well managed company, one of Kenya’s leading industrial 
enterprises; strong management support from UK parent company 0 
Market aspects – borrower is a small player, relying on discount pricing and 
service quality; he will have to demonstrate his ability to sell higher quality 
product at higher prices – market risk is therefore high. 
40 
Financial situation and performance: large equity base, comfortable liquidity 
position, sales revenues secured by letter of credit; good financial 
20 
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performance however has only been attained since recently 
Outlook and robustness of projections – strong prospects in the medium and 
long run; cash shortfall risks however during project implementation and 
first years of operation 
20 
Technical/environmental – comprehensive project development, carried out 
by reputable independent advisors, no significant environmental impact. 0 
Loan structure: loans backed by project assets as well as borrower’s existing 
property; liquidation of security however, through sale to one of the bigger 
world market players, may take time and require lenders’ heavy involvement. 
100 
Total mark-up 260 
 
This mark-up however would result in an interest rate significantly lower than the one proposed 
by IFC: LIBOR fixed rate plus 450 basis points until technical and financial completion of the project, 
365 basis points thereafter. It is also lower than the rate the borrower is willing to pay: 400 basis points 
before completion, and 375 thereafter. In order not to avoid below market positioning, it is therefore 
proposed to follow the borrower’s proposal. 
For the subordinated loan, a rate apart from those computed according to the master-table should be 
charged, in line with its character as mezzanine finance, cushioning entrepreneurial risks. Its rationale is 
indeed to replace funds the promoter would have to put in place in case the company’s cash flow for 
investment falls short of projections, or the project witnesses cost overruns, or sales revenues after 
commissioning the project are lower than expected. The borrower does not accept pricing related to the 
company’s performance as this would give lenders quasi dividend income where shareholders have given 
up their dividend claims. IFC is proposing a fixed rate of 15 % p.a., while the borrower is targeting 11 % 
p.a. Given the Bank’s pricing standards that normally do not result in rates at such a level, it is proposed 
here to accept the borrower’s proposal 
 
Source: EIB Magadi Soda Pure Ash Project. Ops B Financial report. 9th October 2004 
I-2.3.1 Evidence that products offered by the EIB would not otherwise be available.  
General According to an IEB staff member, the EIB’s instruments are very flexible in the sense that the EIB can 
support all types of projects (public, private, PPP). There is no ideological or dogmatic bias. This is a 
major difference with other international institutions which can not finance State, for example. 
 
Source: MN016 
General The EIB can  provide under certain conditions  local currency loans since the Cotonou Agreement. 
No rigid methodology. An EIB staff member mentioned hereby the following:  
“Autre dimension plus ponctuelle et plus technique : intervenir en monnaie locale (synthétique) depuis Cotonou. C’est l’IF 
qui porte le risque de change, avec des restrictions sur le degré de risque (situation du pays, etc.). C’est la DEAS qui est 
sensée donner ce degré de risque. Ensuite le pricing : déterminer en monnaie locale un prix en accord avec les conditions du 
marché. Pas de méthodologie extrêmement rigide, mais en cours de formalisation pour déterminer taux raisonnable, pour 
éviter des distorsions et pour être quand même rentable (ex ante en tout cas). Les économistes de DEAS sont donc 
extrêmement impliqués dans les opérations financières. » 
Source: MN 007 
 
EIB staff members note the following with regard to (the limited use of) guarantees and (no use of) B-
loans:  
“In terms of guarantee, we are not very much equipped. We don’t have much. I remember one operation where we were 
successful, relating to syndication of local banks. We have made guarantee facilities for other banks, which have not worked 
well for various reasons. Partially because they did not have the capacity and expertise in place to use it. Misjudgment in the 
beginning on our side. We don’t do partial risk guarantees, where this possibility is mentioned. I didn’t think any minute 
that we would do one: very complex and resource-intensive. There has been an external study on guarantees on operations 
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outside the EU (incl. ACP), but no internal EIB conclusions were drawn so far from this study. Stéphanie will put us in 
touch with the EIB colleague dealing with this study. 
B-loans are a very sensitive instrument that we don’t have. We also don’t have the resources to do this. The WB had a B-
loan programme but abandoned it. Be careful in comparing EIB with IFC, as IFC is mostly with private clients, whereas 
the EIB is dealing mostly with the public sector.” 
Source: MN 007 
 
An IF Committee representative mentions on guarantees and PPPs that “we have discussed guarantees in 
the IF committee, and the EIB said it was a question of resources. EIB made a decision on not putting resources on 
guarantees (resources-consuming business). PPPs: Possiblities are rather lmiteted in ACPs (to say the least).” An EIB 
staff member confirmed the issue of the need for specific resources for guarantees: “guarantees: also a 
question of resources. We need people with very specific skills and few of our people have it.” 
Source: MN 020 
 
EIB staff members note the following with regard to blending (incl. on interest rate subsidies) :  
“The whole issue of blending started more at our shareholders level (EU MS) rather than from the EIB operational level. 
Interest rate subsidies: used in an unorganized way.  
Note. There are two types of “blending”: between EIB instruments/resources, and with non-EIB instruments/resources. 
The second is new, to put EC grants with loans in a same Facility.  
Example of EU-Africa Infrastructure TF: Most operations in ACP are for the public sector  more concessionnality. 
When launching the Cotonou agreement, ACP countries did not like the idea that most loans should be market-based.” 
Source: MN 007 
 
Other EIB staff members also emphasize the importance of benefiting from grants for providing TA:  
“[TA is a] very important aspect of our work. TA is really really improving our work over the last years. Such grant 
money is interesting. It really makes things possible which would otherwise not be possible. Blending grants and loans is very 
valuable”. Has TA been used frequently to develop a project for making it bankable in EIB terms? “We 
are still climbing the learning curve, but yes, for instance with the EU-Africa ITF. E.g. to finance the environmental 
impact assessments.” Do you think the TA envelope is large enough? “There are lots of projects e.g. support for 
organisations to convince of need of that instrument, for technical choices, EIAs. Particularly for infrastructure. The main 
issue is not money to be available, but projects to be ahead for moving. Grant money is essential. It is mainly used for hiring 
consultants (more than for financing personnel of the EIB); it hence hires external expertise, which increases expertise basis. 
Note. Water Facility : very small, just a few millions” 
Source: MN 024 
General (Lomé IV) The Evaluation of EIB financing through individual loans under the Lomé IV Convention (covering the 
period 1990-2003, before the set-up of the IF under the Cotonou Agreement) describes the EIB’s 
financial and non-financial value added to the projects financed:  
“Under the Lomé IV convention, the already low (“AAA” based) EIB interest rates are either subsidised (own resources 
loans to ACP borrowers) or administratively fixed at a relatively low level (risk capital). The financial value added 
provided by the Bank has therefore generally been substantial. Alternative sources of funding with similar maturities and at 
comparative costs have in most cases not been available, and only in the case of fixed rate contracts denominated in foreign 
exchange did alternative sources of funding (e.g. local currency denominated loans at variable rates) become more attractive 
as interest rate levels generally declined over time and local currencies depreciated. 
An important factor is the substantial non-financial value added that the EIB was able to deliver to some of the projects. In 
particular public sector projects with weak promoters benefited substantially from the Bank’s early involvement in project 
preparation and during implementation (e.g. competitive bidding for contracts). It is also noteworthy that a water project 
that was rated overall “unsatisfactory” was so largely because key measures identified ex-ante at appraisal (tariff increased, 
privatisation) and incorporated as covenants into the Banks finance contract were not implemented, resulting in the poor 
performance of the project. This case highlights the importance of a proper monitoring and follow-up by the Bank of project 
related covenants in the finance contracts that may relate to factors beyond the control of the promoters and need to be taken 
up with the appropriate government authorities.”  
Source: Evaluation of EIB financing through individual loans under the Lomé IV Convention, EIB, 
2006 (p2). 
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2003_MAURITIUS 
CONTAINER 
According to the EIB, 20 year long-term financing is not available in Mauritius. Therefore the EIB’s loan 
allows spreading the financial implications of this heavy investment over a long period.  
 
“Together with the IBRD the Bank has played an important role in redeveloping the port sector in the 
past and the considerably more efficient handling of imports and exports at the newly created Mauritius 
Container Terminal over the last years has already added significant value to the Mauritian economy. 20 
year LT financing is not available in Mauritius and is thus a welcome source of funding as it allows to 
spread the financial implications of this heavy investment over a long period.” 
 
Source: « Mauritius: Mauritius Container Terminal II Project. Extension of the Mauritius Container Terminal. Cotonou 
Agreement-Loan from the Bank’s own resources. Ops B Financial report», EIB, 2004, p 2 
2003_GILGEL 
GIBE 
According to project documents established by the EIB, local long-term funding is not available in 
Ethiopia. Consequently, the EIB’s loan is judged necessary to help the promoter to modernize the sector 
without impairing Ethiopia’s debt sustainability as a HIPC country. 
 
Source: “Fact sheet B: financing proposal”, EIB, 2005, p4 
 
2003_BOAD PG 
IV 
See I-2.2.3 
2003_Dakar-
Ziguinchor 
See I-2.2.3 
2001_Moma 
Titanium 
The large contribution of the Bank in the form of subordinated loan was crucial to make to project 
viable.  It is impossible to affirm that another provider of mezzanine finance would have been 
impossible to find, but it is very likely. 
Sources MN302;  EIB. Board of Directors. Moma Titanium Mozambique, 29 April 2003. Doc. 03/181. 
2004_OLKARIA As  a result of delays in finalising the contract (due to delays in the turnkey contract) KenGen had to 
finance the implementation without being able to draw down on the eixisting loans with EIB (and 
AFD). It could however draw on the IDA loan. The transitional borrowing that KenGen had to do 
proved possible but at less favourable terms.It could however draw on the IDA loan. The transitional 
borrowing that KenGen had to do proved possible but at less favourable terms.  
MN342 
2005_Pacific 
Islands 
 
The Financial Report relating to this operation mentions that the risk of non-utilisation of the PIFF for 
the region is fairly low: “ The risk of non utilisation of the proposed facility seems to be fairly low, as the 
Bank has carefully evaluated the potential dead flow of each participating intermediary. Funds can be 
reallocated.” 
Source: “Financial Report Ops B”(of the operation), EIB (p27) 
  
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
No evidence has been found so far. 
2007_ACPGLOG 
SOCREDO 
No evidence has been found in that respect. 
2009_MICRO 
FINANCE_ACP 
No evidence has been found in that respect. 
I-2.3.2 Existence and justification of downward adjustments of the indicative credit spread (risk 
margin) in pricing risk of loans and guarantees 
2003_MAURITIUS 
CONTAINER 
No evidence has been found so far. 
2003_GILGEL 
GIBE 
No guarantee is foreseen as sovereign lending. 
 
The only information provided on potential downward adjustment is the following: 
 
“The borrower is committed to public debt restriction under the HIPC program and therefore entitled 
to borrow only at concessional rate including a minimum 35% grant element. The amount of the 
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subsidy attached to the proposed financing will be determined at the time of the signature of the 
Finance Contract but will not exceed EUR 25 M.” 
 
Source: “Fact sheet B: financing proposal”, EIB, 2005, p 1 
 
2004_OLKARIA EIB money has been more expensive than IDA and Jica.. 
Source: MN371 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
In order to be compatible with the IMF requirements, an interest subsidy has been applied. 
Consequently the interest rate is 4%. 
 
“Fact sheet B: financing proposal”, EIB, 2007, p3 
2007_ACPGLOG 
SOCREDO 
Only 50% of each operation presented by SOCREDO to EIB is financed by the IF. Furthermore a rate 
subsidy is granted. 
 
Source: “SOCREDO-ligne de crédit environnement (2007-328)”, EIB, 2007, p10 
 
2009_MICRO 
FINANCE_ACP 
No evidence has been found in that respect. 
I-2.3.3 Conformity of criteria for selecting financial intermediaries with the EIB guidelines provisions 
2003_BOAD PG 
IV 
In this operation, there was a potential risk of market distortion relating to loan guarantees, but this was 
tackled so as to avoid the issue, according to the EIB’s operation fact sheet.:  
 « L’octroi de la garantie à un prêt de la BOAD pourrait conduire à l’exclusion de banques commerciales de projets aux 
financements desquels elles auraient participés sans la garantie de la Banque. Pour réduire ce risque, la Banque exigera, 
dans le cadre de garantie de prêt, qu’une partie substantielle des financements soient assurée par les banques commerciales.» 
Source : “ Fact Sheet B : proposition de financement » (of operation 2003_BOAD PG IV), EIB, 11 mars 
2004 (p3) 
2003_Dakar-
Ziguinchor 
This senior loan benefited from an interest rate subsidy, but there is no evidence of undercutting the 
market. At the contrary probably, it contributed to a project with low profitability and high risks (see I-
2.1.3). 
2003_MAURITIUS 
CONTAINER 
No evidence has been found in that respect. 
2003_GILGEL 
GIBE 
N/A 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2006 
The intermediary was accepted by EIB (upon introduction by IFC) as it conformed to EIB’s above-
mentioned Strategic Orientations For Financial Sector Operations 
2005_ACPGLOB 
ADEMI 
This operation was selected and conducted in accordance with the EIB Strategic Orientations For 
Financial Sector Operations In Acp Countries- Board Of Directors- February 2008 
2005_EMP 
AFRICA FUND II 
This operation conforms to guidelines- This raises the question as to whether the guidelines are 
sufficiently clear in terms of EIB value added and prioritization of operations. 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2004 
The intermediary was accepted by EIB (upon introduction by IFC) as it conformed to EIB’s above-
mentioned Strategic Orientations For Financial Sector Operations 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2006 
The intermediary was accepted by EIB (upon introduction by IFC) as it conformed to EIB’s above-
mentioned Strategic Orientations For Financial Sector Operations 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
N/A 
2007_ACPGLOG 
SOCREDO 
The financial situation and the activities of SOCREDO and its historical relations with the EIB are 
presented in the EIB’s internal documents. The Standard & Poor’s rating of the intermediary bank is 
analyzed. 
SOCREDO has to respect the environmental guidelines established by the EIB. 
 
Source : “SOCREDO-ligne de crédit environnement (2007-328)”, EIB, 2007, p 2 
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2009_MICRO 
FINANCE_ACP 
In the appraisal authorisation document, the EIB foresaw to assess the risk-retunr profile of the 
proposed investment and to evaluate its contribution to the sustainability of the IF’s portfolio. 
 
In terms of governance and management, the application of satisfactory governance mechanisms as well 
as legal safeguards was checked by the EIB. This implied that the supervision of the selected managers 
and protection of shareholder interest are ensured. 
 
Finally, the EIB reviewed the initial deal-flow of proposed investments and ensured that a sufficient 
allocation is provided for MFIs in sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
Source: “Fact sheet A : Appraisal Autorisation ”, EIB, 2009, p 4 
 
JC 2.4 IF/OR financing has brought specific added value 
2004-OLKARIA The financing would be granted directly to KenGen, in recognition of its improving financial condition, 
and thereby contribute to confidence building among potential future lenders or, at a later stage of 
corporate development, in view of a possible public listing of shares. 
Source: EIB Fact Sheet A: proposal to appraise new operation. Luxembourg 19/11/2004. OPS 
B/ACPIF-2CENT&EASTAFR/2004-0255/GOUNOT MARCEL 
I-2.4.1 Evidence of the leading role of EIB in putting together the financing plan 
General - See I-9.3.1 on “IF/OR approach in project generation (reactive versus proactive)” 
- See also I-4.1.2 on the use of TA by the EIB in project generation (increasing possibility to use EIB TA but still limited 
compared to some peer institutions) 
2001_Moma 
Titanium 
The project won already several awards, including the African Mining Deal of the Year (in 2004)3 and is 
being presented as a case study in many universities world wide. In the Bank’s IF presentations, Moma is 
given as an example of innovation in project financing.    
Source: EIB. Mozambique Moma Titanium. Project Progress Report, 25/7/2007. OpsB/ACP-IF-
3/2007-1460/mh 
2003_BOAD PG 
IV 
There is no evidence on a leading role of the EIB.  
See also I-10.2.1 (the WB had apparently the lead) 
2003_Dakar-
Ziguinchor 
There is no evidence on a leading role of the EIB. 
2004_OLKARIA AIB proved very constructive and helpful on roject design, identification of support for the energy 
sector reform. With AFD it provided valuable advise on how to finance operations and assisted in 
finding financial partmers.  
Source: MN371 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2006 
The leading role was by BPSA and IFC who introduced the operation to EIB 
Fiji Denarau hotel Clear evidence of proactive role in this regard in the initial phases of the project. And evidence that this 
early involvement of EIB gave credibility to the project and attracted other financial intermediaries, 
which permitted eventually to reduce the EIB financial investmen. 
Sources: MN 313, MN343 
2005_ACPGLOB 
ADEMI 
As the only IFI to take charge of initial support to Banco Ademi, and through its continued support 
since inception in 1997, EIB has exercised leadership in putting together the financing packages for this 
intermediary.     
2005_EMP 
AFRICA FUND II 
No leading role for EIB.   
Additionality of EIB is unclear. This operation is a follow-up on the AIG Infrastructure Fund under 
same management, introduced to EIB by IFC. At that time, ING Emerging Markets questioned the 
need for EIB to step into this operation supported already by several private as well as IFI sources.  IFC 
did not participate into this operation in view of certain value added  
Source: MN254 AFIG v0-01 20 100415 ec+CV). 
                                                 
3  Title awarded by the Project Finance Magazine. Moma Ttitanium got the “Most Effective Financing of a Mine or Expansion Project” 
by Mining Journal as well ; 
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2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2004 
The leading role was by BPSA and IFC who introduced the operation to EIB 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2006 
The leading role was by BPSA and IFC who introduced the operation to EIB 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
N/A 
I-2.4.2 Evidence that IF/OR specific risk- bearing capacity led to financing operations that would 
otherwise not have been financed or under less appropriate conditions. 
General General comment on EIB value-added in ACP, according to an EIB staff member, owing to infusion of 
EIB proper experience within EU in ACP. High EIB additionality in ACP because of favorable 
financing conditions. Limitation is that it cannot be leveraged with TA on project design.  
“EIB works both within and outside the EU: in particular sector people work in both regions; experience from EU MS. 
EIB technical people work globally, from Germany to Benin. That is also why we focus on infrastructure and financial 
sector, because this was our key expertise within the EU. Most other IFIs focus on development countries. Financial 
additionality: considered as high in ACP countries. Expertise (although TA funding is not sufficient): we often asked more 
funds for TA, we don’t have enough funding, although we have the internal expertise with the Projects Department. 
Internal expertise used mainly for appraisal and design (setting and formatting) of the project. But not much to give full 
advises: we can say “you should do this kind of study” but we cannot do it ourselves. In particular upstream studies. In our 
EU-Africa Infrastructure TF: in the past we were being told we were arriving when everything was ready. Now with the 
TA money available we can finance all kind of earlier preparation work. We have TA since 2007. We still think that we 
desperately needed money for TA. Having more funding would enable bringing more TA to the project. Cf. WB in terms of 
missing link: they have created between IDA and IFC the “IFC advisory services” financed on TFs.” 
Source: MN 007 
 
A Commission staff member noted that the EIB value-added was sometimes used as an argument for 
not intervening in a specific sector.  
Source: MN 023 
 
EIB staff members linked the increasing use of interest rate subsidies and TA to debt requirements for 
HIPC countries:  
“Why such an increase between Cotonou I and II? They had not realised that they would need this amount of 
subsidisation. First they thought the private sector would do it; then they started to conclude that the private sector is not a 
good option for large infrastructure: lot of public works needed. A lot of public funding would thus be needed; but there were 
a lot of HIPC countries. These countries, most of them, have entered into agreements with the IMF to limit their future 
indebtedness, by borrowing only funds with a certain element of concessionality. Most of them needs up to 50% grant 
element built in the loan they take. This can be done by subsidizing the investment. This is why IRS envelope increased. At 
the same time we realized that TA was on the rise and that it would be interesting to do more of that.”   
Source: MN 102 
General (Lomé IV) See I-2.3.1, notably: “Under the Lomé IV convention, the already low (“AAA” based) EIB interest rates are either 
subsidised (own resources loans to ACP borrowers) or administratively fixed at a relatively low level (risk capital). The 
financial value added provided by the Bank has therefore generally been substantial.” 
2003_BOAD PG 
IV 
There is no such evidence. 
2003_Dakar-
Ziguinchor 
There is not this type of evidence as such, but the EIB contributed here to a project with high risks - See 
I-2.2.3 
2004_WAGP Long term financial resources are scarce and expensive on the private financial market in Ghana. 
Therefore the Government could only obtain a transitional financing from the Nigerian state for this 
project. The EIB loan allows the Government of Ghana to reimburse the Nigerian loan, for which 
arrears were due, and to refinance its participation in the WAGP with long term resources. 
Source: BEI. CA Pret bonifié sur resources propres, projet WAGP, 12/12/2006, Document 06/517. 
 
2005_Pacific 
Islands 
The “Fact Sheet A” specifies that the credit guarantee helped risk taking in the Pacific region:  
“A credit guarantee facility would help increase the amount of risk taking capital in the Pacific region, which could then be 
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used to increase the availability of targeted credit, denominated in either local currency, or foreign currency, as appropriate. 
The credit could possibly be in the form of (i) short term domestic trade credit (ii) medium term finance in the form of 
equipment lease, corporate and small business loans and home loans, which by their nature have local currency cash flows 
(iii) medium term finance in foreign currency to exporters and tourism operators. A regional approach would help each 
partner bank and the Bank to diversify risk across a number of relatively small countries.” 
Source: “Fact Sheet A – Proposal to appraise new operations” (of the operation), EIB, 29/09/2005 (p1) 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
The scope of the investments envisaged and the weak financial situation of the beneficiary imply that it 
could not borrow at the financial market condition without jeopardize its financial balance. 
Consequently, the EIB intervention through its OR specific risk-bearing capacity has allowed this 
project. 
 
Source: “Fact sheet B: financing proposal”, EIB, 2007, p3 
I-2.4.3 IF/OR type of instruments (e.g. longer maturities and/or subsidised interest for loans; range of 
risk capital instruments) are not available from other sources 
General Loans are extended, when feasible, in local ACP currencies, in line with the provisions of the Cotonou 
Agreement which enables the Bank to bear the forex risk on local currencies, notably for supporting 
SMEs. This is a major value added in certain circumstances in the sense that it meets the requirements of 
SMEs and other companies with very little, if any, foreign exchange revenues.  
 
Source: Counter Balance, Challenging the EIB, “Corporate welfare and development deceptions : why the EIB is failing to 
deliver outside the EU?”, February 2010 (page 27) 
 
For economic infrastructure and asset with a long economic life the Bank can offer maturities and grace 
periods that are not available on the local markets. 
 
Source:  DG ECFIN Mid-term evaluation of EIB’s external mandate, Final Report, March 2010 
General (Lomé IV) See I-2.3.1, notably: “Alternative sources of funding with similar maturities and at comparative costs have in most cases 
not been available” 
2003_BOAD PG 
IV 
There is no evidence that IF/OR type of instruments were not available from other sources 
2003_Dakar-
Ziguinchor 
There is no evidence that IF/OR type of instruments were not available from other sources 
2005_Pacific 
islands 
See I-2.1.1 with information from a 2009 PPR on this EIB operation in a context of limited financial 
market liquidity. However, it is not clear to what extent other DFIs provide such type of financing 
instruments and hence the EIB fills a real gap in the market. 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
No evidence has been found so far. 
TA2008_Dom. 
Rep. 
EIB has been a leader in providing an integrated package to Microfinance Institutions/Banks in the 
Dom. Rep. The combination of loan, equity, TA for institution building has major value added. Value 
added of local currency loans.  Major advantage of EIB-IF. 
I-2.4.4 Range of non-financial contributions offered by the EIB at investee company level (e.g. in terms 
of governance, integrity, social responsibility, capacity building and good management 
practices) 
General (Lomé IV) See I-2.3.1, notably: “the substantial non-financial value added that the EIB was able to deliver to some of the projects. In 
particular public sector projects with weak promoters benefited substantially from the Bank’s early involvement in project 
preparation and during implementation (e.g. competitive bidding for contracts).” 
2001_Moma 
Titanium  
The EIB support in leading the technical and governance assessment at the time of the financial 
montage of the operation involved considerable efforts from its staff and proved valuable for the 
investee and for the other financing partners. 
Source: MN302. 
2003_BOAD PG 
IV 
There is no evidence of EIB non-financial contributions as such, but the modest and relatively symbolic 
EIB equity investment in the BOAD was considered important (see I-2.1.3) 
2003_Dakar- The operation’s 2004 “fact sheet A” mentions the following value-added from the EIB loan in this 
MID-TERM EVALUATION OF THE IF AND EIB OR OPERATIONS IN ACP/OCTS 
ADE - EGEVAL II  
Final Report  September 2010 Annexe 9/Page 62 
Ziguinchor operation (notably that it was a necessary condition for the AFD grant): 
«La contribution de la Banque au financement de ce projet est, en l’état de nos informations, une condition nécessaire pour 
le déblocage par la KfW de sa subvention.  Par ailleurs, la Banque apporte une expérience précieuse en matière de contrat 
de gestion dans le domaine maritime. Enfin la Banque attachera une importance particulière :   i) à une répartition 
équitable des risques et des retours sur investissements entre la société privée de gestion du navire et l’Etat dans le cadre des 
négociations à venir et ii) à ce que la privatisation de la gestion soit irréversible.» 
Source : « Fact Sheet A : Proposition portant sur l'instruction d'une nouvelle opération » (of the 
operation), EIB, 26 March 2004 (p2) 
 
The EIB defined three conditions that have been met before the first disbursement.  
1. Ministry of Infrastructure, Equipment and Transport has to create an unity of project’s 
execution. 
2. The boat’s operator needs to be selected via an international tender procedure. The 
selection’s conditions have to be considered as satisfactory by the Bank. Apparently, the 
Ministry will be supported by international consultants in order to prepare the tender, 
analyze the offers received and select the boat operator. No evidence has been found 
attesting that international consultants have effectively supported the Ministry. 
3. The Dakar and Ziguinchor harbours have to be sufficiently developed as the boat can berth. 
Furthermore the boat’s construction needed to be checked and certified by an international company as 
Lloyds, Veritas 
 
Two other conditions were identified by the EIB, which should be met during the project’s execution 
phase: 
1. If the profit and loss accounts show deficit, the Senegalese government and the operator 
should revise the costs and the tariff in order to achieve a financial balance. 
2. An international company should certify, each year, the navigation’s condition of the boat. 
The boat, the passengers and the merchandise should be properly insured.  
The boat and its crew members should meet the security guidelines defined by IMO’s conventions 
(International Maritime Organization).  
Source : Operation’s « Conseil d’administration. Prêt sur les ressources de la FI. Projet Liaison maritime 
Dakar-Ziguinchor (Sénégal) », EIB, 2004, p6-9 
 
The security was a high priority for the investors, mainly following the Joola disaster. In that respect, the 
EIB requested that several controls need to be performed by international firms and that the 
maintenance should be carried out on a yearly basis (at least).   
The project included security and safety components, lighting, supports for navigation, amongst others. 
These components are considered as value added and are mainly a necessity. 
 
Sources: MN017, « Rapport d’instruction », EIB, 2004 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2006 
This venture capital fund provides operational support to Kenyan investee SMEs.  This non-financial 
contribution is made by the fund manager, and not EIB, but was a factor for EIB to enter this project. 
“Investee Support Infrastructure (Technical Assistance Fund / SSC) - in 2001, BPSA transformed its 
mentor programme into a core part of its investment business. It has developed systems and experience in applying technical 
assistance using this programme. BVI-K has access to USD2.5m to implement this programme in Kenya which, even 
though it must be adapted to the Kenyan environment, puts the Fund in a uniquely strong position ta support the activities 
of its SMEs. The physical presence of the SSC in Nairobi will provide both top quality office infrastructure and assist in 
raising the profile of BPI-K.” 
Source: Report to Management Committee, 16/2/2006, p. 21 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2004 
This venture capital fund provides operational support to Malagasy investee SMEs.  This non-financial 
contribution is made by the fund manager, and not EIB, but was a factor for EIB to enter this project. 
Source: Fact Sheet B, Financing proposal. 
2005_ACPGLOB 
ADEMI 
EIB has been instrumental in the transformation of Banco Ademi from microfinance to banking 
institutions (and this seemingly has also been the case in respect of Banco ADOPEM which is not part 
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of the operations selected for detailed review). The addition of TA to the EIB equity and loan finance 
formed a package that had a clear impact.  The same applies to Banco ADOPEM in the Dominican 
Republic. 
Source: MN 401 Banco ADEMI;  MN 403 Banco ADOPEM 
Pacific PIFF I Comparison of non financial value added of ADB and EIB ADB: 
When provide loans also always provide training opportunities for staff, in order to comply with their 
requirements in terms of credit rating, marketing, governance, management. 
Are bringing into the bank ideas that the staff should adopt in order to work more efficienctly, in terms 
of human resources management, for instance. Not just technical financial aspects. 
DBS was a recipient of those training activities and appreciated it. Training was free but travel to training 
places (e.g. Fiji for regional seminars) had to be covered by the DBS. 
EIB 
The DBS was visited by EIB personnel but mainly to check how the DBS used the funds, to assess its 
capacity, and to check its credibility. 
Very good relationship with the EIB in terms of lending. Relationship is strictly limited to lending. No 
training except some assistance with IT.  
 
In the past (long time ago), the EIB had a technical antenna (NB in fact it appeared that Mr. Wongsin 
meant the CDE). When the DBS identified a project opportunity, the DBS could recourse to the CDE 
to get technical expertise. The CDE would cover the cost of the TA whereas the DBS would pay the 
accommodation. Proved extremely valuable and the DBS regrets it is no more in application. 
Source MN363 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
 
The EIB have defined a structure regarding the project implementation which has to be followed by the 
promoter. This structure needed to be in place prior to disbursement of the first instalment of the EIB 
loan. 
“The promoter will be tasked with implementing the project and will receive assistance in its role as contracting authority for 
the entire duration of the project. A Project Management Unit (PMU) will be created under the auspices of the Works 
Directorate. The staff already have a highly successful track record with carrying out similar works under previous projects. 
However, the promoter needs to draw up a structure for its role as contracting authority tailored to the geographical scale of 
the project, with a regional breakdown of the works.” 
 
“Conseil d’administration. Prêt à l’investissement bonifié sur ressources propres. Projet PROGRAMME EAU », EIB, 
2007, p5 
TA2008_Dom. 
Rep. 
TA was well designed, what we need to do, they are doing, they helped us to develop new products, to 
develop manuals. (DR Field Visit) 
I-2.4.5 EIB contribution at project execution level (procurement process) and due attention to cost-
effectiveness 
General For all projects analysed there is abundant evidence of EIB following closely the execution and its cost 
effectiveness. 
2003_Dakar-
Ziguinchor 
Project progress reports should be sent to the EIB every six months in order to assess the effective 
project’s implementation. These reports should also mention the total cost estimation (adjusted if 
necessary) and the planning of the project. These reports have been provided regularly to the EIB. 
 
Furthermore, the promoter should send a final report as soon as the boat is operating. This report will 
include: 
 Important differences between the technical description in the contract and the effective 
execution; 
 The real cost of each project’s component; 
 The planning of the execution of each project’s component; 
 The effective financial results of the first year. 
 The application of the specific conditions established in the contract; 
 The permanent employment effectively created. 
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The final report is expected to be delivered in 2010. 
Sources : « Rapport d’instruction », EIB, 2004, Annex A & « Monitoring 2009 », EIB, 2009, p5 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
According to the EIB Board of Directors document, the Bank is interested in the implementation 
process in respect with the degree of urgency, the stage of preparation, the complexity and the priority 
according to the prioritisation criteria defined in the programme. 
In that respect, “it would be advisable for the water treatment schemes that will have a significant impact 
on operating costs to be brought into operation at the end of the period (2010-2011). To that end, the 
following approach involving commitments and disbursements in tranches has been adopted:  
• successive €15m commitment tranches, renewed on the basis of the findings of "commitment" audits 
(conformity of projects carried out under the previous tranche) and of the updated projected programme 
of commitments under the following tranches, agreed with the lenders. The network upgrading schemes 
for which financing is included in the programme will strictly correspond to the contractual 
commitments of SONES;  
• successive €7m to €10m disbursement tranches, renewed where 80% of the previous tranche has been 
drawn down subject to the results of checks and ex post audits. These audits will cover both (i) the 
technical aspects (content and quality of the projects, checking that the physical results correspond to the 
approved projects, implementation of the environmental and social requirements) and (ii) the financial 
aspects (supporting documents for payments and advances) and procedures (procurement).” 
 
Source : “Conseil d’administration. Prêt à l’investissement bonifié sur ressources propres. Projet PROGRAMME 
EAU », EIB, 2007, p5  
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EQ3 To what extent did IF/OR operations have a catalytic effect in helping 
enterprises mobilise long-term local and foreign loan resources and investment? 
JC 3.1 EIB has contributed to mobilising a critical mass of additional finance needed by 
project beneficiaries 
General  EIB-IF Policies and Guidelines attach major importance to catalytic effect in 
terms of mobilisation of (mainly) commercial finance 
 Few actual cases of mobilization or catalytic presence of EIB identified, due to 
absence of specific monitoring (see below) 
 In co-financings, EIB mostly appears to “join in” rather than being  the initiator. 
(see also Indicator re: leading role in I-2.4.1).  In that sense perhaps, EIB may  
be considered a “co-mobiliser” 
 Limited effort for capital markets development [see more under EQ 4] 
 EFP is a particular case of “leveraging” or catalytic effect, as EIB matching 
finance allows EDFIs to do more operations 
 It is unclear to what extent mobilisation effect is considered an important 
element in selecting projects in accordance with Cotonou requirements and the 
requirement of EIB value-added. This indicates that EIB does not consistently 
apply the following requirement of the “Operational Guidelines of the IF, p. 10: 
“The choice of financial instruments depends on the individual operation 
concerned and is established in order to optimize the terms of the financing 
package and maximize the catalytic effect of the IF.”  
 Possibly, EIB sees an important mobilisation role in providing equity and 
subordinated finance, allowing the beneficiary to access commercial funding.  
But we have no evidence of that because EIB does not measure its mobilisation 
impact. 
 Few of the 20 selected Ops are catalytic 
I-3.1.1 EIB measures its mobilisation effect 
General EIB did not specifically measure its mobilization effect at project level or at portfolio 
level 
2003_BOAD PG IV See I-3.1.2 
2003_Dakar-
Ziguinchor 
See I-3.1.2 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2006 
No evidence of role of EIB in mobilising resources for the Fund.  The Fund may play a 
role in helping investee enterprises mobilise additional commercial finance 
2005_ACPGLOB 
ADEMI 
 
Evidence of mobilisation effect, as well as for the Banco ADOPEM project, though not 
measured specifically 
Source: Project documentation; MN 401 Banco ADEMI;  MN 403 Banco ADOPEM 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2004 
 Madagascar 
No evidence of role of EIB in mobilising resources for the Fund.  The Fund may play a 
role in helping investee enterprises mobilise additional commercial finance 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2006 Kenya 
No evidence of role of EIB in mobilising resources for the Fund.  The Fund may play a 
role in helping investee enterprises mobilise additional commercial finance 
2005_EMP AFRICA 
FUND II 
No evidence of role of EIB in mobilising resources for the Fund.  The Fund may play a 
role in helping investee enterprises mobilise additional commercial finance 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
No evidence has been found so far. 
2008_EDFI n/a  (EFP is a special case of EIB leveraging, and the leverage ratio is well documented 
corresponding to the pari-passu financing ration) 
I-3.1.2 Ratio of mobilisation at project level 
General EIB does not specifically measure its mobilization ratio at project level or at portfolio 
level 
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2003_BOAD PG IV There is no evidence of ex-ante or ex-post measure by the EIB of its mobilisation effect 
in this operation. 
2003_Dakar-
Ziguinchor 
There is no evidence of ex-ante or ex-post measure by the EIB of its mobilisation effect 
in this operation. 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2006 
Not measured 
2005_ACPGLOB 
ADEMI 
 
Not measured, though it must be important. 
The situation is similar for EIB’s support to Banco ADOPEM. 
Source:     Project documentation 
              MN 401 Banco ADEMI;  MN 403 Banco ADOPEM 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2004  
 Madagascar 
Not measured in project documentation 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2006 
 Kenya 
Not measured in project documentation 
2005_EMP AFRICA 
FUND II 
Not measured in project documentation 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
No evidence has been found so far. 
2008_EDFI EIB’s leverage effect corresponds to the pari-passu co-financing ratio 
I-3.1.3 Evidence of mobilisation effect and of extent to which it was critical to meeting 
financing needs 
  
2003_BOAD PG IV Loan: There is no evidence on direct mobilisation effect as such. But this operation has 
been developed in coordination with the WB and the European Commission: see I-10.2.1 
 
Guarantee: EIB’s guarantee instruments are geared to mobilization. Support to bond 
issues is all about mobilization.  However, guarantee line not taken-up 
2003_Dakar-
Ziguinchor 
There is no evidence on direct mobilisation effect as such.  
Exception: the EIB loan is said to have been a necessary condition for the AFD grant - 
See I-2.2.3. This operation was further carried out in coordination with notably the KfW 
and the AFD - see I-10.2.1 
The KfWgrant has been conditioned to the EIB’s participation in this project.  
Source : Operation’s « Conseil d’administration ». Prêt sur les ressources de la FI. Projet 
Liaison maritime Dakar-Ziguinchor (Sénégal) », EIB, 2004, p3  
2004_OLKARIA This first financing without recourse to the Government of Kenya will encourage other 
lenders in the future to provide direct financing to KenGen, including commercial 
banks. 
Source: EIB Fact Sheet B: financing proposal, Luxembourg 24/2/2005. OPS B/ACPIF-
2CENT&EASTAFR/2004-0255/GOUNOT MARCEL 
 
EIB is very constructive and helpful on project design, identification of support for 
supporting the energy sector reform. EIB and AFD advise on how to finance operations, 
finding financial partners. According to the authorities the Bank had a catalytic role and 
its presence strengthened the credibility of the government when seeking other sources 
of finance. 
Source: MN371 
 
2004_WAGP The Government of Ghana secured short term financing to meet the Final Investment 
Decision deadline in November 2004. This short term financing was intended as 
bridging finance, in anticipation of a more appropriate long-term funding arrangements. 
However, the market was not yet ready to take the long term credit risk on the project. 
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For this reason the Government of Ghana approached the EIB to refinance its equity 
share in the pipeline. It can be inferred from this historical sequence that the 
contribution of the EIB was critical for the financial consolidation of this operation 
which is regarded as an important developmental project by the Government of Ghana. 
Source: D2 
2004_LUMWANA See I223 
2001_MOMA_ 
TITANIUM 
See I223 
2005_Pacific Islands This PIFF II operation was set-up as a €50m financing facility (of which €25m provided 
by the EIB on IF resources) for providing global loans to several banks in the Pacific 
region, for increasing the access to finance for SMEs. It also encompassed a guarantee 
facility. Both instruments and the second in particular, are geared towards mobilisation 
of resources from other sources. 
 
In the end, only one bank benefited from a global loan from this facility: the NDBP 
(National Development Bank of Palau) with a global loan of €5m. The total amount 
allocated and disbursed from those €5m was €3,3m (64%). Disbursements for the whole 
global loan facility overall represented hence not more than 13.1% (€3.3m out of €25m). 
 
The second part of the operation, the Guarantee facility, materialised even less, if it 
materialised at all. An EIB staff member mentioned it had not been used: “Elle existe mais 
n’a pas été utilisée. Aucune garantie n’a été conclue. Pourquoi ? Parce que le cas ne s’est pas présenté, il 
n’y a pas eu d’opportunité. En fait à ma connaissance il n’y a jamais eu d’opération de garantie au sein 
de la Banque. C’est étonnant même qu’il soit proposé un instrument de garantie. » 
Source : MN 011 
PIFF I - Samoa This PIFF I operation was set-up as a €40m financing facility (of which €20m provided 
by the EIB on IF resources) for providing global loans to several banks in the Pacific 
region, for increasing the access to finance for SMEs. This operation initially envisaged 
(cf. Fact Sheet A) to also provide a guarantee facility and equity investment, two 
instruments geared towards mobilisation of resources.  
 
 
The initial willingness to provide a guarantee facility and equity investments in this 
operation did not materialise. It is not clear what the reasons thereof were, but 
information provided in Fact Sheet A (p3) in terms of risks & issues provide possible 
indications:  
“•The proposed portfolio guarantee product is a new one for the Bank and in defining its structure, close 
co-operation will be sought both with ACPIF’s RD team and with CRD to ensure consistency with the 
Bank’s mandate and coherence with the its credit risk policy guidelines. 
•The Bank’s experience with venture capital funds has been mixed to date but there is clearly a need for 
equity funding in many of the projects in the region. In the appraisal of this part of the facility, lessons 
will be drawn from the Bank’s experience to ensure that the chances of successful outcomes can be 
maximised” 
Pacific PIFF I Guarantees: 
Was not used because the DBS concentrated on its lending activity; it is more 
manageable than guarantees. Loans allow a relationship with the client that involves a 
regular monitoring and confidence building. Guarantees are a facility the DBS is not so 
confident with because the people to whom the DBS would give guarantee would not 
take that as seriously as a loan.  
Source: MN 363 
Fiji_Denarau Hotel BEI intervenue avec un prêt participatif. Mécanique : BEI a proposé à Colonial Fiji, une 
compagnie d’assurance de prendre des participations dans Novotel et la BEI a fait un 
prêt participatif à Colonial Fiji pour refinancer sa participation. Plan initial : outre ce prêt 
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participatif de 5mln à Colonial Fiji, la BEI consentait un prêt sur own resources de 15 
mln ; ce dernier a été réduit à 6ml car au vu de l’implication de la BEI, l’ANZ (filiale 
d’une grande institution financière australienne) a été intéressée). Finalement  l’ ANZ a 
« éjecté » la BEI et pris tout le prêt. Effet catalytique clair. 
Source: MN313 and MN343 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
No evidence has been found so far. 
JC 3.2 EIB’s financial instruments (in particular the risk-sharing and credit 
enhancement instruments) encourage mobilisation of additional commercial 
finance; EIB makes optimal use of its financial and risk-bearing capacity 
General  Credit enhancement not a major product line of EIB-IF, raising a question as to 
whether IF risk-bearing capacity for mobilisation effect  is optimized 
 Guarantees: Insufficient take-up of guarantees due to insufficient efforts by EIB 
to develop the guarantee instrument.  In addition, EIB’s guarantee instrument is, 
in the view of some financial intermediaries, not well adapted to the needs- on 
the contrary, guarantee instruments deployed by other institutions (Ex. AFD, 
USAID, IFC) have major impact in the absence of collateral that can be offered 
by SMEs, and such guarantees have larger value added and impact than lines of 
credit.   
          Source: EIB documentation and discussion with EIB staff 
          MN 251 BOA- 20100416 CV 
          MN 258 Ecobank v0-01 20 100415 
 
 EIB does not arrange B-loan type operations, as other major IFIs, for 
mobilisation 
 EIB appears not to have an approach for mobilising commercial finance in 
PPPs, particularly infrastructure (EIB focus area) 
 No evidence of EIB approach for enhancing capital markets development (such 
as increase the supply of good quality local securities and thus contribute to the 
development of local capital markets). 
 Contrary to other IFIs, EIB does not believe that the use of financial 
intermediaries could, besides SME finance, also address housing finance 
Sources re : housing finance:  
IFC:  http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/gfm.nsf/Content/HousingFinance 
FMO:  http://www.fmo.nl/smartsite.dws?id=74 
AKDN:  http://www.akdn.org/Content/690 
Other: examples: http://www.bis.org/ifc/publ/ifcb31i.pdf 
http://www.fias.net/ifcext/economics.nsf/Content/CON_Housing-
Regional_SouthernAfrica_Nov08 
 
I-3.2.1 Extent to which EIB’s instruments are geared  to (design for) mobilisation 
General EIB staff members noted that they don’t do B-loans or syndications despite their high 
mobilization impact: “we don’t do B-loans or syndications because we don’t have the resources 
necessary to set up a specific department. But indeed this instrument has a very high mobilization 
impact.” 
Source: MN 007 
2003_BOAD PG IV See I-3.1.3 on the guarantee instrument 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2006 
Equity and quasi-equity instruments for Kenyan SMEs by definition strengthen their 
capital base and may help them mobilize classical debt finance 
2005_Pacific Islands An EIB staff member mentions that the Guarantee facility, which was part of the initial 
set-up of this operation, had not been used.  
“Elle existe mais n’a pas été utilisée. Aucune garantie n’a été conclue. Pourquoi ? Parce 
que le cas ne s’est pas présenté, il n’y a pas eu d’opportunité. En fait à ma connaissance il 
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n’y a jamais eu d’opération de garantie au sein de la Banque. C’est étonnant même qu’il 
soit proposé un instrument de garantie. » 
Source : MN 011. 
2005_Pacific Islands The operation has been designed with inclusion of a guarantee component. This 
component has not been implemented, and the same situation occurred to PIFF I. 
Reason; 
Facilité de garantie : BEI a essayé de la mettre en place avec l’ANZ principale banque 
privée. N’a pas marché. 
Principe : La BEI offre une garantie sur un portefeuille identifié. Danger que la banque 
bénéficiaire ne fournisse un portefeuille dans lequel elle inclut tous les projets à risques. 
D’où proposition de la BEI que la bq bénéficiaire prenne les premiers 20% , le reste 
étant pris à 50% par les deux institutions. Le portefeuille qu’on va garantir doit être bien 
identifié.  
Les grandes banques régionales ressortent de grandes banques australiennes et n’ont pas 
besoin de garanties. Par ex. en PNG il y a énormément de liquidités et donc les bqs ne 
cherchent pas de garanties. 
Source : Project reports, MN313 
2005_ACPGLOB 
ADEMI 
 
EIB’s presence as a founding shareholder, and its continued subscriptions to Banco 
Ademi’s share capital, has placed this institution in a stronger position to raise finance 
from local commercial sources.  The same conclusion appears from the Banco 
ADOPEM Project. 
Source: Project documentation; MN 401 Banco ADEMI;  MN 403 Banco ADOPEM 
 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2004 
Equity and quasi-equity instruments for Malagasy SMEs by definition strengthen their 
capital base and may help them mobilize classical debt finance 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2006 
Equity and quasi-equity instruments for Kenyan SMEs by definition strengthen their 
capital base and may help them mobilize classical debt finance 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
No evidence has been found so far. 
2008_EDFI The three successive EDFI EUROPEAN FINANCING PARTNERS (EFP) operations 
are designed for leverage and the first two such operations were evaluated by EV as 
having a multiplier effect. 
I-3.2.2 Extent to which EIB assesses its mobilisation potential for each operation 
Operation /General No evidence was found that catalytic/mobilisation effect is sought systematically by EIB 
when selecting operations. 
This should be covered in Country Financial Sector Strategy documents to answer this, 
but such documents were not available in all countries in which a financial sector 
operation was reviewed. 
2003_BOAD PG IV See I-3.1.2 
2003_Dakar-
Ziguinchor 
See I-3.1.2 
2005_ACPGLOB 
ADEMI 
 
Mobilization potential of Banco Ademi was strengthened by EIB’s continued support 
since inception in 1997.  This is recorded as a strong point of this operation in EIB’s 
Project docts 
2005_EMP AFRICA 
FUND II 
 
N/A 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2004 
Mobilization potential not assessed in EIB’s Project docts 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2006 
Mobilization potential not assessed in EIB’s Project docts 
2005_ACPGLOB Mobilization potential not assessed in EIB’s Project docts 
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CA2006 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
No evidence has been found so far. 
2008_EDFI n/a 
I-3.2.3 Hurdles to deployment of mobilisation instruments (e.g. pricing of guarantees, 
limits to volumes of subordinated finance, etc.) 
2003_BOAD PG IV See I-3.1.3 on the guarantee instrument 
2005_Pacific Islands An EIB staff member mentions that the Guarantee facility, which was part of the initial 
set-up of this operation, had not been used.  
“Elle existe mais n’a pas été utilisée. Aucune garantie n’a été conclue. Pourquoi ? Parce 
que le cas ne s’est pas présenté, il n’y a pas eu d’opportunité. En fait à ma connaissance il 
n’y a jamais eu d’opération de garantie au sein de la Banque. C’est étonnant même qu’il 
soit proposé un instrument de garantie. » 
Source : MN 011. 
2005_Pacific Islands The operation has been designed with inclusion of a guarantee component. This 
component has not been implemented, and the same situation occurred to PIFF I. 
Reason; 
Facilité de garantie : BEI a essayé de la mettre en place avec l’ANZ principale banque 
privée. N’a pas marché. 
Principe : La BEI offre une garantie sur un portefeuille identifié. Danger que la banque 
bénéficiaire ne fournisse un portefeuille dans lequel elle inclut tous les projets à risques. 
D’où proposition de la BEI que la bq bénéficiaire prenne les premiers 20% , le reste 
étant pris à 50% par les deux institutions. Le portefeuille qu’on va garantir doit être bien 
identifié.  
Les grandes banques régionales ressortent de grandes banques australiennes et n’ont pas 
besoin de garanties. Par ex. en PNG il y a énormément de liquidités et donc les bqs ne 
cherchent pas de garanties. 
Source : Project reports, MN313  
Prelim. Findings At general level: EIB does not monitor specifically this effect 
At project level: In some cases, EIB’s participation in an operation provides comfort and 
confidence to other lenders or investors (same operations as referred under  JC 3.1, i.e. 
Banco Ademi, Olkaria II, BOAD, BIMAO) 
Hypothesis to test EIB’s comfort role depends on its leading role in structuring an operation 
Information Gaps Importance of catalytic effect for EIB 
2001_MOMA_ 
TITANIUM 
The following table summarises the commitments of senior and subordinated lenders: 
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(1€ = 1.22 $US- 
Source: EIB Project Progress Report, Moma Titanium (Serapis 200010242), 
Luxembourg 25 July 2007, OPS B/ACP-IF-3/2007-1460/mh., annex 2 
JC 3.3 EIB’s participation in an operation provides comfort and confidence to other 
lenders or investors  
General  EIB does not monitor specifically this effect 
 In co-financings we find  a “grey zone”: EIB often appears to have “joined in” 
rather than being  the initiator, but in limited other cases EIB took a leading 
position 
 EIB’s presence reinforced the credibility of projects in varying degrees. Where 
EIB acted as the main/sole IFI financier, EIB has been more instrumental in 
terms of catalytic effect. In two investment funds (Field Visit Senegal: ACRF; 
Microcred) , while EIB was not the initiator or in the lead, EIB’s presence has 
nevertheless been instrumental in attracting other investors; this was found to be 
the case in view of EIB’s traditional rigour in project appraisal. 
 In some cases, EIB’s participation in an operation provided comfort and 
confidence to other lenders or investors.  EIB’s stature reinforced the credibility 
of a number of projects; for a number of other projects, there is unclarity or 
“grey zone as to how instrumental EIB’s presence was. During one Field Visit, 
the credibility of EIB technical services (engineers, environmental assessment, 
...) were highlighted as lending credibility to projects. 
 The degree of catalytic/mobilisation effect at portfolio level cannot be assessed, 
as EIB does not monitor specifically this effect. 
I-3.3.1 Extent to which sponsor investment has been encouraged/triggered by EIB 
presence 
2001_Moma 
Titanium 
Kenmare,  the promoter, a small mining company, chose an international bureau of 
financial advisers to pull the financial consortium to fund this operation, which was very 
large compared to the size of Kenmare. The EIB did not lead the financial montage but 
led the technical and governance assessment. Its positive appraisal gave confidence to 
the other partners. 
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Source: MN302. 
2003_BOAD PG IV The operation’s March 2004 fact sheet mentioned that the EIB participation to the 
BOAD’s capital increase was important in terms of image and for future ranking: 
“Contribution relativement modeste et symbolique mais toutefois très importante pour la BOAD en 
terme d’image et dans la perspective de son « rating » à  terme. De plus, compte tenu de l’augmentation 
proposée la participation de la Banque serait portée au niveau de celle de la BAD et de Belgique. 
Bien que modeste, cette augmentation de capital est particulièrement importante pour la Direction 
Générale de la BOAD qui considère les trois volets (package deal) comme l’expression du caractère 
stratégique du partenariat BOAD-BEI. » 
Source : « Fact Sheet B : proposition de financement » (of the operation 2003_BOAD 
PG IV), EIB, 11 mars 2004 (p3) 
2003_Dakar-
Ziguinchor 
The EIB loan is said to have been a necessary condition for the AFD grant - See I-2.2.3.  
The KfW grant has been conditioned to the EIB’s participation in this project. 
There is no other evidence. 
2005_ACPGLOB 
ADEMI 
As the only IFI to take charge of initial support to Banco Ademi, and through its 
continued support since inception in 1997, EIB has exercised leadership in putting 
together the financing packages for this intermediary. 
2005_EMP AFRICA 
FUND II 
It is difficult to make out whether EIB’s presence has encouraged other investors, or 
rather whether other DFI investors encouraged EIB to invest 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2004 
In this case it seems that it was IFC’s sponsorship that triggered/encouraged EIB 
investment 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
This project is totally financed by IFIs and by the borrower itself. 
“The total estimated project cost is EUR 59 million. This will be financed, in addition to 
IF (25.5%), by AFD (EUR 20 million, 34%), BOAD (EUR 12.9 million, 22%) and by a 
grant from the EU Water Facility (EUR 9 million, 15%). The balance of the project is to 
be funded with the Borrower’s own funds (EUR 2 million, 3.5%).” 
The fact that the EIB’s financing should encourage sponsor investment cannot be 
assessed so far. 
 
« Programme eau Senegal. RM/CRD opinion” Fact sheet A Ops B/ACP-IF/2006-0566, BEI, 
2007, p1 
2008_EDFI n/a 
I-3.3.2 Extent to which private commercial financing sources have been 
encouraged/triggered by EIB presence  
Field Visits In Atlantic Coast Regional Fund (ACRF) and MicroCred Senegal (MicroCred I and 
MicroCred II)EIB’s presence was catalytic in helping provide credibility which in turn 
attracted other investors.  In the Fiji Denarau Hotel) EIB provided bridge financing for a 
project to go ahead, in order to be subsequently replaced by a commercial bank 
2004_OLKARIA The terms of the EIB loan, i.e. without recourse financing, encouraged commercial bank 
loan financing 
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EQ4 To what extent did IF/OR operations strengthen the local financial sector’s capacity, 
including in terms of social responsibility, to address the financial needs of enterprises?  
JC 4.1 IF/OR operations have strengthened the viability of the local/regional bank and non-bank 
credit institutions and equity funds 
General At a general level, EIB has strengthened several intermediaries both with its financial and 
non-financial contribution.   
From the list of projects reviewed in detail, plus a few operations analysed during Field Visits, 
these represent a strong sample which benefited from balance sheet strengthening (financial 
contribution) as well as TA for management strengthening (non-financial contribution).  
While requirements on Governance and Compliance are in principle applied to all financial 
intermediaries, this could not be verified, except for two banks in the DR which were clearly 
subjected to these requirements. 
 
 
In terms of financial contribution:  
 
- EIB has strengthened the balance sheets of two banks (Banco Ademi and Banco 
Adopem in the Dominican Republic) with its financial support.  This financial support 
comprised successive equity injections helping strengthen the balance sheet of the banks and 
raise more debt finance (bond issues, savings accounts, short term borrowings) and deposits.  
The long-term credit lines helped the banks not only to make longer terms to their 
borrowers, but improved the transformation ratio.  
- EIB has helped capitalize investment funds (e.g. Atlantic Coast Regional Fund (ACRF); 
MicroCred Senegal (MicroCred I and MicroCred II). 
- In some cases. Employment creation is monitored by EIB 
In terms of non-financial contribution: 
 
- EIB imposes requirements in respect of Governance and Social Responsibility, thereby 
upgrading the overall standing and competitiveness of the financial institutions 
General EIB Policies and EIB-IF Policies and Guidelines give major importance to basic 
“Requirements” regarding governance, transparency, integrity, social responsibility and 
environment  
but IF Equity Guidelines are more developed than non-equity guidelines- 
Governance requirements are not reflected in IF Guidelines- e.g when providing a 
credit line ... 
  
Strong alignment on best practice of IFIs: 2007 Corporate Governance Approach Statement: 
EIB has signed Corporate Governance Approach Statement, based on OECD Principles of 
Governance, with 31 IFIs/DFIs, addressing Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets. 
Strong benefits for enterprises which are upgraded by demonstrating stronger transparency 
and good governance- this has become part of global competitiveness. Helps provide a degree 
of confidence that is necessary for the proper functioning of a market economy; as a result the 
cost of capital is lower and firms are encouraged to use resources more efficiently, thereby 
underpinning growth. 
EIB Press release 
 
Key practical aspects : the rights and equitable treatment of shareholders, the role of 
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stakeholders, disclosure and transparency, responsibilities of the BoDs 
Transparency policies of EIB improve the transparency of enterprises financed by EIB. 
Social Responsibility 
Comprehensive Corporate Governance requirements are standard policy for financial 
intermediaries 
 
MN308 
 
- EIB has Compliance Policies. The EIB BoDs approved in 2008 (i) the Anti-Fraud Policy, 
namely  Policy on Preventing and Deterring Corruption, Fraud, Collusion, Coercion, Money 
Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism in EIB activities and (ii) the Procedures for the 
Conduct of Investigations. 
EIB carries out Reputation  check on managers of beneficiaries 
EIB sends questionnaire re Money laundering, ... to all companies 
MN450 
The Policy states EIB’s commitment to “zero tolerance” in these matters.  
EIB is part of the 2006 International Financial Institutions Anti-Corruption Task Force, and 
has signed an agreement in April 2010 (after the period covered by this evaluation) with major 
IFIs on their common fight against corruption, namely the Task Force’s Uniform Framework 
Agreement, including a Joint Sanction Accord. 
EIB Press release 
-  
- TA has been used to strengthen management practices of financial intermediaries 
TA was applied in several operations for strengthening management practices financial 
intermediaries.  In some case, applied by EIB (Banco Ademi, DR; Banco Adopem, Fondesa in 
DR + TA Programme to Financial Institutions in the Dominican Republic for institutional 
capacity building. In some cases applied by other source of grant funding in support of EIB 
operation (BPI Madagascar SME Fund; BPI Kenya SME Fund). 
 
But TA resources envelope is viewed by EIB staff as insufficient for ACP (compared to e.g. 
FEMIP, IFC Advisory Services, ...). More blending is required of EC grant funding and EIB 
investment funding.  It was also found that the Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF) of the 
IADB provides extensive TA for strengthening enterprises. 
 
- Indirect TA was applied also by EIB or others to help with the preparation 
of quality/bankable project requests submitted to the EIB supported Financial Intermediary or to 
strengthen investee companies (e.g PIFF II; BPI Madagascar SME Fund; BPI Kenya SME Fund)  
I-4.1.1 EIB has specific requirements (e.g. governance, social responsibility, risk management, 
integrity) for strengthening the viability of local/regional financial intermediaries 
General On Governance and Compliance- see above under General 
General Re: Tax heavens- from Counterbalance Report 
 
The report points to the fact that many projects and beneficiaries funded by EIB money involve tax 
havens and transnational companies that use them for tax purposes. In the last five years, the EIB has 
loaned €5.66bn to the top tax haven users from the UK, France and the Netherlands, while €210m has 
gone to African funds using tax havens in their strategies. €196m out of €210m is allocated to one 
beneficiary, European Financing Partners (EFP). EFP, a joint venture to finance private sector 
operations in ACP, has been established by EDFI. 2 EDFI members generally use tax havens in their 
investment strategies. One example cited is the UK based development fund, Commonwealth 
Development Corporation (CDC), which announces in its 2007 annual report that at least 70% of its 
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investment are made in the poorer countries of the world while most of its subsidiaries in Africa are 
based in the tax haven of Mauritius, two of its subsidiaries in Latin America are based in tax haven 
Barbados and its only subsidiary in Asia is based in the tax haven of Malaysia. 
 
The report further states that the EIB generally does not succeed in identifying tax evasion practices 
and that when it is the case, the sanctions are too weak. 
 
Moreover, the report states that the EIB tends to support European firms under its development 
cooperation objectives. Global loans, which represent 30% of EIB lending, are credit lines provided to 
intermediaries which in turn give loans to local authorities or SMEs for new capital investment 
projects worth up to €25m. Some major financial intermediaries benefitting from EIB funding in the 
ACP region are closely linked with major European banks. Most of these banks use tax havens in their 
investment strategies for tax purposes. 
 
The report gives several examples of projects financed by the EIB which are linked with tax havens : 
Tenke-Fungurume copper/cobalt mine in DRC, The West African Gas Pipeline from Nidgeria to 
Ghana, the Mopani copper project in Zambia, the Bujagali Hydroelectric Damproject in Uganda. 
 
The EIB has policies and procedures to guard against tax evasion and avoidance but these policies 
raise concerns within the NGO community and the European Parliament that qualify them of too 
passive.  
In its 2006 guidelines on fighting corruption, fraud, money laundering and financing terrorism, the 
EIB summarises the main points of its strategy in this area. These guidelines are supposed to ensure 
that the EIB does not support or undertake any project, structure or investment intended to permit 
fraud. This policy contains three key elements: 
- A ban on helping to finance structures that could be conducive to tax evasion, 
- Vigilance, by requiring documentary checks, and if necessary on site inspections in the case of 
a project that appears to have capital-links with the countries concerned, 
- Regular reporting to the Board of Directors if a new factor comes to light. 
 
In April 2008, the EIB published an updated policy “Preventing and deterring corruption, fraud, 
collusion, coercion, money laundering and the financing of terrorism in EIB activities”. It is noted that 
the EIB will not tolerate prohibited practices, which include fraudulent practices, in its activities or 
operations.  
The report stresses that the treatment of tax havens is weaker and less explicit than in the previous 
version. 
On March 2009, the EP adopted a resolution which stressed that the EIB should pursue a zero 
tolerance policy in regard to fraud and corruption. 
 
 
Source: Counter Balance, Challenging the EIB, “Flying in the face of development: how EIB loans enable tax havens?, 
July 2009” (pages 4,5, 13,17,19,20) 
 
 
In 2009, the EIB updated its 2005 policy “EIB lending, borrowing and treasury activities (OFC 
structures) connected with offshore financial centres with its “Interim revised policy towards offshore 
financial centres”. The core principles of this policy are: 
- Prohibition to operate or participate in OFC structures linked to prohibited jurisdictions 
- Enhanced vigilance on OFC structures linked to monitored jurisdictions, and 
- Informing the Board of Directors of the existence, nature and economic rationale of any OFC 
structure linked to a prohibited or a monitored jurisdiction 
 
Source: EIB, “Interim revised policy towards offshore financial centres”, July 2009 
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The European Investment Bank (EIB) has revised its existing policy towards Offshore Financial 
Centres (OFCs), ensuring that it is fully in line with the principles endorsed by the G20 summit of 
world leaders in London in April 2009. The EIB’s Interim Revised OFC Policy was approved by the 
Board of Directors on 14th July 2009 following extensive consultations with EU Member States, key 
expert Lead Organisations, International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and other concerned 
stakeholders, including civil society organisations.   
Strict internal rules regarding the use of OFCs have been in place for several years at the EIB, which 
from 2005 was among the first IFIs to have a policy on such jurisdictions applicable to all EIB’s 
lending, borrowing and treasury activities. With the adoption of the Interim Revised OFC Policy, and 
as the European Union’s long-term financing institution, the EIB confirms its leading role in 
addressing the problems caused by non-cooperative jurisdictions, including tax havens, as well as its 
commitment to ensure that its loans are used for the purposes intended – that is, the promotion of EU 
priority objectives. 
Source: EIB Press Release 
2003_BOAD PG IV There is no evidence in documentation of this operation aiming at strengthening the BOAD that the 
EIB had specific requirements for strengthening the viability of local/regional financial intermediaries. 
2005_ACPGLOB 
ADEMI 
Project documents do no evidence this.  However, Interview in Dom Rep indicate this is the case 
Source:     Project documentation 
              MN 401 Banco ADEMI;  MN 403 Banco ADOPEM 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2004  
 Madagascar 
Project documents do no evidence this 
Source:     Project documentation 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2006 
 Kenya 
Project documents do no evidence this 
Source:     Project documentation 
2005_Pacific Islands The operation’s report to the Board of Directors mentioned on p12 information relating to anti-
money laundering (AML) and combating the financing of terrorism (CFT):  
 
 
 
That report to the Board further specifies that 3 out of the 4 countries supported are defined as off-
shore financial centers, although they are not on the FATF and OECD lists:  
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Source: “Board of Directors, Global authorisation from IF resources” (for the operation), EIB, 21/11/2006 (p2) 
2005_EMP AFRICA 
FUND II 
Project documents indicate that access to this equity funding will encourage the improvement of 
corporate governance 
Source:     Project documentation 
2008_EDFI Project documents do no evidence this 
TA2008_Rep Dom. The EIB intervention could improve the risk-taking attitude of the financial intermediaries in 
Dominican Republic. 
 
“In addition to expand access to finance for Dominican enterprises and economic agents, the EIB 
intervention should also aim at contributing to improve the risk-taking attitudes of local financial 
intermediaries. While credit lines can provide a small contribution in that direction, it would appear 
that in the Dominican context this would require the EIB to be prepared to assume some form of risk 
sharing with local institutions, for example by extending portfolio guarantees.” 
 
“A financial sector strategy for the Dominican Republic”, p2 
 
Pacific PIFF I 
 
The DBS is obliged to make some form of environmental assessment taking into account, the location 
of the projects, the type of production process, to ensure that waste is disposed safely.  
Credits between 70 K and 500 K have to be approved by EIB, and the compliance with the 
environmental measures is verified. 
For portfolio loan an annual report to EIB is provided.  
 
No conditions regarding the social policy of the clients. The DBS would not interfere in that aspect of 
the management of a client. But the government has a Department of Labour with a member on the 
board of the DBS; they would immediately come to the DBS in case in violation of the labour rules. 
Compliance with tax laws, customs regulations, are also to be respected and the DBS reminds them to 
its clients. 
MN363 
I-4.1.2 Extent to which EIB TA has been provided to strengthen the foregoing 
General The 2009 Cotonou TA Annual Report notes (p1) that the focus of TA should lie on financial sector 
operations, in addition to infrastructure projects: 
“In accordance with the strategic thrust of the Bank’s operations in the ACP region, the 2009 TA programme continued 
to focus on: (i) financial sector operations (microfinance and SME lending, for instance in 
Ethiopia, Rwanda, Liberia, Uganda and the Dominican Republic); and (ii) infrastructure projects, notably initiatives in 
Central, West and East Africa and the Solomon Islands.” 
(see also I-9.3.1 for a short description of Cotonou’s TA programme). 
It further mentions on p3 that the TA endowment benefited essentially the financial sector since 2008, 
while noting that infrastructure projects could benefit since then from other sources of TA funding 
(EU-Africa ITF and Water Facility):  
“As shown in Table 3, 97% and 85 % of the Cotonou TA approvals have been accounted for by the financial sector 
TA operations in 2008 and 2009, respectively. This trend is expected to continue in 2010, with 2009 and 2010 
approvals (not yet signed) of 8 MEUR for financial sector TA already. In 2007 the lion share of TA funds was still 
attributed to regional projects in the communication and energy sectors (83%). The significantly reduced funding for 
infrastructure TAs in 2008 is partially the result of a shift to a newly available funding opportunity, the EU-Africa 
Infrastructure Trust Fund3 (see also text section 3). Also, the Water Project Preparation Facility became operational in 
2008.” 
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A TA portfolio performance analysis conducted by the EIB (and referred to in the 2009 TA Annual 
Report, p5) notes that the largest share of Cotonou TA funds continues to be used for the promotion 
of microfinance investments vehicles that invest in, and provide technical assistance to, local 
microfinance institutions, and that >€15m have been made available for capacity-building measures in 
microfinance institutions: “The largest share of Cotonou TA funds continues to be used for the promotion of 
microfinance investments. In order to address the limited availability of financial services to the poor and economically 
marginalized, the Bank has supported microfinance investment vehicles that invest in, and provide technical assistance to, 
local microfinance institutions. It is the aim to extend sustainable microfinance services and to develop innovative products 
that, in turn, will generate positive social and economic impacts to small and micro-businesses. Since 2007, more than 
MEUR 15 have been made available from the Cotonou TA envelope for capacity-building measures in microfinance 
institutions. Many MFIs have significant needs for capacitybuilding, and transfer of knowledge in order to succeed as self-
sustaining institutions. In addition, more mature and well-established institutions still require TA for the Cotonou TA 
Annual Report 2009 6 development of new products, and the extension of operations into new geographical areas”. 
An EIB staff member notes that sustainability of MFI still remains challenging:  
“Sustainability of the micro-finance institutions is a challenge. Will they be able to fly alone? What has worked in the 
Balkans would not necessarily work in Uganda… But that is why we do the TA.” 
Source: MN 102 
 
EIB staff members described as follows the different types of TA provided by the EIB:  
- “Feasibility studies (including financing a pilot plant or a mining borehole (i.e. physical investment can be 
involved) 
- Capacity building 
- Implementation support 
- Project preparation and implementation 
- For SMEs: dedicated computer programme: also management capacity, training. Interim management team.  
- More or less in all sector but less in roads.” 
Source: MN 102 
 
EIB staff members described as follows the value added of  (EIB) TA:  
- in project preparation: it should lead to a project. No impact in terms of increasing lending figures at the end of 
the day, but better quality projects, improving quality of individual loan applications. (…) This is actually a 
key challenge for the EIB, that project preparation activities should also lead to an investment. E.g. power 
plant: long term projects which need a lot of preparation: important challenge: in such a long period 
economic/technical conditions can change. 
- allows EIB to become a more pro-active partner in the community 
- allows EIB to have a real strategic impact, as the EIB can propose to finance feasibility studies and hence can 
give them a certain direction.  
- capacity building.  
- social impact: environmental and social impact assessment, notably for large projects. E.g. WAGP. E.g. in 
mining sector: analyse social issues: it is a possibility but it has not been realised. You could do an evaluation 
on something like that (social consequences of mine activities). 
- Leverage for enterprise performance? Not typically that they directly advice SMEs.  
Source: MN 102 
 
That 2009 TA AR provides the following examples (p6-7) aimed at demonstrating the capacity 
building efforts at the level of selected microfinance institutions: 
 
“Advans Cameroun: Since 2007, Horus Development has delivered capacity-building services to Advans Cameroun 
in the area of operations (introduction of group and individual lending methodology, training of loan officers and branch 
staff, product range development including saving products and financial services, structuring of operations department at 
head office), human resources (management of operations and finance department were transferred to national executives; 
the 5 branches of the network now being managed by local branch managers; a training department was created), finance 
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(IFRS standards implemented, new budget process); management information system; and internal audit (a local audit 
committee has been established and a local audit department has become operational). Horus Development continues to 
assist Advans Cameroun via the secondment of an expatriate General Manager and a Head of SME unit, as well as 
continuous support from Horus’ Head office in Paris.  
Dominican Republic – capacity-building in the financial sector: For the past 12 years, the Bank has supported the 
development of the microfinance sector in the Dominican Republic. This co-operation also benefits from a comprehensive 
TA program which is divided into five components: (i) operational risk manual application; (ii) demand study; (iii) credit 
technology improvement; (iv) corporative governance improvement and (v) agricultural products. Within the Operational 
Risk Management (OR) Component, material and documents, such as manuals, are being elaborated. A training plan 
covering the relevant issues of OR is being designed and will be implemented. One principal objective of these trainings 
will be to enable the participating key personnel to train the rest of the institutions` staff by themselves afterwards 
(“Training of Trainers”) and thereby to enhance the outreach of OR concepts to all levels of the Institution. The technical 
assistance aimed at FONDESA’s credit products will achieve a comprehensive redesign of the product portfolio, defining 
policies and institutional arrangements, identifying priority customer segments and a medium-term goals definition for 
outreach of each segment. 
AccessBank Liberia – the Microfinance Bank: Teaming with Access Microfinance Holding of Germany as well as 
the IFC and the AfDB, EIB has established AccessBank Liberia as the country’s first commercial bank specializing 
on micro and small business finance. After many years of a devastating civil war, Liberia’s economy has started its 
recovery only very recently. Micro and small enterprises play a pivotal role in this process and have so far lacked any 
access to credit. Since opening doors in January 2009, AccessBank has extended more than 3,700 loans averaging some 
USD 1,100 to micro entrepreneurs. The outstanding portfolio amounts to some USD 2.5 million and shows an 
excellent quality – as of January 2010 only one of the outstanding 2,886 loans was in arrears by more than 30 days. 
Operating from three branches across Monrovia, AccessBank has trained already more than 160 local staff and has 
quickly established itself as the bank of choice for Liberia’s small entrepreneurs. This is evidenced by the 14,000 savers 
who have opened accounts with AccessBank. EIB supports AccessBank with equity and technical assistance funds. The 
TA funds are mainly used to finance a team of international experts and capacity building measures in specific areas. 
AccèssBanque Madagascar: In January 2008, the EIB signed a TA agreement with LFS, the manager of 
Access Microfinance Holding and designated TA provider, to support the creation of 4 greenfield microfinance 
institutions, of which one was located in Madagascar. With regard to the microfinance institution (MFI) in Madagascar, 
the main objectives of the TA are (i) to ensure the successful creation of MFIs, (ii) to build capacity at local level and to 
transfer knowledge to the management and operational staff, (iii) to implement an efficient Management Information 
System, (iv) to support the growth and expansion of the MFI and (v) to ensure both financial sustainability and the 
quality of financial and operational data. TA services are mainly provided by LFS’s its inhouse staff. Continuous 
backstopping services are also being provided from the headoffice of the holding company. In 2 years operation, 
AccèsBanque Madagascar (ABM) could open 6 branches in Antanananarivo.” 
 
Reading between the lines of that analysis shows that TA has not much been used for strengthening 
the viability of other financial institutions or beneficiary enterprises as such, although this may have 
occurred indirectly through sound design of investment projects or improved quality of investments:  
“To learn lessons from previous assignments, the Technical Assistance Unit (TAU) of the Development Economics and 
Advisory Services (DEAS) in OpsB, together with relevant services of the Bank, has drawn up TA operation progress 
and completion sheets for TA operations several of which are financially closed and completed (see Annexes 1 and 2). 
These sheets (fifteen progress sheets and seven completion sheets) allow a view on the overall progress of the entire TA 
portfolio and achievements of individual TA operations. Quality-at-entry is another means to improve the TA portfolio 
performance: The EIB lays emphasis on developing well designed terms of reference/scope of work.  
TA is being used at different stages of the project cycle: 
1) the preparatory phase of design of investment projects – TA helps to ensure the quality and to further develop the 
Bank’s portfolio of sustainable investment projects (e.g. Ethiopia Gibe III due diligence studies, feasibility study in the 
Solomon Islands, EASSY). 
2) in some cases, TA directly supports project implementation to ensure the quality of investments during subsequent 
phases of a project. TA operations also help to address typical problems during project implementation such as delays, cost 
overruns and other bottlenecks. TA is contributing to more general improvements in the running of project management 
units, by improving planning and procedures, improving tender documentation and tender procedures, focusing on quality 
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assurance and supervision, and through various training activities etc. 
3) TA is also used to enhance the technical and financial attractiveness of EIB products, by combining TA with existing 
Global Loans, and by combining investments with TA, and to finance start-up costs of newly created commercial 
institutions, as is the case with several microfinance TA operations. 
Financial sector TA is often being provided in support of Global Loan operations: TA helps strengthen the lending 
capacities of financial intermediaries to ensure an effective and efficient use of EIB global loan facilities. This approach is 
having a positive impact on the quality of loans and on improving disbursement rates of global loan operations to small 
and medium-sized enterprises (Ethiopia, Rwanda, Dominican Republic, Uganda and Niue). Such TA operations are 
also helping to improve procedures and processes in the intermediary banks.” 
 
That same TA Annual Report notes (p2) provides details on actual approvals/ signatures/ 
disbursements. The second endowment (€40m) was almost double of the first endowment (€18m).  
Only half of the first TA endowment was disbursed at end 2009, but most of it was contracted and 
under imlementation:  
“All approved TA operations under Cotonou I were contracted by end 2009 and hence are under implementation or are 
completed. As per Table 1, the disbursement level for TA operations under Cotonou II is low (MEUR 0,4); however, 
in view of the size of the signed contracts in 2009 (see Table 2) disbursements are expected to significantly 
increase in 2010. 
 
The figures of TA operations contracted so far and the contract forecast for the coming 
year based on the provisional pipeline are as follows: 
 
The 2009 service contracts amount to EUR 11,5 million, compared to EUR 3,6 million and 7,9 million in 2007 and 
2008, respectively. At the end of 2009, nineteen (19) TA operations were ongoing requiring a substantial amount of 
Bank staff resources to monitor and ensure their successful completion. Thirteen (13) TA operations had been completed 
at the end of 2009. Details regarding the individual TA operations are given in Annex 1.  
By 28 February 2010 TA operations for EUR 13,0 million were already approved (but not yet signed), most of which 
are expected to be contracted by end 2010.” 
 
The table below from the 2009 Cotonou TA AR (p8) compares Cotonou data with EU-Africa ITF 
data, both for 2009 
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EIB staff members confirmed that there is an increasing demand for TA. They also considered that it 
is normal that microfinance require a lot of TA given that it takes ~5 years for setting up MFI:  
“Portfolio is more and more diversified. They started in 2007 and there is now much more demand than three years ago. 
Start was like under FEMIP, takes some time, get used to working with consultants. Since then they have done a lot of 
things especially in the financial sector, notably micro-finance. Double focus of IF: financial sector and infrastructure. 
Therefore many TA projects in financial sector are finance feasibility studies. Work in all sectors. A lot is being done in 
the power sector. Also partnership with Development Bank in South Africa: they manage it, identify the projects which 
require feasibility projects. They hope there will be viable projects that can be co-financed. If micro-finance requires a lot of 
TA, this is a natural feature, especially for investment vehicles focussing on the creation of new financial institution: five 
years before they become profitable and viable. You need people, set up procedures, IT system, and management 
information system. TA is the right means to do that.” 
Source: MN 102 
 
EIB staff members also provided the following explanation of the evolution:  
“Why such an increase between Cotonou I and II? They had not realised that they would need this amount of 
subsidisation. First they thought the private sector would do it; then they started to conclude that the private sector is not a 
good option for large infrastructure: lot of public works needed. A lot of public funding would thus be needed; but there 
were a lot of HIPC countries. These countries, most of them, have entered into agreements with the IMF to limit their 
future indebtedness, by borrowing only funds with a certain element of concessionality. Most of them needs up to 50% 
grant element built in the loan they take. This can be done by subsidizing the investment. This is why IRS envelope 
increased. At the same time we realized that TA was on the rise and that it would be interesting to do more of that.”   
Source: MN 102 
 
EIB staff members noted hereby that “the good news is they are disbursing well, the bad news: 
they will run out of funds”: 
“Evolution: Cotonou 1: €187m for subsidies, of which 10% TA. 95 % used: there was a sunset clause (anything that 
was not used was gone) ; Cotonou 2: €400m of which 10% for TA, thus €40m. In 18 Months they signed 5,5 M; 
approved X: 50 % allocated. 20% allocated to future TA operations (figures to be checked). Time horizon for Cotonou 
2 is 6 years. The good news is they are disbursing well, the bad news: they will run out of funds. Disbursement is always 
an important indicator for success. Maybe all this 20 M will be for financial structure. If they want more than 10% this 
would require an approval by ACP – EU Council and there might be resistance from the Commission, as they consider 
this is their job (although the Commission is not providing the same type of TA: e.g. they don’t finance TA in 
infrastructure or micro-finance)).” 
Source: MN 102  
 
EIB staff members noted that EIB TA is demand driven, which is less the case for some others such 
as the WB. They also explained that peer institutions considered before that the EIB was “free-riding”: 
“TA is demand driven: defined on needs, e.g. capacity building. During appraisal they decide whether TA is necessary. 
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In ACP WB is very active and they often work with them. In some cases for instance, the WB worked on initial TOR, 
then processed by project team, then the EIB starts to select consultant or delegates it to the promoter (a bit different from 
MEDA). One reason for this change is to follow the Paris Declaration: more ownership. Moreover, as they are not a 
development Bank or not staffed as one (and no staff on site most of the time) generating and monitoring TA is not easy 
for them.  They need to delegate the contracting authority. Sometimes they can do it themselves : e.g. Solomon Islands: 
engineer in Sidney office to be able to run the show. 2nd case in Kenia: Head of EIB office: engineer: he was involved.” 
“There is no single infrastructure where there is no TA. (…) A was provided by others before the EIB. For micro-
finance: IFC, African Development Bank. Why did the EIB join the club? There was some frustration from other 
Banks: the EIB was free-riding. It is also a vehicle to identify projects: contribution to project.”  
Source: MN 102 
 
Note. More information on coordination with the EC and peer institutions on TA is provided under I-
10.2.1 
 
EIB staff members report that TA assistance is very limited, vs. for instance the FEMIP Trust Fund. 
They expressed their willingness to dispose of a similar instrument as well. They further indicated that 
an EIB limitation in ACP is that operations cannot be leveraged with TA on project design. They also 
specified that there is a missing link between the EC and EIB in terms of TA. 
“FEMIP : il existe une enveloppe d’AT par la CE etc. BEI à aussi de l’AT mais doit être project-related. Récemment 
on a interprété la notion de project-related, en concluant un accord avec le FMI appelé AFRITAC, avec des experts 
dans chacun de ces centres appuyant certaines dimensions (y compris experts sur secteurs financiers aidant le 
Gouvernement). On a considéré que de ce point de vue qu’il pouvait être légitime de contribuer financièrement à leurs 
efforts (ils ont une capacité bien supérieure à la nôtre d’identifier les problèmes). Nous participons par exemple aux 
Steering Committee de ces centres. » 
 “EIB works both within and outside the EU: in particular sector people work in both regions; experience from EU 
MS. EIB technical people work globally, from Germany to Benin. That is also why we focus on infrastructure and 
financial sector, because this was our key expertise within the EU. Most other IFIs focus on development countries. 
Financial additionality: considered as high in ACP countries. Expertise (although TA funding is not sufficient): we 
often asked more funds for TA, we don’t have enough funding, although we have the internal expertise with the Projects 
Department. Internal expertise used mainly for appraisal and design (setting and formatting) of the project. But not much 
to give full advises: we can say “you should do this kind of study” but we cannot do it ourselves. In particular upstream 
studies. In our EU-Africa Infrastructure TF: in the past we were being told we were arriving when everything was ready. 
Now with the TA money available we can finance all kind of earlier preparation work. We have TA since 2007. We 
still think that we desperately needed money for TA. Having more funding would enable bringing more TA to the 
project. Cf. WB in terms of missing link: they have created between IDA and IFC the “IFC advisory services” financed 
on TFs.” 
Source: MN 007 
 
Other EIB staff members also emphasize the importance and benefits of TA:  
“Very important aspect of our work. TA is really improving our work over the last years. Such grant money is 
interesting. It really makes things possible which would otherwise not be possible. Blending grants and loans is very 
valuable”. Has TA been used frequently to develop a project for making it bankable in EIB terms? “We 
are still climbing the learning curve, but yes, for instance with the EU-Africa ITF. E.g. to finance the environmental 
impact assessments.” Do you think the TA envelope is large enough? “There are lots of projects e.g. support for 
organisations to convince of need of that instrument, for technical choices, EIAs. Particularly for infrastructure. The main 
issue is not money to be available, but projects to be ahead for moving. Grant money is essential. It is mainly used for 
hiring consultants (more than for financing personnel of the EIB); it hence hires external expertise, which increases 
expertise basis. Note. Water Facility : very small, just a few millions” 
Source: MN 024 
2003_BOAD PG IV There is no evidence of TA from the EIB for this operation aiming at strengthening the BOAD. 
A 2003 EIB fiche mentioned possible European Commission support through TA (but there is no 
evidence this has materialised – see I-10.2.1) 
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2005_ACPGLOB 
ADEMI & 
TA2008_Rep Dom 
The specific objectives of the envisaged Technical Assistance programme are as follows: 
 
 to contribute to the  capacity building of the intermediaries by transferring best industry 
practice in the areas of micro and small and medium sized enterprises lending, project 
appraisal, credit risk evaluation, credit portfolio management, exchange rate risk and interest 
rate risk management, human resources development  as well as MIS and data software.  The 
need for improvements in the institutions’ AML/CFT will be assessed and addressed if 
necessary;  
 to help a more effective and efficient use of the EIB line of credit; 
 to support potential final beneficiaries of the lines of credit during the preparation and 
implementation of their investment projects to be financed by the intermediaries. 
Project Documentation 
  
Limited information was found in Project Documentation on the results of the above in the absence 
of a Monitoring/Progress report.  However, the Filed Visist to DR evidenced strong effects of this TA 
(as well as for Banco Adopem). 
Sources: MN401, MN403 
2005_Pacific Islands The report to the Board of Directors mentioned on p2 that €1 was also envisaged for TA for the PIFF 
and PIFF II: 
 
 
More details are provided on p13:  
 
Source: “Board of Directors, Global authorisation from IF resources” (for the operation), EIB, 
21/11/2006 (p2 and p13) 
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However, there is no information available on effective delivery of TA. An EIB staff member 
mentioned that final structuration of this TA is under way (“Structuration finale est en cours”).  
Personal understanding on this TA was also provided:  
“€1m prévu pour AT pour ce projet (dans l’approbation globale), qui serait à délivrer aux PME bénéficiaires pour 
améliorer le montage de leur dossier de crédit. On regarde cela de manière conjointe avec le CDE  pour qu’il finance une 
partie des frais de structure et pour qu’il finance les plus petites PME. L’idée est de créer une plateforme pour mettre en 
relation les PME et les consultants d’AT. Après le processus, elles remettent leur proposition au secrétariat général . 
Source: MN 011. 
2005_Pacific Islands Dans les 25 mln de PIFF II, 1mln était envisagé pour de l’AT. Diagnostic était que ces petites banques 
ont un énorme problème car les dossiers qui leur sont soumis par leurs clients n’ont pas la qualité 
minimale requise. D’où l’idée de créer un site web avec une liste de consultants agréés. Les 
emprunteurs auraient pu bénéficier d’un subside (75%) pour leur permettre de faire appel à l’un de ces 
consultants pour préparer leur dossier. CDE très intéressé. Idée était que CDE aurait développé une 
petite facilité « quick accesss » pour services de moins de 5000 euros, CDE (avec la TA de 1mln) pour 
plus grosses opérations. Difficultés passées du CDE ont bloqué l’opération. Va reprendre avec le 
bureau régional du CDE (le million est toujours là) 
 
Sources : 
MN313 
EIB Pacific Regional Office, Quarterly Report, QIV: October-December 2009 
EIB PIFF II Proposal to approve a) an additional intermediary and b) the technical assistance scheme 
under the Facility, Luxembourg 19th April 2010? 
TA2007_ACP The beneficiary bank of this TA, MicroCred S.A , financed capacity building and institutional 
strengthening for three of its network banks, according to the 2009 Cotonou TA Annual Report 
(Annexe 2):  
“In September 2007, MicroCred S.A. has requested financial assistance to the EIB to finance capacity building and 
institutional strengthening for three of its network banks: MicroCred Madagascar (MCM), MicroCred Senegal (MCS) 
and a third MicroCred subsidiary which will be agreed upon at a later date. 
On December 20th, 2006, the EIB approved a EUR 3 million investment in MicroCred, an investment company 
created by Planet Finance that aims to create a group of commercial microfinance banks offering financial services to low-
income entrepreneurs in developing countries. 
After having obtained approval from the IF Committee of the allocation of the TA funds on December 12th, 2007, the 
EIB has entered into a TA Agreement with MicroCred S.A. on January 21st, 2008. MicroCred has been awarded a 
TA funding line of EUR 2 million: EUR 800,000 were granted to MicroCred Madagascar (MC Madagascar), 
EUR 600,000 to MicroCred Senegal (MC Senegal) and the rest (EUR 600,000) to a third MicroCred MFIs in 
another ACP country still to be defined.” 
 
The following objectives were set for the TA, including in terms of strengthened financial 
sustainability: 
“The main global objectives of TA activities can be divided into five categories: 
1. Ensure the successful creation of MicroCred companies; 
2. Building capacity of the local team and transfer of knowledge to middle management and operational staff; 
3. Implement a resilient and efficient Management Information System (MIS); 
4. Support to the operations of the company, and ensure the realization of objectives in terms of product development, 
network expansion, quality process of operations. In order to achieve these goals, consulting is provided by experts on 
various matters, including marketing and communications, training, market studies; 
5. Legal and Financial Counsel to ensure both financial sustainability of the company and quality of financial and 
operational data and help the MC companies on planning and fundraising matters in order to achieve a healthy growth.” 
Source: Cotonou TA - Annual Report 2009, Annexe 2 
 
The following two tables with performance indicators are provided in Annexe 2 of the Cotonou TA 
AR 2009:  
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The annual report comments hereby the following: “launched its operations in Antananarivo at the beginning 
of December 2006. 2009 was a year of severe political and economical crisis in Madagascar. Economically, all sectors of 
activities have been affected directly or indirectly. Impact on local money was important, MGA –EURO exchange rate 
increased of 10% between January and December 2009. Local Medium enterprises exportations suffered from MGA 
devaluation. Technical Assistance support was consequently modified to better face the evaluation of 
operations. To face after-effects of the crisis on operations, COO’s (FX. Poste) contract was extended for a three months 
period (from June to August). He ensured also transfer of knowledge to his successor.  Other reinforcement at the 
Holding level were implemented:  
- The recruitment of an Audit and Performance Group Officer (P.Ecorcheville) has brought analysis expertise on finance 
and reinforcement control on audit. 
- MicroCred Holding legal expert (J.P Bertolas) was involved in the finalization of Capital increase with AfricInvest.” 
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The annual report comments hereby the following: “The IFC capital increase postponed since 16 months has 
impacted the cash availabilities of the company. Consequently, growth was voluntary limited. This explains the non 
achievement of objectives of Active clients. Non Achievement of Outstanding Loan portfolio objectives is due to a much 
lower average loan at disbursement compared to projections.” 
I-4.1.3 Evidence of improvement in management practices and capacities, including in terms of 
social responsibility, following the EIB operation 
2003_BOAD PG IV There is no such evidence in documentation of this operation, which aims at strengthening the 
BOAD. 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2006 
There is no monitoring report yet on this operation, but operational strengthening of Kenyan SMEs is 
expected to be provided 
2005_Pacific Islands See the indicator below (I-4.1.4), which information shows among all that the direct beneficiary bank 
in Palau (NDBP) has sound ratios with regard to non performing loans (NPL) and provisions, and 
also capital/asset.  
2005_ACPGLOB 
ADEMI 
 
Banco Ademi is a socially motivated private initiative specialised in financing micro and small 
enterprises. EIB’s support was aimed at supporting this approach, and EIB continued to monitor 
employment creation by final beneficiaries. 
Strong evidence was found of management improvements, as well as at Banco Adopem 
Sources: MN 401: MN 403 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2004 
There is no monitoring report yet on this operation, but operational strengthening of Malagasy SMEs 
is expected to be provided 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2006 
There is no monitoring report yet on this operation, but operational strengthening of Kenyan SMEs is 
expected to be provided 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
No evidence has been found in that respect. 
Field Visits In addition to Banco Adopem, management improvements were confirmed at Microcred Senegal. 
I-4.1.4 Evidence from intermediaries’ balance sheets before and after EIB operation 
2003_BOAD PG IV Information not available at the EIB. 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2006 
Not found in project docts 
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2005_ACPGLOB 
ADEMI 
 
EIB’s equity subscriptions improved Banco Ademi’s capital base and solvency ratio to allow for a 
higher lending capacity. 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2004  
 Madagascar 
Not found in project docts 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2006 
 Kenya 
Not found in project docts 
2005_EMP AFRICA 
FUND II 
Not found in project docts 
2005_Pacific Islands For the Facility’s first contract, with the NDBP, the following can be said with regard to compliance of 
this local bank with contractual terms and conditions of the global loan with the EIB, notably in terms 
of the capital/asset ratio, non performing loans (NPL) and provisions.  
 
Note. This bank is a relatively small financial institution, with nine employees including the President, 
5 of which are involved in loan operations (see annexes to this operation’s report to the Board of the EIB). 
 
a. Financial Ratios 
Article Description Compliance Comments 
6.06 A. Capital to Total Asset 
Ratio > 20% 
Yes At 30 September 2008, expected 
level was 64% 
6.06 B. 
(a) 
NPL to Total Loans 
< 10% 
Yes At 30 September 2008, expected 
level was 7% 
6.06 B. 
(b) 
Provisions for Loan 
Losses to NPL > 
90% 
Yes At 30 September 2008, expected 
level was 115% 
 
b.  Information Covenants 
Article Description Compliance Comments 
8.03(a)(ii) Certificate from the 
Borrower of 
compliance with 
financial ratios based 
on unaudited 
accounts 
Yes (see comments) Before the 2008 audit was 
completed, in the borrower’s 
statement received on 26 Dec. 
2008, the ratio of provisions for 
loan losses to NPL was slightly 
less than the minimum required 
(89.23%). However the auditors 
finally set the ratio at 115%, 
which is largely within the 
contractual limits 
8.03(a) 
(iii) 
Certificate from the 
auditors confirming 
compliance with 
financial ratios 
Yes 
 
Deloitte’s statement was received 
on 6 May 2009 
8.03 
(a)(i) 
Annual Report  Received on 20 May 2009 
 
SCORE – Compliance 
Financial Ratios Good – 2 
Information Covenants Good – 2 
Comments Ops has regular e-mail contacts with its President, Acting 
President and Operations Manager, and Finance Manager  
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The President, Mr. Kaleb Udui, visited EIB in February 2009. 
 
Source: “Project Progress Report” (of the operation), EIB, 01/12/2009 (p4) 
 
The 2009 PPR further provides on p5 information on evolution over the last three financial years. 
(“N-3” = FY 2006, “N-1” = FY 2008). It appears that there has been a significant increase in net 
income, while the total balance sheet increased (only) slightly. The return on assets and on equity ratios 
(ROA and ROE respectively) increased also significantly.  
 
c. Financial Indicators 
Financial Data (in million EUR, exchange rate used is 1 EUR = 1.4881 USD at 15 October 2009 – 
Source: EIB) 
Indicator N-3 N-2 N-1 
Net Income 0.116 0.345 0.505
Net Income before Taxes 0.152 0.481 0.641
Current Assets 3.955 3.128 3.120
Current Liabilities 0.570 0.275 0.523
Total Balance Sheet 13.926 15.004 15.901
Ratios (%) 
Indicator N-3 N-2 N-1 
Equity/Total Assets 66.7 64.3 63.8
Debt/Equity 49.8 55.6 56.7
NPL/Total Loans Not available Not available 7.0
ROA 0.8 2.3 3.2
ROE 1.3 3.6 5.0
Current Ratio 693.0 1134.7 596.6
SCORE – Borrower Financial Situation Good – 2 
External auditors opinion and other remarks 
 
In the auditors opinion (Deloitte & Touche LLC), the financial statements present fairly, in all 
material aspects, the financial position of the Bank as of 30 September 2008 and 2007, and the 
changes in its net assets and its cash flows for the years then ended in conformity with accounting 
principles generally accepted in the United States of America. 
Source: “Project Progress Report” (of the operation), EIB, 01/12/2009 (p5) 
 
The 2009 PPR provide the following comments on the financial situation:  
“The National Development Bank of Palau’s (NDBP) financial situation in the financial year (FY) 2008 (September 
30, 2008) is generally solid and the ratios show a rather prudential management. The Bank is government-owned and, 
according to DEAS, the Republic of Palau is rated Baa2 with a stable outlook. 
 
NDBP is very well capitalised with a high degree of equity coverage to outstanding loans (74.1%) and a similarly 
appropriate equity to total assets ratio of 63.8% indicating NDBP’s solvency. 
 
The Banks profitability is fair with a 3.2% return on assets and a 5.0% return on equity. Both ratios have constantly 
improved since FY2006. Consequently, NDBP’s efficiency in using its accumulated equity and assets to generate 
earnings has been adequate at FY2008 as net profit grew faster than the Bank’s equity and asset base.  
 
Operating expenses have increased 19% in FY2008 reflecting full staffing levels, travel and professional fees as well as 
trainings abroad. In addition to that, depreciation and amortization costs increased due to the fact that NDBP acquired 
leasehold as a source to generate new earnings leading to an equity increase of 5% because of the capital asset growth. The 
higher operating expenses are mirrored in slight increases of the relation between operating expenses to total assets and 
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total revenues but the respective levels of 2.7% and 35.7% are still adequate. 
 
The net profit margin as well demonstrates a positive development and stood at 39.3% in FY2008. The reason for the 
latter can be found in the net profit growth of 46% due to increased total revenues, lower provisioning costs and slightly 
lower interest expenses. Revenues are expected to rise even more in FY 2009 as loans worth USD 6.4 million have been 
approved in 2008 of which USD 2.7 million have not been disbursed then.    
 
Total liabilities have increased by 7.2% and stood at USD 8.6 million in FY2008. This development can mainly be 
ascribed to the growth of current liabilities which in turn were primarily influenced by a USD 300,000 short term loan. 
Consequently, the debt to assets (36.2%) and debt to equity ratio (56.7%) have marginally worsened, as they have done 
since 2005, while long-term debt to equity (51.6) shows a slight amelioration in FY2008. Nevertheless, all debt ratios 
indicate healthy levels. 
 
Liquidity levels are very good but have declined since FY2007 because the cash position has decreased from 9.7% to 
3.6% while current liabilities have increased due to the short term loan in FY2008. Therefore, the current ratio shows a 
very healthy level of 5.96 and cash to current liabilities ratio stands at 1.09. 
 
Total assets have increased by 6% to USD 24 million while gross loans have increased by 11% in FY2008 amounting 
to USD 20 million and accounting for 86% of NDBP’s asset base. The largest components of the loan book are 
housing and commercial loans. The non-performing loan share of gross loans is 7% and provisions for loan losses relative 
to non-performing loans stand at 1.15 at financial year-end 2008. Provisions account for 7.6% of gross loans. 
Consequently, NDBP seems to be adequately provisioned.”  
Source: “Project Progress Report” (of the operation), EIB, 01/12/2009 (p7) 
PIFF I - Samoa For the PIFF I contract, with the DBS, the following can be said with regard to the compliance of this 
local bank with contractual terms and conditions of the global loan with the EIB (which is qualified 
overall as “Regular -2”), notably in terms of the capital/asset ratio, non performing loans (NPL) and 
provisions.  
 
 
Source: “Project Progress Report” (of the operation’s contract n° 23209 with the DBS), EIB, 07/01/2009 (p2) 
 
The 2009 PPR for the PIFF I global loan with the Development Bank of Samoa further provides on 
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pages 3 and 4 information on financial indicators for two years, accompanied by comments. Overall, 
the DBS is received an “Acceptable – 1” EIB rating for its Financial Situation. It should be noted that 
between 2005 and 2007 DBS invested a large amount in a new building project, thereby significantly 
increasing Total Income in 2008, and increasing rental income in 2008. However, this increase in 
income has been outweighed by a proportionally greater increase in expenses attributed to the new 
building project and the challenging financial conditions. The consequence of this sharp rise in 
expenses has been the return of a loss for the 2008 financial year.  
 
 
 
Source: “Project Progress Report” (of the operation), EIB, 01/12/2009 (p3-4) 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
This kind of information was not provided. 
2008_EDFI Not found in project docts 
I-4.1.5 Evidence that EIB specific requirements and/or accompanying TA have contributed to 
strengthening viability 
2003_BOAD PG IV See 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 
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2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2006 
Accompanying World Bank TA are expected to strengthen management , accounting, etc. of investee 
companies, but no results found in project docts 
2005_ACPGLOB 
ADEMI 
 
Banco Ademi (as well as Banco ADOPEM and Fondesa) are supported by the TA Programme to 
Financial Institutions in the Dominican Republic for institutional capacity building.  However, no 
Monitoring Report yet (too early to assess results).  The Filed Visist to DR confirmed that EIB’s TA 
was strongly instrumental. 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2004  
 Madagascar 
Accompanying World Bank TA are expected to strengthen management , accounting, etc. of investee 
companies, but no results found in project docts 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2006 
 Kenya 
Accompanying World Bank TA are expected to strengthen management , accounting, etc. of investee 
companies, but no results found in project docts 
2005_EMP AFRICA 
FUND II 
No evidence 
2005_Pacific Islands See possibly the previous indicator (I-4.1.4) and I-4.1.2 
  
TA2008_Dom.Rep. Banco Ademi (as well as Banco ADOPEM and Fondesa) are supported by the TA Programme to 
Financial Institutions in the Dominican Republic for institutional capacity building.  However, no 
Monitoring Report yet (too early to assess results). However, no Monitoring Report yet (too early to 
assess results).  The Filed Visits to DR confirmed that EIB’s TA was strongly instrumental. 
2008_EDFI No evidence 
JC 4.2 Financial institutions supported by the EIB have improved their capacity to mobilise 
domestic savings 
General At general level: 
- According to the Operational Guidelines of the IF, the efforts should be concentrated on the 
development of the local financial sector with the view to foster the capacity to mobilise 
domestic savings of small businesses (“Operational Guidelines of the IF, p. 4”; see also same 
Guidelines, section 1.1.1) 
- Strengthening the balance sheet of a financial institution through equity investment places it in 
a position to mobilise funding (deposits; capital markets funding, ...) 
At project level:  
- Only one example found where this is evidenced: in the case of Banco Ademi in the DR, EIB 
places a financial intermediary in a position to raise commercial resources and encourages a 
local financial intermediary with which it is in partnership to improve its deposit mobilisation  
I-4.2.1 Trend in domestic savings mobilised by the IF/OR-supported institutions 
General Capital markets development  insufficiently addressed by EIB- capital markets development being one 
of the main components of the financial sector besides credit institutions 
2003_BOAD PG IV Information not available at the EIB. 
2005_ACPGLOB 
ADEMI 
 
EIB’s equity subscriptions improved Ademi’s capital base and solvency ratio to allow for a higher 
creditworthiness.  In addition to capital subscriptions by local investors, Banco Ademi has succeeded 
in issuing bonds locally. 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2004  
 Madagascar 
No evidence found at Fund level or at SME investee level 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2006 
 Kenya 
No evidence found at Fund level or at SME investee level 
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2005_EMP AFRICA 
FUND II 
No evidence found at Fund level or at SME investee level 
2008_EDFI No evidence found 
I-4.2.2 Evidence that this trend is linked to the EIB support 
2003_BOAD PG IV Information not available at the EIB. 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2006 
No evidence found at Fund level or at SME investee level 
2005_ACPGLOB 
ADEMI 
 
This trend is at least partially due to EIB, as EIB’s equity subscriptions improved Banco Ademi’s 
capital base and solvency ratio to allow for a higher creditworthiness.   
EIB had explored the option of subscribing to, or guaranteeing, a bond issue in the Dominican market 
by Banco Ademi, which could not be done due to local regulatory conditions.  But EIB’s efforts for 
thus supporting the mobilization of domestic capital should be commended. 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2004  
 Madagascar 
No evidence found at Fund level or at SME investee level 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2006 
 Kenya 
No evidence found at Fund level or at SME investee level 
2005_EMP AFRICA 
FUND II 
No evidence found at Fund level or at SME investee level 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
No evidence has been found in that respect. 
2008_EDFI No evidence found  
JC 4.3 Local/regional bank and non-bank financial institutions supported by IF/OR have financed 
the development of enterprises including SMEs 
General At general level: 
- EIB’s Strategic Orientations for Financial Sector Operations in ACP countries constitute a 
sound policy document for supporting SMEs 
-  Capital markets development  insufficiently addressed by EIB- capital markets development 
being one of the main components of the financial sector besides credit institutions?  This is 
a question only- I don’t know the answer yet- see under General comments below 
At project level:  
Serious effort by EIB to serve SME/MSME sector, including microfinance (Banco Ademi and Banco 
Adopem and Fondesa  in the DR, Pacific Financing Facility, BPI Kenya, BPI Madagascar, SOCREDO 
in Fr.Polynesia, Microcred, ...) 
General EIB’s capacity and major effort to provide local currency financing 
I-4.3.1 Trend in financing of enterprises by IF/OR-supported local/regional institutions 
2003_BOAD PG IV Information not available at the EIB. 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2006 
This venture capital fund targets the lower end of the SME spectrum in Kenya 
2005_ACPGLOB 
ADEMI 
 
Banco Ademi is focused on financing local enterprises, principally small and very small enterprises. 
2005_EMP AFRICA 
FUND II 
 
This fund finances enterprises’ growth. 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2004 
This venture capital fund targets the lower end of the SME spectrum in Madagascar 
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2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2006 
This venture capital fund targets the lower end of the SME spectrum in Kenya 
2005_Pacific Islands The following can be said with regard to financing of SMEs by the NDBP relating direct to the 
facility’s first contract of €5m with this bank: “9 projects (small and medium sized projects each requiring an 
investment by the Bank comprised between EUR 70,000 and EUR 500,000) totalling USD 2.3M and 70 portfolio 
projects (below EUR 70,000) totalling USD 2.1M have been allocated and disbursed. Over a fourth of the GL has 
been allocated to construction (28.61%), another fourth (25.68%) to social housing (classified under real estate, renting 
and business activities), 18% to hotels and restaurants, 17% to wholesale and retail trade, 5.6% to transport, 2.2% to 
electricity, gas and water supply and 2.6% to other community, social and personal service activities.” 
Source: “Project Progress Report” (of the operation), EIB, 01/12/2009 (p2) 
PIFF I - Samoa The following can be said with regard to financing of SMEs by the SBD relating direct to the PIFF I 
contract of €7m with this bank: “To date [January 2009], 15 Projects (small and medium sized projects each 
requiring an investment by the Bank comprised between EUR 70,000 and EUR 500,000) and 184 Portfolio Projects 
(projects below EUR 70,000) have been allocated and disbursed (15 disbursements have occurred). 724 jobs have been 
created. More than a third (35%) of the GL has been allocated to hotels and restaurants, 20% to wholesale and retail 
trade, 10% to transport, storage and communication, 9% to manufacturing and 8% to agriculture, hunting and 
forestry.” 
Source: “Project Progress Report” (of the operation), EIB, 01/12/2009 (p2) 
I-4.3.2 Banks supported through IF/OR have increased long-term lending or maintained it at 
previous levels 
2003_BOAD PG IV Information not available at the EIB. 
2005_ACPGLOB 
ADEMI 
 
EIB’s equity subscriptions improved Ademi’s capital base and solvency ratio to allow for a higher long 
term lending capacity, and EIB’s credit lines have directly been used for higher lending levels to very 
small and small enterprises. 
I-4.3.3 Evidence that this trend is linked to the EIB support 
2003_BOAD PG IV Information not available at the EIB. 
2005_ACPGLOB 
ADEMI 
EIB’s equity subscriptions improved Ademi’s capital base and solvency ratio to allow for a higher 
creditworthiness.  In addition to capital subscriptions by local investors, Banco Ademi has succeeded 
in issuing bonds locally. 
I-4.3.4 SME focus is among the criteria used by EIB for selecting financial intermediaries 
2003_BOAD PG IV Information not available at the EIB. 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2006 
EIB has accepted this operation (selected by IFC) in view of its focus on the lower end of the SME 
market in Kenya, which was underserved 
2005_Pacific Islands The report to the Board for the operation’s contract in Palau specifies that the NDBP has been 
selected among other criteria for its experience in providing assistance to SMEs and micro-sized 
initiatives: 
 
Source: “Board of Directors, Global authorisation from IF resources” (for the operation), EIB, 21/11/2006 (p3) 
2005_ACPGLOB 
ADEMI 
 
This operation was selected by EIB in view of its focus on financing small and very small enterprises. 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2004 
EIB has accepted this operation (selected by IFC) in view of its focus on the lower end of the SME 
market in Madagascar, which was underserved 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2006 
EIB has accepted this operation (selected by IFC) in view of its focus on the lower end of the SME 
market in Kenya, which was underserved 
TA2008_Dom Rep. As the project concerns the microfinance sector, the EIB clearly concentrates on the SMEs. 
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EQ5 To what extent did enterprises which benefited from IF/OR support improve their 
performance and long term viability?  
JC 5.1 Enterprises which benefited from IF/OR support have improved their governance and 
management capabilities 
I-5.1.1 Changes in the behavioural patterns of the managers and management practices  
General The IF Annual Report 2008 provides in a single paragraph an overall summary (p45) of various 
EIB commitments in terms of good governance: “The EIB is committed to promoting good governance in 
all the projects that it finances. Supporting the objectives of the EITI reconfirms the Bank’s recent joint 
undertaking with other development financing institutions, in the form of the Approach Statement on 
Corporate Governance, to promote sound corporate governance, as well as the orientation of its recently 
revised antifraud and corruption policy. The EIB applies European Union standards and 
international best practice to all the projects it finances, devoting particular attention to development, environmental 
and social issues.” 
 
The EIB together with various Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) signed indeed on 19 
October 2007 a “Corporate Governance Approach Statement” (an initiative from the FMO, 
according to an interviewee – MN 007). It applies to direct or indirect equity investments in 
private sector companies operations in emerging markets. This initiative highlights the increased 
role of good corporate governance as a facilitator of international capital flows to emerging 
market companies. By signing the statement the EIB recognises not only the importance of good 
corporate governance practices for sustainable economic development, but also the critical role 
that DFIs can play in their promotion in emerging markets at both the private and public sector 
level. The EIB and each DFI that adopted this Approach Statement endeavours hereby to 
develop and adopt guidelines, policies and procedures for good corporate governance, notably:  
 
“1. Develop or adopt guidelines, policies or procedures on the role of corporate governance considerations in its due 
diligence and investment supervision operations; these could cover aspects such as: commitment to good corporate 
governance, the rights and equitable treatment of shareholders, the role of stakeholders, disclosure and transparency, 
and the composition and responsibilities of the Board of Directors. 
2. Provide or procure training on corporate governance issues to its investment and supervision staff 
3. Encourage companies where it invests in (whether directly or indirectly) to observe local codes of corporate 
governance in the spirit of best international practice. Engage company management and board members in a 
dialogue to foster improvement in those cases where corporate governance practices are weak. 
4. Promote the use of internationally-recognized financial reporting standards and encourage investee companies to 
adopt or align their accounting principles and practices to such standards. 
5. Collaborate with other DFIs on an ongoing basis, and when appropriate with its partners, to further advance 
the cause of good corporate governance.” 
Sources: “A Corporate Governance Approach Statement by Development Finance Institutions”, July 2007; EIB 
Press Release with reference “2007-109-EN”.  
 
According to an EIB staff member, these policies improve the transparency of enterprises 
financed by the EIB because they ensure an upgrading of enterprises which have to demonstrate 
an improved transparency and governance as elements showing their competitiveness. 
Source: MN 308 
 
The EIB further endorsed in 2008 the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). 
The initiative encourages, on a voluntary basis, the disclosure and reconciliation of extractive 
industry payments and revenues. Enhanced transparency from both governments and extractive 
companies should contribute to increased accountability regarding the use of extractive industries 
proceeds. The EIB supports EITI work in the resource-rich countries in which the Bank 
operates, by working with its project sponsors to introduce greater transparency and consistency 
in reporting on payments at a project level. At the same time, the EIB promotes the initiative in 
its contacts with governments and national authorities and encourages them to adopt the EITI 
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principles for reporting and publishing extractive industry revenues. The EIB also actively 
supports the work of the EITI International Secretariat based in Oslo. 
Sources: IF Annual Report 2008, EIB (p45); http://eitransparency.org    
 
An EIB staff member notes that the EIB is also a financial sponsor of the EITI (also referred to 
as “the Tony Blair initiative”), with a view to apply those principles. 
Source: MN 007 
 
The EIB is also committed to attaining a high level of transparency of its activities, but this is 
essentially related to its own activities; its transparency policies are not geared towards 
beneficiaries as such (except clauses on fraud and corruption, see below). The Information 
Policy Statement published in October 2002 expressed the commitment of the EIB to attaining 
a high level of transparency of its activities. Two years later, a document entitled “Transparency 
- Report and Proposals” was endorsed on 15 June 2004. It provided clear proposals for 
enhancing transparency of the EIB activities. It was revised five years later in the “EIB 
Transparency Policy”, dated 9 December 2009. This revision detailed EIB principles and 
practices in terms of practices. It specifies hereby the principle of promoting transparency also 
with regard to its project-level management (p8): “In its financing operations, the Bank recognises the 
rights, interests and responsibilities of stakeholders to achieve sustainable outcomes. In this context, the EIB 
actively promotes transparency with its counterparts, including with the development and operations of financed 
projects”.  
An EIB staff member noted with regard to requirements that the Extractive Industry 
Transparency Initiative (EITI – see above) requires an AML (anti-money laundering) clause in 
contracts, although this is not a safeguard.  
 
The EIB has a zero-tolerance policy on fraud or corruption, incl. in connection with projects, 
loans or equity investments. Key reference documents are the 2006 EIB Guidelines on Fighting 
Corruption, Fraud, Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism, the EIB’s 2008 
Anti Fraud Policy, and the Procedures for the Conduct of Investigations. These documents are 
based on the Uniform Framework agreement reached by the IFI Anti-Corruption Task Force in 
September 2006, which harmonises the definitions of fraud, corruption, collusion and coercion 
across the IFIs. An Annual Report of Fraud Investigations is further published on the EIB 
website. 
 
An EIB staff member provides details on the EIB view on “requirements” (the EIB speaks of 
“requirements”, while others such as the WB speak of “safeguards”):  
“Quite naturally the evaluators think in terms of “impact”, but there is a difference with “safeguarding” good 
practices (not using child labor etc.). We won’t have an impact in terms of child labor…  Everything we do is 
hence not with a quantifiable impact in terms of safeguards. Very important point. We will get projects with a 
negative footprint – we have to be prepared to accept that, balanced with other benefits of the project. But child 
labor etc is just not possible. Difficult question: what are the Bank’s minimum requirements, its bottom line? E.g. 
co-labor. In some sectors we have a black line (e.g. for child labor) and not a dotted line.”  
Source: MN 007 
 
On offshore financial centres, a Commission staff member has a balanced view: “Il y a également 
le problème des offshore centres. Ex. Ile Maurice pour ACP. Mais BEI dit que ce n’est pas sur la liste de 
l’OCDE. La BEI dit «alors pourquoi pas ? ». Il faut dire qu’il n’y pas beaucoup de centres financiers qui 
marchent en Afrique (Afrique du Sud, Maurice, autre ?). Ils ont fait une review sur les centres offshores en 
décembre 2009. Ils sont déjà en train de le revoir. Leur « Financial Action Task Force » s’occupe surtout de 
Anti-Money Laundering, Financing of Terrorism (pas seulement les paradis fiscaux). Ils ont maintenant une liste 
(différente de celle de l’OCDE accusée par certains d’être insuffisante) et des rapports sur cela. La BEI voudrait 
utiliser cette liste contre les pays qui y sont. La Grèce y est mentionnée par exemple. La BEI essaie de montrer 
avec les listes de différentes institutions qu’elle est réglo. » 
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Source : MN 023 
 
An EIB staff member mentions as a general comment that “these governance issues have come to the 
Bank relatively recently. They are relatively scattered around the Bank. Several of them are under the Secretary-
General (not all).”  
Source: MN 007 
 
When asked whether they really implement such governance guidelines to notice 
improvements at the enterprise level, responses from senior EIB staff were the following: 
“This should be checked with people at project level. Relatively recent. In practice there are now training sessions for 
raising awareness; there are also rules now. It also depends on the issue (e.g. money-laundering, etc.). We have 
some clauses. During the due diligence we look if they have systems in place etc. In mining projects we also would 
have more than a general clause, a specific part of the contract committing the borrower to publish what they pay to 
the Government, to be transparent. Even encouraging the Government itself to subscribe to EITI. You have to 
look at all these different cases.  
Talking about private equity: investing in a fund = delegating management to the fund management. We ask him 
in the legal aspects to comply with some rules (transparency, …) and to report to the Bank on a yearly basis. The 
fund manager has actually to perform the due diligences to the enterprises.” 
Source: MN 007 
 
General There is no evidence from the documents that private sector enterprises that have benefitted 
from EIB funding have radically changed their management practices. The main reason is that 
for the EIB the quality of the management and the social, environmental and governance 
responsibilities of the promoter/beneficiary are a key criterion for selecting an operation. The 
Bank tends to provide funding to companies that have demonstrated, prior to the Bank 
intervention, managerial capacity and responsible behaviour. However, when the Banks 
participates to a project it imposes conditions for loan signatures, for first disbursement, for 
particular undertaking. These conditions always are meant to strengthen the beneficiary’s 
managerial capacity and compliance with environmental, social and governance good practices. 
For instance, in the Pacific, the EIB targets, with its global loans, development banks if they 
commit themselves to undertake efforts to improve their effectiveness and governance. 
Source : MN 313 
 
2000_Magadi 
Soda 
The company has a long track record of good management practice (governance, environment, 
social policy, interaction with the local community) and this has been a positive criterion in the 
investment decision of the EIB. Whereas site visit, recent documents and contacts with 
authorities indicate that this standard is maintained there is no evidence that it improved as a 
consequence of the EIB operation. 
 
See also JC 7.2 
 
Source: MN352 
2001_Moma 
Titanium 
In the preparatory phase of the project the quality of the governance and the compliance of the 
promoter with environment and social measures have been checked by the Bank and led to a 
positive assessment. A key person clause has been included to ensure the continued quality of the 
management. The 2010 report prepared by an independent consultant engineering firm notes an 
improvement in the governance: “Over the past year there has been a considerable improvement in the 
management of the operation and the development of management procedures and the impact of a more structured 
management system is already evident in improved production results and the general morale of the personnel on 
site. SRK considers that the improvements to the management procedures are progressing well and the development 
of management systems and training programmes has continued during December”. However, there is no 
evidence that these improvements are a consequence of the Bank investment. 
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Source: MN310, OPS B Financial Report 2003, Board of Directors 2003, SRK Consulting. Moma Titanium 
Minerals Project: December 2009 Project Update. Report Prepared for the Lenders, February 2010. 
 
2003_Lumwana As is the case with many operations of the Bank the promoter was known by the Bank from 
previous projects and judgement on its governance made in the preparation phase of the project 
was favourable. As indicated in I721 and I722 the company has an active policy with regards to 
human resources, relation with the community, security. Promoter reports are required by the 
Bank and evidence good governance practices. It is impossible to demonstrate that the quality of 
the governance has improved as a result of the Bank’s operation. 
 
Sources: Appraisal Report 2006; Monthly project report January 2010. 
2003_Dakar-
Ziguinchor 
Some undertakings to increase management practices have been considered:  
 Certification on the proper condition of the ship provided annually by a company of 
international repute; 
 Insurance obligation for ship, passengers and merchandises; 
 Obligation on the part of the operator to seek to balance operating revenues and costs 
within the first two years of operation without government subsidies. If this condition is not 
met, the tariff structure should be adapted. 
Regarding the last undertaking, the Senegalese government is not willing to adapt the tariff 
applied. The authorities would like to keep low costs in order to maintain the social cohesion and 
to allow the regional development. The Monitoring report edited in 2009 mentions that the 
Senegalese government has not updated the tariff as requested by the financing contract of the 
EIB. 
Sources: Operation’s « RM/CRD opinion », EIB, 2004, p2 & Operation’s « Conseil d’administration. Prêt  
sur les ressources de la FI. Projet Liaison maritime Dakar-Ziguinchor (Sénégal) », EIB, 2004, p9  
& « Monitoring 2009 », EIB, 2009, p7 
 
See I.9.1.1 for more details 
 
2004_OLKARIA EIB supported a sound enterprise: Kengen is in a sound financial situation even if the profit 
before tax however decreased sharply from KShs 3,477M in 2006/7 to KShs 1,628M (EUR 
16M) in 2007/08, as a result of foreign exchange losses of KShs 1.4bn (EUR 13.7M) attributed 
to the strengthening of the Japanese yen against the Kenya shilling, making it more expensive to 
service the debt contracted with JBIC. A tax credit of KShs 3,181M from capitalization costs of 
Sondu Miriu Power Station offset the effect of the foreign currency loss on profitability. A profit 
after tax of KShs 4,809M (EUR 47M) was reported compared to 2,446M in 2007/06. Electricity 
sales over the same period increased from KShs 14,552M to KShs 16,902M, while unit sales rose 
marginally from 4,599Gwh to 4,818Gwh. The company's net assets increased substantially from 
KShs 64,786M in 2005/06 to KShs 101,751M in 2006/7 as a result of a revaluation of plant and 
machinery which was carried out by an international valuation firm. The liquidity position has 
remained acceptable as indicated by the current ratio of 1.4 in 2007/06 and 1.3 in 2008/07. The 
capital adequacy position remains strong, with the GoK controlling 70% of the equity as at 
30.06.08.  
Source: EIB. Project Progress Report, Olkaria II Extentions.Luxembourg 10/6/2009. PPR 23027 
 
2005_ACPGLOB 
ADEMI 
The EIB has requirements in terms of improved governance and managerial capabilities. It 
contributed to reinforce the governance practices of ADEMI (support to the development of a 
manual for anti-money laundering, KYC and support to the refinement of ADEMI’s Operational 
Risk Management) 
Source: Project documentation, MN 401 
 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2004 
The EIB has requirements in terms of improved governance, but the actual effects are not 
documented. 
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Madagascar Source: Project documentation 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2006 
Kenya 
The EIB has requirements in terms of improved governance. In practice the EIB is not involved 
in the contacts of BPI Kenya Fund with the investees but it participates to its advisory 
committee. There is no evidence of particular follow up of the EIB on the respect of its 
requirements in terms of improved governance. However, the Funds managers before 
concluding an investment in an enterprise take into account the quality of its governance and this 
can be used as a deal breaker. 
Source:  Project documentation, MN352 
2005_EMP 
AFRICA FUND 
II 
The EIB has requirements in terms of improved governance of investee companies, but the 
effects are not documented. 
Source: Project documentation 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
Specific requirements in terms of management practices have been asked by the EIB: 
disbursement of the first EIB’s loan payment will be conditional on the Project Management 
Unit (PMU) and also the environmental and social monitoring team being set up. An 
environmental and social monitoring team needs to be set up as part of the project under the 
auspices of the PMU. This unit will be given assistance in its role as contracting authority and, 
for that purpose, some SONES managerial personnel will receive additional training. 
Source : “Conseil d’administration. Prêt à l’investissement bonifié sur ressources propres. Projet 
PROGRAMME EAU », EIB, 2007, p7 
 
The above-mentioned EIB requirements have been applied and contributed to the strengthening 
in the management of utilities (SONES). 
Source: MN 250 
2008_EDFI Most EDFIs have strict requirements in terms of governance, but this is not documented in the 
documentation for this operation.  The Evaluation of EFP carried out by EIB’s EV does not 
focus specifically on governance (but reports strong social performance of the beneficiaries). 
Source: Project documentation   
I-5.1.2 Evolution of accounting and reporting  
General Bank’s conditions (see I-5.1.1) include reporting and precise information covenants to be 
completed by the beneficiary. See for example, 5001_Moma Titanium EIB Appraisal Report 
Moma Titanium. Luxembourg 27, 2003. PJ/I&S/2003-259/GCE/MUG/ms. PPR follow up 
and report whether these requirements have been complied with satisfactorily. 
I-5.1.3 Evolution of corporate governance 
General See findings under I.5.1.1 which detail effects in terms of corporate governance. 
 
2004_WAGP The Government of Ghana had initially designated Takoradi Power Compaty Ltd (TAPCO), a 
wholly owned subsidiary of VRA, to hold the shares in the WAGP. However, the Bank 
suggested the Government of Ghana to create a special purpose vehicle to hold the shares in the 
WAGP, instead of VRA, so as to separate revenues from the pipeline from VRA’s general 
operations.  
The EIB is therefore concerned for transparent governance mechanisms but the team has no 
information on whether EIB’s suggestion in terms of corporate governance has been adopted by 
the Government.  
Sources: EIB, Fact Sheet A: proposal to appraise new operation, Luxembourg 17/2/2005 and 
OPS/B/ACPIF-1 WestAfr & Sahel/20040026/Walter Eve 
 
2005_ACPGLOB
_ADEMI 
EIB contributed to raise Ademi’s standards in terms of corporate governance. EIB helped 
Banco Ademi to obtain new regulations by accompanying Ademi to the Central Bank cf 
prudential rules on operational risk were unfavourable to Ademi. For every department, a manual 
for anti-money laundering, KYC and basic policies and procedures has been written. 
Source: MN 401 
 
JC 5.2 TA for institution building has contributed to creating sound enterprises  and/or to 
MID-TERM EVALUATION OF THE IF AND EIB OR OPERATIONS IN ACP/OCTS 
ADE - EGEVAL II  
Final Report  September 2010 Annexe 9/Page 99 
improving governance and management capabilities 
I-5.2.1 Changes in the behavioural patterns of managers, and in management practices, are 
observed in enterprises that benefited from TA 
General EIB TA has typically not been used for providing direct advice to SMEs.  
Source: MN 102 
 
The 2009 Cotonou TA Annual Report notes that the focus of TA lied on financial sector 
operations and on infrastructure projects. It further mentions that the TA endowment 
benefited essentially the financial sector since 2008 (>85%), and specifically micro-finance 
institutions, while noting that infrastructure projects could benefit since then from other sources 
of TA funding, notably the EU-Africa ITF and the Water Facility: nevertheless, all infrastructure 
projects are reported to have benefited from TA, from the EIB, from other EU instruments or 
from peer institutions.  However, it is not clear whether such TA has been directed towards 
‘institution building aimed at creating sound enterprises and/or to improving governance and 
management capabilities’. 
Source: 2009 Cotonou TA Annual Report 
 
Out of the 20 selected operations,  TA has been provided for two operations: 
- TA Microcred (Madagascar&Sénégal) 
- TA Financial Institutions in DR 
Details for each operation are presented in the grid hereunder. 
TA was also foreseen for two other operations (BOAD PG IV and PIFF) but has not 
materialised. 
 
See I-4.1.2 and also I-9.3.1 for more details.  
 
2003_BOAD PG 
IV 
An EIB fiche mentioned possible EC Support through TA but there is no evidence that this TA 
materialised. 
See I-4.1.2 for more details 
 
2007_TA ACP La TA reçue par MicroCred Sénégal a contribué à renforcer : 
- les pratiques de gestion de Microcred : en particulier, la TA a soutenu un système 
d’information commun à MicroCred ainsi qu’un jeu de procédures ; 
- Et la gouvernance de Microcred : la TA a financé des missions de supervision, contrôle 
et audit de leur holding. 
Source : MN 261 
 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
Over a long period of time, SONES, the water supply company, has benefited from various 
forms of institutional support from the several IFIs which have supported the water sector in 
Senegal.  EIB has not provided TA to SONES under this specific project. 
But in the broader water and sanitation sector, EIB has supported ONAS, the sanitation 
company, and has provided TA for a tariff study leading to improved financial management. 
Source: MN259 
 
2005_Pacific 
Islands 
The report to the Board of Directors mentioned on p2 that €1 was also envisaged for TA for the 
PIFF and PIFF II (see I-4.1.2). However, there is no information available on effective delivery 
of TA. 
 
Interviews confirmed this point: 
« Dans les 25 mln de PIFF II, 1mln était envisagé pour de l’AT. Le diagnostic était que ces petites banques ont 
un énorme problème car les dossiers qui leur sont soumis par leurs clients n’ont pas la qualité minimale requise. 
D’où l’idée de créer un site web avec une liste de consultants agréés. Les emprunteurs auraient pu bénéficier d’un 
subside (75%) pour leur permettre de faire appel à l’un de ces consultants pour préparer leur dossier. CDE très 
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intéressé. L’idée était que le CDE aurait développé une petite facilité « quick access » pour des services de moins de 
5000 euros, CDE (avec la TA de 1mln) pour plus grosses opérations. Mais les difficultés passées du CDE ont 
bloqué l’opération. L’opération va reprendre avec le bureau régional du CDE (le million est toujours disponible). » 
Source: MN313 
 
The proposal, submitted to the Management Committee on 19th April 2010 is to set up a 
technical assistance facility (1mln) pursuing three objectives: i° pre-investment support (financial 
diagnostic, feasibility study, business plan and credit proposal preparation), ii° post-investment 
support (training, information & management system setup), iii° capacity building (training, 
improvement of credit appraisal processes, bad loan management, etc.). An agreement has been 
reached with the CDE (Centre for Development of Enterprises) to manage this TA on their 
internal budget directly from their regional office to be established in Suva, Fiji. 
Source:  Note to the Management Committee: “PIFF II Proposal to approve A) an additional intermediary and 
B) the technical assistance scheme under the Facility. EIB Regional Office in the Pacific, Report 2009 Q.IV. 
 
TA2008_DomRe
p 
Micro-finance institutions having benefited from EIB TA in DR have reinforced their 
management practices. Banco Ademi as well as Banco ADOPEM and Fondesa are supported 
by the TA Programme to Financial Institutions in the Dominican Republic for institutional 
capacity building. The main component of this facility focuses on the upgrading of the 
operational risk of these three institutions (creating a unit dealing with OR, hiring people, 
teaching people). The improvement of corporate governance is particularly relevant for Fondesa 
which is a non-regulated institution (NGO). 
 
The field visit to Dominican Republic evidenced that the TA provided has strengthened the 
management capacities of these banks/organisations (but there is no monitoring report as yet). 
For instance, the EIB TA allowed Ademi to refine its Operational Risk Management. EIB TA to 
Banco ADOPEM helped raised standards for governance, risk management, efficiency and 
transparency through the development of manuals. EIB TA to Fondesa contributed to the 
institutional strengthening of Fondesa in order to prepare the NGO to become a Bank. 
Sources: ADEMI project documentation;  MN 001 ; MN 401;  MN 403, MN 425 
 
In that respect, it should be noted that the EIB has been a leader in providing an integrated 
package to Microfinance Institutions/Banks in Dominican Republic. Beneficiaries reported that 
the combination of loan, equity, TA for institution building had major value added. Similarly, 
local currency loans provided under the EIB-IF presented a major value added for beneficiaries 
because other IFI do not offer local currency loans. 
Sources: ADEMI project documentation;  MN 401;  MN 403, MN 425 
 
See also I4.1.2 for more details 
 
I-5.2.2 Inclusion in the TA projects of indicators that permit assessment of results in the areas of 
corporate governance and management capabilities 
2007_TA ACP The available documentation does not evidence the monitoring of TA activities on the basis of 
indicators that permit assessment of results in the areas of corporate governance and 
management capabilities. 
Sources: TA_ACP documentation 
TA2008_DomRe
p 
The ToR for this project require the definition of indicators in the areas of corporate governance 
to ensure monitoring and evaluation: 
- Application of the Regulation on Operational Risk : requirements of the Central Bank are 
met so as to meet the Regulation on Operational Risk 
- Improvement in coporate governance : the institution/bank supported is in line with the 
requirements of the Central Bank 
Source: EIB, Programa de asistancia tecnica para el fortalecimiento institucional de entidades financieras que 
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intermedian con las MIPYME en la Republica Domonicana, Terminos de Referencia, 2008.  
I-5.2.3 Trends in these indicators 
2007_TA ACP No monitoring on specific indicators in the areas of corporate governance and management 
capabilities (cf I.5.2.2). See I.5.2.1 for results of EIB TA. 
 
TA2008_DomRe
p 
No monitoring report as yet. See I.5.2.1 for results of EIB TA. 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
No evidence has been found in that respect for this specific project.  However, overa long period 
of time, SONES, the water supply company, has benefited from various forms of institutional 
support from the several IFIs which have supported the water sector in Senegal.  EIB has not 
provided TA to SONES under this specific project. 
But in the broader water and sanitation sector, EIB has supported ONAS, the sanitation 
company, and has provided TA for a tariff study leading to improved financial management. EIB 
has insisted on the signature of a Performance Contract between the State and ONAS to 
monitor this.MN259 
I-5.2.4 Managers’ opinions of enterprises which benefited from such TA 
2007_TA ACP MicroCred Sénégal a reçu 800,000 euros d’AT en 2008-2009 (2 x €400,000). Cette AT a été 
stratégique car elle a soutenu la phase d’incubation du projet. Elle a couvert plusieurs aspects :  
- capacity building pour créer et monter la société (bénéfice de l’expertise de la BEI) 
- un système d’information commun à MicroCred, ainsi qu’un jeu de procédures 
- Missions de supervision, contrôle, audit de leur holding 
- Soutien à la création de leur réseau d’agences (6 agences au Sénégal). 
En 2008, la BEI couvrait l’ensemble de leur AT. 
Source : MN 261 
 
TA2008_DomRe
p 
Managers from the Banks (Ademi and Adopem) and organisations (Fondesa) having benefited 
from the TA are very positive on the EIB TA received. See I.5.2.1 
Sources: MN 401;  MN 403, MN 425 
 
I-5.2.5 Opinions of EIB and other donors involved  
General EIB staff pointed to the fact that the TA was quite new (since 2007) and that the funds allocated 
to it were limited. 
 
EIB staff views as positive the TA provided under the DR Financing Facility, for the three 
institutions (including the ADEMI bank). The main component is the upgrade of the operational 
risk of these three institutions (creating a unit dealing with OR, hiring people, teaching people). 
As the three institutions are in different degrees of development, some components apply more 
for one or the other (e.g. as only 2 of the institutions are regulated (Ademi and Adopem), the 
improvement of corporate governance concerns more the non-regulated institution (Fondesa) 
while the development of a rural agricultural product concerns more Ademi and Adopem which 
so not have such products). 
Source: MN 007, MN 001 
 
JC 5.3 Enterprises which benefited from IF/OR support have improved/restored their financial 
viability 
I-5.3.1 Evolution of financial results of enterprises which benefited from IF/OR support 
General As a general rule, enterprises in which the EIB strengthened the capital base (i.e EIB as 
shareholder) have improved their balance sheet and debt-equity ratios (e.g BOAD, 
ADEMI). 
Source: EIB project documentation, MN 401, MN 255 
 
See also EQ4, JC4.1 
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1999_Maragra 
Sugar project 
In 2006, it was expected that the company (Maragra), currently experiencing losses due to the 
2000 floods in Mozambique, would become profitable in 2009 instead of 2006. The Economic 
Rate of Return is expected to be positive but lower than the 11% calculated during the appraisal 
stage. 
Source: EIB project completion report 
 
2000_Magadi 
Soda 
Magadi Soda benefited from one EIB operations composed of three loans (senior loan OR, 
senior loan IF and subordinated loan IF). The financial prospects of the projects were promising 
in the preparation phase. The attractiveness of the promoter, of the project, of the resource and 
of the location were confirmed in the implementation phase so that the promoter was taken over 
by an international group (Tata group) who repaid anticipatively the EIB loan. 
Source: Board of Directors 2003; MN 352, MN310 
 
2001_MOMA 
TITANIUM 
For this operation, it is too early to assess the evolution of the result in terms of financial 
viability.  As the mine has not yet been capable of operating at the capacity level planned by 
management the Moma Titanium project has not yet posted any revenue in the income 
statement during the period; instead it capitalised operating and financial costs net of revenue.  In 
end 2009 the profitability of the Moma mine is still uncertain. Kenmare expects relatively high 
returns but it is not known whether delays experienced by the project and the global crisis will 
have a major impact in the return of the Moma.  
Sources: EIB. MOZAMBIQUE- MOMA TITANIUM (FI No, 22604, 22605 and 23084; Serapis No 
2001-0242) Finance contract signed between the EIB and Kenmare Moma Processing (Mauritius) Ltd and 
Kenmare Moma Mining (Mauritius) Ltd on 18'" June 2004, 18'" June 2004 and 30th June 2005 respectively. 
Luxembourg, 30/11/2009 
 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2006 
Kenya 
The Kenya BPI Fund started operations in 2007 and is still building its portfolio. By end 2009, 
61 deals had been concluded but it was too early to have information on the evolution of the 
financial situation of the investees. 
Source: MN352 
 
2005_ACPGLOB 
ADEMI 
 
Banco Ademi has increased/maintained profitability, and EIB has received dividends from 
its share subscriptions. EIB was instrumental in transforming Banco Ademi from a microfinance 
institution into a full-fledged bank. 
Source: ADEMI project documentation, MN 401 
 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2004 
Madagascar 
This should be the expected result for SME investee companies, but the evidence was not fund 
in the EIB project documentation. 
Source: EIB project documentation 
 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
This project corresponds to the 3d Bank operation with Sones. Two loans (in 1995 and in 2001) 
were previously provided to finance Sones long-term investment programmes aimed to improve 
the access to drinking water in Senegal. According to the EIB statements, these reforms 
previously undertaken have resulted in stabilising the financial equilibrium of the water sector 
since 2003. As from this date, Sones shows positive financial results. 
Source: “Fact sheet B: financing proposal”, EIB, 2007, p3 
 
2008_EDFI This should be the expected result for SME investee companies, but the evidence was not found 
in the EIB project documentation for this specific operation. 
Source: EIB project documentation 
 
I-5.3.2 Evolution and importance of (profitable) involvement in new activities and business 
expansion by non-financial enterprises that benefited from IF or OR 
Fiji Denarau Pour cette opération, des signes positifs montrent que le prêt de la BEI va probablement 
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Hotel aider l’hôtel à accroître son activité mais cela n’est pas démontré à ce jour. Dans l’idée des 
promoteurs, la profitabilité de l’hôtel n’était pas le premier objectif ; l’objectif était de créer une 
capacité hôtelière suffisante pour générer une augmentation du trafic de passagers vers les Fidji.  
Bien entendu l’hôtel devait néanmoins être rentable. 
 
« Le prêt participatif de 5mln est remboursable uniquement sur base de dividendes versés par Novotel à Colonial 
Fiji. Novotel n’a pas encore versé de dividendes. L’hôtel fonctionne actuellement sans bénéfice mais en couvrant ses 
coûts. La concurrence entre les transporteurs aériens s’aiguise, il y a de plus en plus de vols sur Fidji ce qui devrait 
favoriser le tourisme. A ce stade il n’est pas encore démontré que la BEI va entièrement recouvrir le risque qu’elle 
a pris. L’hôtel, ouvert depuis 2006, est très bien géré.” 
Source: MN313 
 
“Room occupancy is high with an average rate of 72%. In face of the general economic crisis this is obtained by 
cutting down prices to maintain volume and generate revenues from food and beverage. Other others apply the same 
policy.  
 
Main origin of tourists: Australia and New Zealand. Growing European tourism, mainly from Britain and 
Germany. Small but extremely fast rising share of tourists from China. The European tourism was traditionally 
constrained by the fact that the only route was the unpleasant Los Angeles one. Since Air Pacific opened a route 
via Hong Kong European tourism expanded.  
 
Every year since 2008 the  project has been to the point of recording profits and being able to serve a benefit but 
each time an external factor prevented such favourable development do materialise: coup d’état, devaluation of the 
currency, floods, have each time hit the tourist industry. As the owner, Richmond, is quite positive: he did not have 
to raise money from its shareholders. Richmond has therefore not yet paid a dividend. A dividend might be served 
this year.” 
Source: MN 353 
 
1999_Maragra 
Sugar project 
This EIB project focused on the rehabilitation and development of the Maragra sugar estate in 
Mozambique. The production expectations were more than fulfilled. After the 2000 floods in 
Mozambique which seriously affected the plantation, the production reached the projected 
production in 2003 and the project produced 74,552 tons of sugar in 2005, which is more than 
expected during the appraisal (+23%). This is mainly due to the better than expected agricultural 
yields.  
Source: EIB project completion report 
 
J.5.4 Enterprises which benefited from IF/OR support have maintained and/or increased 
their competitiveness 
General The reinforcement of the resilience of the private sector is a major objective of the IF. As stated 
in the 2007 EIB Business Plan 2007-2009, “the prime objective of the IF is to further the Cotonou 
Agreement's goal of reducing poverty in the ACP States by contributing to sustained economic growth and private 
sector development. (…) The IF endeavours to have a catalytic effect by encouraging the mobilisation of long-term 
international and local financial resources, in the form of both debt and equity investments, in favour of projects in 
the ACP States.”  
Source: EIB, EIB Business Plan 2007-2009 , 2007 
 
In general, the EIB supported sound financial institutions and enterprises with high potential. 
See also I.5.1.1.  
 
At operation level, the assessment of the effect of IF/OR on competitiveness is constrained by 
the fact that several operations are still ongoing and that external factors also play a significant 
role. Moreover, information on market shares is not always available for confidentiality reasons. 
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I-5.4.1 Trend in the ratio of credit granted to enterprises provided by the financial 
intermediaries that benefited from IF or OR loans to total domestic credit granted to 
enterprises 
General Such data are not available from project documentation. 
 
2005_ACPGLOB 
ADEMI 
While such data (ratio) are not available from project documentation, Banco Ademi has remained 
the largest development bank in the country. 
Source: Project documentation, MN 401 
 
I-5.4.2 Expansion of activities on the domestic and foreign markets of non-financial 
beneficiaries of IF/OR 
2001_MOMA 
TITANIUM 
The EIB operation contributed to the launching and expansion of the activities of Moma 
Titanium. The minerals production site has a profitable production capacity of 625,000 t/year of 
ilmenite and of 24,000 t/year of Zircon and 12,000 t/year of rutile. 
Source: project documentation 
2004_LUMWAN
A 
The EIB operation contributed to the development of Lumwana Mining Cy Ltd, one of the 
largest copper mines in the world, outside the copper belt. The EIB has been determinant in the 
financial engineering of the operation in providing quasi equity.  
Source: Project documentation 
Fiji Digicel Impact of the Digicel project: 
The introduction of Digicel, 2nd operator, has been important to boost competition in the Fiji. 
Vodaphone had been sole operator in Fiji for 14 years. To penetrate the market, Digicel cut 
prices and Vodaphone had to respond. Vodaphone made every attempt (price cuts) to outs 
Digicel of the country. Prices went from FJD 2/minute to FJD 0.02/minute. Vodaphone 
monopoly was broken.  
 
Currently Digicel market share is below initial expectations (figures not disclosed) and has not 
succeeded in taking a dominant position in the market. Vodaphone was extremely well prepared 
to face the competition, however the company is now solidly in the Fijian market and intends to 
stay there.  
 
Digicel has invested about 100 m $US in the country. About 50% has been spent in the country. 
Whereas Vodaphone focused on the corridors with the main revenues, Digicel invested 
everywhere, and forced Vodaphone to do the same. Prices have been cut for handphones as well: 
from 100$US to 20 $US. Development of retailers, also. 
 
Digicel also brought technology all over the country (notably internet access with mobile 
phones). 
 
Source: MN337, MN362 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
The project was expected to allow 50 000 new social water connections by 2011. Therefore the 
activities of Sones are supposed to increase. In order to assess the expansion of the activities, a 
post-evaluation should be necessary. However the EIB documents analysed do not refer to such 
ex-post analysis. 
 
Source : “Note à Ops B/ACPIF-1. Avis pour instruction », BEI, 2007, p3 
MID-TERM EVALUATION OF THE IF AND EIB OR OPERATIONS IN ACP/OCTS 
ADE - EGEVAL II  
Final Report  September 2010 Annexe 9/Page 105 
EQ6 In what respect have IF/OR operations contributed to the sustainable growth of a 
competitive productive sector in the partner countries?  
JC 6.1 EIB had an explicit strategy at country or sector level guiding the choice of operations 
to those most likely to generate a broader impact in terms of enhanced growth and 
competitiveness 
I-6.1.1 Inclusion in EIB country and sector strategies of assessment of potential impact of 
proposed operations 
General Specific country/sector strategies have been developed for the financial sector within 
the framework of general strategic orientations (“Operational Strategies for the 
Financial Sector in the context of the ACP Investment Facility, DEAS, August 2007”). 
In the available documentation, 2 sector strategies (one for the Dominican Republic 
and one for the French Polynesia) have been made available to the team. They present 
an assessment of the sector and of the potential impact of the proposed operations. 
For other sectors, there are no country or sector strategies that provide an assessment 
of the potential impact of proposed operations. 
 
A Financial Sector Strategy for the Dominican Republic has been produced. It presents: 
 the situation of the financial sector in DR : little systemic risk, regulation and supervision 
have been significantly upgraded, small financial sector, limited competition among its 
players, capitalization levels are on the weak side. 
 EIB interventions : “through equity participations and lines of credit, the EIB has emerged a key 
player in the sector, having a close relationship with ADEMI (the EIB is the largest shareholder) as well 
as an operational role in another Savings and Credit Bank (ADOPEM) and FONDESA, a non-
regulated NGO”. 
 EIB prospects: “In addition to expand access to finance for Dominican enterprises and economic agents, 
the EIB intervention should also aim at contributing to improve the risk-taking attitudes of local financial 
intermediaries. (…) Over the medium-term the EIB could also play a role in promoting the development 
of local capital markets, notably through the issuance of bonds denominated in Dominican pesos.” 
 
An assessment of the potential impact of proposed operations is made but is not very 
detailed: “Any further interventions need to take into consideration the systemic impact of the EIB’s 
positioning in the sector. It is also relevant that the value-added of the EIB’s intervention is considerably higher 
here than elsewhere. MFIs can only partly rely on deposits to finance their activities and are thus in demand of 
long-term funding. Regulatory constraints – and good economic sense – force this funding to be denominated in 
local currency. The development impact of the microfinance sector, while limited by its small size, is not 
negligible, as it appears to have played a critical role in substantially expanding the access to finance for micro 
and small enterprises.” 
Source: EIB, Financial Sector Strategy for the Dominican Republic, no date 
 
An Operational Strategy for the Financial Sector has been issued in 2007 for New 
Caledonia and French Polynesia. It presents an analysis of the macroeconomic background 
as well as of the financial sector. The operation included in this financial sector review 
(SOCREDO-Ligne de crédit environnement) is assessed against the three-pillar structure of 
the EIB’s value added framework. The lending should stimulate the development of the 
environment sector as well as of renewable energies through a better access of final 
beneficiaries to long-term financing via an interest rate subsidy. 
Source: French Polynesia, Financial Sector Review, October 2007 
 
More generally, the Financial Rate of Return (FRR) and the Economic Rate of Return 
(ERR) analyses are the framework ensuring that selected operations have a broader 
growth and competitiveness impact. Indeed, both an FRR and ERR analyses are required 
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for all EIB projects: during project appraisal the Bank always examines the financial and 
private return generated by the investments it helps to support. But a comprehensive analysis 
is rarely performed. In practise, the ERR calculation focuses on adjusting the project’s private 
costs and benefits by adding to (or subtracting from) the private revenue streams market 
distortion effects such as taxes, subsidies, tariffs and other transfers. A comprehensive analysis 
taking into account broader and development impacts is not performed. 
 
In order to help improve the Bank’s understanding and assessment of the impact of its 
direct lending operations on economic and social development in ACP countries, the 
Management Committee approved in March 2005 the establishment of a Development 
Impact Assessment Framework (DIAF) to be used on a pilot basis for investment 
loans under the IF. The DIAF corresponds to the second Pillar of the Bank’s existing 
value-added framework but takes it one step further to take into account a wide range 
of impacts, notably in the social area. In particular, project appraisal reports should include 
a qualitative judgement well-backed by an appendix of relevant statistics in seven crucial 
project performance aspects: 
- Financial performance 
- Economic performance 
- Social performance 
- Governance/institutional aspects 
- Environmental performance 
- IF strategic role, and 
- Contribution to MDG 
 
In parallel, the Bank also designed and tested an ACP specific three-pillar value-
added framework (VAF), similar to the one in place in operations in Europe. It follows 
a similar three-pillar design: 
- Pillar 1 is about consistency with EU policies and priorities (for ACP countries, it 
means consistency with the Cotonou mandate) 
- Pillar 2 deals with the intrinsic quality and soundness of projects 
- Pillar 3 deals with the EIB’s financial value-added 
 
DIA and VAF have been used exclusively for ex-ante assessments in the context of project 
appraisal. 
 
In December 2006, the Board of Directors decided to fully integrate the DIAF and 
value added frameworks for direct lending operations of the Bank in ACP countries to 
avoid duplication of work. Corresponding frameworks for global loans/banking sector 
operations and for investment in equity funds were being developed in parallel 
because in the case of indirect operations, the ex-ante assessment has to focus on the 
intermediaries themselves as the projects to be financed by the various intermediaries 
are not known ex-ante. 
 
In February 2008, after approval by the Council of the new External Lending mandate, 
the Board of Directors decided to expand the original ACP DIAF to cover all 
operations, including the financial sector. The Economic and Social Impact 
Assessment Framework (ESIAF) is the framework for assessing, at approval stage, 
some of the key features of projects financed by the EIB outside the EU. In full 
consistency with the value-added approach, the ESIAF relies on the three pillars of: 
 Consistency with EU (mandate) objectives and policies (pillar 1) 
 Project quality & soundness in terms of economic, financial, environmental, social and 
governance features/impact of the project (pillar 2). For financial sector operations, the 
quality of the operating environment, the quality of the financial intermediaries and the 
MID-TERM EVALUATION OF THE IF AND EIB OR OPERATIONS IN ACP/OCTS 
ADE - EGEVAL II  
Final Report  September 2010 Annexe 9/Page 107 
specific expected sector development impacts (e.g development of access to financial 
services, development of new products or markets, development of institutions and of the 
capacities of intermediaries, and improvement of environmental and social standards) are 
the three building blocks against which the assessment is made. 
 The EIB’s contribution to the project, both financial and non-financial (pillar 3) 
 
Sources:   
EIB, Board of directors, Development Impact Assessment Framework of IF projects, April 2005. 
EIB, Board of directors, Development Impact Value Added of Investment Loans in ACP countries, 
December 2006.  
EIB, Board of directors, Extension and adaptation of the Economic and Social Impact Assessment 
Framework (ex-DIAF) to all operations (including financial sector operations) outside the EU and pre-
accession countries, February 2008.  
 
I-6.1.2 Evidence that potential development impact is used as a key criterion in selecting and 
prioritising operations 
General The development impact is always a criterion in selecting operations since the 
creation of the DIAF in 2005. Indeed, the Bank, recognising that the development 
impact could not be fully analysed in the project’s financial and economic internal 
rates of return, designed the DIAF to assess the development impact of EIB’s 
operations. This criterion is also part of the ESIAF, framework applied since 2008 (see 
also I.6.1.1). 
 
Sources:   
EIB, Board of directors, Development Impact Assessment Framework of IF projects, April 2005. 
EIB, Board of directors, Development Impact Value Added of Investment Loans in ACP countries, 
December 2006.  
EIB, Board of directors, Extension and adaptation of the Economic and Social Impact Assessment 
Framework (ex-DIAF) to all operations (including financial sector operations) outside the EU and pre-
accession countries, February 2008.  
 
2000_MAGADI 
SODA 
 
Preparatory documents specify that the main developmental benefits that justify the operation 
are completely in line with the Cotonou objectives. They are: 
 Valorisation of local resources: the investment will increase the value added of an 
abundant local resource  
 Positive employment effects and increased influx of foreign exchange.  
 Important spill over on a region that is particularly poor and remote (“contribution to the 
bare survival of surrounding population”) 
 Support to private sector industrial activity 
According to EIB it is certain that the closure of MSC would have a large and distinct 
negative economic effect on a region that is already economically weak.  
Sources:  
EIB Appraisal Report, Magadi Soda, Luxembourg 29/1/2002. (PJ/I&S/GCE/KAI/scm) 
EIB Magadi Soda Pure Ash Project, Project completion Report, Luxembourg 23/4/2008. 
EIB Board of Directors. Magadi Soda Pure Ash Project (Kenya). 9/10/2003 
 
2003_Dakar-
Ziguinchor 
The operation’s 2004 “fact sheet A” mentions in its section « economic interest » that the 
project (reestablishing a sea link after the dramatic wreckage of the Joola in 2002) was a key 
element for realizing the economic and social recovery plan for the Casamance region: 
« La liaison maritime Dakar – Ziguinchor est un complément indispensable à la voie routière qui traverse la 
Gambie. Elle est seule capable d’assurer le transport des voyageurs avec gros bagages ou des marchandises 
diverses. C’est un élément clé pour la réalisation du plan de redressement économique et social de la Casamance 
qui est un volet de l’accord de paix avec le Mouvement des forces démocratiques de Casamance. Au titre de la « 
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continuité territoriale », le gouvernement considère cette liaison maritime comme prioritaire. Depuis le tragique 
naufrage du ferry « Le Joola », en septembre 2002, elle n’est plus assurée. Toutefois, la rentabilité économique 
est moyenne, et la rentabilité financière faible voir négative (liée à un tarif assez bas tenant compte du faible 
pouvoir d’achat de la population et de la concurrence du transport par la route assuré par le secteur informel). Il 
est donc nécessaire que le gouvernement prenne en charge la quasi-totalité du coût d’acquisition du navire. » 
Source : « Fact Sheet A : Proposition portant sur l'instruction d'une nouvelle opération » (of the operation), 
EIB, 26 March 2004 (p2) 
 
2004-WAGP The project appraisal documents clearly identify the main potential impact as being a 
reduction of the cost of electricity supply in Ghana, Togo and Benin by replacing oil with gas 
imported from Nigeria. They insist on the developmental importance of a natural gas pipeline 
throughout West Africa. It was already identified in 1982 as one of the key regional energy 
infrastructure projects by the ECOWAS. 
 
The following list of positive aspects of the projects shows the rationale behind the selection 
of the project: 
 Well structured cross-border private/public partnership benefiting from the strong 
support of ECOWAS and the governments of Nigeria, Togo, Benin, Ghana and from the 
financial, technical and managerial strength of the participating private oil companies. 
 The project will significantly reduce the cost of electricity supply in Ghana, Togo and 
Benin by replacing oil with natural gas imported from Nigeria. 
 The project’s environmental and social impact assessments are of high standards and 
provide a sound basis for environmental management during the project’s 
implementation and operation. In addition, the replacement of liquid fuels by natural gas 
transported by the project will result in significant environmental benefits. 
 Good financial and very good economic profitability under conservative assumptions. 
 Secondary benefits could also be realised through new industrial development facilitated 
by the availability of reliable and cheap energy transported by the WAGP. 
Source: EIB, Appraisal Report, West African Gas Pipeline, Ghana. Luxembourg, 02/10/2006, 
Justifications. 
 
2001_Moma 
Titanium 
This will be the largest project in the North of Mozambique, and the largest mining project 
ever implemented in the country. The project will yield substantial benefits for the regional 
economy of the Nampula province and the Mozambican economy in general. The most 
important are the improvement of infrastructure (roads, power supply and airstrip) as well as 
wages and salaries paid out la locally recruited employees (inclusive of the usual indirect 
multiplier effects). Moreover, income from royalties of the mineral license and tees for 
using the free trade zone will contribute to the positive economic impact of the project. 
Source: EIB. Board of Directors. Moma Titanium Mozambique, 29 April 2003. Doc. 03/181. 
 
2004_OLKARIA The potential development impact is considered in preparatory documents. Positive aspects of 
the project as seen in the EIB preparatory documents are:  the development of an indigenous, 
environmentally friendly source of renewable energy at competitive cost, reducing Kenya’s 
dependence on imports of fossil fuels and increasing the reliability of power supply and 
geothermal power being unaffected by hydrological conditions. 
Source: EIB Fact Sheet B: financing proposal, Luxembourg 24/2/2005. OPS B/ACPIF-
2CENT&EASTAFR/2004-0255/GOUNOT MARCEL 
 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
The potential development impact is described in the first EIB document related to this 
project. Therefore the EIB takes into account the development impact of the selected project. 
However, this does not imply that the potential development impact is considered as a key 
criterion in selecting and prioritising EIB’s operations.   
Source : “Note à Ops B/ACPIF-1. Avis pour instruction », BEI, 2007, p3 
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JC 6.2 EIB operations have contributed to improving the business environment 
General There are two business environment areas where the EIB had the capacity to 
intervene: 
- Access to infrastructure; 
- Regulatory and institutional framework 
The focus of EIB operations has generally not been put on the improvement of the 
business environment of the beneficiary countries. However, through specific 
operations, the EIB intervened at the two levels mentioned above and contributed to 
specific improvements: 
- Access to infrastructure : facilitation via a reduction of the cost of the infrastructure 
(e.g electricity with Olkaria and WAGP, maritime infrastructure with Dakar 
Ziguinchor) 
- Regulatory and institutional framework: tariff study for the sanitation sector in 
Senegal, water/sanitation in Senegal and institutional strengthening of financial 
intermediaries with a view to ensure their compliance with the banking regulatory 
framework in DR) 
 
See below for more details 
I-6.2.1 Accompaniment of EIB operations by TA or conditions meant improving the legal 
and regulatory framework and the business environment. 
General EIB staff members note that TA assistance is very limited, vs. for instance the FEMIP Trust 
Fund. They expressed their willingness to dispose of a similar instrument as well. They further 
indicated that an EIB limitation in ACP is that operations cannot be leveraged with TA on 
project design. They also specified that there is a missing link between the EC and EIB in 
terms of TA. 
“FEMIP : il existe une enveloppe d’AT par la CE etc. BEI à aussi de l’AT mais doit être project-related. 
Récemment on a interprété la notion de project-related, en concluant un accord avec le FMI appelé 
AFRITAC, avec des experts dans chacun de ces centres appuyant certaines dimensions (y compris experts sur 
secteurs financiers aidant le Gouvernement). On a considéré que de ce point de vue qu’il pouvait être légitime de 
contribuer financièrement à leurs efforts (ils ont une capacité bien supérieure à la nôtre d’identifier les 
problèmes). Nous participons par exemple aux Steering Committee de ces centres. » 
 “EIB works both within and outside the EU: in particular sector people work in both regions; experience 
from EU MS. EIB technical people work globally, from Germany to Benin. That is also why we focus on 
infrastructure and financial sector, because this was our key expertise within the EU. Most other IFIs focus on 
development countries. Financial additionality: considered as high in ACP countries. Expertise (although TA 
funding is not sufficient): we often asked more funds for TA, we don’t have enough funding, although we have 
the internal expertise with the Projects Department. Internal expertise used mainly for appraisal and design 
(setting and formatting) of the project. But not much to give full advises: we can say “you should do this kind of 
study” but we cannot do it ourselves. In particular upstream studies. In our EU-Africa Infrastructure TF: in 
the past we were being told we were arriving when everything was ready. Now with the TA money available we 
can finance all kind of earlier preparation work. We have TA since 2007. We still think that we desperately 
needed money for TA. Having more funding would enable bringing more TA to the project. Cf. WB in terms 
of missing link: they have created between IDA and IFC the “IFC advisory services” financed on TFs.” 
Source: MN 007 
 
Other EIB staff members also emphasize the importance and benefits of TA:  
“Very important aspect of our work. TA is really really improving our work over the last years. Such grant 
money is interesting. It really makes things possible which would otherwise not be possible. Blending grants and 
loans is very valuable”. Has TA been used frequently to develop a project for making it bankable 
in EIB terms? “We are still climbing the learning curve, but yes, for instance with the EU-Africa ITF. E.g. 
to finance the environmental impact assessments.” Do you think the TA envelope is large enough? 
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“There are lots of projects e.g. support for organisations to convince of need of that instrument, for technical 
choices, EIAs. Particularly for infrastructure. The main issue is not money to be available, but projects to be 
ahead for moving. Grant money is essential. It is mainly used for hiring consultants (more than for financing 
personnel of the EIB); it hence hires external expertise, which increases expertise basis. Note. Water Facility : 
very small, just a few millions” 
Source: MN 024 
 
2003_Dakar 
Ziguinchor 
L’opération vise à faciliter le volet “accès à l’infrastructure” de l’environnement des affaires. 
« Le projet inclut l’acquisition d’un navire roulier pour le transport de passagers et de marchandises entre 
Dakar et la région de la Casamance, et les aménagements portuaires connexes. Le rétablissement de la liaison 
maritime Dakar-Ziguinchor permettra de désenclaver une région en sortie de crise, d’assurer la continuité du 
territoire national (la seule liaison routière économique traverse la Gambie) ». 
Source : EIB, FSA, 2004 
 
2004_WAGP The main expected impact of the project on the business environment is the reduction in the 
cost of power generation the project is expected to generate, particularly in Ghana. It should 
be noted that this operation does not foresee TA. 
Sources: Fact Sheets A and B. Board Report 
 
2004_Olkaria The operation aimed at improving the business environment in terms of improved access to 
infrastructure. In particular, it aimed at increasing the technical capacity and strengthening the 
economic viability of the electricity sector in Kenya through an extension of the capacity of 
the EIB financed Olkaria geothermal power station, by adding 35 MWe to the existing 70 
MWe. 
Source: EIB Fact Sheet A: proposal to appraise new operation. Luxembourg 19/11/2004. OPS 
B/ACPIF-2CENT&EASTAFR/2004-0255/GOUNOT MARCEL 
 
2005_Pacific 
Islands 
The report to the Board of Directors mentioned on p2 that €1 was also envisaged for TA for 
the PIFF and PIFF II (see I-4.1.2). However, there is no information available on effective 
delivery of TA. 
Source: Report to the Board of Directors 
 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
This operation included conditions meant to improve the regulatory framework. The 
EIB suggests reviewing the tariff adjustment in the water sector in order to ensure the 
financial viability of Sones. Furthermore, the promoter has to prepare a manual for the 
operational procedures which should facilitate the project’s follow-up by the donors. 
Sources:  
“Fact sheet A: Appraisal Authorisation”, EIB, 2007, p 4 
“Fact sheet B: financing proposal”, EIB, 2007, p2 
 
A TA financed by the Commission was also foreseen but was not meant to 
improvements of the business environment. A technical assistance implemented by the 
AFD should limit the technical risks linked to the quality of the project at design and 
implementation stages. This TA should include several components such as assistance to 
project management and capacities enhancement (training, business plan, etc.). 
Source : “Rapport financier. Projet: Programme eau Sénégal”, EIB, 2007, p13 
 
2007_TA ACP This EIB operation has not aimed at improving the business environment.  
Its objectives were: 
 “To  ensure the successful creation of MicroCred companies;  
 Building capacity of the local team and transfer of knowledge to middle management and operational staff; 
 Implement a resilient and efficient Management Information System (MIS);  
 Support to the operations of the company, and ensure the realization of objectives in terms of product 
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development, network expansion, quality process of operations. In order to achieve these goals, consulting is 
provided by experts on various matters, including marketing and communications, training, market 
studies;  
 Legal and Financial Counsel to ensure both financial sustainability of the company and quality of 
financial and operational data and help the MC companies on planning and fundraising matters in order 
to achieve a healthy growth.” 
Source: EIB, TA Operation Progress Sheet, December 2009 
 
2008_TA Rep 
Dom 
This EIB operation aimed at the institutional strengthening of the financial intermediaries 
supported. In particular, it foresaw support to ensure the adequacy of financial intermediaries 
with the requirements of the Central Bank. Moreover, it envisaged support to the 
transformation of FONDESA in a regulated institution. 
Source: EIB, Terminos de Referencia, no date 
 
2008_Assainisse
ment Senegal 
En janvier 2008, la BEI et l’AFD on signé des prêts d'un montant de 20 M d'euros pour la 
BEI et d'un montant de 30  millions d'euros pour l'AFD pour financer la création d'un réseau 
d'assainissement le long de la Baie de Hann en vue de restaurer la qualité des eaux de la baie. 
« En complément de ces prêts, l'AFD a également octroyé en 2008 une subvention de 2,5 millions d'euros 
pour ce projet. Elle permet notamment de financer un appui institutionnel aux autorités dans leur négociation 
avec les industriels pour qu'ils prennent en charge une partie du coût du service d'assainissement. La BEI a 
octroyé en 2008 un financement complémentaire de 831 000 euros sous forme d'assistance technique pour la 
réalisation d'une étude tarifaire ainsi que pour l'actualisation du Plan Directeur d'assainissement liquide de la 
ville de Dakar à l'horizon 2025. Cet appui vise à contribuer à l'amélioration de la performance opérationnelle 
et financière de l'Office National de l'Assainissement (ONAS). » 
Source : EIB web site, http://www.eib.org/eib.org/projects/press/2009/2009-002-pret-de-50-millions-
deuros-de-lafd-et-de-la-bei-a-letat-du-senegal-pour-la-depollution-de-la-baie-de-hann.htm 
 
Par ailleurs, la Commission européenne a financé étude organisationnelle de l’ONAS qui a 
résulté en un plan de réorganisation de l’office. 
 
La Commission, la BEI et l’AFD ont posé une condition avant le financement du projet : la 
signature d’un contrat de performance tarifaire entre l’Etat et l’ONAS visant à assurer cet 
équilibre. Ce document détermine l’engagement de l’Etat vis-à-vis de l’ONAS  pour garantir 
l’équilibre financier. Dans le but d’assurer un suivi, les bailleurs ont organisé des réunions 
mensuelles de suivi rassemblant l’ONAS, l’AFD, la BEI, et le Ministère de l’environnement et 
de l’assainissement et un comité de pilotage a été créé pour faire le suivi du contrat de 
performance.  
 
Source : MN 259 
 
I-6.2.2 Evaluations of the results of such operations 
2003_Dakar 
Ziguinchor 
Il n’y a pas dévaluation pour ce projet. La mission pays au Sénégal a permis de constater les 
effets positifs de cette opération en termes de facilitation d’accès aux infrastructures: la liaison 
maritime Dakar-Ziguinchor, à travers le financement d’un bateau, permet de désenclaver la 
région (transport des personnes et des marchandises). Sans ce bateau, il faut traverser la 
Gambie, ce qui est long (500 km) et compliqué. 
Source : MN 263 
 
2004_WAGP At the time of this evaluation the project was just being fully completed and therefore it was 
not possible to assess its impact as no documentation was available yet on its commercial 
operations (due in the first quarter of 2010). The new infrastructure will allow to replace fuel 
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with gas imported from Nigeria and the pipeline capacity will allow for future demand growth 
in power generation. On 6th April 2010 WAGP co-issued a statement announcing that the 
volume of gas flowing from the Nigeria gas producers was about 30 million standard cubic 
feet per day, enough to generate 110 megawatts. It also announced the near completion of the 
project that should be in position to deliver compressed gas to all customers in the three 
countries (Ghana, Togo and Benin) in the summer 2010. 
Sources: EIB, West African Gas Pipeline, Monitoring exercise 2009.  
http://41.204.59.211:81/ind.php?evt=1 : communication of Wapco on 6/4/2010 
 
2004_OLKARIA There is no evaluation for this project. The field visit evidenced that this project contributed 
to improvements in terms of access to infrastructure: it is a project that involved technology 
transfer and development of new expertise in the country. With this project, KenGen has 
reached first class technical competence in geothermal power generation. The project permits 
to alleviate the constraints on power generation and to benefit from environmentally cleaner 
process. Currently total energy production is 1350 MW and there is a national reserve 
emergency power of 290 MW which is extremely costly to activate and environmentally 
adverse because it relies on expensive fuel power plants. The 35 MW additional capacity of 
Olkaria II extension will permit to rely less on these 290 MW; for instance during drought 
period. Interventions in power generation are important for the private sector as they 
contribute to lowering the high price of electricity, currently a strong impediment to the 
development of the private sector.  
Sources: MN310, MN341, MN332 
 
Fiji Digicel Cf  I.5.4.2 
2006_Eau 
Senegal 
The EIB, the AFD and other institutions have been involved in the water & sanitation 
sector in Senegal for a number of years. A result has been the reorganisation of the 
water sector under a concession regime and the introduction of an “affermage” 
leading to sustainability of the water supply component.  
Source : MN250 
 
2008_TA Rep 
Dom 
No evaluations have been carried out. From the field visit, it appeared clearly that the 
operation contributed to the institutional strengthening of the financial intermediaries 
supported with a view to ensure the compliance of these institutions with the Dominican 
banking regulatory framework. In particular, the EIB helped Banco Ademi to obtain new 
regulations by accompanying Banco Ademi in the development of manuals for compliance 
with prudential rules on operational risk.  It also accompanied Fondesa with a view to 
transform it in a regulated institution. Fondesa is not yet a regulated institution but was 
preparing itself to proceed with the transformation. However, the EIB support has not 
contributed to improvements of the Dominican banking regulatory framework as such. 
Sources: MN 401, MN 425 
 
I-6.2.3 Selected indicators from “Doing business in….” for those countries where substantial 
operations were conducted. 
JC 6.3 EIB IF/OR support has contributed to developing / strengthening the local financial 
sector 
General See findings under JC4.1 
 
I-6.3.1 Trend in the volume and quality of products offered by the local financial sector 
General and 
operation-
specific 
See findings under JC 4.3 
Kula II Fund The operation has introduced the product risk capital that was totally unknown in the region. 
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Source: MN313 
I-6.3.2 Trend in credit to the private sector, and particularly to SMEs 
General and 
operation-
specific 
See findings under JC 4.3 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2006 
The fund started operations in January 2007 with the objective to invest $US 14.1. By end 
2009 61 deals have been concluded for a total amount of $US12.4. The table provides the 
distribution of the loans granted by the fund: 
Source: MN352 
2005_ACPGLOB 
ADEMI 
 
Banco ADEMI was both transformed into a bank, and enlarged, with EIB support and has 
thus increased the supply of long term credit to SMEs 
Sources: 
 MN 401,  
EIB, Monitoring Exercise  8/2008 ADEMI V, ADEMI V A, ADEMI V C- OPS B Project 
Progress Report 
 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2004 
 Madagas
car 
This Fund is expected to have increased equity and quasi-equity supply to MSMEs 
Source: Project documentation 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2006 
 Kenya 
This Fund is expected to have increased equity and quasi-equity supply to MSMEs 
Source: Project documentation 
2005_EMP 
AFRICA FUND 
II 
This Fund is increasing equity supply to MSMEs. 
Source: Project documentation 
2008_EDFI  
JC 6.4 EIB IF/OR support has stimulated sector growth and competitiveness 
I-6.4.1 Contribution of private sector to value added 
1999_Maragra 
Sugar project 
The project stimulated the national economy : “The project is making positive contributions to the 
national economy and to the local community. It allowed the generation of substantial sugar related revenue that 
flows into the communities through salaries and wages and from support services supplied by local entrepreneurs. 
In the factory and agricultural production, economic benefits are expected from significant savings in foreign 
exchange through import substitution.” 
Industry Classification Number % Value %
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry & Fishing 2  3% 301 210   2%
Mining 2  3% 708 222   6%
MNF – Food & Beverages 6  10% 1 630 000    13%
MNF – Textiles 3  5% 531 769   4%
MNF - Wood Products 2  3% 157 632   1%
MNF - Chemicals & Rubber 1  2% 238 000   2%
MNF - Other non-metallic products -    0% -   0%
MNF - Iron, Steel, Mach, Equip, Transport Equip 2  3% 345 000   3%
MNF – Furniture -    0% -   0%
Construction 9  15% 1 674 000    13%
Wholesale & Repair – Personal, Household Goods 3  5% 323 000   3%
Retail & Repair - Personal, Household Goods 2  3% 417 888   3%
Sale, Maint & Repair of vehicles, Retail Auto 4  7% 899 000   7%
Hotels & Restaurants 2  3% 372 470   3%
Transport, Storage & Communication 5  8% 1 040 000    8%
Business Services 16   26% 3 460 812    28%
Social & Personal Services 2  3% 301 210   2%
Private Households, Exterr. Organisations -    0% -   0%
Total 61   100% 12 400 213    100%
Business Plans Gross Approved by Industry Classification 
Since Inception 
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Source: EIB project completion report 
 
2001_Moma 
Titanium 
When fully completed, (estimated date end 2010), the project will significantly increase the 
value added of the mining and manufacturing sectors (limited respectively to 0.25% and 13% 
of GDP despite favourable geological environment), moreover in one of the poorest areas of 
the country with no alternative sources of development.  
Source: EIB. Board of Directors. Moma Titanium Mozambique, 29 April 2003. Doc. 03/181. 
 
2004_LUMWAN
A 
Preparatory documents state: “Project team conclusions: The project is sustainable and 
profitable, and will generate direct income for Zambia (as well as producing dividends for 
shareholders and ensuring full debt service for lenders). It will at the same time contribute to 
Zambia’s Poverty Reduction Strategy, create jobs, develop the local skill base and contribute 
to improvement in infrastructure. It is fully consistent with the objectives for the Cotonou 
Agreement, and merits support from the Bank.” 
Source: EIB Fact Sheet B: financing proposal, Luxembourg 19/7/2006. 2004- OPS B/ACPIF 
0146/BrandSchmitzWaltraud, p.4 
 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2006 
A new venture capital fund was created, and was supported by EIB, filling a gap in the local 
financial sector in Kenya 
Source:  MN 352 
 
2005_ACPGLOB 
ADEMI 
 
The 2008 Monitoring exercise states: “ADEMI’s activities have undoubtedly had a positive impact on 
the economic development of the country, since it has opened and widened access to credit for the smaller SMEs, 
whose crucial role in job creation is now widely recognised.  [The Bank’s][EIB’s] support for ADEMI has 
been very important in enabling the institution to enlarge the amount as well as the duration of its loans along 
with dynamic growth of many of its customers. (…) The loan contributed so far to the financing of 161 
projects.” 
Source: Monitoring Exercise  8/2008 ADEMI V, ADEMI V A, ADEMI V C- OPS B Project 
Progress Report 
 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2004 
A new venture capital fund was created, and was supported by EIB, filling a gap in the local 
financial sector in Madagascar 
Source: Project documentation 
 
Fiji Denarau 
Hotel 
Benefits to the local community 
Fiji native people are the owners and the land (10.7 ha) is leased 90 years. Landowners are 
benefitting from the lease. Schools and other amenities of the landowners communities are 
completely financed by the revenue from the lease. Lease is a % of turnover of the hotel, 
capped to 300 000 FJD (due by Richmond). Gross turnover is around 30 000 000 FJD. Note 
that there is no escalation clause to adjust the lease to inflation. The lease is only one source of 
income for the landowners. They have preference rights for jobs (on equal qualifications).  
(Indians would be more employed in the accounting). Hotel provides housing to the staff that 
is not local. The project has a strong potential. 
Sources: MN313, MN343, MN362 
 
I-6.4.2 Trend in employment in the private sector 
1999_Maragra 
Sugar project 
The operation contributed to the creation of jobs. “The rehabilitation of Maragra created direct 
employment of which permanent 1,791 and seasonal 3,369, which exceed the 3,100 people expected at the 
appraisal.” 
Source: EIB project completion report 
 
Fiji Denarau 
Hotel 
The operation contributed to the creation of jobs: 300 permanent staff + 300 at peak season 
(in the Sofitel, but one must also keep in mind that the number of hotels in Denarau increased 
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from 2 to 8). To this direct employment must be added a variety of indirect jobs linked to the 
tourist activities. 
Sources: MN313, MN343, MN362 
 
2000_MAGADI  
SODA 
MSC is employing 410 people 
Number of people employed during implementation of project: 700 
Number of new permanent jobs created: 40 (estimated number at appraisal, confirmed at 
completion) 
Sources: EIB. Appraisal Report, Magadi Soda, Luxembourg 29/1/2002. (PJ/I&S/GCE/KAI/scm) 
EIB Magadi Soda Pure Ash Project, Project completion Report, Luxembourg 23/4/2008. 
 
2003_Dakar-
Ziguinchor 
The EIB evaluated the number of jobs created by the project: 
 Boat’s construction: 400 persons/year (temporary work) and 200 persons/year for the 
harbours developments. These estimations are based on the productivity of the low-
income countries. 
 Boat’s exploitation: 90 employments created. 
Source : Operation’s « Conseil d’administration. Prêt sur les ressources de la FI. Projet Liaison maritime  
Dakar-Ziguinchor (Sénégal) », EIB, 2004, p7 
 
2005_ACPGLOB 
ADEMI 
 
The 2008 Monitoring exercise states: “ADEMI’s activities have undoubtedly had a positive impact on 
the economic development of the country, since it has opened and widened access to credit for the smaller SMEs, 
whose crucial role in job creation is now widely recognised.  [The Bank’s][EIB’s] support for ADEMI has 
been very important in enabling the institution to enlarge the amount as well as the duration of its loans along 
with dynamic growth of many of its customers. (…) The loan contributed so far to the financing of 161 
projects, creating 408 jobs.” 
 
Source: Monitoring Exercise  8/2008 ADEMI V, ADEMI V A, ADEMI V C- OPS B Project 
Progress Report 
 
2005_Pacific 
Islands 
The PIFF II is expected to create at least 300 jobs in total: “on the basis of the Bank’s similar 
operations in the region, it is expected that the facility will contribute to the financing of at least 300 projects of 
all different sizes. Through these projects, the facility will help creating a considerable number of jobs across 
various sectors and different countries in the Pacific Region”. 
Source: “Board of Directors, Global authorisation from IF resources” (for the operation), EIB, 21/11/2006 
(p14) 
 
For the facility’s first contract of €5m with the NDBP, the 2009 Project Progress Report 
mentions that 194 jobs have been created, all in Palau. It also provides in the following text 
and table information on the sectors relating to this job creation, with hotels and restaurants 
accounting for almost two thirds (122/194 or 63%) of the jobs created:   
 “9 projects (small and medium sized projects each requiring an investment by the Bank comprised between 
EUR 70,000 and EUR 500,000) totalling USD 2.3M and 70 portfolio projects (below EUR 70,000) 
totalling USD 2.1M have been allocated and disbursed. Over a fourth of the GL has been allocated to 
construction (28.61%), another fourth (25.68%) to social housing (classified under real estate, renting and 
business activities), 18% to hotels and restaurants, 17% to wholesale and retail trade, 5.6% to transport, 
2.2% to electricity, gas and water supply and 2.6% to other community, social and personal service activities.” 
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Sector analysis  
Section % 
Allocated 
amount 
(EUR) 
SubProject 
cost (EUR)
Jobs 
created
Section H : Hotels And Restaurants 18,01 % 531.625,41 26.424.110,57 122
Section G : Wholesale And Retail Trade; 
Repair Of Motor Vehicles, Motorcycles 
And Personal And Household Goods 
17,30 % 510.660,04 1.021.320,07 12
Section I : Transport, Storage And 
Communication 5,59 % 164.993,73 1.227.031,03 7
Section K : Real Estate, Renting And 
Business Activities 25,68 % 758.214,49 1.808.378,66 5
Section O : Other Community, Social And 
Personal Service Activities 2,58 % 76.241,14 152.482,27 1
Section E : Electricity, Gas And Water 
Supply 2,23 % 65.732,62 131.465,25 20
Section F : Construction 28,61 % 844.753,31 2.256.927,72 27
 100 % 2.952.220,74 33.021.715,56 194
Source: “Project Progress Report” (of the operation), EIB, 01/12/2009 (p2, 4) 
PIFF I - Samoa For the contract with the DBS, the January 2009 Project Progress Report mentions that 724 
jobs have been created.    
Source: “Project Progress Report” (of the operation’s contract n° 23209 with the DBS), EIB, 07/01/2009 
(p2) 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
The number of temporary jobs created during the construction is estimated at 500 man-years 
according to the EIB. 
Source : “Conseil d’administration. Prêt à l’investissement bonifié sur ressources propres. Projet 
PROGRAMME EAU », EIB, 2007, p5 
 
I-6.4.3 Trend in investments in the private sector. 
General No evidence has been found in this respect 
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EQ7 To what extent did IF/OR investments generate positive social and environmental 
impact?  
JC 7.1. EIB has systematically addressed social and environmental impact in its operations 
and ensured that mitigating measures were put in place 
General The EIB issued a document outlining the procedures for environmental examination of 
projects in 2002. The environmental requirements are without clear performance levels or 
auditable compliance criteria ; it refers to EU policies, standards and laws. The most 
important EU directive in this context is the EIA directive. EIB projects outside the EU but 
excluding ACP countries show that generally projects are generally rated satisfactorily. With 
the issue of the EIB Statement of Environmental and Social Principles and Standards in 2009 
reinforced environmental requirements for projects benefiting from a loan from the EIB. 
 
In terms of social safeguard, the EIB should restrict its financing to projects that respect 
human rights and comply with EIB social standards, based on the principles of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the EU. In all regions (except for Enlargement countries), the EIB’s 
approach to social matters is based on the right-based approach mainstreaming the principles 
of HR law into practise through application of its Social Assessment Guidelines. 
 
ESIAF has been used since 2007 for all direct project loans and for all financial sector 
operations outside Europe. ESIAF follows a three-pillar system (similar to the one of the 
value-added framework in MS and pre-accession countries): 
 Pillar 1: contribution to overall mandate objectives and priorities (including consistency 
with EU policies) 
 Pillar 2: quality and soundness of the project (includes the social and environmental 
impacts of all investment operations) 
 Pillar 3 : EIB contribution to the project (includes the EIB’s non-financial contribution) 
 
Source : Mid Term Evaluation of EIB’s External Mandate, DG ECFIN, March 2010. 
For the Investment Facility projects approved in 2009, the outcome of ESIAF is as follows: 
 
 Low Medium High
Pillar 1  5 30 
Pillar 2 
- Financial sector 
- Non financial sector 
  
15 
9 
 
3 
8 
Pillar 3  12 23 
 
This reflects that the EIB puts effort to meet the EIB’s mandate in the regions of operations 
(by contributing to economic growth, development and ultimately to poverty reduction. The 
EIB also concentrates on projects where it can bring added value, notably by providing 
promoters with long maturities, grace periods and risk-capital instruments. Pillar 2 ratings also 
show that the EIB approved projects that meet an expanded set of economic, financial and 
environmental and social criteria. 
 
Source:  EIB, Investment Facioity Annual Report 2009. 
 
The report indicates the example of the Nam Theun 2 Dam project in Laos to stress that 
environmental compliance is falling behind. According to the EIB, “NT2’s environmental and 
social impacts and corresponding mitigation measures have been reviewed against the relevant 
policies of the EIB and the principles underlying related EU legislation. The EIA and design 
of mitigation measures are considered to have met EU standards”. The EIB also claims that 
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the “project complies with the EU’s and the EIB’s environmental policy, by taking climate 
change and promoting sustainable use of renewable natural resources”. However, illegal 
logging and mining concessions are threatening the watershed area and the Nakai-Nam Theun 
National Protected Area. Poor environmental management practices, including the failure to 
control erosion, dust, sedimentation and excessive forest clearance along roads have been 
criticized. Similarly, the large NT2 reservoir will actually contribute to greenhouse gas 
emissions. Neither the company nor the Lao government has committed to clear biomass 
from the reservoir area before it is flooded, despite promises made in the EIA.  
 
Moreover, the EIB notes that “the project has gone a long way to meet WCD 
recommendations”. However, the report stresses that the project fails to comply with 6 of the 
7 strategic priorities outlined in the WCD report (gaining public acceptance, comprehensive 
options assessment, addressing existing dams, sustaining rivers and livelihoods, recognising 
entitlements and sharing benefits, and ensuring compliance.” For example, WCD Strategic 
Priority 3, “Addressing Existing Dams”, stipulates that outstanding issues with existing dams 
must be resolved before additional dams are built in the same river basin. But hydropower 
projects in Laos have left a legacy of destroyed livelihoods, decimated fisheries and 
environmental destruction. Some assistance was provided but villagers still have not been 
compensated for fish losses of up to 90% of their pre-project catch. Severe flooding and 
erosion along the Hinboun River continues to impact villagers. Similarly, taking WCD 
recommendations into account, the EIB stipulates that its loan is conditional on mitigation 
measures for directly affected people going beyond mere compensation but also providing a 
share in project benefits. The WCD requires that all adversely affected people negotiate 
formal and legally enforceable agreements guaranteeing their rights. This never occurred for 
Nam Theun 2 : there are no independent organisations in Laos that are able to monitor the 
project and the commitments made by the Government of Laos and Nam Theun 2 Power 
Company (NTPC). The legal system is not sufficiently developed to provide possible remedies 
for affected people. This calls into question the accountability of the parties who have not 
taken actions on these issues. 
 
Source: CEE bankwatch network, “Raising the bar on big dams, Making the case for dam policy reform at 
the European Investment Bank”, November 2007 
General An EIB staff member noted that TA provided by the EIB has also value added in terms of 
environmental and social impact assessments, notably for large projects. E.g. WAGP. 
In the mining sector there is a possibility for analysing social issues, but it has not been 
realised.  
Source: MN 102 
Pacific general BEI a introduit des lignes de crédit environnementales, bonifiées (subsides d’intérêt) en 
Nouvelle Calédonie et Polynésie Française. La BNDP (Palau) en demande une de 2m à la 
BEI. Sous étude.  
MN313 
Pacific Novotel 
Denrau 
Views of partner authorities on social and environmental impact:  
Tourism Sector:  
The effort to build the Sofitel hotel has been instrumental in developing the tourism sector in  
Nadi and making Fiji an attractive destination for tourism. 
However, the ministry considers that developing the 5 stars segment of the tourism industry is 
necessary and welcome but not sufficient. The current policy is to support smaller touristic 
projects and eco-tourism, to increase the benefits for the local communities. 
In tourism projects there are three stakeholders: 
The promoters/investors 
The industry (operators) 
The local population (fishing rights, lease) 
The Government is an indirect benefactor: it gets taxes, foreign exchange revenues for the 
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countries etc… but provides concessions in the form of tax holidays and various exemptions. 
After 2006 the government has considered that it was losing and is now trying to reduce the 
length of tax holidays and other concessions. 
The large tourism projects bring minimal benefits to the local populations because the 
operators are usually foreign. The ministry would like to develop smaller projects involving 
local operators. 
An issue with the large projects like the Denarau one is that on paper they are compliant with 
all the environmental regulations. In practice, tourist activities in the area have created some 
environmental negative consequences: water pollution, damage to corral, careless waste 
disposal, landscape modification. Tourism Fiji Board is attempting to identify them. The 
problem is that penalties are ludicrously small.  
Communication sector: 
Digicel project: Objectives of stimulating competition and reducing costs have been realised.  
Ministry would welcome help in developing the regulatory institutions for the sector. 
Private sector development: 
Support to the development banks and global loans are regarded as ideal. Global loan are 
currently not provided to Fiji Development Bank due to political situation. Authorities 
consider that this would be the most useful contribution to development in Fiji 
Source: MN362 
2004-WAGP The project was subject to rigorous Environmental and Social Impact Assessments including 
extensive public consultation, in line with EU standard and policies. Major potential impacts 
that have been identified relate to the change of land utilisation with possible resettlement4 of 
population, the alteration of vegetation and gulf water habitats, the disruption of community 
activities, in particular fishing, the influx of construction workers, and the spread of disease 
and social issues (compensation and employment). Detailed environmental management plans 
(EMP) and resettlement action plans (RAP) have been developed to provide mitigation, 
compensation and monitoring requirements for the project. The result of the assessment is 
that no potentially high severity impacts would remain after the planned mitigation measures 
are applied. The EIA work is of good quality and was endorsed by the World Bank and Miga.  
 
The project will bring significant benefits in term of reduced air pollution in Ghana, Benin 
and Togo where natural gas transported by the project will replace liquid fuels.  
 
The project is generally supported by most of the affected communities and NGO's with the 
exception of some communities and NGO's (mostly in Nigeria) who are campaigning against 
the project on the basis of broader issues related to the environment and socio-political 
situation in the Niger Delta.    
 
Source: EIB, West African Gas Pipeline, Ghana, RM/CRD Opinion (Fact Sheet B Ops 
B/ACP-IF-1/2004-0026/EW) 
I-7.1.1 Consistency of project processing with EIB standards procedures and guidelines, as 
reflected in the ESIAF framework 
General An EIB sources stated that the Bank is confronted in its activities with increasing 
‘stakeholder scrutiny’: “Under the Lomé Conventions, (…) a standard sovereign/public sector loan, 
typically to a national utility company, involved a relatively light appraisal, largely based on PJ’s analysis of the 
technical, cost and economic profitability elements of the project. This was accompanied by a somewhat broad-
brush financial assessment undertaken by OPs. Negotiations of the standard legal documents were usually no 
more than a one-to-two day, take it or leave it, affair. Today, the due diligence process with private sector 
counterparts is far more comprehensive encompassing increasingly sophisticated financial modelling, a detailed 
credit analysis involving CRD, the completion of the ESIAF to demonstrate the Bank’s value-added, opinions 
from JU and OCCO, the provision of term sheets, long and complex legal discussions on tailor-made 
                                                 
4 At this stage it is estimated that the resettlement would concern around 150 households. 
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contractual documents often involving external lawyers, NGO scrutiny etc. This process is particularly complex 
in the case of project finance/PPP operations”. 
“ACP operations are now subject to much greater stakeholder scrutiny than in the past, be it from the 
shareholders, other EU institutions (Commission, Parliament and Court of Auditors) and, above all civil 
society and in particular NGOs”.  
The EIB was asked for “introducing greater transparency into ACP operations and the resultant decision to 
extend the role of the IF Committee and to apply the ESIAF to all operations. Whilst the latter framework is 
in place consistent application and quality control have still to be assured. In short, either explicitly or 
implicitly, there is a view amongst the shareholders and the NGOs that the Bank should emulate its peers and 
be more active in, and thereby devote more resources than it has done traditionally to, the upstream and 
downstream parts of the project cycle. As far as ACP-IF is concerned, the impact is also felt through the 
burgeoning dialogue with the shareholders and especially the NGOs, either in the increasing number of 
conferences that the NGOs are organising about the Bank’s criteria, safeguards and procedures or in the direct 
campaigns that they mount in the case of sensitive sectors such as dams, mining, renewable energy and climate 
change (e.g. Chad-Cameroon pipeline and Tenke Fungurume project in DRC). Also adding to the workload 
is the European Parliament’s increased interest in the Bank’s activities and a more critical approach by the 
Commission.” 
Source: MN 027 
 
General points on this EQ follow here, as reported by an EIB staff member (source: MN 007). 
This includes the observation that the EIB doesn’t have a scorecard on mechanical impact 
measurement like other DFIs but has its own approach of ex post impact measurement.  
 
 « DEAS : on fait pas mal de choses diverses et variées. Point de départ : aspects 
macroéconomiques au niveau des pays. Ce sont nos macro économistes qui dirigent … A 
partir de là plusieurs choses se sont développées, en particulier avec une dimension risque.  
 Autre dimension (pas liées directement aux opérations) plus générale, de l’ordre de la politique/stratégie : 
ESIAF est un peu le fruit du hasard. Les idées ont commencé à venir en 2003, discussions internes 
quand on a commencé à introduire la dimension de risque crédit depuis Cotonou. Trouver l’équilibre 
entre la perspective risque et la perspective développement (= plus de développement qu’avant). Nous avons 
alors développé un premier cadre (DIAF), uniquement ACP et opérations directes. Avec le temps est 
devenu ESIAF et s’est élargi (opérations, dimensions, etc.). Après un certain temps on est aussi entrés en 
contact avec nos collègues de l’EVALUATION à la BEI – pour voir comment mesurer cela.  
 ESIAF (economic & social): concerne toute la performance de l’opération (incl. relevance, efficiency, etc.). 
It is inspired by two key documents : the EIB statement on social & environmental standards (last year), 
and the Environmental and Social Practices Handbook (latest public version is 2007  – but a draft of 
the revised manual is for next month).  
 ESIAF : trois piliers (déjà les indicateurs existaient depuis toujours, depuis le début en 2002, même si 
pas autant formalisés, pas de véritable innovation à l’exception des aspects sociaux):  
 Cohérence avec objectifs / mandats politiques (éligibilité) 
 Qualité projet 
 Contribution de la BEI 
 Evaluation ex-post : voir ex-post dans quelle mesure la réalité à été conforme aux attentes. Nous 
souhaiterions développer (encore au niveau du souhait…) que le cadre ESIAF (qui est encore de nature 
relativement qualitative) soit plus chiffré, avec objectifs mesurables, en tout cas au niveau projet. Il y a 
matière à intégrer de façon plus systématique des indicateurs quantitatifs. Il manque une certaine 
systématisation d’inclusion de tels indicateurs (qui sont parfois déjà utilisés).  
o ESIAF n’est pas un système de scoring mécanique. DOTS de l’IFC c’est comme nous 
(appréciation sur la base du jugement). DEG et son GER est du scoring par exemple. 
PROPARCO l’a repris par exemple.  
o Pilier 2 : qualité du projet. C’est la direction PJ qui a la responsabilité de remplir ces 
tableaux. Mais quand il s’agit de la dimension financière, ce sont nos services DEAS qui 
s’en chargent.  
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 Dans le cadre actuel (ex ante) on ne dit rien sur les bénéficiaires finaux. Cela dit toutefois quelque 
chose sur (i) la qualité des intermédiaires financiers et l’environnement macro-financier, (iii) l’impact 
spécifique en termes de développement et (iii) les éventuelles dimensions développement spécifiques5. Mais 
vu que c’est ex ante, on ne peut dire grand-chose sur l’impact (emplois créés etc.) de façon ex ante. Mais ce 
n’est pas tant ce qu’on nous demande dans l’IF. Lorsqu’on a fait l’évaluation il y a qqs années (Lomé 
IV), quand on avait visité un quart des bénéficiaires, on avait dit que ce serait l’unité d’évaluation de la 
BEI (EV) qui serait chargée de faire ce type de rapport, car mesure ex-post. On le trouvera donc dans le 
rapport ACP sur les lignes de crédit. » 
Source : MN 007 
 
Monitoring of development impact is hampered by lack of resources, as mentioned by EIB 
staff members (see also I-9.3.2): 
“Selon « Fair evaluation »  (international financial reportings standards – IFRS) il faut faire chaque année 
un inventaire de la valeur des actifs, y compris de la FI, notamment pour travail de provisions -  on fait cela en 
même temps que le monitoring.  
Monitoring de l’impact en termes de développement : a été demandé clairement il y a qqs années. On a du mal 
à le mettre en place par manque de ressources. Bernard Ziller avait été voir des peer institutions pour voir 
comment ils faisaient : ils ont des ressources dédiées. Nous n’avons pas ces moyens.  
Décision du CD prise d’harmoniser maintenant toutes les activités monitoring au sein de la Banque dans le 
TMR (Transaction Management Restructuring), pareil pour EU et Externat Lending Mandate et ACP etc. 
Problème : c’est du monitoring point de vue risque. Le Département Projets serait sensé faire le monitoring 
point de vue physique, mais ils n’ont pas les ressources. Souvent ils font du copier coller de ce qu’on fait ici. » 
Source : MN 027 
General According to this NGO report, EIB staff is supposed to appraise the projects proposed in 
relation to EIB priorities and EIB economic, technical, environmental and financial viability. 
However, the EIB makes too many ad-hoc decisions as it lacks a sufficiently clear way to 
assess project’s likely impacts. The EIB says that it has introduced improvements in its project 
appraisal to balance financial and economic considerations with the project’s expected social 
and development impact. The standard financial checks aim to determine : 
- Consistency with the objectives of the EIB’s mandate under the Cotonou Agreement 
- Quality and soundness of projects (economic, environmental, social, financial and 
institutional) 
- EIB contribution or additionality (both financial and non-financial) 
The EIB spells this in an Economic and Social Impact Assessment Framework (ESIAF). The 
EIB claims that starting in 2008, the ESIAF has been systematically applied to benchmark all 
operations appraised, whether investment loans or financial sector operations. However, as a 
more focused implementation of ESIAF was planned for 2009, the EIB implicitly recognised 
that there was room for improvement.  
 
The EIB also has other documents, for example the Development Impact Assessment 
Framework which applies to the IF projects in ACP countries. This document requires the 
EIB project appraisal team to provide a development impact assessment which analyses the 
distribution of project effects and the project social acceptability, who benefits and who pays 
for the costs.  
 
According to this report, several examples show that these processes have not worked. For 
example, the Bujagali dam in Uganda in 2007 approved by the WB, EIB and ADB where the 
economic and environmental soundness were not properly assessed (in particular the effect 
on climate change, on the environment and on biodiversity). There is a high risk that the 
project will produce less power than expected and at a higher price: the dam’s capacity has 
                                                 
5  Éléments qualitatifs dans la conception de l’intervention (ciblage, instrument, etc. éventuellement novateur sur le 
marché spécifique, impact spécifique, effort spécifique, etc.) 
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been overestimated and the terms of the Power Purchase Agreement are disadvantageous 
implying that the electricity produced will only be affordable to the wealthiest segments of the 
Ugandan population. This project violates the principles stated in EIB policies including its 
Environmental Statement and the climate change provisions outlined in the Environmental 
and Social Practices Handbook. 
 
This report also points that the EIB sometimes approved projects before the completion of 
the Environmental Impact Assessment and before relevant approvals have been granted by 
national authorities. Example: the Gilgel Gibe II dam in Ethiopia where construction started 
before the environmental licence was released by the Ethiopian Environmental authority. In 
early February 2010, a critical water passage tunnel in the newly inaugurated project collapsed, 
shutting down operations for an extended period. 
 
 
Source: Counter Balance, Challenging the EIB, “Corporate welfare and development deceptions : why the EIB 
is failing to deliver outside the EU?”, February 2010 
 
In its manual of social and environmental practices, the EIB has developed main lines on 
population displacements and resettlements. The project analysis should in particular 
“evaluate the will of the population to move” and the “consulting procedures put in place” as 
well as “the capacity of public services to manage the process”. However, according to this 
report, these declarations are not accompanied by specific procedures or conditions. The 
report points to an example where these principles are not respected (Tenke-Fugurume 
project in DRC) 
 
Source: Counter Balance, Réformer la Banque Européenne d’investissement, “Terrain miné, l’implication de la 
BEI dans le projet minier de Tenke-Fugurume en RDC », Août 2008 (page 15) 
 
The EIB has been involved in a number of large dam projects in recent years, many of them 
in Africa. All could have been improved by more careful planning and better implementation 
standards. The report stresses that the EIB does not have clear internal safeguard policies and 
no comprehensive sector policy on dams. The EIB environmental policy (“Environmental 
Statement 2004”) states that the “EIB is guided by the findings and recommendations of 
recognized international good practice for particular sectors”. According to this report, the 
statement is too vague to be meaningful. Moreover, EIB’s intentions are undermined in 
practice. According to its environmental statement, the EIB does not accept a project for 
financing that is likely to have a significant negative environmental impact. However, the EIB 
took on numerous projects with high environmental risks (mining in Africa, pulp mills in 
Brazil, dams project in ACP countries). The EIB’s 2006 Corporate Responsibility Report 
indicates that the EIB’s top two objectives for defining its environmental responsibility is to 
“promote projects that protect and improve the natural and built environments and foster 
social well-being in the interests of sustainable development”. The large dam projects do not 
meet that definition: they have submerged productive farmland, forests and riverine habitat, 
left thousands of rural oustees more impoverished than before and sent some species to the 
brink of extinction. 
 
Source: CEE bankwatch network, “Raising the bar on big dams, Making the case for dam policy reform at 
the European Investment Bank”, November 2007 
General Systematic environmental studies are always conducted and apply the norms. Their 
conclusions are always taken into consideration to appraise a project. And in all cases 
compliance with the environmental norms will be checked, generally before signature, and in 
any case before the first disbursement; the environmental studies are then available in a quasi 
final form. Similarly consultations are conducted according the rules. The standard of these 
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studies and consultations is similar to that of IFC and other reputed institutions.  
It leads to the rejection of some projecs: 
 Coal power generation was refused because the technology was not acceptable on the 
basis of environmental criteria.  
 Ardjanala dam in Benin was refused because it involved an excessive resettlement of 
populations.  
Source : MN266 
2000_MAGADI_ 
SODA 
Environment Impact Study has been established. In view of the methods used, the mining 
and processing of trona at lake Magadi is not believed to present particular problems. 
Source: Note to OP3. Opinion for Appraisal Authorisation. Project Magadi Soda, country 
Kenya. Luxembourg 24/10/2000, PJ/I&S/2000-1186/GCE/SHW/ms 
2003_BOAD PG 
IV 
No information available. 
2004_OLKARIA Full scale environmental studies for the Olkaria II power station and related transmission line 
were carried out in 1993/1994. The content of the study for the power station, which did not 
find significant negative environmental impacts, is still mostly valid and also applicable to the 
present project. In 2004, an opinion report for the Extension project based on the existing 
EIA provided an indication of the significance (result: low) of possible impacts of the project. 
Also, an environmental audit has been established for the existing Olkaria II power station. 
The location of the project within the Hell’s Gate National Park (as is the case for the power 
stations Olkaria I and II) requires special attention. 
Source EIB Fact Sheet A: proposal to appraise new operation. Luxembourg 19/11/2004. 
OPS B/ACPIF-2CENT&EASTAFR/2004-0255/GOUNOT MARCEL 
2004_OLKARIA The following steps have been undertaken for the Olkaria " Extension project: 
1. A complete and detailed ElA had been set up in 1993/94 for the Olkaria " project. In 
essence, the study and findings are also valid for the Olkaria " Extension project as it 
concerns the same location and issues. This ElA had been complemented in 1998 on 
EIB's insistence for the transmission line outside the Hell's Gate National Park and the 
new Nairobi North Substation. 
2. An independent consultant prepared in April 2004 a short opinion report for the promoter, 
screening the project for potential major issues. This report represents the project brief. 
3. The same consultant issued in May 2004 the required audit report (in draft form). 
4. The same consultant established in June 2004 a full ElA on the Olkaria " Extension 
project in draft form. Currently, the last landowners' consultation is underway. It is foreseen 
to submit the ElA in form of a final draft to NEMA in early 2005. Approval is expected 
during the second quarter 2005. 
5. KenGen has no objection against EIB posting the ElA  on its website . 
Source: EIB. Appraisal Report. Olkaria II Extension. Extension of a geothermal power 
station. Luxembourg 18/1/2005. PJ/Enercom/I&S/2005-25/EH/EG/fe., Appendix E 
2004-WAGP The project has been the object of in depth environmental and social assessments complied 
line with each country’s legislation, submitted to public review. Results have been published 
of Environment Impact Assessments have been published on the web site of the promoter 
and the World Bank. 
Source EIB, West African Gas Pipeline, Ghana, RM/CRD Opinion (Fact Sheet B Ops 
B/ACP-IF-1/2004-0026/EW) 
2004_LUMWAN
A 
Environment Impact Assessment has been prepared by an independent consultant as part of 
the feasibility study.  No major environmental problems have been detected. No resettlement 
of local population will be necessary.   
Source:  EIB Note to Ops B/ACP-IF-3 Opinion for Appraisal, Luxembourg 27/5/2005. 
PJ/I&S/2005-598/GCE/MJ/aa 
Project information required by the Bank in the promoter’s regular progress reports includes: 
- Update on staffing and training; 
- Update on environmental, safety and health situation at site and description of major 
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issues;  
Information required in the completion report includes: 
- Number of new jobs created 
- Staff training activities 
- Description of the development and actual status of environmental issues, safety and 
health situation at site and description of any major issues health situation at site and 
description of any major issues health situation at site and description of any major 
issues. 
Source EIB Lumwana Copper Project, Appraisal report, Luxembourg 30/6/2006, 
PJ/I&S/2006-675/GCE/VMJ/aa. This document includes Evaluation summary sheet. They 
evidence the fact that the environmental situation is assessed and monitored, and they verify 
that consultation, public information has been done. 
 
2001_MOMA_ 
TITANIUM 
Full scale EIA carried out ad submitted for approval to the relevant authorities. No 
insurmountable problems expected.  
Sources  
EIB Note to OP3. Opinion for Appraisal Authorisation, Luxembourg, 15th May 2001, 
PJ/I&S/2001-0556/GCE/IK/sp 
EIB Appraisal Report, Moma Titanium, Luxembourg 27th February 2003, PJ/I&S/2003-
259/GCE/MUG/ms 
EIB Fact Sheet A: proposal to appraise new operation, Luxembourg 28th February 2002, Ops 
B/ACP-3/A° 2001-0242 
 
2001_MOMA_ 
TITANIUM 
Under Mozambican environmental and mining law, the project requires an environmental 
licence, for which the approval process is well advanced and on track. Some negative project 
impacts, such as the jetty location, have already been mitigated in the project definition as a 
result! of an early independent environmental assessment. The highest remaining environ 
mental risk is a potential ship wreckage offshore in the transhipment area, which has been 
relocated in order to protect a coral island (now some 5 km away). However, the likelihood of 
such an incident is low and can be further reduced by imposing and respecting strict 
operational procedures. The other issues such as e.g. resettlement of a village (some 1000 
people in total), mine closure and preservation of a sensitive coastal forest will be handled and 
mitigated accordingly, including an adequate resettlement and compensation plan following 
World Bank guidelines (as part of the Environment Management Programme) and a well-
adapted mining plan. A conceptual mine closure plan will be set up during early construction. 
Il appears that the relevant issues have been properly addressed by the promoter and 
mitigation measures have been introduced or foreseen to the extent possible. The project thus 
complies with the Bank's environ mental principle of minimisation of negative environmental 
impacts, and is deemed environmentally acceptable. 
Source: EIB. Board of Directors. Moma Titanium Mozambique, 29 April 2003. Doc. 03/181. 
 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
The CSPs for Senegal explain that for each project, an evaluation should be undertaken 
according to the EIB’s guidelines and should determine the financing rules.  
« Document de stratégie pays et programme indicatif national pour la période 2008-2013 », European 
Community, 2007, p35 
 
The DIAF report is annexed to the EIB Board of Directors document. The project is briefly 
analyzed through several attention points as the consistency with EC national priorities, 
attention paid to gender related aspects or use of technical assistance, for example. 
 
“Conseil d’administration. Prêt à l’investissement bonifié sur ressources propres. Projet PROGRAMME 
EAU », EIB, 2007, p15 
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I-7.1.2 Degrees of environmental sustainability sought by the EIB (from introduction of 
environmental requirements for all beneficiaries to specific environmental projects) 
2000_MAGADI 
SODA 
Acceptance of the project's EIA/Environmental Audit and Improvement Plan by NEMA 
(National Environment Management Agency), the Government's competent environmental 
authority and acceptance by MSC of the respective conditions potentially set by NEMA has 
been a condition imposed by EIB.  
Source: EIB. Appraisal Report, Magadi Soda, Luxembourg 29/1/2002. 
(PJ/I&S/GCE/KAI/scm) 
2003_BOAD PG 
IV 
Information not available . 
2003_Dakar-
Ziguinchor 
The favourable environmental impact of the project is described by the EIB. In that respect, 
the emissions of CO2 are lower compared to the transport road. The difference should be 
more important because the shipping distance is less than the road distance between Dakar 
and Ziguinchor.  
 
The sea link should also reduce the traffic jams on the road Dakar-Rufisque-MBour (83 km).   
 
According to the EIB, environmental impact analysis is not required due to the fact that the 
harbours developments are limited. However specific environmental impacts have been 
assessed. For example, the boat’s speed should be limited in order to avoid the shores erosion. 
No evidence has been found regarding the effective application of this recommendation.  
 
Finally, the boat should meet the IMO’s convention in terms of shipping pollution, especially 
the MARPOL (i.e. the main international convention covering prevention of pollution of the 
marine environment by ships from operational or accidental causes). 
 
Source: Operation’s « Conseil d’administration. Prêt sur les ressources de la FI. Projet Liaison 
maritime  
Dakar-Ziguinchor (Sénégal) », EIB, 2004, p2 
 
An environmental paper as well as an environmental summary are enclosed to the « Rapport 
d’instruction » edited by the EIB. Beside the element mentioned above, the paper specified 
that the antipollution system on the boat should be checked each year by an international 
firm.   
Source: « Rapport d’instruction », EIB, 2004, annex D 
2004-OLKARIA The project aims at the development of renewable energy resources in line with EIB 
environmental policy and will help meet growing electricity demand at a competitive cost and 
with a limited impact on environment. The behaviour of the geothermal reservoir is 
sufficiently known 
Source: EIB. Apparaisal Report. Olkaria II Extension. Extension of a geothermal power 
station. Luxembourg 18/1/2005. PJ/Enercom/I&S/2005-25/EH/EG/fe. 
Specific conditions of disbursements have been imposed by the EIB to avoid or limit 
environmental damage caused by the project:  
• First Disbursement conditions 
The promoter shall provide the preliminary results of the reservoir optimisation study to 
confirm the sustainability of the geothermal resource for the project. 
NEMA approval and KenGen acceptance of conditions set therein. 
• Last Disbursement conditions 
Last disbursement (no less than 20%) shall be conditional on the promoter demonstrating to 
the satisfaction of the Bank that the bulk supply tariff is established at a level sufficient to fully 
and continuously coyer the generating costs of its plant portfolio. 
• Undertakings 
Implementation of the recommendations cited in the Environmental Impact Assessment. 
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Source: EIB. Apparaisal Report. Olkaria II Extension. Extension of a geothermal power 
station. Luxembourg 18/1/2005. PJ/Enercom/I&S/2005-25/EH/EG/fe. 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
The EIB seems to see the environmental aspects as an important matter of attention. In that 
respect the EIB makes sure that the EC Directive 97/11/CE on the assessment of the effects 
of certain public and private projects on the environment is correctly applied by the promoter. 
The impact on the protected natural area should be also assessed. And the exploitation of 
underground water by drilling should be attentively followed up to avoid over-exploitation. 
The national legislation, the procedures applied by the promoter as well as the location of the 
new infrastructures should be analyzed in that respect. 
 
“Fact sheet A: Appraisal Authorisation”, EIB, 2007, p2 
“Note à Ops B/ACPIF-1. Avis pour instruction », BEI, 2007, p4 
JC 7.2 Enterprises supported by IF/OR have applied sound social, employment, and 
environmental policies 
General According to this NGO  report, the EIB has so far failed to improve the environmental, 
social and human rights due diligence of the financial institutions it supported through 
lending, or introduce adequate monitoring procedures to verify that operations backed by 
financial intermediaries contribute in real terms to poverty reduction and sustainable 
development in developing countries. 
 
Source: Counter Balance, Challenging the EIB, “Corporate welfare and development deceptions : why the EIB 
is failing to deliver outside the EU?”, February 2010 (page 25) 
 
The company in charge of implementing the mining Tenke-Fugurume project in RDC has not 
respected fundamental labour and human rights. For instance, to allow the building of the 
factory, the population of Mulumbu had to be displaced and the building of places of 
resettlement had been foreseen. Populations have actually been displaced without giving their 
consent and before these new shelters were ready. Moreover, the displacement has been made 
without taking due care of the relations among communities, hereby creating a risk of conflict 
among them. Several jobs have been created but the fundamental labour norms have not been 
respected: the employees could not unionize, received very low salaries and had to work extra-
hours. Additionally, there has been very few jobs created, these were illegal and source of 
conflicts. 
 
Source: Counter Balance, Réformer la Banque Européenne d’investissement, “Terrain miné, l’implication de la 
BEI dans le projet minier de Tenke-Fugurume en RDC », Août 2008 
2000_MAGADI 
SODA 
Despite the fact that the HIV infection ratio in the Magadi region is currently below the 
national average the company in cooperation with its medical staff have taken a number of 
concrete steps to minimize the spread of HIV infection during the construction period of the 
new plant. The project thus fully complies with the Bank's environmental principles of 
sustainability and minimisation of negative environmental impacts. 
Source D12 
2000_MAGADI 
SODA 
People working in the plant : 450 (thus confirms addition of 40 to the initial 410) 
Magadi town: about 5000 people. 
The company provides jobs to the local community in salt work (non qualified work). 
The town is run by the company. Local market, three schools, water supply, 300 houses 
owned by the company, town maintenance run by the company). 
Company has contributed to 70% of the local hospital. 
NB:  much of this existed before: the company is in its hundredth year. Tata took over and 
continued the tradition. 
The company is well known for its CSR (company safety rules?) are highly recorded and the 
company has won many awards (NB: I am not entirely sure of this, CSR is my interpretation) 
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Region is vulnerable to floods in case of rains. The road is maintained by the company on 
over 100 km. 
NB: See the website: http://www.magadisoda.co.ke/ (in particular  community) 
Source: MN352 
2004_Lumwana The project plays a significant role in the expansion of a previously isolated region, some 220 
km west of the traditional Copper Belt. Hence, it is a step in the development of a new copper 
province in Northwest Zambia to even economic disparities between the regions. The project 
has created some 1150 direct jobs and in the medium term is expected to create at least three 
times as many indirect jobs. It values an indigenous natural resource, adds to 
Zambia's export revenues and generates direct Income for the country through mining 
royalties and corporate taxes. Through the training of local employees, the project  contributes 
to the local skill base. LMC is constructing a new town (Lumwana town) to  accommodate 
employees and their families, Including the opportunity for local nationals to purchase their 
homes through a home ownership mortgage program. The town community will also benefit 
from educational, recreational and cultural facilities, together with modem medical centres. 
This is the first new town to be built ln the country since its independence in 1964 
Sources:  
EIB Fact Sheet A: proposal to appraise new operation. Luxembourg 08/07/2005. OPS 
B/ACPIF-3SouthAfrica,0.Ind/2004-0146/BrandSchmitzWaltraud  
EIB Lumwana Copper Project. Finance Contracts n°23717,13718 and 23719 signed on 
November 2006, Luxembourg, 23 Décember 2008. 
It is estimated that during the construction phase of the project, employment will be 
generated for between 1500 and 2500 people, 80% of which will be Zambian nationals. The 
project is expected to create some 1150 direct jobs, with only a small number being 
expatriates, and at least three times as many indirect jobs. This is an important impulse for the 
region, of which the overall population in the vicinity of project is estimated at 10,000 people 
with, in addition, another 14,000 residents in the Meheba refugee settlement, within 15 km of 
the project (refugees mainly from Angola, Congo, and Rwanda origin). Through the trainingof 
local employees, the project will further contribute to the development of the local skill 
Source: EIB Lumwana Copper Project, Appraisal report, Luxembourg 30/6/2006, 
PJ/I&S/2006-675/GCE/VMJ/aa 
I-7.2.1 EIB appraisal of implementation of sound social policies by IF/OR-supported 
enterprises  
General EIB staff members noted that the EIB is calculating an ERR where possible, but that this 
does not integrate integrate the social & environmental dimensions (too demanding in terms 
of data):  
“Economic rate of return calculated where possible. Incl. value for carbon. More recently also trying valuating 
other things ex ante. But we don’t calculate an economic rate of return integrating also social & environmental 
dimension (too demanding in terms of data). We will systematically look at the expected impact on the 
natural environment. When negative, we are bound to identify ex ante mitigation and compensation 
measures. In the most extreme cases it will be part of a management plan. These mitigation and compensation 
measures will be factored in the project at they might have some costs. The project will then receive on 
environmental rating, a summary measurement. We are in the process of revising the handbook. Idea: that the 
rating evolves in the project cycle (e.g. with another rating after appraisal). We use a letter-based system (A, B, 
C etc.). Social considerations: five dimensions (co-labor standards, indigenous rights, etc.). Expectation is that 
project is judged against the compliance with those guidelines. Those ratings then come into the ESIAF. We 
might ask particular indicators for the monitoring depending on the specific cases.” 
“Looking at the future:  methodology for calculating carbon footprint: when we have got that data and be 
confident with the methodology, we will publish it. Likewise, we are piloting an environmental & social 
datasheet. This will facilitate our public disclosure policy.” 
“Quite naturally the evaluators think in terms of “impact”, but there is a difference with “safeguarding” 
good practices (not using child labor etc.). We won’t have an impact in terms of child labor…  Everything we 
do is hence not with a quantifiable impact in terms of safeguards. Very important point. We will get projects 
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with a negative footprint – we have to be prepared to accept that, balanced with other benefits of the project. But 
child labor etc is just not possible. Difficult question: what are the Bank’s minimum requirements, its bottom 
line? E.g. co-labor. In some sectors we have a black line (e.g. for child labor) and not a dotted line.”  
Source: MN 007 
 
A NGO interviewee noted that the EIB was responsive in the field of conflict prevention and 
peacebuilding: “EIB quite responsive to advocacy in the field of conflict prevention and Peacebuilding. There 
is now a document in place that requires the Bank to be conflict sensitive when it considers it should. Published 
in February 2009. It would be interesting to see to what extent it would have been useful to have a conflict 
sensitive approach over the evaluation period. EIB is bound by European Consensus (cf. Göteborg etc.) to be 
sensitive on conflict sensitivity. All EIB activities ought to be part of this framework. It also makes sense for 
the EIB: violent conflict is not good for projects and for the Bank  moral imperative and personal interest. 
Maybe there needs to be a steer to ensure that the EIB turns its commitments on conflict prevention into action. 
Risk is that conflict prevention dimension falls outside the prioritisation (e.g. versus financial return of a 
project).” 
Source: MN 022 
 
With regard to operations in the mining sector, a Commission staff member notes the 
following:  
“A la DEV, il n’y a plus de politique sectorielle. Il n’y a plus de politique concernant le secteur minier. 
Avant il y avait par exemple l’instrument SISMIN.  
Il y des instruments liés à la gouvernance, la transparence, etc. mais pas liés directement aux secteurs miniers.  
En tant que CE on peut assurer le bon climat des affaires, la gouvernance, la transparence, mais pas 
directement les entreprises minières. C’est pour cela qu’il y a des interventions (prêts) de la BEI dans ce secteur. 
Mais très critiquées, pas mal de conflits entre multinationales vs. communautés locales, etc. Extraction minière 
souvent à la base de conflits armés également. Les investissements de la BEI essaient de ne plus être directement 
dans l’extraction, mais d’investir moins et dans des projets moins sensibles. Plutôt en transformation de matière 
première par exemple. Ex. projets de cimenterie ». 
Source : MN 023 
General The EIB has conducted an Evaluation of activities under the European Financing Partners 
(EFP) Agreement. The evaluation added to the usual DAC criteria a specific criterion on 
environmental and social impact of the operations. In includes the outcome of ex-ante 
appraisal projections, impact during implementation and impact ex-post. Out of 5 projects 
evaluated 1 was rated good, 4 satisfactory. 
Source: EIB, Synthesis Report, Evaluation of activities under the European Finaning Partners 
(EFP) Agreement,  Janary 2009. 
2000_MAGADI 
SODA 
MSC has commissioned an ElA of the project by an independent consultant established in 
2000 with the participation of local stakeholders, This ElA has been submitted for approval to 
the relevant authority NEMA (National Environmental Management Agency) in October 
2001, Additional requirements by NEMA are an independent environmental audit of MSC, an 
environ mental improvement plan and consent of ail stakeholders, Final acceptance is 
expected towards the end of the 1 quarter 2002, If located within the EU, the project would 
fall under point 6 (a) of the annex Il of the respective EU Directive 97/11. Parts of the Lake 
Magadi which serve as an important refuge for water birds (where a certain fresh water influx 
exists) have been, are and will be quite distinct, far and untouched from and not adversely 
affected by the MSC operation. The project has no major negative environmental impact. The 
project will be set up within the borders of the existing operation. Tailings particularly 
containing elevated levels of NaF are pumped back into mined out areas of the lake and 
stored there, S02 emissions from power generators are minimised by scrubbing the off-gas 
with naturally occurring soda liquor. Dust generated in the plant will be further reduced by the 
new processes and installations, Cogeneration of electric power contributes to limiting CO2 
emission levels to a feasible extent. 
Sources 
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EIB. Appraisal Report, Magadi Soda, Luxembourg 29/1/2002. (PJ/I&S/GCE/KAI/scm) 
EIB. Board of Directors. Magadi Soda Pure Ash Project (Kenya). 9/10/2003 
 
The company has an active social  and employment policy 
450 people are working on the site (this figure confirms addition of 40 to the initial 
employment 410, as indicated in the preparatory document) 
The company is actively involved in the local community.  
Magadi town: about 5000 people. The company provides jobs to the local community in salt 
work (non qualified work).The town is run by the company. Local market, three schools, 
water supply, 300 houses owned by the company, town maintenance run by the 
company).Company has contributed to 70% of the local hospital. 
NB:  much of this existed before: the company is in its hundredth year. Tata took over and 
continues the tradition.  
The company is well known for its safety rules which are highly recorded and won several 
awards. Region is vulnerable to floods in case of rains. The road is maintained by the 
company on over 100 km. 
NB: See the website: http://www.magadisoda.co.ke/ (in particular  community) 
MN352 
2003_BOAD PG 
IV 
There is no evidence of such appraisal of social policies 
2003_Dakar-
Ziguinchor 
There is no evidence of such appraisal of social policies 
2004_OLKARIA The project implementation is assumed to generate direct temporary construction 
employment on site in the order of 500 staff-years. 
 As the operator intends to use the current crew of Olkaria II to operate and maintain also the 
3d unit, the total direct  additional permanent employment generated by the operation of the 
project is negligible. 
Source: EIB. Apparaisal Report. Olkaria II Extension. Extension of a geothermal power 
station. Luxembourg 18/1/2005. PJ/Enercom/I&S/2005-25/EH/EG/fe. 
2004_OLKARIA At the outset of the project a baseline study was done to assess the CO2 emissions (from 
geothermal origin) and ground level concentration. Study conducted afterwards showed that 
there was no change. Only environmental nuisance is due to the site itself, for that reason 
adaptations were done to allow the animals to cross the site. Before being in the ground re-
injected water PH is controlled.  
Source: MN 361 
2004_LUMWAN
A 
Disease issues like malaria and AIDS have been addressed in the EIS and the IPDP. The sa 
me is valid for housing, community development plans, security measures, influx management 
of people into the area, and employment. The project does not require any resettlement. The 
few -subsistence- farmers have been offered crop compensation schemes, in full consultation 
with ail people affected and the Zambian Ministry of Agriculture. The relationship between 
the promoter and the local communities (tribes, local, regional and national governmental 
agencies, and other stakeholders) is excellent. The Community Development Plan will further 
provide particular opportunities for vulnerable groups, including women, to develop 
sustainable livelihoods. NGOs will  be involved in the implementation of the respective plans. 
Detailing of these plans is underway. 
Source: EIB. Board of Directors, Lumwana Copper Project. Luxembourg 26 septembre 2006, 
Document 06/354. 
200  
2005_Pacific 
Islands 
For the contract with NDBP, the report to the Board mentions (only) the following in terms 
of social impact: “The proposed facility would contribute to the support of development finance institutions 
that are playing an important economic and social role in their respective countries.” 
 
Source: “Board of Directors, Global authorisation from IF resources” (for the operation), EIB, 21/11/2006 
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(p14) 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
No evidence was found in that respect. 
I-7.2.2 EIB appraisal of implementation of sound employment policies by IF/OR-supported 
enterprises 
General EIB staff members noted that the EIB does not integrate the environmental dimension in the 
ERR, but that it is bound to identify ex ante mitigation and compensation measures if the 
expected impact appears ex ante to be negative in terms of respect of natural resources (see 
details above under I-7.2.1) 
2000_MAGADI 
SODA 
This aspect does not seem to have been the object of much follow up. Financial and technical 
issues, as well as environmental ones, have been followed more closely. 
Regarding employment policies only the document ‘EIB Magadi Soda Pure Ash Project, 
Project completion Report, Luxembourg 23/4/2008’. simply indicates that the number of 
new permanent jobs created corresponded to the number that had been anticipated (40 
people) and adds that this employment increase has been compensated by a general reduction 
in personnel. 
On the occasion of the site visit  current management confirmed the net addition of 40 staff 
to the situation at the outset of the project. (MN 352) 
2003_BOAD PG 
IV 
There is no evidence of such appraisal of employment policies 
2003_Dakar-
Ziguinchor 
No reference is made to effective employment policies. However, the EIB evaluated the 
number of jobs created by the project: 
 Boat’s construction: 400 persons/year (temporary work) and 200 persons/year for 
the havens developments. These estimations are based on the productivity of the 
low-income countries. 
 Boat’s exploitation: 90 employments created. 
 
Source : Operation’s « Conseil d’administration. Prêt sur les ressources de la FI. Projet Liaison 
maritime  
Dakar-Ziguinchor (Sénégal) », EIB, 2004, p7 
2004-OLKARIA “There have been some social and environmental issues as detailed in the attached Annex II (Environmental, 
social and safety monitoring report). The report also details how these shall be addressed by Kengen, the 
contractor and other parties”.  
Source: Olkaria II Extension. Note do the File. Monitoring Exercise 2009, Nairobi 
01/12/2009. OpsB/ACP-IF-2/2009/NN. 
However the annexes attached to the document do not include Annex II.  
2004_LUMWAN
A 
The company is providing monthly reports stating evolution of human resources, security, 
sustainability , town and development management.  Thers reports are detailed and evidence 
an involvement of the company in community affairs, security and health safety and 
environment. Opinion of EIB staff is that the reports are credible. 
Sources: 
D20: Lumwana Mining Company, Monthly Project Report, Executive Summary, December 
2009. 
D21: Lumwana Mining Company, Monthly Project Report, January 2010) 
 MN307s 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2006 
No information found  
2005_ACPGLOB 
ADEMI 
No information found  
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2004  
 Madagas
No information found 
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car 
TA2008 DOM 
REP 
Banco ADOPEM shows a good social return due to the fact that it targets the poor segment 
of the population. Indeed, Banco Adopem offers small credits with average loans amounted 
to $300 - $350 in 2008 and 2009 in peri-urban and marginal areas. Moreover, Banco Adopem 
offers a wide range of financial and non-financial products (credits to MSMEs, credits for 
consumption, credit for agriculture, savings, etc.) and the costs of the loans in Banco Adopem 
are inferior to the ones offered by other banks monitored by MicroRate. 
 
Banco ADOPEM also demonstrates a good institutional responsibility, mainly towards 
employees and clients. Moreover, initiatives have been undertaken towards the communities 
(e.g support for insertion in the labour market) and the environment (e.g no specific policies 
but practices aim at saving energy) and have shown good results. 
 
Monitoring exercises internal to the Bank exist and ensure a follow-up of the results. Social 
impacts analyses are realized each semester and each year.  
 
Source: MicroRate, Banco Adopem, Junio 2009 
 Note : dès le départ, ADOPEM a eu une mission sociale (ONG à l’origine) et s’est toujours 
concentrée sur les micro-entreprises. La banque a un important impact social en Rep Dom et 
a bénéficié d’un appui de la BEI (TA, equity, loan) qui l’aide et qui est fortement apprécié 
mais il n’y a pas de preuve que l’appui BEI a permis à ADOPEM de se concentrer 
davantage/d’avoir plus d’impact en termes sociaux. 
Source :  MN 401 
 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2006 
 Kenya 
No information found  
2005_EMP 
AFRICA FUND 
II 
No information found  
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
The number of employment generated by this project is equivalent to 20. However none of 
the documents refer to specific employment policy put in place by the beneficiary enterprise. 
 
“Appendix Development Impact Assessment Framework”, EIB, p1 
2008_EDFI 
 
An evaluation by EV of the portfolio of projects under the first two of the three successive 
EDFI EUROPEAN FINANCING PARTNERS (EFP) operations shows substantial social 
(employment) and environmental impact.  
EIB Group Operations Evaluation 
Synthesis Report : Evaluation of activities under the European Financing Partners (EFP) Agreement, 
January 2009 
I-7.2.3 EIB appraisal of implementation of sound environmental policies by IF/OR-
supported enterprises (e.g. with respect to reducing pollution loads, protecting 
biodiversity etc.) 
General A specific section of an operation’s “fact sheet A” is dedicated to environmental aspects.  
This has been observed in several operations, e.g. 2003_BOAD PG IV; 2003_Dakar-
Ziguinchor; and 2005_Pacific Islands. 
Operation 
/General 
The EIB has not always received sufficient evidence from financial intermediaries/promoters 
regarding environmental compliance. The environmental monitoring performance by the EIB 
was limited to documentary checks, which did not constitute a comprehensive environmental 
monitoring exercise. For intermediated operations, the financing contracts and the practical 
provisions did not require environmental monitoring by the financial intermediaries after the 
investment screening and approval phases. 
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Source: Counter Balance, Challenging the EIB, “Corporate welfare and development deceptions : why the EIB 
is failing to deliver outside the EU?”, February 2010 (page 25) 
2000_MAGADI 
SODA 
Soda ash production takes place in a region where little other formal economic activities are to 
be found and has particular development implications for the indigenous population of that 
area. MSC maintains the main road which links Nairobi to Southwest Kenya, provides very 
low cost healthcare and educational opportunities for the Maasai community in the area, 
permits access to fresh water outside the plant and cooperates extensively with five foreign 
NGOs for regional development in Southwest Kenya. 
Source: EIB. Appraisal Report, Magadi Soda, Luxembourg 29/1/2002. 
(PJ/I&S/GCE/KAI/scm) 
2003_BOAD PG 
IV 
The operation’s 2003 fact sheet A mentioned that a BOAD guidebook on environmental 
management had been introduced, developed with the WB and which should be acceptable 
for the EIB : 
« Le Conseil des Ministres de l’Union Monétaire Ouest Africaine a adopté lors de sa session de juin 2003 un 
document de politique et procédures d’intervention de la BOAD en matière de gestion environnementale et 
sociale dans le financement des projets. Ce manuel a été préparé en étroite coopération avec les services de la 
Banque Mondiale et devrait être acceptable pour la Banque. » 
Source : « Fact Sheet A : Proposition portant sur l'instruction d'une nouvelle opération » (of 
the operation), EIB, 26 September 2003 (p2) 
2003_Dakar-
Ziguinchor 
The operation’s 2004 fact sheet A mentioned that sea transport pollutes less than road 
transport, and that the ship will be conform to international safety and pollution conventions:: 
« Le principal avantage écologique du transport maritime est qu’il produit moins de dioxyde de carbone que le 
transport routier, et évite une congestion routière supplémentaire. Par ailleurs le navire sera conforme aux 
dispositions des conventions de l’OMI (Organisation Maritime Internationale) destinées à assurer la sécurité 
des passagers et à limiter la pollution en mer, en particulier MARPOL (International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships). » 
Source : « Fact Sheet A : Proposition portant sur l'instruction d'une nouvelle opération » (of 
the operation), EIB, 26 March 2004 (p1) 
2004-WAGP Volta River Authority be the final beneficiary of the loan is a repeat borrower of the Bank 
with a very good monitoring track record (regular submission of progress reports and good 
quality completion reports). 
A close follow-up of the project would be required to enable the Bank to respond effectively 
to possible NGOs’ queries/criticism. Apart from the NGOs’ risk, no special difficulties are 
foreseen as the project will be managed by an experienced operator (ChevronTexaco). 
Participation of the World Bank and Miga in the project guarantee scheme should facilitate 
the monitoring task as well as the reporting from independent environmental auditors that 
monitor the compliance with the Environmental Management plans.  
Source: D6 
2004_Lumwana No major insurmountable environmental problem has been detected. The mine and plant are 
designed according to international best practice and national laws. The main environ mental 
issues of the project relate to the separate handling and storing of uranium-bearing ore,a river 
diversion, development of the surface water quality, acid rock drainage and road transport of 
supplies and concentrate. For ail these issues, mitigation measures have been proposed in the 
EMP. They are satisfactory to the Bank. In addition, the final ECZ approval spells out a 
number of mitigating conditions, which are acceptable to the promoter and will be 
implemented. The EMP will be more developed in detail during construction and early 
production. 
Source: EIB. Board of Directors, Lumwana Copper Project. Luxembourg 26 septembre 2006, 
Document 06/354. 
 
2005_Pacific 
Islands 
The operation’s 2005 fact sheet A refers to national legislation and the EU environmental 
policy: « In line with EIB’s environmental statement and procedures any sub-project would need to comply 
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with national environmental legislation, taking into account the principles and standards enshrined in EU 
environmental policy.» 
Source: “Fact Sheet A – Proposal to appraise new operations” (of the operation), EIB, 
29/09/2005 (p2) 
 
The report to the Board for this operation further mentions the following obligations for the 
intermediaries: “The intermediaries will provide the EIB with a summary on environmental impacts and 
mitigating action, they will make further investigations if the Bank so requests to ensure that projects to be 
financed comply with the environmental standards that satisfy the Bank’s requirements. Guidelines on the 
Bank’s environmental requirements will be provided to the banks as part of the loan negotiation process”. 
Source: “Board of Directors, Global authorisation from IF resources” (for the operation), EIB, 21/11/2006 
(p3) 
PIFF I (DBS) There are conditions imposed by the EIB. The DBS is obliged to make some form of 
environmental assessment taking into account, the location of the projects, the type of 
production process, to ensure that  waste is disposed safely.  
Credits between 70 K and 500 K have to be approved by EIB, and the compliance with the 
environmental measures is verified. 
For portfolio loan an annual report to EIB is provided.  
 
No conditions regarding the social policy of the clients. The DBS would not interfere in that 
aspect of the management of a client. But the government has a Department of Labour with a 
member on the board of the DBS; they would immediately come to the DBS in case in 
violation of the labour rules. 
Compliance with tax laws, customs regulations, are also to be respected and the DBS reminds 
them to its clients. 
Source MN 363 
 
2005_EMP 
AFRICA FUND 
II 
As in the Predecessor Fund, identification, analysis and supervision of the investments will be 
carried out with due regard to ecological and environmental factors and in accordance with 
both local law and World Bank standards.  Investments in new projects will be made only 
where such projects have been designed so as to comply with applicable environmental 
regulations.  The experience of the first Fund regarding environmental aspects has been 
positive.  At the request of EIB, the Fund Managers have agreed to include a social 
assessment of all investments as part of their due diligence requirements. (Project Docs) 
PIFF I - Samoa The operation’s 2004 fact sheet A refers on p1 to national legislation and the EU 
environmental policy, providing exactly the same text as for the PIFF II : « In line with EIB’s 
environmental statement and procedures any sub-project would need to comply with national environmental 
legislation, taking into account the principles and standards enshrined in EU environmental policy.” 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
The EIB seems to see the environmental aspects as an important matter of attention. In that 
respect the EIB makes sure that the EC Directive 97/11/CE on the assessment of the effects 
of certain public and private projects on the environment is correctly applied by the promoter. 
The impact on the protected natural area should be also assessed. And the exploitation of 
underground water by drilling should be attentively followed up to avoid over-exploitation. 
The national legislation, the procedures applied by the promoter as well as the location of the 
new infrastructures should be analyzed in that respect. 
 
Source:  
“Fact sheet A: Appraisal Authorisation”, EIB, 2007, p2 
“Note à Ops B/ACPIF-1. Avis pour instruction », BEI, 2007, p4 
 
Note that no evidence was found related to EIB appraisal of the environmental policies 
implantation for this specific project. 
2008_EDFI An evaluation by EV of the portfolio of projects under the first two of the three successive 
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EDFI EUROPEAN FINANCING PARTNERS (EFP) operations shows substantial social 
(employment) and environmental impact. Five projects analysed (ex ante appraisal,  
performance during implementation, impact ex-post) , 4 with satisfactory social and 
environmental performance, one with good performance. 
Source: EIB Group Operations Evaluation:Synthesis Report : Evaluation of activities under the European 
Financing Partners (EFP) Agreement, January 2009 
JC 7.3 Infrastructure operations contributed to improving public services for the local 
population, including the poorer segments 
General  
The report indicates the example of the Nam Theun 2 Dam project in Laos which does not 
evidence that infrastructure operations have contributed to improve public services for the 
local population. The EIB claims that overall NT2 project will generate a net environmental 
benefit for the region, improve living standards and economic development for the local 
population. But halfway through its construction phase, NT2 proves to be another two-speed 
infrastructure project where construction proceeds on schedule and social and environmental 
programs lag critically behind. Livelihood projects supported by village saving fund loans are 
getting underway and have yet to deliver results. Seventeen villages of more than 6,200 
indigenous people on the Nakai Plateau are undergoing resettlement to make way for the NT2 
reservoir. The resettlement program experienced delays and as a result, people are moved in 
temporary houses. Due to the poor quality of soil on the Plateau, NTC has had to abandon 
the agriculture plans for resettlers that were outlined in the 2005 NT2 Social Development 
Plan. 
 
Source: CEE bankwatch network, “Raising the bar on big dams, Making the case for dam policy reform at 
the European Investment Bank”, November 2007 
 
In the context of the current global economic crisis, existing infrastructure projects have been 
affected and many sponsors are reluctant to embark on new projects. In 2009, the EIB, 
relying on its expertise, focused its attention on bridging the commercial lending gap, enabling 
infrastructure projects to go ahead. Projects taking into account climate change 
considerations, generating a positive impact on development and encouraging regional 
integration remained the EIB’s priority.  
 
Source: MN 901 
I-7.3.1 Evidence of consultation of the people affected by the infrastructure supported  
2003_BOAD PG 
IV 
There is no evidence of such consultation. 
2003_Dakar-
Ziguinchor 
There is no evidence of such consultation. 
2004-WAGP There is no such analysis in the preparatory and appraisal documents. It is simply stated the 
cost of electricity supply. The main project customers are the Takoradi Power stations.  
The project does not include measures to assess how  lower production costs of the Takoradi 
Power stations will be passed upon their customers. 
Sources 
EIB, Fact Sheet A: proposal to appraise new operation, Luxembourg 17/2/2005, 
(OPS/B/ACPIF-1 WestAfr & Sahel/20040026/Walter Eve) 
EIB, Appraisal Report, West African Gas Pipeline, Ghana. Luxembourg, 02/10/2006 
 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
No evidence was found in that respect. 
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I-7.3.2 Evidence of identification of target populations, i.e. intended beneficiaries of the 
infrastructure supported 
2003_BOAD PG 
IV 
See I-1.3.4 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
The facts sheets established by the EIB identify clearly the final beneficiary of the programme, 
i.e. Société Nationale des Eaux du Sénégal”.  From the EIB’s point of view, the final 
beneficiary corresponds to the borrower. 
Regarding the final beneficiaries in terms of development needs, the EIB does not clearly 
identify them. Only the expected result in terms of new social connections to drinking water is 
evaluated in the appraisal authorisation.   
 
Source: 
“Fact sheet B: financing proposal”, EIB, 2007, p1 
“Fact sheet A: Appraisal Authorisation”, EIB, 2007 p1-2 
 
In its financial report, the EIB considers that new water connections allowed by the project 
will mainly concern the poorest population. However, this is highlighted in the specific 
context of potential risks linked to the evolution of drinking water demand. Indeed, as the 
beneficiaries will mainly correspond to the poorest population, the revenues growth of 
SONES could be less than expected. 
 
Source: “Rapport financier. Projet: Programme eau Sénégal”, EIB, 2007, p13  
 
The DIAF report evaluated the impacts on vulnerable groups, including indigenous peoples 
as good. The EIB has thus taken into account the potential effects on the poorest population. 
 
Source: 
“Appendix Development Impact Assessment Framework”, EIB, p2 
 
 
I-7.3.3 Inclusion in operational design/conditions of indicators that allow verification that 
the expected benefits reached the targeted populations 
2003_BOAD PG 
IV 
Information not available.  
2003_Dakar-
Ziguinchor 
Information not available.  
2004-WAGP No such indicators.  
However, a June 2009 World Bank Mission concluded that the policies of WAPCo, 
particularly the participatory community development approach of that company produced 
positive and encouraging results. 
Source: PPR, WAGP, Luxembourg 19th November 2009, OpsB/ACP-IF1/2009/FFC. 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
No evidence was found in that respect. 
I-7.3.4 Trends in these indicators 
2003_BOAD PG 
IV 
Information not available. 
2003_Dakar-
Ziguinchor 
Information not available . 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
No evidence was found in that respect. 
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EQ 8 To what extent is the IF financially sustainable over the long-term horizon of the Cotonou 
Agreement? Has a right balance been found between its developmental objective, the level of 
commensurate individual project risk borne by the IF, and the financial viability requirement 
on the basis of the portfolio as a whole? 
JC 8.1 Compatibility of EIB’s selection and processing of projects with Cotonou Agreements 
General As a rule Bank will always consider as a first criterion for selecting a project , if it has a development 
potential in the sense of Cotonou, if no the analysis will not be pushed further; if yes then the Bank 
will consider the financial viaibility and the ways to improve it.  
Source: MN024 
I-8.1.1 Indicators related to JC 1.2 
2004-WAGP The Bank has explicitly assessed the consistency of the project with EU policy objectives and 
concluded positively. 
Source: EIB, Appraisal Report, West African Gas Pipeline, Ghana. Luxembourg, 02/10/2006 
2004_Lumwana The project is fully consistent with EU development policy objectives as specified in the Cotonou 
Agreement and with the mandate given to the Bank under the Investment Facility. It would contribute 
to development of the mining sector in Zambia with the direct participation of the private sector, and 
fils weil with Zambia's Poverty Reduction Strategy. In addition, the Government of Zambia is keen to 
develop the remote North-Western area and is assisting with infrastructure, i.e. road rehabilitation and 
electric power supply, to even out economic and social disparities be!ween the regions. The project is 
expected to create sorne 1 150 direct jobs, with only a small number being expatriates, and three times 
as many indirect jobs. Through the training of local employees, the project will further contribute to 
the development of the local skills base. The project will bring value to an indigenous natural resource, 
increase Zambia's export revenues, and generate fiscal income for the country through mining royalties 
and corporate taxes. 
Source: EIB. Board of Directors, Lumwana Copper Project. Luxembourg 26 septembre 2006, 
Document 06/354. 
2000 Magadi Soda Consistency with Cotonou objectives justified by:  
- Assists an ACP private sector development in accordance with the primary focus of its 
mandate under the Cotonou Agreement.  
- In line with Government of Kenya’s objectives to improve the country’s balance of payments, 
raise employment and reduce poverty, and indeed has Government’s full support.  
Source: EIB, Board of Directors, Magadi Soda Pure Ash Project (Kenya), 2003. 
2001 Moma 
Titanium 
Consistency with the Cotonou objective justified by : 
- The project is promoted by the private sector and supported by the Government 
- It is implemented in the Nampula province, a region where the GDP/capita is estimated at 
some $100, less than half the national average 
- It will contribute to theEU and Government strategy of poverty reduction by creating up to 
600 temporary jobs for local residents during construction, and about 400 during operation,and 
indirectly around 1200 additional jobs.  
- It will increase the contribution of mining and manufacturing industries which is very limited 
(13% of GDP) notwithstanding a favourable geological environment. 
.Source: EIB, Board of Directors, Moma Titanium, April 2003 
 
2004_Lumwana The project is considered by the EIB as fully consistent with the Cotonou objectives and the EU 
development policy objectives for the following reasons: 
- It will contribute to the development of the mining sector in Zambia with the direct 
involvement of the private sector; 
- It fits well with Zambia’s Poverty Reduction Strategy 
- The Government of Zambia wants to develop the remote North Western area and is assisting 
with infrastructure 
- Project is expected to create 1150 direct jobs, few of which expatriates, and 3 times as many 
MID-TERM EVALUATION OF THE IF AND EIB OR OPERATIONS IN ACP/OCTS 
ADE - EGEVAL II  
Final Report  September 2010 Annexe 9/Page 137 
indirect ones. 
- Through training of local employees the project with contribute to improve the local skills base 
- It will value an indigenous natural resource, increase Zambias export revenue and generate 
fiscal income 
Source: EIB Board of Directors, Lumwana Copper project (Zambia), 2006 
2004 Olkaria Consistency with Cotonou mandate and EU policy objectives justified by: 
Consistency with Kenya long-term energy policy objectives to make electricity available at a cost 
effective price and to support socio-economic development while protecting the environment 
In line with the Bank’s policy of supporting renewable energy at competitive cost 
Sources: EIB, Appraisal Report, Olkaria II Extension, Kenya, 2005. 
EIB : EIB, Olkaria II Extension, Value Added Pillar 1, (no date) 
2004_WAGP Consistency with Cotonou objectives justified by its following expected outcomes: 
- Reduction of the cost of electricity supply in Ghana,Togo, Benin due to the replacement of oil 
by gas from Nigeria. 
- Pipeline capacity will permit future growth in power generation to respond to future demands 
from the industry 
- Environmental benefits of replacing oil with gas: improved air quality and reduction of 
emission of greenhouse gasses.  
- Promotes regional economic and political integration. 
 
Source: EIB, Conseil d’Administration, Projet West African Gas Pipeline (Ghana), 2006 
 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2006 (BPI Kenya) 
Consistency with Cotonou mandate :  
- Providing support to SME sector in ACP countries is a key requirement of Cotonou ; as the 
Bank cannot reach the sector directly, BPI_K is a credible way of doing so at the small end of 
the market. 
- If successful will constitute a platform that from which BPI could expand to new countries. 
Supporting this is in line with the IF financial and developmental objectives.  
Source: EIB Management Committee, BPI Kenya SME Fund, 2006 
2005_Pacific Islands The credit line is consistent with the Cotonou objectives in particular the objective of supporting the 
private sector; moreover, the credit line addresses MSMEs and as such is a key factor to generate 
sustainable employment growth in the Pacific region; and the project benefits from the total support 
of the governments. 
Source: EIB Conseil d’Administration, Pacific Islands Financial Facility II, 2006. 
Digicel Fiji Consistency with Cotonou: 
- Contribution to economic growth; access to competitive telecommunication is key for 
promoting development and fighting poverty; 
- Transfer of economic and technological knowledge 
- Improved competition and innovations; 
- Development of private sector services in line with objectives of Cotonou 
Source: EIB, Board of Directors, Pacific Mobile Regional Network Development Project,, 2008  
 
Roco Ki Beach and 
Golf Resort, DR 
Consistency with Cotonou objectives justified as follows: 
- Project in line with EC strategy to promote sustainable tourism in developing countries. 
- Project is a private sector investment which is consistent with the EIB mandate under the 
Cotonou Agreement 
- Project in line with DR development strategy geared to promote tourism investments, in 
particular high quality forms of accommodation through private sector investment and 
management. 
- Employment creation is expected to be of the order of 1000 direct and 500 indirect jobs. 
Source: EIB, Proposal from the Management Committee to the  Board of Directors. 
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I-8.1.2 Indicators related to JC 1.2 
2005_Pacific Islands A 2006 financing proposal specifies the following:  
 “Markup: 40bp” 
 “Loans to the three development banks will benefit from sovereign guarantees of the three countries concerned, 
while the loan to BSP will be made on a single signature basis, justified by the ‘B’ rating given by S&P for 
this institution.” 
 “Fee: EUR 5000 per borrower (for smaller banks EUR 2500)” 
 A “Risk Pricing” table is provided on p2 of that financing proposal, with the loan grading and 
risk pricing per borrower 
Source: “Fact Sheet B – Financing Proposal” (of the operation), EIB, 11/10/2006 (p1) 
 
In accordance with this, the RM/CRD Opinion Note on the Fact Sheet A mentions the following 
regarding loan grading and risk pricing:  
“On the basis of the detailed information available at FSB stage, loan grading and risk pricing will be carried out 
individually for each bank participating in the global loan. 
Indicative risk pricing for the guarantees will be provided once the structure of the guarantees and the inherent risks are 
known. Individual operations will have to be priced on a case-by-case basis, after a thorough assessment of the underlying 
risks, in accordance with the principles outlined in the IF CRPGs.” 
Source: “Fact Sheet A – RM/CRD Opinion” (of the operation), EIB, 25/05/2005 (p2) 
 
The “Fact Sheet A” specifies additionally that there is “Euro 5000 appraisal fee for each of the participating 
intermediary to be paid on loan signature”. “Guarantee fees to be examined during appraisal”. 
Source: “Fact Sheet A – Proposal to appraise new operations” (of the operation), EIB, 29/09/2005 
(p1) 
 
The 2009 Project Progress Report mentions that the first contract of €5m with the NDBP has a fixed 
interest rate (no further details), a 15-year term and a grace period of 3 years. 
Source: “Project Progress Report” (of the operation), EIB, 01/12/2009 (p1) 
PIFF I - Samoa The 2009 Project Progress Report for the contract with the DBS mentions there is a fixed interest rate 
(no further details), a 15-year term and a grace period of 4 years. 
Source: “Project Progress Report” (of the operation), EIB, 01/12/2009 (p1) 
 
The “Fact Sheet B” specified additionally on p1 that there was a due diligence fee of €5000.  
There would also be security/guarantee fee of € 5000 per borrower.  
 
The ‘Fact Sheet A” for the operation provided (p4) the following information in terms of proposed 
front end fees:  
“A minimum global front end fee of EUR 40 000 will be achieved through charging each of the potential development 
banks EUR 10 000 each, with the amounts to be paid on loan signature. Additional fees related to size of funding 
taken up by the individual development banks will be charged to ensure that the required 1% of loan amount is achieved 
overall. The delayed payment mechanism for the appraisal fee is proposed because the risk of the Borrowers not signing up 
to an EIB facility is considered to be low.” 
J.8.2 EIB’s risk management systems and policies are aimed at long-term sustainability of the IF 
General EIB’s local currency financing entails substantial benefits, such as reducing exposure of final 
beneficiaries with no forex earnings to currency fluctuations.  This in itself reduces the EIB credit risk 
under such operations.  However, it is unclear why EIB does not hedge such exposures to protect the 
financial sustainability of the IF.  It is unclear for instance why EIB-IF have not, like many EDFIs, 
EBRD, other IFIs, etc.  joined TCX, the FMO sponsored Currency Exchange Fund. 
[staff interviewed were also wondering why this had not occurred, but could provide no explanation 
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other than EIB-IF “passive model”- little interest in innovation due to the ACP “nuisance syndrome” 
amidst a bigger EIB.] 
TCX is a special purpose fund providing market risk management products to investors active in 
emerging markets. This unique fund focuses on currencies and maturities which are not covered by 
regular market providers. http://www.fmo.nl/smartsite.dws?id=1675 
http://www.tcxfund.com/ 
2004_OLKARIA In order to reduce the risks of non payment of the debt service the EIB took into consideration the  
more fundamental issues of the long term viability of KenGen and of the monopoly power distributor: 
“The project is small compared to KenGen’s existing production facilities. Debt service is therefore 
not dependent upon project performance, but on the borrower’s ability to carry on its business in a 
sound manner, and on KPLC, Kenya’s monopoly power distributor, to pay for its purchases of bulk 
power. KenGen has a sound record of technical and financial performance. KPLC experienced 
financial difficulties from 2000 to 2003, but has recovered since with the help of the Government of 
Kenya; resolute performance enhancement measures have started showing success. In the framework 
of Kenya’s Energy Sector Recovery Project (ESRP) under World Bank lead, KPLC’s management 
capacities will further be strengthened and its infrastructure upgraded such as to expand its operations 
and reach higher levels of efficiency. In the framework of the ESRP, the Government has committed 
itself to ensuring cost covering sales prices for KenGen and KPLC; a tariff study will be carried out 
and KenGen’s bulk supply price as well as KPLC’s retail tariffs adjusted at the latest in 2006, to secure 
the utilities’ financial viability.  As KenGen will face increasing generation costs with each new power 
plant it takes on stream in accordance with Kenya’s Least Cost Power Development Plan, the 
borrower will undertake to demonstrate to the Bank at all times that bulk supply prices are established 
allowing it to recover its costs of production fully and service its debt. 
 
Source EIB Fact Sheet B: financing proposal, Luxembourg 24/2/2005. OPS B/ACPIF-
2CENT&EASTAFR/2004-0255/GOUNOT MARCEL  
 
Current bulk supply tariffs are not high enough to cover the cost of electricity generated from the 
project (financing costs included). Response to this issue: The tariff study that the Ministry of Energy 
is going to launch with a view to adjusting consumer prices of electricity will take into account 
KenGen’s supply price requirements in line with the principle of long-term marginal cost recovery. 
 
Source: EIB Fact Sheet B: financing proposal, Luxembourg 24/2/2005. OPS B/ACPIF-
2CENT&EASTAFR/2004-0255/GOUNOT MARCEL 
2004_OLKARIA Points that have been verified by the Bank to prepare its operation: 
-The behaviour of the geothermal reservoir is sufficiently well known. 
- In the framework of its Energy Sector Recovery Project, of which the Olkaria II extension is part, 
the Government of Kenya has demonstrated its commitment to increase competition and ensure the 
long-term viability of Kenya’s power sector. 
 
Source EIB Fact Sheet B: financing proposal, Luxembourg 24/2/2005. OPS B/ACPIF-
2CENT&EASTAFR/2004-0255/GOUNOT MARCEL 
 
Moreover the following conditions have been imposed to the promoter to ensure the environmental 
sustainability of the project:  
• First Disbursement conditions 
The promoter shall provide the preliminary results of the reservoir optimisation study to confirm 
thesustainability of the geothermal resource for the project. 
NEMA approval and KenGen acceptance of conditions set therein. 
• Last Disbursement conditions 
Last disbursement (no less than 20%) shall be conditional on the promoter demonstrating to the 
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satisfaction of the Bank that the bulk supply tariff is established at a level sufficient to fully and 
continuously coyer the generating costs of its plant portfolio. 
• Undertakings 
Implementation of the recommendations cited in the Environmental Impact Assessment. 
 
Source: EIB. Apparaisal Report. Olkaria II Extension. Extension of a geothermal power station. 
Luxembourg 18/1/2005. PJ/Enercom/I&S/2005-25/EH/EG/fe. 
I-8.2.1 Pricing of loans and of guarantees 
General In the case of local currency loans, DEAS assess if the exchange risk is acceptable and define the 
pricing of local currency loans according to the local market.  
“Autre dimension plus ponctuelle et plus technique : intervenir en monnaie locale (synthétique) depuis Cotonou. C’est 
l’IF qui porte le risque de change, avec des restrictions sur le degré de risque (situation du pays, etc.). C’est la DEAS 
qui est sensée donner ce degré de risque. Ensuite le pricing : déterminer en monnaie locale un prix en accord avec les 
conditions du marché. Pas de méthodologie extrêmement rigide, mais en cours de formalisation pour déterminer taux 
raisonnable, pour éviter des distorsions et pour être quand même rentable (ex ante en tout cas). Les économistes de 
DEAS sont donc extrêmement impliqués dans les opérations financières. » 
Source: MN 007 
2000_MAGADI_ 
SODA 
Appraisal/due diligence fee: € 40 K for the loan on own resources, 1% front-end fee upon signature 
for loans on IF.  
 
Pricing/remuneration: 
1) Standard rate for lending outside the EU (fixed rate or variable spread floating rate), in force at 
date of signature or of disbursement 
2) Standard rate for lending outside the EU (fixed rate or variable spread floating rate based on 
EURIBOR or LIBOR), as at signature or disbursement date, increased by 400 bp until project 
completion and by 375 bp thereafter, plus the potential cost of hedging €/US$ forex risk incurred 
by the IF. 
3) 11-13% p.a. fixed, plus the potential cost of hedging €/$US forex risk incurred by the IF. 
Source EIB Fact Sheet B: financing proposal. Magadi Soda Pure Ash Project, Kenya, Luxembourg, 9th 
October 2003, Ops B/ACP-IF-2/2000-0279/MG  
 
Loan grading and risk pricing:  
Senior IF loan 
Indicative loan grading d2 
General provisioning 
charge 
20% 
 Risk pricing 3.46% 
Subordinated IF loan 
Indicative loan grading e2 
General provisioning 
charge 
35% 
Risk pricing 4.84% 
 
Source: EIB Magadi Soda Pure Ash Project, RM/CRD Opinion, 22/1/2004 
2003_BOAD PG IV The March 2004 fact sheet of the operation 2003_BOAD PG IV (combining an OR global loan, IF 
guarantee, and IF equity investment ) mentioned the following information with regard to the pricing 
under the guarantee facility:  
 
“Rémunération de la Facilité de Garantie : 
Le traitement de la rémunération de la garantie est proche de celle qui serait demandée dans le cadre de la mise en place 
d’un crédit, avec toutefois des minorations selon la garantie.  
- Pour une garantie de prêt : la garantie de la Banque ne sera pas une garantie à première demande, elle ne 
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pourra être mise en jeu que dans certaines conditions. La commission de garantie devra refléter cette situation. 
- Pour une garantie d’émission obligataire, les caractéristiques de la garantie seront plus proche de celle d’une 
garantie à première demande et la rémunération devra en tenir compte. 
Ce taux sera établi en conformité avec les CRPG (Credit Risk Policy Guidelines), en coopération avec CRD, au cas par 
cas.” 
Source : « Fact Sheet B : proposition de financement » (of the operation 2003_BOAD PG IV), EIB, 
11 mars 2004 (p2) 
2003_BOAD PG IV The operation’s March 2004 fact sheet mentioned the following information with regard to the pricing 
of this operation combining an OR global loan, IF guarantee, and IF equity investment:  
 
Operation a) Prêt Global (on OR) :EUR 25 millions 
b) Facilité de garantie (on IF) : EUR 25 millions  
c) Participation à l’augmentation de capital (on IF) pour un montant 
maximum de EUR 4.6 millions 
Formule de calcul 
du taux d’intérêt 
a) Taux de référence OPSB  
Recouvrement des 
coûts/commission 
d’instruction 
40.000 EUR de commission d’instruction déjà réglée par la BOAD 
Coût, pour 
l’emprunteur, d’un 
financement de 
substitution 
d) Le coût moyen pondéré de la dernière émission obligataire dans la 
zone UEMOA, en FCFA, de la BOAD (durée 7 ans, 2 ans de 
différé) s’établit à 5.48%. 
e)  du même ordre que celui des garanties obtenues auprès des fonds de 
garanties locaux (1.5 to 3%), qui ont des limites de taille. 
f)  n.a. 
Sûreté/Garanties 
 
a) Mécanisme identique à celui mis en place à l’occasion des prêts 
globaux précédents : un engagement formel de la Banque Centrale 
des États de l’Afrique de l’Ouest de se substituer aux États 
actionnaires de la BOAD, en cas de besoin et en cas d’appel au 
capital non encore versé. Également sûretés négatives. 
b) Les sûretés prises par la BOAD et satisfaisantes pour la Banque 
bénéficieront pari-passu aux deux institutions suite à une cession ou 
à une subrogation. 
c) n.a. 
Modalités et 
conditions  de 
l’opération FI 
b) Commission de mise en place : 0.50 % flat du montant de la Facilité 
lors de la mise en place de la première garantie. Commission 
d’engagement sur la partie garantie mais non-déboursée du prêt ou 
de l’émission obligataire sous-jacente de 0.5% l’an. Commission de 
garantie : comprise entre 0.50% et 3-5% selon le risque du 
bénéficiaire final tel qu’estimé par les services de la BEI 
c) Une partie seulement de la participation  à l’augmentation de capital 
sera versée, le solde restera bloqué dans les comptes de la Facilité. 
Conditions 
spéciales 
 
a) Lors des demandes d’affectations la Banque adossera la durée de 
chaque affectation à la durée respective des prêts subsidiaires. 
Structure 
financière 
complexe 
nécessitant l’appui 
de FI lors de la 
négociation du 
contrat 
Non mais s’agissant d’une première opération de garantie la participation 
de FI aux négociations  sera demandée. 
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Source : « Fact Sheet B : proposition de financement », EIB, 11 mars 2004 (p1) 
 
That fact sheet further mentions the following with regard to dividends relating to the equity 
investment (see also I-8.3.1):  
« Modalités et Rémunération de la participation au capital :  
La BOAD n’a jamais distribué de dividende ce qui est normal pour une institution de développement. Toutefois alors 
que les statuts de la BOAD prévoient que le capital souscrit soit décomposé en capital appelé à hauteur de 25% et 
capital sujet à appel à hauteur de 75%, la Banque (comme d’autres actionnaires non régionaux) a versé l’intégralité de 
sa participation. La Direction Générale examine la possibilité d’appliquer les statuts à tous les actionnaires, ainsi la 
Banque pourrait porter son capital souscrit de FCFA 1 milliard (EUR 1.55 millions) à FCFA 4 milliards (EUR 6 
millions), en augmentant simplement sa portion de capital sujet à appel conformément aux statuts. Le capital sujet à 
appel (en fait dans ce cas l’intégralité de l’augmentation de la participation) serait conservé par la Banque et pourrait 
générer un revenu pour la Facilité d’Investissement.” 
Source : « Fact Sheet B : proposition de financement », EIB, 11 mars 2004 (p2) 
 
« Faible rémunération du fait de l’absence de distribution de dividende. Compte tenu du montage envisagé, le revenu du 
placement du capital sujet à appel permettrai d’assurer une rémunération satisfaisante. » 
Source : « Fact Sheet B : proposition de financement » (of the operation 2003_BOAD PG IV), EIB, 
11 mars 2004 (p3) 
 
According to a 2004 note, the guarantee facility has an “open rate”, with the interest rate not being 
determined at signature.  
Source: “Note conjointe”, EIB, 02/12/2004 (p2) 
 
In terms of pricing, that joint note specifies the following:  
« Les commissions à  percevoir sont  présentées dans l’article 5.  
- Commission de mise en place 0.5% du montant de l’Affectation 
- Commission d’engagement 0.25% 
- Commission de garantie comprise entre 0.5% et 5% déterminée affectation par affectation . » 
Source: “Note conjointe”, EIB, 02/12/2004 (p1) 
2003_Dakar-
Ziguinchor 
The interest rate before interest rate subsidy amounted to 5.7%, taking into account the market 
conditions prevailing at this time and the EIB’s margin. A grant was applied (about 1.6 million EUR) 
in order to reduce the interest rate to 2.85%. 
 
Source : Operation’s « Conseil d’administration. Prêt sur les ressources de la FI. Projet Liaison 
maritime  
Dakar-Ziguinchor (Sénégal) », EIB, 2004, p9 
 
The monitoring report mentions an interest rate subsidy established at 2.28% (i.e. interest rate 4.51% 
+ the  
margin – the subsidy 3%).  
Source : « Monitoring 2009 », EIB, 2009, p3 
2004-WAGP Ops B and Factsheet B  provide information on the mark up and the risk pricing but under the 
hypothesis that the operation is an IF one.  Eventually it was decided as a senior loan under the OR 
but we do not have the corresponding pricing.  
2004_LUMWANA Appraisal fee/due diligence fee: .5 to .75% of total loan amount, of which US$ 40 K to be paid 
upfront.  
Indicative risk pricing:  
 
Loan Senior loan 
from IF 
resources 
Senior loan 
from own 
resources 
Subordinated 
loan from IF 
resources  
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* 
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an
da
rd 
E
U 
loan grading scale 
 
Source: EIB Fact Sheet A. RM/CRD Opinion. Lumwana Copper project,12/7/2005 Ref. Ops 
B/ACPIF-3/2004-0146/WB 
(a) (b)* (c) 
Indicative loan grading d1 A- e2 
General provisioning charge 20% 0.20% 35% 
Risk pricing 306 bps N/A 713 bps 
2001_MOMA_ 
TITANIUM 
Appraisal/due diligence fee €40 K flat fee as a condition for progressing with project evaluation (in 
2002), source. D2 
 
Indicative loan grading, general provisioning and related risk pricing 
Senior IF Loan 
Indicative loan grading e1 
General provisioning 
charge 
35% 
Risk pricing 344 bps 
Subordinated IF Loan 
Indicative loan grading e2 
General provisioning 
charge 
35% 
Risk pricing 448 bps 
Ratings and assumptions 
 Mozambique has been assigned a B2 rating by Fitch. 
 CRD assigned a B3 Moody’s equivalent rating (counterpart internal rating of 17) to KMML 
and KMPL on account of the low project profitability, the weakness of the promoter, the 
uncertainties relating to the turn-key contract and the participation of IDC, and the relatively 
weak security package. 
 The two loans bear interest at a fixed rate.  Tenor is 13 years, including a 3-year grace period, 
for the senior loan, and 15 years, including a 5-year grace period, for the subordinated loan. 
 Both contracts include a financial covenant (debt service coverage ratio), in addition to the 
standard clauses (MAC, cross default and pari passu). 
 The security package includes claims on project’s assets and revenues.  The standard recovery 
rate for senior loans (50%) has been decreased to 40% to take into account the tight market 
conditions faced by producers of titanium products.  The recovery rate for the junior loan has 
been reduced by half to 20%. 
Source: EIB Moma Titanium Project Mozambique, RM/CRD on operation already approved, 27th 
March 2003 
2001_MOMA_ 
TITANIM 
The table summarises the commercial terms for the Senior and Subordinated loans and for the standby 
subordinated loans:  
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Source: EIB Project Progress Report, Moma Titanium (Serapis 200010242), Luxembourg 25 July 2007, 
OPS B/ACP-IF-3/2007-1460/mh, annex 2, §5 
2004_OLKARIA Interest rate formula: EIB’s standard interest rate for lending outside the EU – fixed rate as at 
signature or at the date of each disbursement, or variable spread floating rate based on EURIBOR or 
LIBOR –  increased by a credit spread of 207 bp, or 171 bp with financial covenants, and by the cost 
of hedging the possible USD exposure for the IF 
Due diligence fee: € 160 K,  
Security/guarantees: 0.5% front-end fee out of which € 40K have been paid up-front 
Pricing:  
   Indicative loan grading: d2 
  General provisioning: 20% 
  Risk pricing 2.07% 
Source EIB Fact Sheet B: financing proposal, Luxembourg 24/2/2005. OPS B/ACPIF-
2CENT&EASTAFR/2004-0255/GOUNOT MARCEL 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
In order to meet the IMF’s conditions and due to the Senegal’s HIPC status, the IF loan have to 
include an interest rate subsidy. The interest rate applied by the EIB after the interest rate subsidy 
should not be higher than 4%. 
 
“Fact sheet B: financing proposal”, EIB, 2007, p 3 
I-8.2.2 Spectrum of risks/benefits between equity (and quasi-equity) and loan operations (taking 
subsidies into account) 
General An EIB source mentioned the following with regard to lending to the public vs. private sector:  
“Under the Lomé Conventions, the majority of loans were directed to the public sector (72 % under Lomé IV a and b, 
vs. 26 % under Cotonou I). A standard sovereign/public sector loan, typically to a national utility company, involved a 
relatively light appraisal, largely based on PJ’s analysis of the technical, cost and economic profitability elements of the 
project. This was accompanied by a somewhat broad-brush financial assessment undertaken by OPs. 
Negotiations of the standard legal documents were usually no more than a one-to-two day, take it or leave it, affair. 
Today, the due diligence process with private sector counterparts is far more comprehensive encompassing increasingly 
sophisticated financial modelling, a detailed credit analysis involving CRD, the completion of the ESIAF to demonstrate 
the Bank’s value-added, opinions from JU and OCCO, the provision of term sheets, long and complex 
legal discussions on tailor-made contractual documents often involving external lawyers, NGO scrutiny etc. This process 
is particularly complex in the case of project finance/PPP operations. 
Albeit to a somewhat lesser extent, the same type of due diligence is now also required for public sector projects. 
Furthermore, the Bank is increasingly getting more involved in the upstream project phase, ensuring that adequate 
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measures are in place to strengthen the institutional/financial framework and to develop capacity building. This is 
translating into the labour-intensive provision and follow-up of technical assistance and discussions with the 
counterparts and other donors. 
Public sector financing is once again gaining new momentum and the new impetus given to regional infrastructure has 
accelerated this trend. Because of the sheer size of such operations, if the Bank wants to play the role that it is expected to 
play, e.g. in the context of the Trust Fund established under the EU-Africa Infrastructure Partnership, larger financial 
resources than currently available will be required. The current pipeline of projects comprises a number of mega projects 
such as the Ethiopia-Kenya transmission line and the Gilgel Gibe III projects the total cost of which amounts to EUR 
600 m and EUR 1 billion respectively, to mention only two examples from the same region.” 
Source: MN 027 
2004-WAGP This operation had been initially envisaged as a risk capital operation under the IF in the form of a 
participating loan. Eventually it took the form of a sovereign loan financed by own resources and 
complemented by an interest subsidy financed by the IF. The project FIRR is estimated at 13% under 
conservative assumptions. Moreover the project benefits from a guarantee of the IBRD and the 
MIGA. 
The financial risks are therefore limited. However, the project revenues derive essentially from the 
payment of the transportation tariff by a single large customer VRA and the project viability thus is 
critically dependent on the ability of VRA to pay for the gas it has contracted.  
Source: EIB, Appraisal Report, West African Gas Pipeline, Ghana. Luxembourg, 02/10/2006 
I-8.2.3 Exposure limits by sector, country, type of borrower/investee, instruments 
General At the end of 2009, the bulk of the IF portfolio was characterised by a concentration of operations at 
“satisfactory” and “acceptable” risk levels. Prudential limits relating to foreign exchange and high-risk 
instruments were complied with in spite of growing levels of provisioning, which is directly linked to 
the effects of the global crisis in developing countries, notably in the mining sector. The quality of the 
portfolio is assured by selective, early stage project screening, regular monitoring of the EIB’s 
operations and ex-post evaluations. 
 
Source: EIB, IF Annual Report 2009, p. 66 
2003_Dakar-
Ziguinchor 
The borrower is the Senegalese government, especially Ministry of Infrastructure, Equipment and 
Transport. As it is a sovereign loan, no guarantee is requested by the Bank, but the government can 
not make over nor take out a mortgage on the boat. 
Source: Operation’s « Conseil d’administration. Prêt sur les ressources de la FI. Projet Liaison maritime 
Dakar-Ziguinchor (Sénégal) », EIB, 2004, p2 
2004-WAGP Borrower/exposure: Republic of Ghana: EIB’s exposure (as of September 2006) to the Republic of 
Ghana amounts to €49 M. 
Sector exposure: EIB total IF exposure to the energy sector amounted to €196M or 19% of the signed 
IF portfolio( as of September 2006). No sector limit applies. 
2004_LUMWANA Equinox Copper Ventures Zambia Ltd (ECV) is a 100% subsidy of Equinox Minerals Ltd (EML). The 
EIB’s existing exposures to EML amount to €7M (i.e. the co-financing of the feasibility study by the 
Bank) 
Sector Exposure/limit: No sector limit in place. IF exposure to the sector amounts (31st May  2005) to 
27.5% of total signed IF exposure. 
Source: EIB Fact Sheet A. RM/CRD Opinion. Lumwana Copper project,12/7/2005 Ref. Ops 
B/ACPIF-3/2004-0146/WB 
2001_MOMA_ 
TITANIUM 
Borrowers/exposure:  
The Bank currently has a total exposure to Kenmare for the Grafites de Ancuabe project amounting to 
EUR 0.72 million (EUR 270,000 worth of Kenmare’s shares6 and EUR 450,000 in outstanding loan to 
Companhia de Desenvolvimento Mineiro, a state owned company).  With the proposed loan, total 
exposure to Kenmare will amount to EUR 55.72 million, i.e. more than 100% of the company’s own 
                                                 
6 Due to market conditions (dumping from China), the Ancuabe Graphite Mine project was stopped, and EUR 3.4 million of the EUR 
3.85 million outstanding loan were converted at a 94% discount into Kenmare’s shares. 
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funds at the end of 2001, while the prudential limit set by the IF CRPG is 50%.  However, the 
company is planning to raise additional funds on the market, which might bring exposure within the 
prudential limit.  
 
The Bank currently has a total exposure to IDC amounting to EUR 141 million.  With the proposed 
loan, total exposure to IDC will amount to EUR 196 million, i.e. around 9% of IDC’s own funds at 
the end of 2001.   
Source: : EIB Moma Titanium Project Mozambique, RM/CRD on operation already approved, 27th 
March 2003 
 
Sector exposure/limit: The loan will bring the IF’s exposure to the African mining sector to EUR 102 
million (EUR 55 million in addition to EUR 34 million for the Zambia Kansanshi Copper project and 
EUR 13 million for the Kenya Magadi Soda Pure Ash project). 
Source: EIB Moma Titanium Project Mozambique, RM/CRD on operation already approved, 27th 
March 2003. 
 
2004_OLKARIA This is 5th IF operation in the energy sector (all ACP) (following € 43 M in Kenya, $US 15 M in 
Grenada, €25 M in Mauritania, €15.25 M in Burkina Faso). No sector limit applies. 
Source: D5 
I-8.2.4 Country and risk assessment 
General To counter the higher credit risk embedded in new operations, as well as the possible negative 
repercussions of the crisis on EIB’s counterparties, a watchlist of potentially risky operations is 
regularly updated. The EIB’s monitoring activity has been strengthened accordingly. 
 
Source: EIB, IF Annual Report 2009, p. 66 
General An EIB source mentioned the IF focus on risk considerations, which has also increased of OR 
operations: “In line with the overall evolution of the Bank towards more commercial banking practices in the course of 
the last 15 years, project/borrower risk considerations, which were secondary under the successive Lomé Conventions, 
have become one of the central features of Cotonou operations as the Bank’s role has changed from the management and 
recovery of Lomé risk capital to the management of the portfolio of the Investment Facility, a revolving fund with its own 
balance sheet. Under the IF, the Bank has to take risks which private sector operators would not be prepared to take, 
thereby playing a catalytic role, whilst at the same time being “developmental” and ensuring the long term financial 
sustainability of the IF on a portfolio basis. Also, risk management considerations have recently been progressively 
extended to own resources operations, the objective being to mitigate the risk borne by the Member States under their 
guarantee, and are expected to become more of an issue following the Member States’ request for the Bank to bear part of 
the risk on its own resources lending in the ACP as from 2011. In addition, developments in corporate governance best 
practice in terms of compliance, ALM, audit/evaluation and corporate social responsibility etc. have also added to the 
due diligence process.” 
Source: MN 027 
General DEAS country risk assessment approach uses rating agency rating and for non rated countries does its 
own assessment. 
For financial sector development, DEAS looks if the macro financial environment is favorable. In the 
case of local currency loans, they also assess if the exchange risk is acceptable and define the pricing of 
local currency loans according to the local market. 
Source: MN 007 
 
Risque pays : notation tous les deux ans – « particulièrement relevant pour ACP car une quarantaine de pays ne 
sont pas notés par les agences. Intéressant pour le Risk Management. (…)  
Source: MN 007 
 
An EIB staff member notes the following with regard to the evolution behind the ESIAF.  
“Autre dimension (pas liées directement aux opérations) plus générale, de l’ordre de la politique/stratégie : ESIAF est 
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un peu le fruit du hasard. Les idées ont commencé à venir en 2003, discussions internes quand on a commencé à 
introduire la dimension de risque crédit depuis Cotonou. Trouver l’équilibre entre la perspective risque et la 
perspective développement (= plus de développement qu’avant). Nous avons alors développé un premier cadre (DIAF), 
uniquement ACP et opérations directes. Avec le temps est devenu ESIAF et s’est élargi (opérations, dimensions, etc.). 
Après un certain temps on est aussi entrés en contact avec nos collègues de l’EVALUATION à la BEI – pour voir 
comment mesurer cela. » 
Source: MN 007 
 
A NGO interviewee noted that the EIB was interested in following countries’ conflict sensitivity: “EIB 
quite responsive to advocacy in the field of conflict prevention and Peacebuilding. There is now a document in place that 
requires the Bank to be conflict sensitive when it considers it should. Published in February 2009. It would be interesting 
to see to what extent it would have been useful to have a conflict sensitive approach over the evaluation period. EIB is 
bound by European Consensus (cf. Göteborg etc.) to be sensitive on conflict sensitivity. All EIB activities ought to be 
part of this framework. It also makes sense for the EIB: violent conflict is not good for projects and for the Bank  
moral imperative and personal interest. Maybe there needs to be a steer to ensure that the EIB turns its commitments on 
conflict prevention into action. Risk is that conflict prevention dimension falls outside the prioritisation (e.g. versus 
financial return of a project).” 
Source: MN 022 
 
A Commission staff member mentions that the EIB focused on lower-risk countries: “ La BEI a aussi 
typiquement choisi les pays avec un risque moindre (stabilité politique, etc.). Elle a complètement ignoré des pays avec un 
risque moindre. Un peu plus de la moitié des pays ACP reçoivent un financement de la BEI. Sauf si catastrophe 
naturelle (cf. Haïti il y a quelques mois). Un prêt non remboursé deviendra un grant à la fin (cf. restructuration de la 
dette – HIPC). ». 
Source : MN 023 
 
In the same line, an EIB source mentioned that the EU MS are not at all comfortable with the idea of 
bearing the unpredictable political risk associated with lending in the weaker ACP countries through 
the OR guarantee mechanism (see I-8.2.6 below). Source: MN 027 
General (Lomé IV) Methodologies for financial and economic risk appraisal: The Evaluation of EIB financing through 
individual loans under the Lomé IV Convention (covering the period 1990-2003, before the set-up of 
the IF under the Cotonou Agreement) recommended better explanation of the methodologies used in 
the financial and economic appraisal of the project. See the table below, which also provides the EIB 
response.  
 
EIB Evaluation’s recommendation 
7 
EIB Services’ Comments 
The appraisal reports should more 
clearly explain and justify the 
methodologies used in the 
financial and economic appraisal 
of the project. If a cost benefit 
framework is used, the project 
specific bench-marks used to 
accept/reject a project based on 
the internal financial and 
economic rates of return of the 
project should be clearly defined 
and mentioned. (Section 5.2) 
The Bank’s services will more clearly explain and justify 
the financial and economic methodologies used through 
the appraisal report.. The appraisal report should 
explicitly state the assumptions made. In line with 
practice followed by several other MDBs (World Bank, 
IADB, AsDB,..) working in the same area and often in 
cooperation with the EIB, the reference ERR level for 
projects outside the EU is 10%, with the results being 
interpreted according to the sector and the extent to 
which economic externalities have been captured. 
However, for a number of sectors it is not possible to 
quantify the economic returns and other methodologies 
must be used. Besides profitability, there are also other 
factors to be taken into account for the opinion for 
financing. 
Source: Evaluation of EIB financing through individual loans under the Lomé IV Convention, EIB, 
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2006 (p5). 
 
Risk of market reform: That same Lomé IV Evaluation recommended better risk management of 
projects in protected markets that are subject to market reforms. See the table below, which also 
provides the EIB response.  
 
EIB Evaluation’s recommendation 8 EIB Services’ Comments 
For projects in protected markets that are 
subject to market reforms, the likely 
impact of such reforms to the financial 
performance of the project need to be 
analysed in detail at appraisal, the risks to 
the financial sustainability of the projects 
be clearly indicated, and the results of the 
analysis be incorporated in the economic 
appraisal of the project. (Sections 3.1.1.3, 
3.1.2, 3.3 and 6.2) 
The Bank’s services agree that this should be part 
of the sensitivity analysis of the project and 
assessed when identifying the major risks and 
their possible mitigation. The impact of market 
reforms are analysed at appraisal and are 
incorporated in the various scenarios used 
through risk assessment matrices, which consider 
market reform issues, where the Bank takes 
project risk. 
Source: Evaluation of EIB financing through individual loans under the Lomé IV Convention, EIB, 
2006 (p6). 
2000_MAGADI_ 
SODA 
The main risks are: 
 The high volatility of world market prices for soda ash and intensifying competition inducing price 
pressure. 
 Railway transport reliability, although improved, remains a significant risk for the smooth 
operation of the project.  
Source Note to OP3. Opinion for Appraisal Authorisation. Project Magadi Soda, country Kenya. 
Luxembourg 24/10/2000, PJ/I&S/2000-1186/GCE/SHW/ms 
2003_BOAD PG IV The March 2004 fact sheet of this operation combining (a) an OR global loan, (b) IF guarantee, and (c) 
IF equity investment), mentioned the following regarding the (low) credit risk related to this operation: 
« Risques de crédit et mesures d’atténuation des risques : 
a)La BOAD est une banque dont la situation financière est saine et qui a pour objectif à moyen terme d’être notée. Elle 
a toujours honoré de manière ponctuelle ses engagements envers la Banque. En dernier recours la Banque disposera de la 
garantie des États Membres de l’U.E. 
b) et c) S’agissant d’opérations sur ressources IF, aucune risque de crédit n’en découle pour la Banque. » 
Source : “ Fact Sheet B : proposition de financement » (of operation 2003_BOAD PG IV), EIB, 11 
mars 2004 (p3) 
 
Exchange rate risk will now be taken by final beneficiaries, not anymore the direct beneficiary bank 
(BOAD):  
« Le risque de change qui était jusqu’à présent supporté directement par la BOAD, sera transféré dorénavant aux 
bénéficiaires finaux selon des modalités qui seront déterminées préalablement à la mise en place du prêt » 
Source : “ Fact Sheet B : proposition de financement » (of operation 2003_BOAD PG IV), EIB, 11 
mars 2004 (p3) 
2003_Dakar-
Ziguinchor 
The operation’s 2004 “fact sheet A” mentions that the financial return will be limited or even negative: 
«La rentabilité financière de l’ensemble du projet sera faible voir probablement négative, ce qui est souvent le cas pour les 
projets de transport public destinés aux populations les plus défavorisées. Cette situation est acceptable à condition que  
l’équilibre d’exploitation du navire soit assuré durant toute la durée de vie du projet. Toutefois, l’amortissement de 
l’investissement (le navire) ne pourra probablement pas être supporté intégralement par l’exploitant. Cette situation,  
avait été envisagée lors de la rédaction de l’accord de Cotonou, qui prévoit la possibilité d’octroyer une bonification pour les 
projets de restructuration dans le cadre de la privatisation ou de projets assortis d’avantages sociaux substantiels (Chap.1, 
Art.2 Para.7).» 
Source : « Fact Sheet A : Proposition portant sur l'instruction d'une nouvelle opération » (of the 
operation), EIB, 26 March 2004 (p2) 
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It further observes the following with regard to the economic return (p2):  
« La rentabilité économique du projet devra inclure les avantages liés à la valorisation des productions vivrières 
transportées vers les marchés de Dakar. Ces avantages ne sont que très partiellement pris en compte dans l’étude du 
consultant. » 
 
Still in the same document (p3), the EIB Operations Deparment commented on hypotheses for the 
possible internal return rate and the need for an interest rate subsidy:  
« L’étude de faisabilité conclut, à partir d’hypothèses raisonnables en terme de volume de trafic et de tarifs  qu’avec une 
subvention initiale de EUR 6 millions pour l’acquisition du navire, le taux de rentabilité interne du projet s’établirait à 
5.8% et la période de remboursement à 15 ans.  Les résultats de cette étude devront être confrontés à la réalité, c’est à 
dire aux résultats des appels d’offres notamment en ce qui concerne les caractéristiques et donc les coûts d’exploitations du 
navire, et les risques que pourrait supporter  l’opérateur du navire. La Banque devra s’assurer notamment que i) les 
tarifs permettent d’atteindre l’équilibre financier d’exploitation (y compris l’entretien du navire et les taxes portuaires), et 
ii) qu’une partie de l’amortissement du navire puisse, dans la mesure du possible, être recouvrée par l’Etat. » 
« Pour que la Banque puisse envisager de participer à ce projet, qui a un impact sur le développement de la Casamance 
indiscutable, bien que difficilement quantifiable, il est nécessaire et justifié qu’elle puisse affecter à son concours une 
bonification d’intérêt.  L’avis de la Commission à ce propos a été sollicité. » 
 
The EOB Projects Department further commented in that document (p3) that the project is difficult 
and confronted with strong risks:  
« Le projet est difficile et risqué. Il sera probablement difficile de trouver un bon opérateur pour l’exploitation du navire 
étant donnée la faible rentabilité financière de la ligne ; le problème du partage des risques commerciaux entre l’Etat et 
l’exploitant devra faire l’objet d’une attention toute particulière. En plus des risques liés à l’incertitude du trafic et à la 
faible solvabilité des utilisateurs, il y a un risque technique d’exploitation (nécessité d’une rotation en 48 heures afin 
d’assurer un maximum de productivité) qui nécessitera une gestion très rigoureuse des opérations aux escales. Afin de 
réduire ce risque, la Banque insistera pour que l’exploitant soit étroitement associé à la définition de certains 
aménagements du navire et du matériel de manutention et conditionnement du fret. Le Ministère de l’infrastructure de 
l’Equipement et des Transports ne semble pas avoir l’expérience de gestion de projet d’une telle complexité. » 
2003_Dakar-
Ziguinchor 
The economic rate of return is evaluated at 14%, which is considered by the Bank as satisfactory. This 
implies that the pillar 2 of the value added analysis (i.e. economic viability of the project) carried out by 
the EIB is considered as fulfilled.  
Source : Operation’s « Conseil d’administration. Prêt sur les ressources de la FI. Projet Liaison 
maritime  
Dakar-Ziguinchor (Sénégal) », EIB, 2004, p3 
2004-OLKARIA The main financial risk that had been anticipated was linked to the tariffs. Bulk supply tariffs were not 
high enough to cover the cost of electricity generated by the project. This risk did not materialise 
because new Power Purchased Agreements were negotiated with KPLC.  
Sources: D12, D11 
The risk that materialised, i.e. the change of market conditions that led to a enormous increase in the 
price to pay for the turnkey contract, had not been anticipated and obliged to adapt severely the 
financing plan. 
Sources: Note conjointe. Olkaria II Extension. Luxembourg 26/5/2005. Note conjointe n° FI/2004-
523, Operation 2004-0255.,  
Olkaria II Extension. Note do the File. Monitoring Exercise 2009, Nairobi 01/12/2009. OpsB/ACP-
IF-2/2009/NN. 
2004-OLKARIA The project’s economic life span is 20 years. 
The financial profitability is extremely low: IRR 4.5% assuming a flat energy tariff higher than the one 
prevailing at the time of the design of the project). Indicates that even with that tariff the project 
would not generate sufficient revenue to fully covers its costs. This is the reason why the EIB imposed 
as a condition that the tariff be revised before the project is commissioned.  
The ERR is much higher and estimated at 16%. When assessed taking into account the environmental 
damage costs of using alternative fuel based plants, the ERR can be as high as 19 to 25%. 
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Source: EIB. Apparaisal Report. Olkaria II Extension. Extension of a geothermal power station. 
Luxembourg 18/1/2005. PJ/Enercom/I&S/2005-25/EH/EG/fe. 
2004-WAGP Main risks are enumerated in EIB, Appraisal Report, West African Gas Pipeline, Ghana. Luxembourg, 
02/10/2006; 
 
 Project relies initially and primarily on a single customer, the Takoradi Power stations, and VRA, 
the main gas purchaser has been operating at losses over the last years. The risk of payment 
default, which has been partially mitigated through external guarantees, cannot be excluded. 
 Gas supply interruptions due to social instability in Nigeria. 
 Some NGO’s (most notably FoE) are campaigning against the project for not sufficiently 
addressing the environmental and social issues in the Niger delta and in particular the flaring of 
associated gas. The contribution of the WAGP to reducing gas flaring in Nigeria will in any case 
be modest when compared with other major export schemes that are being developed as part of 
the Nigeria programme for ending flaring by 2008. However the Bank could not obtain during 
appraisal clear commitments from the oil companies that volumes of associated gas transported by 
the WAGP will be maximised at all times).     
 
2001_MOMA_ 
TITANIUM 
Key credit risks: 
 limited capacity of the principal sponsor Kenmare; 
 the nature of the market for the products; 
 uncertainty regarding project cost until the turnkey EPCM contract has been negotiated and 
concluded (which will fix the price of construction); 
 only modest financial profitability 
Source EIB Fact Sheet B: financing proposal, Moma Titanium Mozambique, Luxembourg, 27th 
February 2003. Ops B/ACT-IF-3/2001-0242 
 
2004_LUMWANA DEAS Country risk in July 2009 is B3 with outlook negative. 
Zambia's B3 rating is supported by improved fiscal accounts, resulting from a substantial reduction in 
external debt obligations. However, the magnitude of development challenges and the country's 
limited institutional capacity to tackle those problems remain a drag on its creditworthiness. Moreover, 
in light of the progressively more difficult external environment, DEAS has revised its outlook on 
Zambia's country rating to negative, down from stable in July. 
Source: D19: EIB Lumwana Copper Project. Finance Contracts n°23717,13718 and 23719 signed on 
November 2006, Luxembourg, 23 Décember 2008. 
 
Risks and mitigants:  
The principal risks associated with this project are: (i) construction/cost over-run risk (ii) market risk; 
(iii)  environmental risk; (iv) counterpart risk and (v) country risk. Mitigants of these risks are (i) a 
fixed-price EPC (Engineering, Procurement, Construction) contract is being negotiated with a 
reputable and experienced contractor; (ii) prudent priee assumptions made in the financial projections 
(USD 1.30/lb in the mid-case and USD 1.00/lb in the low case scenario), as compared to a current 
price of USD 3.40/lb; (iii) ElA established and approved; (iv) strong security package and financial 
covenants, and (v) the project is wholly export-oriented and not exposed to domestic demand: Zambia 
has a long history of mining, and since the las! ten years has had a pro-business approach to foreign 
investment. 
Source:  EIB. Board of Directors, Lumwana Copper Project. Luxembourg 26 septembre 2006, 
Document 06/354 
2005_Pacific islands The 2006 financial proposal mentions the following regarding credit risk:  
“The financial intermediaries will assume the commercial risk of the sub-loans to be refinanced under this facility, the 
credit risk of the proposed operation consists mainly of the quality of the selected financial intermediaries.” 
Source: “Fact Sheet B – Financing Proposal” (of the operation), EIB, 11/10/2006 (p2) 
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The RM/CRD Opinion Note on the Fact Sheet A mentions further the following regarding 
“Guarantee/Security”:  
“(a) The availability of government guarantees for the global loan will be investigated during appraisal. 
(b) For the guarantee product, it is anticipated that project security will be shared with the commercial banks providing 
the loans/ credit lines.” 
Source: “Fact Sheet A – RM/CRD Opinion” (of the operation), EIB, 25/05/2005 (p1) 
 
Regarding the facility’s first contract, the local bank supported, NDBP, is a 100% public bank, with an 
EIB “Internal rating” of “B1” (not clear what it refers to). The score provided by the EIB to the 
NDBP in terms of “Borrower quality” is “Good – 2”. This is the first and only operation of the 
Borrower with the Bank.  
The 2009 PPR further mentions that “At the time of appraisal, the Republic of Palau had been assigned an 
informal Ba3 Moody’s equivalent rating by DEAS. In December 2008, DEAS assigned to the Republic of Palau an 
internal rating of Baa2 (investment grade) and it has not changed since then.” 
The “Borrower Financial Situation” further receives that score “ Good – 2” 
Source: “Project Progress Report” (of the operation), EIB, 01/12/2009 (p5) 
 
The 2009 PPR further summarises information on risk rating of this contract with NDBP as such:  
d. Risk identified at Appraisal  
 
CRD recommendations at Fact Sheet B stage 
The loan agreements should include pari passu with other senior indebtedness, negative pledge 
undertaking, cross default and material adverse change clauses and compliance with the prudential 
standards set by the Central Banks. 
 
In line with other global loans signed under the IF, financial covenants should be introduced in the 
finance contract, including capital adequacy ratios, asset quality ratios and provisioning ratios. The 
level of these ratios was to be set above the requirements by the Central Bank and in agreement 
with CRD during the course of the negotiations. 
 
Appropriate information covenants, including audited statements of compliance with financial 
covenants, were to be inserted in the finance contract. 
 
Ratings and assumptions for the loan to NDBP 
 Palau is rated Ba3 by DEAS; 
 The IF benefits from a first demand guarantee from the Government of Palau; 
 Guarantee agreement includes cross default and pari passu on the Government of Palau; 
 NDBP is assigned a counterpart internal rating of B1; 
 The correlation between NDBP and the Government of Palau is set to single risk; 
 The loan is disbursed in EUR; 
 Tenor is 15 years, including a grace period of 3 years. 
 
 
Extracts from FSB 
Credit risks and mitigants 
The financial intermediaries will assume the commercial risk of the sub-loans to be refinanced under 
this facility, the credit risk of the proposed operation consists mainly of the quality of the selected 
financial intermediaries. 
 
Project issues 
Positive 
 Quality of the selected intermediaries with a good local reputation, a sound financial base and 
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good operational results relative to their peer institutions in the Pacific region. Banks have been 
selected carefully on the basis of their overall performance and standing in the industry as well as 
their experience in and capacity for the financing of SMEs and micro-sized projects.  
 Selected banks meet respective national prudential guidelines applied. 
 Evidence of a structural lack of medium and long-term resources justifying an intervention by 
the Bank. 
 
Negative 
 Although measures taken in recent years have helped to improve the system of regulation and 
supervision, the Pacific regulatory framework still has room for further improvement in terms of 
strengthened prudential guidelines from Central Banks. 
 The slow pace of economic reforms and a weak basic infrastructure are still major impediments 
to private sector development. 
 
Intended solution 
 The proposal will be backed by appropriate financial covenants in order to ensure a minimum of 
quality standards throughout the duration of the loans. 
 
 
 
e. Comment on above risk/Identification of new risks 
 
Both information and financial covenants have been inserted in the finance contract and complied 
with by NDBP. 
 
A year ago, Palau was rated Baa2 by DEAS, better than previous informal rating of Ba3 at appraisal 
stage. 
 
The two disbursements occurred in USD instead of EUR (according to the Finance Contract, the 
Borrower can choose between EUR and USD). 
 
Source: “Project Progress Report” (of the operation), EIB, 01/12/2009 (p9-10) 
 
The 2009 PPR further summarises the EIB B1 grading for this loan to the NDBP as follows:  
CRD Loan Grading 
12864-01 NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PALAU 
Comments 
At appraisal stage (October 2006), CRD gave to this global loan an indicative loan grading of b1. At 
the time, the Republic of Palau had been assigned an informal Ba3 rating by DEAS. Given that the 
loan is guaranteed by the Republic of Palau and that since December 2008 DEAS has assigned a 
Baa2 rating to the country, an upgrading of the loan might have to be considered. 
 
Please note that the loan grading has been changed from b1 to D- according to the new CRPG. 
 
OPS will probably have to cancel the undrawn balance of the credit in Q1 2010. 
Source: “Project Progress Report” (of the operation), EIB, 01/12/2009 (p10) 
 
Additionnally, the 2009 PPR provided the following overview relating to the “DEAS Country Risk Rating” for Palau 
in July 2009 of “Baa2”:  
MID-TERM EVALUATION OF THE IF AND EIB OR OPERATIONS IN ACP/OCTS 
ADE - EGEVAL II  
Final Report  September 2010 Annexe 9/Page 153 
Economic Peer Group Comparison (3-year average)
Political Peer Group Comparison
Data sources are the April 2009 IMF World Economic Outlook and the 2008 World Bank Governance Indicators (unless noted otherwise).
Each variable is compared against the control group “Rating Agencies” and – in those cases where the country is not rated by at least one of the Rating Agencies 
(Fitch, Moody’s or Standard and Poor’s) – also against the control group “DEAS”. Values in the control group reflect the median of the corresponding variable in all 
countries with a comparable risk profile as measured by the Rating Agencies or DEAS. Economic data are averaged over the period 2006-2008, while the 
governance data correspond to 2008.
Voice and Accountability: the extent to which citizens of a country participate in the selection of governments. 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence: the likelihood that the government will be destabilized/overthrown by unconstitutional and/or violent means.
Government Effectiveness: the quality of public service provision and of the bureaucracy as well as the government's commitment to policies.
Regulatory Quality: the incidence of market-unfriendly policies, as well as burdens imposed by excessive regulation. 
Rule of Law: the incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts. 
Control of Corruption: the extent of corruption, conventionally defined as the exercise of public power for private gain.
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Source: “Project Progress Report” (of the operation), EIB, 01/12/2009 (p13) 
PIFF I - Samoa Regarding the PIFF I contract with the DBS, the local bank supported is a 100% public bank, with an 
EIB “Internal rating” of “B1” (not clear what it refers to). The score provided by the EIB to the SDB 
in terms of “Borrower quality” is “Good – 2”. The EIB has already experience with this bank through 
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several operations, including 5 global loans. The PPR provides hereby the following comment and 
table:  
 
 
 
 
Source: “Project Progress Report” (of the operation), EIB, 01/12/2009 (p3) 
  
This PPR further reports the following in terms of risk.  
The credit risk is born by the DBS for this global loan. As a consequence, the EIB is willing to 
introduce for instance standard protective clauses. :  
 
 
The Fact Sheet B of the overall PIFF I operation provided on p1 the following indication on loan 
grading, risk pricing and provisioning:  
MID-TERM EVALUATION OF THE IF AND EIB OR OPERATIONS IN ACP/OCTS 
ADE - EGEVAL II  
Final Report  September 2010 Annexe 9/Page 155 
 
 
The fact sheet B also provided (p4) the following in terms of “Main issues & Risks” the following 
project issues:  
“Positive:  
•Quality of the selected intermediaries with a good local reputation as being dynamic and experienced, a firm financial 
base and good operational results relative to their peer institutions in the Pacific region; 
•A proven track record of similar medium to long-term credit lines from either EIB or other international institutions; 
•Selected development banks meet respective national prudential guidelines. 
•Evidence of a structural lack of medium and long term resources justifying an intervention by the Bank. 
•The development of SMMI businesses is one of the keys to the sustained employment growth that is crucial to both 
poverty reduction and the building of stable democratic societies. To respond to the issue of poverty alleviation the overall 
objective of this proposal is to maintain a sustainable SMMI financing capacity through financial intermediaries focusing 
not only on small and medium sized investments but also to address micro-finance by providing for tailor-made financing 
and giving the least privileged strata of the population access to credit. 
•Participating banks are government owned and have been selected carefully on the basis of their overall performance and 
standing in the industry as well as their experience in and capacity for SMMI financing. In addition, the Pacific 
Financing Facility will be backed by financial covenants in order to maintain an acceptable quality standard. The sound 
use of IF resources should be ensured through the selection of dynamic and solid intermediaries in addition to DBS and 
TDB with a proven track record and adequate monitoring capacities.  
•Previous global loan operations have yielded positive results and merit continuation under the Cotonou agreement. They 
have proven to be a useful instrument to leverage intermediaries and have also enabled the Bank to branch prudently into 
areas such as SMMI finance.” 
Negative:  
•Although measures taken in recent years have helped to improve the system of regulation and supervision, the regulatory 
framework still gives room for further improvement in terms of strengthened prudential guidelines and prompt remedial 
actions against distressed banks to be taken by the Central Bank;  
•The slow pace of economic reforms and a weak basic infrastructure are still major impediments to private sector 
development. 
•Common characteristics in the region’s banking system are that commercial banks do not reach beyond main urban 
areas and have little outreach to outer islands, credit to indigenous entrepreneurs is extremely limited, there is little lending 
to agriculture and fishing by the commercial banks and interest rate spreads are large.” 
 
 
I-8.2.5 Provisioning policies 
2000_MAGADI_ 
SODA 
The Bank’s exposure under the loan on own resources is adequately covered by a guarantee of FMO. 
The loans on IF are backed by project security as well as by charges over the borrower’s existing 
property, which would be fully in place from first disbursement, providing as best a protection against 
project completion risks as could be obtained. The mortgage over MSC’s issued shares, and the 
financiers’ option to require from Brunner Mond Group transfer of the shares to them, are primarily 
meant as a leverage to help mobilise shareholder support in the event of a default by MSC in project 
completion or debt service. The possibility to sell the company at a price satisfying at least lenders’ 
claims is realistic since the Magadi plant with its access to a rare natural resource would be a strategic 
asset to each of the bigger players in the world’s soda ash markets.  
Source: Note to OP3. Opinion for Appraisal Authorisation. Project Magadi Soda, country Kenya. 
Luxembourg 24/10/2000, PJ/I&S/2000-1186/GCE/SHW/ms 
NB: The last sentence is important since it shows that from the beginning of the project the possibility 
that it would be sold to a larger group was anticipated. However, it was envisaged exclusively from the 
point of view of the financial consequences; the consequences (environmental, social, etc.. ) of a 
takeover were not analysed as rightly mentioned in  EIB, Magadi Soda Pure Ash Project completion report, 
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24/4/2008. 
Security package: 
The Bank’s loan from own resources is proposed to be guaranteed by Nederlandse Financierings-
Maatschappij voor Ontwikkelingslanden N.V. (FMO), a major development finance institution owned 
by the State of the Netherlands (51 % of shares) and the Dutch private sector. FMO, whose portfolio 
expansion the State is strongly backing through annual equity contributions, enjoys Standard & Poor’s 
“Triple A” rating.  
The loans from the Investment Facility will be backed by security over all of MSC’s existing and 
future, fixed and current assets, shared pari passu among the project financiers, including FMO as 
guarantor. Such security would be first ranking, except for that created over certain current assets in 
respect of which local banks may enjoy first ranking security for limited amounts of working capital 
finance provided by them. In respect of these current assets, the financiers’ security would be second 
ranking. Claims under the subordinated loans would be satisfied after those relating to the senior loans 
and to FMO’s potential claims as subrogate to the EIB in case the guarantee was executed. 
The security package further includes a permanent debt service reserve to be maintained on bank 
account pledged to the lenders from the beginning of the repayment period, equivalent to one half-
year debt service instalment, and a first ranking mortgage, shared pari passu among the three 
financiers, over all of Brunner Mond Group’s shares in MSC’s capital. 
Source: EIB. Board of Directors. Magadi Soda Pure Ash Project (Kenya). 9/10/2003 
 
2004-WAGP Participation of the World Bank and Miga in the project guarantee scheme should facilitate the 
monitoring task as well as the reporting from independent environmental auditors that monitor the 
compliance with the Environmental Management plans.  
Source D6. 
¨The CRD Opinion include the following recommendations to mitigate the risks: 
CRD supports the proposal by Ops B. The following clauses should be included in the finance 
agreement with the Republic of Ghana: 
Pari passu ranking: the proposed loan should rank pari passu in terms of all other obligations and 
prepayments of the Republic of Ghana, with the obligation on the part of the Borrower not to grant 
security to any other lender without providing equal treatment to the Bank; and 
Cross default: any default on any other long-term indebtedness of the Republic of Ghana should 
result in an Event of Default under the loan and the right of the Bank to demand immediate 
repayment (any default on a loan from the resources of the Bank or the European Community should 
trigger an Event of default, independently of amount and tenor). 
 
Source: EIB Fact Sheet B: financing proposal, Luxembourg 19/7/2006. 2004- OPS B/ACPIF 
0146/BrandSchmitzWaltraud 
D6: EIB Lumwana Copper Project, Appraisal report, Luxembourg 30/6/2006, PJ/I&S/2006-
675/GCE/VMJ/aa 
Project conditions, split into disbursement conditions and undertakings by the borrower are spelled 
out in EIB Lumwana Copper Project, Appraisal report, Luxembourg 30/6/2006, PJ/I&S/2006-
675/GCE/VMJ/aa §12. 
 
2004-LUMWANA (a) First charge on project security package, pari passu with other senior lenders. 
(b) Third party guarantee from KfW or other eligible financial institution. In line with the Risk Sharing 
scheme adopted by the Bank and the Member States, the Bank will enter into intercreditor 
arrangements with the guarantor, limiting its rights to call on the guarantee to risk events not 
covered by the Member States guarantee. 
(c) Second ranking charge on the project security package under (a) above. 
Source: : EIB Fact Sheet A. RM/CRD Opinion. Lumwana Copper project,12/7/2005 Ref. Ops 
B/ACPIF-3/2004-0146/WB 
2005_Pacific Islands See I-4.1.4, which provides that for the contract in Palau the direct beneficiary bank (NDBP) had its 
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ratio of “Provisions for Loan Losses to NPL” at 30 September 2008 expected to have a level of 115%. 
PIFF I – Samoa The Fact Sheet B of the overall PIFF I operation provided on p1 the following indication on 
provisioning:  
I-8.2.6 Mix of IF and OR 
General EIB staff members note the following with regard to blending:  
“The whole issue of blending started more at our shareholders level (EU MS) rather than from the EIB operational 
level. Interest rate subsidies: used in an unorganized way.  
Note. There are two types of “blending”: between EIB instruments/resources, and with non-EIB instruments/resources. 
The second is new, to put EC grants with loans in a same Facility.  
Example of EU-Africa Infrastructure TF: Most operations in ACP are for the public sector  more concessionnality. 
When launching the Cotonou agreement, ACP countries did not like the idea that most loans should be market-based.” 
Source: MN 007 
 
An EIB source mentioned that the EU MS are not at all comfortable with the idea of bearing the 
unpredictable political risk associated with lending in the weaker ACP countries through the OR 
guarantee mechanism: “(…) Adaptations to the financial resources have been made, notably by making possible own 
resource lending for all public sector projects, including in the weaker countries. However, even this solution obviously does 
not have wholehearted shareholder support, as recently evidenced by the decision of the Board to split the financing of the 
Inga Rehabilitation project in the Democratic Republic of Congo on IF and OR respectively, contrary to the Bank 
proposal to finance the project entirely from its own resources, which was fully in line with the modalities approved in June 
2007. It is indeed becoming evident that Member States are not at all comfortable with the idea of bearing the 
unpredictable political risk associated with lending in the weaker ACP countries through the OR guarantee mechanism. 
They prefer by far the Bank to make use of the IF, i.e. budgetary funds for which they have the necessary procedural 
system in place, rather than the contingent liabilities inherent in their guarantee.” 
Source: MN 027 
Operation /General For 2010, the EIB plans to proactively take part in initiatives aimed at blending grant and loan funding, 
thereby helping to support projects that will result in bankable and sustainable undertakings. 
 
Source:  EIB, IF Annual Report 2009. 
2004-WAGP An interest rate subsidy is funded out of the IF in order to meet the specific requirements for HIPC 
countries. The resources freed by the interest will be used to fund poverty reduction measures in 
agreement with the Government of Ghana and the IMF. 
Source: 
 BEI. CA Pret bonifié sur resources propres, projet WAGP, 12/12/2006, Document 06/517. 
 PPR, WAGP, Luxembourg 19th November 2009, OpsB/ACP-IF1/2009/FFC. 
2004_LUMWANA See project description and I222 
JC 8.3 IF’s inflows and reflows (fees and interest, reimbursements, equity sales) are providing, or are 
expected to provide, a revolving character to the IF 
General At the end of 2009, accumulated reflows stood at €380m, of which €110m for 2009 alone. Principal 
repayments on loans, interest income, sales of shares and dividend income on ongoing projects explain 
mainly this figure. 
 
Source:  EIB, IF Annual Report 2009 
Pacific Qualité financière du portefeuille de la BEI : 
Projet forestier aux Salomon pourrait être mis sur la Watch List : actionnaire principal est un fond qui 
a décidé de céder sa participation. 3 acquéreurs sont sur les rangs. Pose problèmes de suivi, de 
changement de direction. Projet est maintenant monitoré par la nouvelle unité de monitoring la BEI 
MN313 
2001_MOMA_ In July 2007 all three loans have been fully disbursed. 
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TITANIUM In regards to the EUR 15m senior loan, the first capital repayment is expected to take place 1 February 
2008, while the last such instalment falls due 1 August 2018. The settlement of both interest and 
commissions due have been punctual. 
In regards to the EUR 40m subordinated loan, the first capital repayment is expected to take place 1 
August 2009, while the last such instalment falls due 1 August 2019. Under this loan, interest is 
capitalised, resulting in an increase of the loan amount by a principal amount equal to the former. 
Source: EIB Project Progress Report, Moma Titanium (Serapis 200010242), Luxembourg 25 July 2007, 
OPS B/ACP-IF-3/2007-1460/mh. 
 
2001_MOMA_ 
TITANIUM 
Management related issues and technical problems encountered during the final phase of construction 
of the project have delay completion date (by 3.5 years). A restructuring of the loan was concluded in 
March 2009 between the promoter and the lender, and the promoter succeeded in raising additional 
equity in June 09. The EIB put the project on the watch list and has recorded a provision of 35% for 
this operation. Latest (nov. 09) production figures showed positive trends; the EIB will continue to 
monitor the project and eventually withdraw if from the watch list.  
On 31/12/09 the arrears amounted to € 6.08 M > 30 days and € 6.08 > 90 days.  
Source: EIB: Cotonou Risk Report 31st December 2009, 3/2/2010. 
 
2004_MOMA_ 
TITANIUM 
The  project faced delays in complement and a number of events that have not yet permitted it to 
reach its full production capacity. This made necessary to revise the initial financial operation with a 
number of waivers and amendments (deferment of payments, issuance of equity shares).Their impact 
will likely be very limited due to the compensation ln the fonn of sharas. incraase in interas! rate. and 
fees obtained from the borrower and Its shareholder. Kenmare. Dependlng on the future performance 
of the company and its shares the Impact could in fact tum out to be positive. 
Source: EIB. Moma Titanium Minerals. Change to operation after Board Approval. Luxembourg 
5/2/2010, Refs: Ops B/ACP-IF-3/OP-2010-223. 
2004_LUMWANA First capital repayment in September 2009 was full and punctual, but given a lack of visibility on the 
prospects of the project, the EIB maintained it on the Watch List and will eventually remove it if 
financial forecasts show that the outlook is positive. A specific provision of 25% has been recorded. 
Source: EIB: Cotonou Risk Report 31st December 2009, 3/2/2010. 
I-8.3.1 Balance sheet and portfolio management 
2003_BOAD PG IV The March 2004 fact sheet of this operation (combining an OR global loan, IF guarantee, and IF 
equity investment) mentioned the following information with regard to dividends relating to the equity 
investment and an exit strategy:  
 « Modalités et Rémunération de la participation au capital :  
La BOAD n’a jamais distribué de dividende ce qui est normal pour une institution de développement. Toutefois alors 
que les statuts de la BOAD prévoient que le capital souscrit soit décomposé en capital appelé à hauteur de 25% et 
capital sujet à appel à hauteur de 75%, la Banque (comme d’autres actionnaires non régionaux) a versé l’intégralité de 
sa participation. La Direction Générale examine la possibilité d’appliquer les statuts à tous les actionnaires, ainsi la 
Banque pourrait porter son capital souscrit de FCFA 1 milliard (EUR 1.55 millions) à FCFA 4 milliards (EUR 6 
millions), en augmentant simplement sa portion de capital sujet à appel conformément aux statuts. Le capital sujet à 
appel (en fait dans ce cas l’intégralité de l’augmentation de la participation) serait conservé par la Banque et pourrait 
générer un revenu pour la Facilité d’Investissement. 
 Stratégie de sortie pour la participation au capital : 
La BOAD s’engage à prendre les mesures de son ressort pour que, lorsque la Banque en fera la demande, et d’accord 
parties, les actions de la BOAD détenues par la Banque au nom de la C.E.E. soient rachetées. » 
Source : « Fact Sheet B : proposition de financement », EIB, 11 mars 2004 (p2) 
I-8.3.2 Income statement: profitability by asset class; key profit drivers; actual and projected returns 
2000_MAGADI 
SODA 
The profitability of the project is based on a differential cash flow for a 15-year lifetime.  
The IRR under the base case conservative assumptions is estimated at 13% . 
The ERR is calculated at 14%.  It take into account the negative effects of a possible upward 
adjustment of the royalties paid by MSC to the Kenyan state; but does not take the possible additional 
benefits coming from the maintenance of the main road between Nairobi and Magadi by MSC, from 
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indirect and temporary labour created by the project, reduction of dust emissions in the working place 
and provision of water to the indigenous populations. 
Source EIB. Appraisal Report, Magadi Soda, Luxembourg 29/1/2002. (PJ/I&S/GCE/KAI/scm) 
It is important to note that MSC is export oriented, and that its revenues are based on USD, 
whereas part of  its production cost is based on KSH. The applicable KSH/USD exchange rate 
therefore plays an important role in determining the profitability  the project. For the 
profitability analysis, it is assumed that the KSH/USD exchange rate will remain constant though 
the lifetime of the project. Given the past experience, this appears to be a conservative 
assumption, which adds confidence to the financial and economic viability of the project. 
Source: EIB. Appraisal Report, Magadi Soda, Luxembourg 29/1/2002. (PJ/I&S/GCE/KAI/scm) 
 
In 2003 project preparation concluded that total project costs could be lowered whereas market prices 
projections and technical concept remained unchanged. This should improve the project profitability .  
However, for prudential reasons expected profitability has not bee revised. 
Source.:  
EIB Update to the PJ Appraisal Report of 29/1/2002 (PJ/I&S/GCE/KAI/scm). 
EIB. Board of Directors. Magadi Soda Pure Ash Project (Kenya). 9/10/2003 
2004_LUMWANA Cf Project description and I222. 
The project rate of return is estimated around 15%. 
Source: D6§3.2; §13 
 
2001_MOMA_ 
TITANIUM 
Profitability analysis provided in D7, appendix F. 
Projections provided in D5 annexes 5 and 7 
The project rate of return is estimated at around 11% by the Bank (promoter’s estimates are higher) 
Source: EIB Fact Sheet B: financing proposal, Moma Titanium Mozambique, Luxembourg, 27th 
February 2003. Ops B/ACT-IF-3/2001-0242 
2004_WAGP The financial and economic profitability analysis of the project are detailed in Appendices F/1 and 
F/2 of D6: The pipeline tariff methodology was defined in the International Project Agreement. It is 
designed to enable WAPCO to achieve a real after tax rate of return of 12% on total capital employed, 
from payments derived from Foundation Customers Gas transportation Agreements, and a real after 
tax rate of return of 15% from payments derived from all gas transportation agreements if new 
customers book pipeline capacity in addition to the one already reserved by the foundation customers. 
The calculation of the rate of returns mentioned above is to be based on an approved project cost of 
630.4 MUSD and therefore WAPCO will assume the risk of cost overrun (but also would benefit from 
cost underrun).    
Source: D6 
2005_ACPGLOB 
ADEMI 
 
Banco Ademi is a creditworthy institution (Fitch rating BBB), and loan interest is paid when due, and 
EIB is receiving dividends from its equity investments. 
However, there is unclarity as to EIB’s approach for exiting its equity stake in Banco ADEMI. 
2005_EMP AFRICA 
FUND II 
EIB-IF’s investment in this fund provides a high and relatively secure return.  The presence of such 
investments in the IF portfolio is conducive to strengthening the IF’s income statement.  However, 
Project Docts do not provide a clear indication as to IF exit strategies in such cases. 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2004 
 Madagascar 
Only one Progress report dated 11/2008. No distribution of proceeds yet. A sound deal flow pipeline 
continues to be developed. Value of investments approved seems well ion excess of budgeted.  
Expected first month on month profit in December 2008 – no indication of actual.  Other than three 
investments, portfolio appears healthy. Valuation approach is at cost, i.e. conservative. 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2006 Kenya 
Only one Monitoring Report (Monitoring Exercise 2009). Substantial rtisks identified: poor 
performance of investee companies, leading to difficulty in exiting; level of demand from good quality 
SMEs lower than expected; Fund incurs substantial currency risk.  2005_ACPGLOB CA2006 Kenya is 
on EIB-IF’s watch list. 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2006 
Only one Monitoring Report (Monitoring Exercise 2009). Substantial rtisks identified: poor 
performance of investee companies, leading to difficulty in exiting; level of demand from good quality 
SMEs lower than expected; Fund incurs substantial currency risk.  2005_ACPGLOB CA2006 Kenya is 
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on EIB-IF’s watch list. 
2008_EDFI EIB-IF will benefit pari-passu from EDFIs’ returns and decisions re: equity exits.  Not known: 
2008_EDFI not yet disbursed 
J.C.8.4 The IF manages to reconcile its development mandate and its objective of financial health 
and sustainability 
I-8.4.1 Utilisation of IF’s and OR’s risk-bearing capacity for higher development impact 
General An EIB source mentioned that the IF was criticised for not being sufficiently ‘developmental’:  
“ACP operations are now subject to much greater stakeholder scrutiny than in the past, be it from the shareholders, other 
EU institutions (Commission, Parliament and Court of Auditors) and, above all civil society and in particular NGOs, 
with the result that the Bank is now required to unambiguously demonstrate the value added of each individual operation. 
As attended to above, there seems to be a perception that the Bank has so far focused mainly on identifying and financing 
good private sector projects, which in itself is already not an easy task in the ACP context and in that respect, the Bank 
has been fundamentally in line with the letter of its Cotonou mandate. However it is also being criticised to various 
degrees, by NGOs, but also by the Commission and by at least one influential Member State for not being sufficiently 
“developmental” and for being too risk averse.” 
Source: MN 027 
 
A Commission staff member mentions that the EIB first concern is on the IF financial sustainability, 
while complying with the development objective: “BEI : objectif premier : assurer la pérennité de la FI  
souci de rentabilité, tout en satisfaisant l’objectif de développement. Ils tâtonnent... ils commencent à comprendre dans 
quoi ils peuvent intervenir. Ils interviennent très peu en agriculture par exemple (risques énormes – leur projets dans ce 
secteur sont d’ailleurs très peu rentables et en difficulté). Je les comprends, il s’agit d’un trade-off. S’ils exagèrent d’un côté, 
ils sont critiqués de l’autre (development vs. risk). Est-il possible d’intervenir avec le même niveau de risque dans des 
opérations plus orientées développement (« plus de développement pour un même risque » ?) ? La BEI pourrait-elle 
s’investir plus directement en développement (santé, éducation, etc.) ? C’est une question.  Le nouveau traité de Lisbonne 
oblige l’UE (y compris donc la BEI) à s’engager sur la voie d’éradication de la pauvreté (Articles 208 à 2010). 
Source : MN 023 
 
Monitoring of development impact is hampered by lack of resources, as mentioned by EIB staff 
members (see also below under I-9.3.2): 
“ Monitoring de l’impact en termes de développement : a été demandé clairement il y a qqs années. On a du mal à le 
mettre en place par manque de ressources. Bernard Ziller avait été voir des peer institutions pour voir comment ils 
faisaient : ils ont des ressources dédiées. Nous n’avons pas ces moyens.  
Décision du CD prise d’harmoniser maintenant toutes les activités monitoring au sein de la Banque dans le TMR 
(Transaction Management Restructuring), pareil pour EU et Externat Lending Mandate et ACP etc. Problème : c’est 
du monitoring point de vue risque. Le Département Projets serait sensé faire le monitoring point de vue physique, mais ils 
n’ont pas les ressources. Souvent ils font du copier coller de ce qu’on fait ici. » 
Source : MN 027 
2003_Dakar-
Ziguinchor 
See I-2.1.3 
I-8.4.2 Use of subsidies 
General See also I-8.2.6 above 
2003_Dakar-
Ziguinchor 
This IF loan benefited from an interest rate subsidy (see I-1.4.1). 
2004-WAGP No information available. 
I-8.4.3 Use of TA to strengthen investee companies 
General EIB staff members note that TA assistance is very limited, vs. for instance the FEMIP Trust Fund. 
They expressed their willingness to dispose of a similar instrument as well. They further indicated that 
an EIB limitation in ACP is that operations cannot be leveraged with TA on project design. They also 
specified that there is a missing link between the EC and EIB in terms of TA. 
“FEMIP : il existe une enveloppe d’AT par la CE etc. BEI à aussi de l’AT mais doit être project-related. Récemment 
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on a interprété la notion de project-related, en concluant un accord avec le FMI appelé AFRITAC, avec des experts 
dans chacun de ces centres appuyant certaines dimensions (y compris experts sur secteurs financiers aidant le 
Gouvernement). On a considéré que de ce point de vue qu’il pouvait être légitime de contribuer financièrement à leurs 
efforts (ils ont une capacité bien supérieure à la nôtre d’identifier les problèmes). Nous participons par exemple aux 
Steering Committee de ces centres. » 
 “EIB works both within and outside the EU: in particular sector people work in both regions; experience from EU 
MS. EIB technical people work globally, from Germany to Benin. That is also why we focus on infrastructure and 
financial sector, because this was our key expertise within the EU. Most other IFIs focus on development countries. 
Financial additionality: considered as high in ACP countries. Expertise (although TA funding is not sufficient): we 
often asked more funds for TA, we don’t have enough funding, although we have the internal expertise with the Projects 
Department. Internal expertise used mainly for appraisal and design (setting and formatting) of the project. But not much 
to give full advises: we can say “you should do this kind of study” but we cannot do it ourselves. In particular upstream 
studies. In our EU-Africa Infrastructure TF: in the past we were being told we were arriving when everything was ready. 
Now with the TA money available we can finance all kind of earlier preparation work. We have TA since 2007. We 
still think that we desperately needed money for TA. Having more funding would enable bringing more TA to the 
project. Cf. WB in terms of missing link: they have created between IDA and IFC the “IFC advisory services” financed 
on TFs.” 
Source: MN 007 
 
Other EIB staff members also emphasize the importance and benefits of TA:  
“Very important aspect of our work. TA is really really improving our work over the last years. Such grant money is 
interesting. It really makes things possible which would otherwise not be possible. Blending grants and loans is very 
valuable”. Has TA been used frequently to develop a project for making it bankable in EIB terms? “We 
are still climbing the learning curve, but yes, for instance with the EU-Africa ITF. E.g. to finance the environmental 
impact assessments.” Do you think the TA envelope is large enough? “There are lots of projects e.g. support for 
organisations to convince of need of that instrument, for technical choices, EIAs. Particularly for infrastructure. The main 
issue is not money to be available, but projects to be ahead for moving. Grant money is essential. It is mainly used for 
hiring consultants (more than for financing personnel of the EIB); it hence hires external expertise, which increases 
expertise basis. Note. Water Facility : very small, just a few millions” 
Source: MN 024 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2006 
The intervention model is for the fund manager to offer TA (World Bank financed) for operational 
support to investee SMEs to strengthen management.  Impact not yet measured. 
2005_Pacific Islands The report to the Board of Directors mentioned on p2 that €1 was also envisaged for TA for the PIFF 
and PIFF II (see I-4.1.2). However, there is no information available on effective delivery of TA. 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2004  
 Madagascar 
The intervention model is for the fund manager to offer TA (World Bank financed) for operational 
support to investee SMEs to strengthen management.  Impact not yet measured. 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2006 
 Kenya 
The intervention model is for the fund manager to offer TA (World Bank financed) for operational 
support to investee SMEs to strengthen management.  Impact not yet measured. 
J.C.8.5 The IF’s financial sustainability is being ensured through management of the portfolio as a 
whole and not only on a project-by-project basis 
General The yearly “Cotonou Risk Report” constitute and analysis of the risk situation of the whole portfolio. 
I-8.5.1 Balancing of risk through the whole portfolio 
General EIB: Cotonou Risk Report 31/12/2009, 9/2/2010 provides the following table  with the distribution 
of OR and IF portfolios of signed exposures per loan grading as of 31/12/2009 
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The table permits to draw the following charts: 
 
 
The above chart shows that the bulk of OR operations are low risk (A° to D+) or high risk (D-to 
E3+). The majority is high risk. 
For the IF the majority in the very high risk category (E1- to F) (ETI and ETP are equity type 
individuals and equity type portfolio) 
 
The second chart below shows the cumulative distributions with the IF significantly on the right of the 
OR presenting a much riskier profile. 
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2005_EMP AFRICA 
FUND II 
EIB-IF’s investment in this fund provides a high and relatively secure return.  The presence of such 
investments in the IF portfolio is conducive to strengthening the IF’s income statement.  However, 
Project Docts do not provide a clear indication as to IF exit strategies in such cases. 
I-8.5.2 Risk reporting 
2004_Lumwana In 2008 the first capital repayment was due, to the extent 40% of the debt. The sharp decline in copper 
prices made this financial model unsustainable and the schedule of payments was revised, the first 
repayment being brought down to 20% 
Simultaneously, following a valuation exercise, the Bank put loans A and B on the Watch List and 
revised their rating (to E- for both loans). (Loan C, senior loan from OR is guaranteed by KfW and 
rated A+) 
I-8.5.3 Risk forecasts in three-year business plan 
I-8.5.4 Income recognition policies 
I-8.5.5 Budget forecasts; ratio analysis 
2000_MAGADI_ 
SODA 
Large investment compared to the size of the borrower:  
Investment = almost3  times borrower’s balance sheet 
          5 times the borrower’s fixed assets net book value. 
Source : : EIB Fact Sheet B: financing proposal. Magadi Soda Pure Ash Project, Kenya, Luxembourg, 
9th October 2003, Ops B/ACP-IF-2/2000-0279/MG 
I-8.5.6 Risk profile of OR operations in terms of coherence in relation to IF’s risk profile 
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EQ 9 To what extent did the use of human and financial resources, and the regulatory and 
administrative framework, allow results to be achieved in a timely manner and at 
reasonable cost?  
JC 9.1 The IF/OR operations remain in line with planning and are cost-effective 
I-9.1.1 Comparison of planning of operations and effective implementation 
2000_MAGADI 
SODA 
The total accumulated delay for set-up of the operation and implementation of the project is 5.5 
years. Indeed, there was a 3.5 years delay in setting up the project (it started on 30/06/2006 instead 
of in the second half of 2002 as envisaged in the EIB appraisal report). Furthermore, the project 
was expected to last 2.5 years (from 01/10/2003 to 30/06/2006), but lasted in total 4.5 years (from 
01/04/2004 to 31/12/2008), corresponding hence to a delay of 2 years in project implementation. 
This is detailed in the information below.  
 
Timetable: The time frame expected by the promoter of some 27 months for the project (21 
months for construction and 6 months for commissioning and production ramp-up) appears tight 
Given the circumstances, a period of 30 months is probably more realistic. A project start at the 
beginning of the second half of 2002 would therefore lead to a fully operational project at the end 
of 2004. This appears realistic in view of the outstanding financial close of the project which is 
expected not before the second quarter of 2002. 
Source EIB. Appraisal Report, Magadi Soda, Luxembourg 29/1/2002. (PJ/I&S/GCE/KAI/scm) 
 
Eventually comparison of the time table at appraisal and completion periods is as follows: 
Time table:   Appraisal   Completion 
Start of works   01/10/2003  01/04/2004 
End of works   30/06/2006  31/12/2008 
Source: EIB Magadi Soda Pure Ash Project, Project completion Report, Luxembourg 23/4/2008. 
2001_MOMA_ 
TITANIUM 
 Project completed in 2007 with a 4 month delay to the initial two year forecast. Lower than 
anticipated ramp-up in production further delayed full production revenues. 
 Financial completion was scheduled (in July 2007) for 30th June 2009, a six month delay 
compared to the original plan. 
 Project cost increased 16.8% from $US 318.5 M to $US 372.2 M due to addition in capital 
expenditure in order to improve product quality and quantity, as well as the mining operations. 
Source: EIB Project Progress Report, Moma Titanium (Serapis 200010242), Luxembourg 25 July 
2007, OPS B/ACP-IF-3/2007-1460/mh. 
Comparison of original budget with cost estimate (May 2007) ($US 000) 
    Original budget  May 2007 Estimate Variance 
EPC Construction Contract         236,750           262,971     26,221  
Owners' Costs                     20,000             32,447    12,447  
Financing Costs                     61,800             76,820                15,020  
Total Moma Project Costs        318,550           372,238                53,688 
Source: EIB Project Progress Report, Moma Titanium (Serapis 200010242), Luxembourg 25 July 
2007, OPS B/ACP-IF-3/2007-1460/mh., Annex 3 
2003_BOAD PG 
IV 
This financial operation’s March 2004 fact sheet mentioned that timing had been swiftly respected 
so far: “La BOAD a honoré de manière ponctuelle et régulière ses obligations vis-à-vis de la Banque”. 
Source : « Fact Sheet B : proposition de financement », EIB, 11 mars 2004 (p2) 
 
The EIB has been a decade-long partner and shareholder of the BOAD.  
2003_Dakar-
Ziguinchor 
The boat has been delivered at the end of 2007 and all harbour’s developments have been realised 
as foreseen apart from the maritime station of Dakar. The boat carried out its first journey on the 
10th March 2008.  
 
The Senegalese State changed the boat operator in 2008 without consultation of the EIB, which 
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was not in line with contractual obligations (until 30/10/2008, it was MARITALIA SA and as from 
this date the new boat operator was COSAMA). EIB and KfW subsequent verifications showed 
that conditions were only partially met, in terms of safety, tariff policy and profitability. 
Furthermore, the condition precedent of having finished sea station developments was not met. 
Initial business plan objectives were not met. The sea link is still heavily dependent from State 
grants, which is in contradiction with the spirit of the financing contract with the EIB.  
The Senegalese State did pay the last invoice, without the last tranche of EIB financing. The EIB 
will hence cancel the non-disbursed part of the loan (EUR 2,150,000).   
 
In 2009, the COSAMA’s statements have not been audited and the financial statements are still 
temporary. The business plan of COSAMA did not take into account the auditors 
recommendations regarding the filling rate. Indeed COSAMA took into account a rate of 70% for 
the first two quarters and 90% for the last two quarter while the auditors advised to take into 
account a rate of 60% for the first semester, 70% for the second semester and 80% for the 
following semesters. According the COSAMA calculations, the condition fixed by the EIB (i.e. 
profit and loss form balanced within the two first years without direct subsidy from the 
government) will be effectively met. However, taking into consideration the calculation of the 
auditors, COSAMA can not be considered as economically independent, which is contradictory 
with the financing contract with the EIB.   
 
Source : « Monitoring 2009 », EIB, 2009 
2004_OLKARIA Initial estimated cost of project $90.2 M  (€ 67.8 M) 
Estimated cost increase in February 2009: 58%, from € 67.8 M to € 114.5 M 
End of project according to initial planning: end 2007. 
Current (end 2009) estimation of end of project: May 2010  + 2.5 years 
Sources: Olkaria II Extension. Note do the File. Monitoring Exercise 2009, Nairobi 01/12/2009. 
OpsB/ACP-IF-2/2009/NN. 
EIB. Project Progress Report, Olkaria II Extentions.Luxembourg 10/6/2009. PPR 23027 
 
Evidence that the EIB has assessed the managerial capacity of the operator. 
– The promoter has acquired long-term experience with developing and operating geothermal 
power plants; efficient and cost effective implementation of the project is ensured through a 
fixed-price turnkey contract. 
Source EIB Fact Sheet B: financing proposal, Luxembourg 24/2/2005. OPS B/ACPIF-
2CENT&EASTAFR/2004-0255/GOUNOT MARCEL 
2004_LUMWANA 
 
 Project cost: at appraisal $US 925 m., December 2009: US$ 1005 m (+8.6%). 
 Completion date of project: Apparaisal: 30/6/2008, Dec. 2009: 31/12/2008  + 6 months 
Source EIB Lumwana Copper Project. Finance Contracts n°23717,13718 and 23719 signed on 
November 2006, Luxembourg, 23 Décember 2008. 
 
Since the start of commercial production in December 2008, the project has faced a number of 
challenges during the ramp-up phase, namely: 
• Lower than planned availability of the mines shovel and truck fleet; 
• Lower than planned shovel and truck productivlty; 
• More than expected transition material being mined rather than sulphide material; 
• The occurrence of uranium within the high grade ore which has to be stockpiled. 
Source: EIB Lumwana Copper Project. Finance Contracts n°23717,13718 and 23719 signed on 
November 2006, Luxembourg, 23 Décember 2008. 
 
EIB relies on the promoter’s experience for the monitoring of the project. This experience has 
been tested during the feasibility study: “The promoter is known from the previous project: 
Lumwana study – i.e. the feasibility study for the project presented. The promoter’s reporting to 
and liaising with the Bank has always been accurate, timely and cooperative.” 
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Source: EIB Lumwana Copper Project, Appraisal report, Luxembourg 30/6/2006, PJ/I&S/2006-
675/GCE/VMJ/aa 
2004_WAGP The project has run out of the original budget (revised in November 2006 before contract 
inception). The difference in overall costs (USD 270.86 million) is explained for 72% by 
construction and for 28% by charges generated by WAPCo's activity. Construction costs are mainly 
driven on one hand, by onshore construction (onshore-offshore installation), and on the other 
hand, by team and inspection charges (construction management and support). 
Source: PPR, WAGP, Luxembourg 19th November 2009, OpsB/ACP-IF1/2009/FFC. 
 
The execution advanced well but it accumulated significant overall delay mainly due to political 
unrest in the Niger Delta and interruption in the supply material. These delays prevented the third 
disbursement and made necessary an amendment to the financial contract to postpone the date 
limit for this disbursement. 
Sources: 
 PPR, WAGP, Luxembourg 19th November 2009, OpsB/ACP-IF1/2009/FFC. 
 
It appears clearly from the appraisal documents that the EIB pays attention to the issue of 
monitoring and the managerial experience of the operator.  
In the present case “Apart from the NGO’s risk (NB linked to environmental issues) no special 
difficulties are foreseen as the project will be managed by an experienced operator (Chevron 
Texaco)?. In addition independent environmental auditors will monitor the compliance with the 
Environmental Management plans and report to the Bank. Estimated staff input will be further 
assessed during appraisal. 
Source: EIB, Note to Ops B, Opinion for Appraisal, Luxembourg 4/2/2005 
PJ/ENERCOM/2005-0124/FT/GF/mh) 
See also I825,  I723. 
The issue of management is addressed in the preparatory documents:  
WAPCo will be responsible for the management, operation and maintenance of the WAGP. 
Experienced personnel from WAPCo shareholders Chevron, Shell, NNPC and VRA) will be hired 
as secondees to fill key positions in WAPCO operational organisation during the first years of 
operation. They will be gradually replaced by nationals with the objective that a majority of senior 
management and supervisory personnel of the company being held by citizens of ECOWAS States. 
Pipeline and facilities control will primarily be from the Central Dispatch Center (CDC) located at 
the Lagos Beach Compressor Station and in event of an emergency situation, from a backup CDC 
co-located with WAPCo Headquarters in Ghana. 
Source: EIB, Appraisal Report, West African Gas Pipeline, Ghana. Luxembourg, 02/10/2006: §8.1 
2005_Pacific 
Islands 
The 2009 PPR of the facility’s first contract, with the NDBP, mentions the following issues, 
relating in particular to delays in fulfilling condition precedents. It has apparently led to un-
disbursement of 36% of the envisaged global loan for this local bank: 
“Disbursements under this global loan (tranche with National Development Bank of Palau) started two years after 
the signature of the Finance Contract. The first reason of this delay was the time elapsed between the signature of the 
Finance Contract (December 2006), the signature of the Guarantee and Indemnity Agreement with the Republic of 
Palau (September 2007)7 and the receipt by the Bank (April 2008) of the Senate Joint Resolution approving the 
entry by the Republic of Palau into the Guarantee and Indemnity Agreement. The second reason was that one of the 
conditions precedent for the first disbursement was fulfilled only in January 2009, namely the letter confirming the 
acceptance of the process Agent. To date, 65% of this global loan has been allocated and disbursed (in USD). It is 
very unlikely that NDBP will draw down the remaining amount within the current deadlines (5 December 2009 for 
                                                 
7  The 2009 PPR provides more information on this on p8: “The Guarantee and Indemnity Agreement has been signed between 
the Republic of Palau and EIB on 28 September 2007. The Senate Joint Resolution approving the entry by the Republic of Palau into 
the Guarantee and Indemnity Agreement, received in April 2008, limits the exposure of the Republic of Palau to USD 6,800,500 
(instead of EUR 5,000,000). It is not clear whether this Senate Joint Resolution does in fact limit the Guarantee and Indemnity 
Agreement, but it was Ops, JU and CRD’s view that it would be prudent to limit disbursements to this amount until an amending 
Senate Joint Resolution was provided.” 
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allocations proposals and disbursement requests). Furthermore, as the repayment of principal is to start in March 
2010, it is most probable that those deadlines will not be extended.” 
Source: “Project Progress Report” (of the operation), EIB, 01/12/2009 (p2) 
 
The 2009 PPR further reports on p7 that repayment was timely: “interest payments and commitment fees 
payments have been regularly served by NDBP. First repayment of principal is due to start in March 2010”. It 
attributed a score for “Contract Debt Servicing” of “Good – 2a”.   
 
The National Development Bank of Palau was a new borrower for the EIB, as mentioned on p12 
of the 2009 PPR: “This is the first and only operation of the Borrower with the Bank”. This is also 
true for the other banks: the report to the Board mentions on p3 that “there has been no previous 
relationship with any of the proposed financial intermediaries”.  
PIFF I - Samoa For the PIFF I overall, the EIB has already relations with several local banks, mainly in countries 
which are historically part of the ACP agreements: “Previous global loans with Fiji Development Bank, 
Bank of Samoa and Tonga Development Bank. No previous relationship with the proposed bank in the Cook 
Islands which is a new ACP country. Working relationship with ANZ but no financing facilities to date with either 
it or Westpac. EIB is investor in Kula I; Samoa Venture Capital (which is being co-ordinated by the IFC) is a new 
operation”.  
Source: “Fact Sheet A – Proposal to appraise new operations” (of the operation), EIB, 05/03/2004 (p1) 
 
Regarding the Development Bank of Samoa in particular, the 2009 PPR mentions that past 
relations with this bank were positive overall and that debt service on these loans has been regular 
albeit with occasional delays: “DBS has been beneficiary of several global loans from the Bank with good results, 
despite a generally difficult political and economic environment in the Pacific region. Under Lomé the Bank has 
previously made five global loans to DBS. The debt service on these loans has been regular albeit with occasional 
delays, due to administrative difficulties. 
Source: “Project Progress Report” (of the operation’s contract n° 23209 with the DBS), EIB, 07/01/2009 (p3) 
 
For the contract with the DBS, the January 2009 PPR mentions that there have been delays in the 
disbursement plan, but that a 9-month extension of the deadline made it possible to disburse the 
entire €7m global loan envelope as planned:  
“A nine-month extension for allocations and disbursement requests has just been granted (Nov. 2008) to allow DBS 
to access the remaining EUR 2M under this facility. The current deadline for disbursement requests is 15 June 
2009.” 
It further mentions an additional constraint linked to the contractual limitation of max number of 
project tranches to be disbursed: “We might encounter a constraint with the contractual limitation of max 20 
project tranches to be disbursed since there are only 5 left. A request to increase the limit on project tranches may be 
put forward in Q1 2009.” 
 
Additionally, that PPR mentions on p2 that interaction with DBS is timely: “DBS submits information 
in a timely manner. Ops has regular e-mail contacts with the head of operations and the head of finance in DBS”.  
 
The PPR further reports on p7 that for the EIB-DBS contract, “interest payments have been regularly 
served”. It attributed a score for “Contract Debt Servicing” of “Good – 2”. 
For the DBS overall, the PPR notes that repayment was regular: “Debt service on DBS's loans has been 
regular albeit with occasional delays, due to administrative difficulties.”. It attributed a score for “Contract 
Debt Servicing” of “Good – 2” also for the DBS overall. 
 
Source: “Project Progress Report” (of the operation’s contract n° 23209 with the DBS), EIB, 07/01/2009 (p2, 
p7) 
 
Approval process: Information from a few sources allow to summarise the process for generation 
of this operation as follows. There was apparently in total a delay of almost 1 year: few weeks delay 
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for the Board meeting, held mid-October 2004 and planned for September, and nine-month delay 
in disbursement (see above).  
  
Process Step Date Status Source 
Fact Sheet A 05/03/2004 Delivered Fact Sheet A 
Relevé Quotidien 25/02/2004 Delivered Fact Sheet A 
Fact Sheet B 21/10/2004 Delivered Fact Sheet B 
ACP States opinions: 28/09/2004 Delivered Fact Sheet B 
Commission opinion:  10/09/2004 Delivered Fact Sheet B 
Article 14 MS / IF Committee 
opinion : 28/09/2004 Delivered Fact Sheet B 
Board meeting: 14/10/2004 Delivered Fact Sheet B 
Signature: 
4th Quarter 
2004 unknown Fact Sheet A 
Disbursements: 2005-2009 delivered Disbursement table 
 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
An EIB staff member mentioned that PPR are annually provided. More precisely, a report has been 
edited in December 2008 and at the end of 2009. 
Source: MN016 
 
According to the promoter’s forecasts, project implementation will be phased over the period 2007-
2011. However, the Bank envisages that the works will be completed in 2012. 
“Conseil d’administration. Prêt à l’investissement bonifié sur ressources propres. Projet PROGRAMME EAU », 
EIB, 2007, p5 
I-9.1.2 Specific patterns in observed delays, if any, and factors explaining them 
General (Lomé 
IV) 
Management weaknesses and procurement: For projects implemented by the EIB under the Lomé 
IV Convention (before the set-up of the IF under the Cotonou Agreement), an EIB evaluation 
notes that “The difficulties observed in the projects’ performance were essentially related to management weakness. In 
addition, most public sector projects were implemented with long delays that were often caused by procurement related 
problems.”  
Source: Evaluation of EIB financing through individual loans under the Lomé IV Convention, 
EIB, 2006 (p2).  
 
Project appraisal and implementation: The Evaluation of EIB financing through individual loans 
under the Lomé IV Convention (covering the period 1990-2003, before the set-up of the IF under 
the Cotonou Agreement) recommended more careful analysis of institutional issues at appraisal in 
order to strengthen the project implementation and management capacities, in particular of public 
sector promoters, and including appropriate measures as loan conditions. See the table below, 
which also provides the EIB response.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MID-TERM EVALUATION OF THE IF AND EIB OR OPERATIONS IN ACP/OCTS 
ADE - EGEVAL II  
Final Report  September 2010 Annexe 9/Page 169 
 
EIB Evaluation’s recommendation 
4 
EIB Services’ Comments 
In order to strengthen the project 
implementation and management 
capacities in particular of public 
sector promoters, institutional 
issues need to be analysed more 
carefully at appraisal, and 
appropriate measures (project 
implementation units, technical 
assistance, training etc.) be 
included as loan conditions. This 
may require the provision of 
adequate resources to strengthen 
the Bank’s monitoring capacities, 
e.g. through Technical Assistance. 
(Sections 3.1.1.2, 3.1.1.3, 3.1.1.5, 
3.1.2 and 6.2) 
The principle has been agreed with the Commission that, 
under Cotonou II, the Bank should have funds readily 
available for the selective use of Technical Assistance 
both for direct projects as well as for financial sector 
operations. In the meantime, the Bank’s services will 
reinforce the application of measures to strengthen 
organisational weakness especially in relation to project 
implementation capacity. While institutional issues are 
analysed in detail at appraisal stage (systematically in some 
sectors, e.g. water), loan conditions relating to 
institutional and regulation reform depend upon the case 
in question, bearing in mind that putting in place the 
required technical assistance and adequately monitoring 
these issues is often a staff intensive exercise, and for this 
the hiring of additional staff is in progress. 
Source: Evaluation of EIB financing through individual loans under the Lomé IV Convention, 
EIB, 2006 (p5). 
 
Project conditionalities: That same Lomé IV Evaluation recommended better setting, follow-up 
and control of conditions. See the table below, which also provides the EIB response.  
 
EIB Evaluation’s recommendation 6 EIB Services’ Comments 
Some covenants included in the Finance 
Contracts go beyond the control of the 
borrowers and need to be implemented 
by Government institutions (e.g. tariff 
increases, institutional reforms, ...). The 
Bank, together with the concerned 
bodies, should take measures in order to 
be more effective in the setting, follow-
up and control of those conditions. 
(Sections 3.1.2, 3.2.1, 3.3, 5.3 and 6.2) 
The Bank’s services agree that covenants should be 
set with care, and appropriate structures should be 
put in place to ensure that covenants can be and 
are actually acted upon. The Bank has most 
leverage to oblige sovereign entities to comply at 
the outset when it still has the choice of whether or 
not to fund a project. Once projects are financed, 
the Bank will actively work with the EU 
Commission to address issues of compliance at the 
national level. 
Source: Evaluation of EIB financing through individual loans under the Lomé IV Convention, 
EIB, 2006 (p6). 
General EIB staff members noted that in terms of delays, condition precedents are an issue:  
“ Condition precedents: remain a problem.» Plus que d’autres ? « Il semblerait que comme on se réfère aux 
directives européennes (environnement etc.) : directives plus contraignantes que par exemple WBG. On est plus stricts, 
surtout au niveau du risque (financier).  On ne décaisse pas plus vite car beaucoup de conditions préalables au 
décaissement, demandées notamment par RM et Dép Juridique. Cf. public utilities, ou projets régionaux (conditions 
dans 3 pays), ou conditions de plusieurs bailleurs de fonds. La recommandation du rapport Camdessus d’encourager 
les cofinancements avec les autres (mutual reliance etc.) a un coût. Avec la mutual reliance, on est en phase pilote avec 
KFW et AFD, mais cela coince sur plusieurs points. Risk assessment est un réel problème. AFD est par ailleurs 
très stricte sur money laundering par exemple. EFP : cela marche très bien par contre. » 
Source : MN 027, MN 329 
2000_MAGADI 
SODA 
Delays due to technical failure in the design of he calciner burner chamber. Provoked instability in 
production and eventually, a new chamber will have to be build capable to withstand higher 
temperatures. 
Source: EIB PJ-PPR Summary Report (2007) 
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2001_MOMA_ 
TITANIUM 
Delays are mainly due to technical adjustments during the construction and the ramp-up phases of 
the project. These adjustments were done to adapt quality and quantity of production. 
See detail in EIB Fact Sheet B: financing proposal, Moma Titanium Mozambique, Luxembourg, 27th February 
2003. Ops B/ACT-IF-3/2001-0242 annex 4. 
 
This project involved a very significant amount of time and work by the EIB Staff and the 
acquisition of a good knowledge of the promoter and borrower and their management.  
The Bank staff has used its knowledge of the promoter through a previous project that had been 
successfully conducted (Ancuabe Graphite Mine, cf. D5), conducted thorough analysis of  
Kenmare, took many steps to ensure good governance and sound management: e.g. with the group 
of lenders decided that the experience, the personality and the overall qualities of the managing 
director should be seen as an essential asset for the project, at least until project financial 
completion is attained, and decided that his engagement to the project should be formalised in the 
loan documentation texts being drafted. The managing director is in place since 1986 and is a 
member of the family who are also shareholders in the company and who have extensive 
experience in the mining industry. (Cf. EIB, Mozambique Moma Titanium, Ops B – Financial Report, 
Luxembourg27th March 2003, OpsB/ACP-IF-3/2003-320Q/GSF (Agora n°2001 0242 Investment 
Facility).  
For administrative and monitoring purposes, the lenders agreed to use the services of consultants 
throughout the project construction and operation. These include : 
a) An independent engineer – SRK - responsible for providing comfort to the lenders on 
technical, environmental and financial model purposes. Within the lenders group, the Bank was 
appointed as link entity for technical and environmental issues and ABSA as link entity for the 
financial model. 
b) A market consultant – IBMA – responsible for providing regular updates on the market, 
competition and prices. KFW and AfDB were appointed as link entities. 
c) A legal advisor – Milbank – to support the lenders in terms of drafting the legal documentation 
with the Borrower’s legal advisor Sullivan and Cromwell and with the financial advisor 
Rothschild, as well as in providing general advise on the risks. 
d) An Administrative Agent  – formerly ABSA, now Barclays – to monitor and manage all project 
accounts, applying and certifying drawdown conditions.    
e) A Security Trustee – Barclays - where the securities are placed. 
The reporting by the various consultants has been deemed both punctual and to the satisfaction of 
the Bank. 
Source : EIB Appraisal Report, Moma Titanium, Luxembourg 27th February 2003, PJ/I&S/2003-
259/GCE/MUG/ms  
The Bank has taken an important and constructive role in the project by advising the sponsors in 
many different areas of the project and facilitating the sponsor’s contacts with the Mozambican 
authorities and co-financiers at different levels and areas. By combining financial instruments 
available under the Investment Facility (IF) – senior debt and subordinated debt - the Bank made 
the project financially attractive both to raise new equity and to bring other debt (co-financiers) 
along.  
Source EIB Mozambique Moma Titanium, Ops B – Financial Report, Luxembourg27th March 2003, 
OpsB/ACP-IF-3/2003-320Q/GSF (Agora n°2001 0242 Investment Facility) 
2004_OLKARIA The project implementation has fallen behind schedule by close to three years following a delay in 
awarding the turnkey contract. This was due to a time consuming procurement process. 
Unexpected market conditions met during the procurement procedures were totally out of the 
control of the borrower. Additional delays were imposed by the civil troubles in the first months of 
2008. The contract was eventually awarded at a higher cost than anticipated and imposed a revision 
of the financial plan with the introduction of AfD as cofinancier with € 20M. and an increase of the 
EIB loan from €32.5 to €36.8 M (NB See D13; BEI. CA. Projet Olkaria II Extsnsion. CA/423/09. 
3 février 2009. Document 09/53. and , EIB. Project Progress Report, Olkaria II 
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Extentions.Luxembourg 10/6/2009. PPR 23027 
The renegotiation of the contract took EIB till December to revise the contract amendment.  (In 
December 2009 that increase had not been decided yet) 
The reason why such market conditions had not been anticipated is that there are only a few 
suppliers in the world for this sort of equipment and this was an extension of an existing structure 
already built by Mitsubishi. The China boom created an unforeseen negative situation for it 
attracted the suppliers elsewhere. 
Sources:  
Olkaria II Extension. Note do the File. Monitoring Exercise 2009, Nairobi 01/12/2009. 
OpsB/ACP-IF-2/2009/NN. 
EIB. Apparaisal Report. Olkaria II Extension. Extension of a geothermal power station. 
Luxembourg 18/1/2005. PJ/Enercom/I&S/2005-25/EH/EG/fe. 
BEI. CA. Projet Olkaria II Extsnsion. CA/423/09. 3 février 2009. Document 09/53. 
MN310 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
The project’s documents do not provide any information in that respect. 
I-9.1.3 Trend in ratio of IF/OR administrative expenses to volume of operations  
I-9.1.4 Evidence from IF/OR investees on administrative costs linked to EIB operations 
General See I-8.2.1 and I-9.1.3  
 
The “Report and recommendations of the Steering Committee of “Wise Persons”” noted for the 
external lending mandate (excl. ACP) mentions relatively low margins: “the EIB transfers the financial 
benefits of its funding to the beneficiaries with relatively low margins to cover 100% of the administrative costs. The 
EIB has specific targets to ensure cost coverage of operations and build the necessary reserves to self-finance capital 
increases and support the expansion of the activity, on the basis of its statutory obligations.” 
Source: Camdessus, “Mid-Term review of EIB external mandate – Report of the Steering Committee” February 
2010 (pages 26, 37) 
General (Lomé 
IV) 
Appraisal fees: The Evaluation of EIB financing through individual loans under the Lomé IV 
Convention (covering the period 1990-2003, before the set-up of the IF under the Cotonou 
Agreement) recommended considering appraisal fees for better cost recovery. This is now the case 
under the IF (at the contrary of a majority of other DFIs). The table below provides also the EIB 
view on the benefits from such charging of appraisal fees, but also on the complexity of their 
implementation.  
 
EIB Evaluation’s 
recommendation 3 
EIB Services’ Comments 
Appraisal fees 
should be regularly 
considered, both 
for private and 
public sector 
operations, 
amongst others, to 
allow for a better 
EIB cost recovery. 
(Sections 2.3 and 
5.2)  
Since inception of the Cotonou Agreement, appraisal fees have been 
systematically introduced for private sector operations on both 
Investment Facility and the Bank's own resources. So far, it has been 
Bank policy not to apply any appraisal fees to public sector borrowers, a 
policy that is also followed by a majority of other DFIs. Appraisal fees 
may nevertheless be charged to commercially run public enterprises. 
Generally, appraisal fees do not discourage promoters who perceive an 
advantage in having Bank participation in a project. But, while they 
encourage accountability within the promoter organisation, their 
implementation can become complex when the Bank is involved at a 
very early stage in the project cycle. Hence they are best handled on a 
case-by-case basis.  
Source: Evaluation of EIB financing through individual loans under the Lomé IV Convention, 
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EIB, 2006 (p5). 
 
2001_MOMA_ 
TITANIUM 
We do not have (also not for other projects) the actual costs incurred by the EIB and nor if and to 
what extent they have exceeded the appraisal/due diligence fees. (Cf I-8.2.1) 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
The project’s documents do not provide any information in that respect. 
JC 9.2 The “regulatory and administrative” framework for IF/OR operations enhances timeliness 
and cost reduction 
I-9.2.1 The guidelines are explicitly geared to timeliness and cost reduction 
General The process for global loans aims at reducing the overall time frame, according to an EIB staff 
member :  
“Autorisation globale demandée pour ce type de projets au Comité de Direction (global loan). On identifie toujours 
un nombre d’intermédiaires semi-directs, en laissant la porte ouverte à d’autres qui seront alors approuvés par Credit 
Risk, OCCO, Département ACP, etc. Avoir l’accord pour financer d’autres intermédiaires. On gagne ainsi en 
période d’approbation (on ne devra plus aller ni à l’IF ni au Board). Ceci pour les petites opérations, de max €5m”. 
Source: MN 011 
2005_Pacific 
Islands 
The specifications for the use of TA in PIFF and PIFF II were clearly taking account of efficiency. 
This is detailed under I-4.1.2, of which a small paragraph is reproduced here: 
I-9.2.2 Evidence that the regulatory and administrative framework is conducive to enhanced 
timeliness and cost reduction 
General Background on EIB organisation:  
“EIB head office in Luxembourg: As part of the Directorate for Lending Operations outside the European 
Union, the ACP-IF Department is responsible for the management of projects and EIB activities carried out in the 
OCTs and ACP countries, including the Republic of South Africa. Tasks cover the whole project cycle, from 
identification to appraisal and actual project implementation and operation. 
To carry out these tasks, the Department, in close cooperation with the project promoter, relies on multidisciplinary 
teams, drawing on resources from other Bank departments, namely engineers, economists and risk analysts. It also 
benefits from the services of the Bank’s non-operational support Directorates such as Human Resources, Information 
Technology and Financial Control. 
The ACP-IF Department’s move in early 2009 to the EIB’s expanded Kirchberg head office buildings will ease 
communication and interaction among the different Departments. 
At the end of 2008, a total of 114 Equivalent Full-Time Staff (EFT) were assigned to ACP/OCT-related 
operations throughout the Bank. 
Source: IF Annual Report 2008 (p65) 
 
The 2009 IF annual report mentions further the following:  
“To carry out its mandate(s), the ACP-IF Department in Luxembourg, in close cooperation with the project 
promoter, relies on multidisciplinary teams and regional offices. At the end of 2009, a total of 114 full-time staff 
were assigned/dedicated to ACP/OCT/RSA-related operations throughout the Bank. Tasks carried out at the 
EIB head office in Luxembourg cover the whole project cycle, from identification to appraisal and actual project 
implementation and operation.” 
Source: Investment Facility Annual Report 2009, EIB, 2010 (p57) 
 
EIB staff members emphasized that there is a serious resource issue in the regional offices, as 
detailed under I-9.3.3.  
 
An EIB source mentioned that the ACP mandate is particularly complex to manage for a 
number of reasons: “Apart from being fairly unique in the Bank due to its developmental dimension, the ACP 
mandate is particularly complex for a number of reasons: it involves the management of a dedicated fund on a 
revolving basis over a 20-year horizon; it covers a very broad spectrum of countries in which, within certain limits, the 
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Bank is expected to operate; it entails interactions with counterparts operating in a very often difficult environment 
characterised by weak institutions and regulatory or legal frameworks; it involves a large number of players involved 
in aid and development finance, with whom the Bank needs to develop and implement various coordination and 
consultation mechanisms, in line with the principle of the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness; it is 
characterised by increasingly changing and even conflicting objectives and expectations from different stakeholders.” 
Source: MN 027 
 
See also JC 9.3 on the issues relating to EIB resources  
 
The same source adds the following with regard to additional workload related to lending to the 
private sector and to ‘stakeholder scrutiny’: “Under the Lomé Conventions, (…) a standard 
sovereign/public sector loan, typically to a national utility company, involved a relatively light appraisal, largely based 
on PJ’s analysis of the technical, cost and economic profitability elements of the project. This was accompanied by a 
somewhat broad-brush financial assessment undertaken by OPs. Negotiations of the standard legal documents were 
usually no more than a one-to-two day, take it or leave it, affair. Today, the due diligence process with private sector 
counterparts is far more comprehensive encompassing increasingly sophisticated financial modelling, a detailed credit 
analysis involving CRD, the completion of the ESIAF to demonstrate the Bank’s value-added, opinions from JU 
and OCCO, the provision of term sheets, long and complex legal discussions on tailor-made contractual documents 
often involving external lawyers, NGO scrutiny etc. This process is particularly complex in the case of project 
finance/PPP operations”. 
“ACP operations are now subject to much greater stakeholder scrutiny than in the past, be it from the shareholders, 
other EU institutions (Commission, Parliament and Court of Auditors) and, above all civil society and in particular 
NGOs”.  
The EIB was asked for “introducing greater transparency into ACP operations and the resultant decision to 
extend the role of the IF Committee and to apply the ESIAF to all operations. Whilst the latter framework is in 
place, consistent application and quality control have still to be assured. In short, either explicitly or implicitly, there is 
a view amongst the shareholders and the NGOs that the Bank should emulate its peers and be more active in, and 
thereby devote more resources than it has done traditionally to, the upstream and downstream parts of the project cycle. 
As far as ACP-IF is concerned, the impact is also felt through the burgeoning dialogue with the shareholders and 
especially the NGOs, either in the increasing number of conferences that the NGOs are organising about the Bank’s 
criteria, safeguards and procedures or in the direct campaigns that they mount in the case of sensitive sectors such as 
dams, mining, renewable energy and climate change (e.g. Chad-Cameroon pipeline and Tenke Fungurume project in 
DRC). Also adding to the workload is the European Parliament’s increased interest in the Bank’s activities and a 
more critical approach by the Commission.” 
“Dealing with both internal and external audit as well as evaluation has become a regular part of the department’s 
workload. More recently, due to a greater awareness of and willingness to acknowledge the issue both within and 
outside the Bank, cases of suspected fraud and corruption have become more prevalent. It is not surprising that there is 
a disproportionate concentration in the ACP countries, where the issue is compounded by the greater susceptibility of 
small projects to such acts of malfeasance. (…). More generally, the Bank operates within a more complex 
institutional framework than most of its peers as exemplified by the mandate that it receives from the Commission 
and Member States with its wide-ranging oversight arrangements and reporting obligations. Despite the intention to 
streamline the role of the IF Committee compared to its predecessor Art. 28 Committee under Lomé, the opposite 
has occurred. Another example of greater complexity is the new Member States Guarantee and Arrears 
Administration Agreement.” 
Source: MN 027 
 
See also JC 9.3 for more information on time-consuming aspects of EIB operations in ACP countries.  
 
EIB staff members mentioned that the internal set-up initially envisaged for the IF was based 
on ‘risk fencing’ with a Service Level Agreement (SLA), for direct cost attribution while keeping 
economies of scale. This set-up implies that IF costs will appear similar to EIB costs. But :  
« IF en tant que telle n’existe pas dans la BEI. Il existe un Département Opérationnel spécifique pour la FI 
(Autonomous Business Unit Department – seul département ainsi de la BEI). Mais Département travaille pour IF 
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+ Afrique du Sud + autres pays Lomé. Ce cadre organisationnel a été réglé ainsi pour plusieurs raisons. IF devait 
au début travailler comme un Service Level Agreement, avec le concours des autres directions de la BEI (ex. 
ingénieurs, juristes pour contrôle crédit). On n’aurait pas pu bénéficier d’économies d’échelles ni du travail des 
ingénieurs par exemple (PJ) si on n’avait travaillé qu’avec des ressources dédiées. Idée : « ring fencing » : identifier le 
department au sein de la BEI pour permettre de gérer la FI (avec comptes séparés etc.). La BEI doit couvrir ses coûts 
dans la FI (full cost recovery). La meilleure façon de faire cela était le ring fencing, avec autonomie financière 
suffisante. Idée donc du Service Level Agreement, qui allait acheter ses services aux autres départements opérationnels: 
départements Services, Crédit (RM), Juridique. On travaille au niveau produit (parfois opération, parfois mandat). 
Corporate est alloué sur base forfaitaire par rapport aux autres coûts. (…) Les coûts de la IF sont similaires à ceux 
de la BEI, par définition selon le principe comptable utilisé. » 
But “(…) shortcomings of the Service Level Agreement (SLA) (…) The SLA has, actually, never really been 
properly implemented (…) – see I-9.3.2) 
Source : MN 027 
 
EIB staff members noted that the role of the IF Committee was extended compared to what was 
initially envisaged. The additional step of presentation to the IF Committee requires typically 3 
weeks; few projects are blocked. All members do not have sufficient expertise for due appreciation 
of IF activities and budgets:  
“Comité IF : on avait essayé de revoir le rôle du comité (plus orientation générale). Cf. rules of procedures. Mais cela 
n’a pas marché. Ils voulaient tout voir. On se retrouve avec un set-up où tous les projets IF + OR (!) passent par 
comité. Vu comme comité préparatoire au CA maintenant.” 
« IF : seule différence avec le reste de la BEI c’est le passage par l’IF Committee – cela prend 3 semaines de plus. 
Pas négligeable pour un opérateur privé par exemple. Traitement moyen d’une opération au sein de la Banque: 6 
mois. Ex. Pour passer au CA de mai il faut envoyer au CD le 17 mars. » 
«Problème principal : le turnover des membres (certains EU MS changent tous les 6 mois), toujours un peu plus 
jeunes et plus inexpérimenté. D’autres EU MS sont bcp mieux : ex. la Belgique avec son représentant qui connait 
très bien la ritournelle (il est d’ailleurs Chair du Committee). Mais un des EU MS a par exemple une demande par 
semaine, pur micro-management. Même tendance à l’OCDE par exemple. (…) Il y a aussi eu beaucoup d’exercices 
démagogiques au Comité. » 
« Un avantage du Comité FI par rapport au CA : moins formel. Il y a qd même un certain formalisme (envoyer 
questions par écrit une semaine avant, seulement tour de table après si questions supplémentaires). Au cours des 
quelques dernières années, on a réussi à établir une relation suffisamment ouverte et franche avec les core members 
pour que les débats soient ouverts. » 
« Certains projets sont bloqués, typiquement un ou deux par an (= très rare). De toute façon, ils ne décident pas, ils 
émettent une opinion. Problèmes surtout dans secteur minier et en téléphonie mobile (car plutôt aux banques 
commerciales qu’à la BEI d’intervenir selon eux). Manque de coordination entre les différents éléments de décision. 
Comité approuve aussi le Financial Statement. Mais il y a des questions chaque année là-dessus et cela prend du 
temps – perte d’efficience et d’efficacité.  Problème en particulier de compétences des membres du Comité, qui ne savent 
pas lire un bilan. » 
Source: MN 027, MN 201 
Several EIB staff members noted that there is an issue of experience and understanding of 
development finance among some participants to the IF Committee.  
Source: MN 201, MN 329 
The evaluators could not investigate the above further as they were not granted open access to IF 
Committee meetings or meeting notes.  
 
Global authorisations (for global loans) contribute to greater efficiency, according to EIB staff 
Source: MN 027 
 
In terms of TA, EIB staff members consider that the TA organization as it is organised now is 
right:  
 “Organization as such is the right one, it works. We are told since 18 months that we might be organized (= we 
won’t be?). We are now at cruising speed” 
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Source: MN 102 
 
Overall, the total aggregate loans granted to ACP countries represented 0.4% of the EIB’s total, as 
according to figures provided in the EIB Group Annual Report 2009: 
 
Table: EIB aggregate loans granted, 2009  
 
 
Overall set-up within the EIB: EIB staff members noted that being a minority activity in the 
overall organization is suboptimal. Many EIB staff members involved with operations in ACP 
countries, including several senior persons, agreed with the recommendation from the Camdessus 
Report to create a separate European development bank:  
“One of the handicaps we have at EIB (external wing of the Bank ELM & ACP/OCTs): we are only the tale of 
the dog (and dogs don’t wait for their tale)… We are not core business, only small part of business. This was 
perceived in wise men report. I would fine it personally a very good idea to have it a separate Bank (others 
nodding). Value added of being so close to the client is huge. And it would allow having more technical expertise, 
with also broad-minded people. More experience. That would be helpful – other institutions have such on the ground 
technical expertise.” 
 « On souffre aussi du fait qu’on est minoritaires dans la Banque. Cf. rapport Camdessus : les gens au sein d’OPS 
B étaient relativement positifs sur les recommandations de Camdessus. Au début de la FI beaucoup de gens étaient 
très pessimistes (sur risk pricing etc.) – beaucoup de contraintes (ex. financières, passer par le Comité 3 fois par an, 
etc.), lourd à gérer en interne (BEI est surtout institution de prêt, instruments flexibles ne peuvent pas être gérés par 
les systèmes et on n’est pas prioritaires pour les développements informatiques par exemple car on est minoritaires 
dans la Banque), pas facile, mais je continue à penser que c’est un bel instrument. A force on a réussi à mettre des 
choses en place, mais tout n’est pas encore en ordre. Gouvernance pas optimale. Il y a aussi eu beaucoup d’exercices 
démagogiques au Comité. » 
Sources : MN 024, MN 027 
 
The Mid-term evaluation of EIB's external mandate (i.e. all activities outside the EU excluding 
ACP and OCT countries) report that the EIB in general is often considered as a very efficient 
institution:  
“Among IFIs the EIB is often considered a very efficient institution with large volumes of lending processed per staff, 
the cost to asset ratio, and the cost to loans outstanding as efficiency indicators.  
A proper efficiency assessment in terms of such benchmarking requires, however, that comparison be made between 
broadly similar institutions.  
In this context, it appears that, for example, comparisons between the EIB and other MDBs such as the EBRD in 
terms of efficiency are very complex since these institutions present a different business model and are different in terms 
of tasks assigned and external resources available.” 
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Source: Mid-term evaluation of EIB's external mandate, COWI, March 2010 (p145) 
 
The related “Report and recommendations of the Steering Committee of “Wise Persons”” 
(covering also the EIB’s external mandate) also mentions that “One of the EIB’s most important 
comparative advantages is its lean and efficient set-up, which entails limited administrative costs. Compared to other 
IFIs, the EIB presents the highest ratio in terms of lending volume per staff member”.  
Source: Camdessus, “Mid-Term review of EIB external mandate – Report of the Steering Committee” February 
2010 (pages 26) 
 
Numerous persons interviewed in this evaluation also considered the EIB as an efficient 
organization overall. To provide just one example, a Commission staff member mentioned that 
“The EIB is a very lean & efficient institution, and the EU wants to keep it as it is.” (Source: MN 020) 
 
But the current level of human resources is also a source of concern.  
See JC 9.3 below for more information.  
 
Nevertheless, that Wise Men Report concluded that the current operational setup for the external 
lending mandate (excl. ACP) within the EIB appeared now less and less adapted:  
“One of the EIB’s most important comparative advantages is its lean and efficient set-up, which entails limited 
administrative costs. Compared to other IFIs, the EIB presents the highest ratio in terms of lending volume per staff 
member. For reference, the EIB operational lending directorates include about 200 staff members dealing with direct 
banking activity in regions outside the EU (including about 80 staff members working on ACP). An additional 
estimated 100-150 support staff is involved in external financing activities 
(project appraisal/monitoring, legal, credit risk) or administrative and financial support. 
EIB lending signatures outside the EU in 2009 amounted to EUR 8.8bn, an amount higher than the total activity 
of EBRD, and about 1/3 of the combined activity of IBRD and IFC over the period 2004-2008.  
The EIB transfers the financial benefits of its funding to the beneficiaries with relatively low margins to cover 100% 
of the administrative costs. The EIB has specific targets to ensure cost coverage of operations and build the necessary 
reserves to self-finance capital increases and support the expansion of the activity, on the basis of its statutory 
obligations. 
Nevertheless, with reference to EIB activity in the regions covered by the external mandate, the evaluation found that 
the tight staff resources of the EIB reduce in certain circumstances the effectiveness of EIB operations taking into 
account the requests put on EIB, as well as expectations of the EU Institutions and civil society. In particular, the 
evaluation found that: (i) the translation of EU policies into EIB lending strategies and the economic and sector 
analysis of country needs are very limited; (ii) the EIB efforts to monitor project implementation, ensure local presence 
and follow-up on environmental and social aspects, appear still insufficient; (iii) the EIB ability to satisfy the 
mandate requirements on development aspects is only indirect. The project selection process is also influenced by limited 
resources, by a higher emphasis on relatively larger and relatively less complex operations. 
Thus, the evaluation concludes that the capability of the EIB to properly contribute to EU external policies and serve 
EU interests is hampered by limited staff and limited local presence.” 
 
“The EIB governing bodies, in particular the Management Committee and the Board of Directors, are appointed by 
the EU Member States and deal with all EIB activities, inside and outside the EU. The Commission is a member 
of the Board of Directors, but not a shareholder. 
The current setup of the Bank is such that the operational staff (banking function) for activities outside Europe 
(Neighbourhood and partner countries, Asia and Latin America, ACP including South Africa) is organised in a 
specific directorate, while the operational staff dealing with Pre-Accession countries is part of the directorate for 
operations in the EU. The support functions, including project engineers and economists, legal staff, credit risk staff, 
are each part of a separate Bank’s directorate which deals with both operations in the EU and outside the EU. Most 
of the resources are absorbed by the activity in the EU. 
This operational setup resulting from the history of the Institution and which has served relatively well so far appears 
now less and less adapted to the growing volume, complexity and importance of its external operations. This should 
now be reviewed, so as to allow a more focused management of external operations and a change in the culture of the 
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organisation including a closer collaboration with the Commission. 
For this purpose, the Steering Committee is of the opinion that all the EIB financing activities outside the EU27 
should be consolidated in a dedicated EIB entity with appropriate participation of the Commission.” Further 
details on the recommended set-up are provided in pages 37 and 38 of the report. 
Source: Camdessus, “Mid-Term review of EIB external mandate – Report of the Steering Committee” February 
2010 (pages 26, 37) 
 
The Mid-term evaluation of EIB's external mandate (i.e. all activities outside the EU excluding ACP 
and OCT countries) also report that there are two areas where efficiency could be improved, 
which relate to EIB disbursement procedures for private sector projects and global loans:  
“Disbursement requirements: Inputs from stakeholders during the country case studies have pointed to two areas 
where efficiency may be improved, reaching the same level of effectiveness, and without adversely impacting the credit 
risk of the operations.  
The first area is the disbursement procedures of the Bank. At least for some projects in the private sector, the Bank 
will only disburse against actual or proforma invoices of the beneficiary. Given that the Bank has carried out a 
comprehensive assessment of the creditworthiness and implementation capacity of the borrower, it should be considered 
if this assessment is sufficient to trust that the borrower will spend the loan funds of the Bank in accordance with the 
stipulations of the finance contract.  
On the disbursement side also but applying to global loans: Some banks are asked to secure approval of individual 
allocations after that approval of reasonably sized disbursements. Others may request a block disbursement for 
prefinance with later Bank approval of the projects, and the risk of non-approval placed with the borrowing bank. 
Since an in-depth appraisal of this bank will have been performed it would increase operational efficiency if a block 
disbursement procedure were used for all. It may also improve effectiveness since it will not deter banks from 
establishing (further) credit lines with the EIB due to these time consuming procedures; an observation made by more 
global loan beneficiaries interviewed. 
However, this further increases the risk of eventually not reaching the intended EU policy objectives as mentioned in 
the section above. Therefore, an appropriate balance should be struck between increase in efficiency and monitoring 
of implementation. 
Source: Mid-term evaluation of EIB's external mandate, COWI, March 2010 (p147) 
 
The related “Report and recommendations of the Steering Committee of “Wise Persons””, also 
focusing on pre-accession countries and countries of the Southern Neighbourhood, Easter 
Neighbourhood, Russia, Asia, Latin America and South Africa (i.e. excluding ACP/OCTs), 
provides the following findings at a general level with relation to the average disbursement level 
that are worth mentioning here.  
 
“The average disbursement rate for the EIB operations signed in the period 2000‐2007 has been 75% measured at 
end June 2009. The pattern for disbursements is twofold: 
 For private sector operations the disbursement rate is normally higher, as observed under EIB own‐risk 
facilities and in ALA region. Lower level of disbursements in Mediterranean and China at EIB own‐risk 
is linked to operations signed recently. 
 Disbursement rates are lower for public sector operations where difficulties are mainly due to weak 
institutional promoters in implementing infrastructure projects, which are often complex in nature, combined 
with limited EIB resources for technical assistance and monitoring support, thus increasing the risk of 
implementation delays. This is especially the case in Western Balkans. Across all regions, it is noticed that 
some operations take a long time until completion, either because of an initial long delay for the preparation 
of the project, or because of slow implementation progress.” 
 
Source: Camdessus, “Mid-Term review of EIB external mandate – Report of the Steering Committee” February 
2010 (page 10) 
I-9.2.3 Evidence that the guidelines are applied systematically 
General The recurrence of the same documents (PIN, appraisal, financial proposal, etc…) for all projects 
indicates that indeed guidelines are applied systematically. This appears to be the case at least until 
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effective start of the project; ensuring systematic monitoring during the lifetime of the project is 
more problematic, as mentioned under JC 9.3 
2004_LUMWANA The project is duly monitored by EIB. Monitoring report of Dec. 2009 shows that compliance with 
financial rations and information covenants has been satisfactory. 
Source EIB Lumwana Copper Project. Finance Contracts n°23717,13718 and 23719 signed on November 2006, 
Luxembourg, 23 Décember 2008. 
JC 9.3 Sufficient resources are available for EIB to take a proactive, as opposed to reactive, 
approach in project generation, and to enhance timeliness and cost-effectiveness.  
I-9.3.1 IF/OR approach in project generation (reactive versus proactive) 
General See also JC 3.3 on the role of the EIB in project generation and mobilization of resources 
 
According to an EIB staff member, proactiveness could be improved essentially for the monitoring 
phase, relying on others for the upfront work: 
“The proactiveness could be improved regarding the monitoring phase, the follow-up rather than the identification 
phase. For instance, the World Bank performs more upfront work compared to the EIB. As long as the EIB works 
in strong cooperation with other donors, it is not really an issue. 
Regarding the monitoring phase, the EIB has some difficulties to be very proactive. This is explained by insufficient 
resources available on the field and the distance from Luxembourg. The EIB local offices would work differently (e.g. 
set up an advisory board,...). Increasing the number of staff in local offices would certainly improve the projects 
monitoring.”  
Source: MN017 
 
An EIB staff member noted that the notion of proactiveness should be considered carefully: 
“«Proactive »: what does it mean? E.g. Mozambique: opening up of a port : that project has been stopped; it got 
basically blocked (partial promise of funding but nothing happening). Promoter got nervous. EIB went to promoter, 
discussed root causes, went to discuss with WB, and then back to the promoter. Is that proactive? Not in the sense 
that the project already existed, but that it involved proactive attitude.” 
Source: MN 024 
 
An EIB staff member provides as example of lack of resources hampering generation of 
operations the case of the idea for creation of a Caribbean Infrastructure TF: “Based on the success 
of the EU-Africa ITF, there is an initiative now to establish a Caribbean ITF, with a similar scope (not entirely 
limited to Infrastructure, we are now for instance considering also mining and smelting). But resources issue for writing 
ToR, hiring consultants, etc. This takes (significant) time but that is underestimated, it has to be done on top of 
people’s activities.” 
Source: MN 024  
 
The 2009 Cotonou TA Annual Report notes (p1) that TA should support the efficient utilisation of 
loan finance, and should enable the EIB to pursue its goal of becoming more proactive in its 
approach to investment projects in the ACP region. TA should whatsoever be project-related:  
“Article 2 (9) of Annex 2 of the ACP-EC partnership agreement (Cotonou I and II) states that “interest subsidies 
may be capitalised or may be used in the form of grants. Up to 10% of the budget for interest rate subsidies may be 
used to support project related technical assistance in ACP countries”. In accordance with the above, all technical 
assistance (TA) operations shall have a link to ongoing or future investment projects (loans). 
The availability of the above grant funding for TA enables the Bank to become more proactive in its approach to 
investment projects in the ACP region8, a goal that the EIB pursues. Year 2009 was the ACP-IF Department’s 
third operational year in utilizing the Cotonou TA Fund. It was a year in which the EIB continued to expand and 
consolidate its TA program9 in the ACP region, helping to support a range of projects and lending programmes. 
                                                 
8  As per ACP Business Plan 2009-2011. 
9  In addition, ACP TA operations benefited from the EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund, and the EU-ACP Water Project 
Preparation Facility, established under the 9th EDF EU-ACP Water Facility, which are not covered by this report. 
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Most TA operations under the Cotonou I and II frameworks are designed to either help identify and prepare 
Investment Facility (IF) or Own Resources (OR) projects to facilitate their implementation. TA supports the efficient 
utilisation of loan finance and can contribute to generate new lending opportunities. 
In accordance with the strategic thrust of the Bank’s operations in the ACP region, the 2009 TA programme 
continued to focus on: (i) financial sector operations (microfinance and SME lending, for instance in 
Ethiopia, Rwanda, Liberia, Uganda and the Dominican Republic); and (ii) infrastructure projects, notably 
initiatives in Central, West and East Africa and the Solomon Islands. 
In March 2007, the Management Committee and the IF Committee endorsed a first Global Authorization (GA) 
for TA for a total amount of MEUR 15 (MEUR 13 were approved by end 2009 under this GA). (…) The IF 
Committee, in its meeting on 25 March 2010, approved a second GA for TA with an amount of up to EUR 8m, 
to be drawn from the Cotonou II TA endowment (EUR 40m). Under the GA the size of individual allocations is 
up to EUR 2m. The IF Committee approves all other TA operations that are not covered by the GA for TA.” 
 
EIB staff members noted that EIB TA is demand driven (which is less the case for some others 
such as the WB). This is partially related to resource availability: 
“TA is demand driven: defined on needs, e.g. capacity building. During appraisal they decide whether TA is 
necessary. In ACP WB is very active and they often work with them. In some cases for instance, the WB worked on 
initial TOR, then processed by project team, then the EIB starts to select consultant or delegates it to the promoter (a 
bit different from MEDA). One reason for this change is to follow the Paris Declaration: more ownership. Moreover, 
as they are not a development Bank or not staffed as one (and no staff on site most of the time) generating and 
monitoring TA is not easy for them.  They need to delegate the contracting authority. Sometimes they can do it 
themselves : e.g. Solomon Islands: engineer in Sidney office to be able to run the show. 2nd case in Kenia: Head of 
EIB office: engineer: he was involved.” 
Source: MN 102 
 
For EIB operations outside the EU but excluding ACP countries, the concept of “restricted 
participation during appraisal” is applied for operations with known borrowers with known 
implementation capacity. EIB technical staff does not participate in project development to the 
same extent as other MDBs and less non-financial value added is brought to borrowers. 
Source: Mid-term evaluation of EIB's external mandate, COWI, March 2010 
2004_Lumwana Considerable amount of resources and time have been devoted to a feasibility study launched in 
2001. The cost of the study wa €15.4  and was partially financed (E7 M) with an EIB loan from the 
IF resources. The study was meant to establishing the comprehensive bankable feasibility of a new 
copper mine at Lumwana in North-western Zambia.  The study includes an assessment of the 
social and environmental impact of the project.  
Sources  
 EIB Fact Sheet A, Proposal to appraise new operation: Zambia Lumwana Feasibility Study, 
Luxembourg, 31/1/2001, OP3/ACPIII/AGORAn°20010013/SAK/ar. 
 EIB. Appraisal Report, Lumwana study, Feasibility study for a copper mining project, Luxembourg 
23/3/2001, PJ/I&S/2001-338/GCE/VMJ/ms 
 EIB Annex to Fact Sheet  B. Board of Directors, Lumwana Feasibility Study,2/4/2001 
 EIB Lumwana Feasibility study Project. Finance Contract between EIB and Equinox Cooper 
Ventures Ltd(Zambia). Luxembourg, Paris, 2/10/2001 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2006 
EIB’s entry into this Project (and in the preceding such fund) was reactive, requiring minimal staff 
input. 
2005_ACPGLOB 
ADEMI 
EIB appears to have played a leading and proactive role in helping Banco Ademi expand and 
strengthen its capital base. 
2005_EMP 
AFRICA FUND 
II 
EIB’s entry into this Project (and in the preceding such fund) was reactive, requiring minimal staff 
input. 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2004 
EIB’s entry into this Project was reactive, requiring minimal staff input.  EIB was invited by IFC, a 
sponsor of this venture capital fund. 
2005_ACPGLOB EIB’s entry into this Project (and in the preceding such fund) was reactive, requiring minimal staff 
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CA2006 input. 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
As this project is the continuation of two previous projects already financed by the EIB, it is 
difficult to attest of the proactive/reactive position of the Bank. 
However the EIB tend to be an important actor on the water and sanitation field in Senegal as it is 
explained in the CSP  
Source: « Document de stratégie pays et programme indicatif national pour la période 2008-2013 », European 
Community, 2007, p35 
 
However the EIB is active in the drinking water sector in Senegal for more than 10 years. 
Source: “Rapport financier. Projet: Programme eau Sénégal”, EIB, 2007, p2 
I-9.3.2 Trend in ratio of full-time equivalent staff to volume of operations 
I-9.3.3 Evidence from staff on availability of HR to fulfil the mandate 
General Regional Offices: Background on EIB organisation:  
“At the end of 2008, a total of 114 Equivalent Full-Time Staff (EFT) were assigned to ACP/OCT-related 
operations throughout the Bank. 
EIB External Regional Offices in the ACP countries: The Luxembourg-based resources are 
complemented in the field by five External Regional Offices in Dakar, Fort-de-France, Nairobi, Sydney and 
Tshwane (Pretoria), covering respectively West Africa and Sahel, the Caribbean region, Central and East Africa, 
the Pacific and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean. At the end of 2008, 10 EIB staff, supported by 17 locally 
hired contract staff were assigned to the five External Regional Offices.” 
Source: IF Annual Report 2008 (p65) 
 
The 2009 IF annual report mentions further the following:  
“To carry out its mandate(s), the ACP-IF Department in Luxembourg, in close cooperation with the project 
promoter, relies on multidisciplinary teams and regional offices. At the end of 2009, a total of 114 full-time staff 
were assigned/dedicated to ACP/OCT/RSA-related operations throughout the Bank. Tasks carried out at the 
EIB head office in Luxembourg cover the whole project cycle, from identification to appraisal and actual project 
implementation and operation. 
The presence of staff locally is instrumental in raising the profile of the Bank, notably by attending key events in the 
region. Through its regional presence, the Bank can more readily visit projects regularly and facilitate communication 
and cooperation/coordination with project promoters, donors, national authorities, European Commission delegations 
and civil society. A swift reaction to local needs as they arise contributes to improving the portfolio, often preempting 
problems and mitigating risks. 
By channelling local and regional information to headquarters and promoting enduring close relations with operational 
divisions in Luxembourg, the regional offices are essential to identify project opportunities and add value at the project 
development stage.” 
Source: Investment Facility Annual Report 2009, EIB, 2010 (p57) 
 
Regional offices: EIB staff members described as follows the set-up history of the regional 
offices; they also referred to a 2008 review on regional offices10 which mentioned reportedly that 
offices were running at the limit of human capacity, with a serious reputation risk for the Bank and 
a serious disadvantage compared to other institutions:  
 “Several threats: see change in the Bank from Lomé Conventions (simple quote projects: Government projects, 
circumscribed by the State), whereas Cotonou had a different flavour, with a large private sector flavour, at a 
time where many African countries were undergoing privatisations. Recognition of need of closer involvement in 
the field. EIB was then starting parachuting people from Luxembourg for a few days in the field to meet 
Ministers etc. That was an issue also in renewing the EIB activities in ACP. Several peer institutions (KFW 
etc.) commented on this, saying that they were present on the ground but not the EIB. EIB decided hence to set 
up “representations” (not offices!) = for strengthening the dialogue with stakeholders in the country (national 
                                                 
10   “Review of the Bank’s External offices in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Mediterannean Region”, produced for the IF 
Committee, EU MS and EC (October 2008, 15p, report prepared by J R Loasby. This document was not provided to 
the evaluators.  
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authorities, Banks, cofinancing organisations, private sector, regional economic communities – 
CEMAC/COMESA/EAC/etc.). Also question of raising the profile of the EIB (= EU), and 
participation in public events which would require local presence (and not empty EIB chairs as before), and also 
prospective, marketing arm in the field, for a better grasp of what is happening in the field (finding new people, 
getting involved in new activities, finding a wider breath of opportunities for being active in the countries). This 
was the broad set of targets set up by management at the time. Idea to have close cooperation with EC, but 
actually it never implied sharing offices with the EC (nevertheless, often close to EC Delegation).  
 These representations were bounded on an existing structure of geographical divisions in the EIB head office. 
This was rather unlike all the other peer institutions (IFC, WB, KfW, AFD, etc.), which have […], carrying 
out there appraisals for instance at sector level at their head offices. Curious structure at EIB vs. all other 
institutions. It merits at least consideration of whether we have the right structure. Should we use our local 
representations more extensively? A lot of us do feel that this would be a very interesting approach. It would 
nevertheless imply shifting of resources.  
 This is another discrepancy: a note to the IF Committee mentioned for instance the following: “offices running at 
the limit of human capacity”; “not a sustainable basis”; “serious reputation risk for the Bank”; “serious 
disadvantage compared to other institutions”. Since that report has been released one year ago, there has been no 
increase of resources. Serious issue.  
o Number of resources available (1 in Pretoria) vs. number of activities/countries to cover (15 
countries for Pretoria office).  
o AFD: Only in Pretoria (excl. their offices in Mauritius and Madagascar): 6 from Paris + 10 
back-up people.  
o Pretoria office last year: 488 working days for last year for 2 people: 212 were spent on mission 
 max. 1 person or no person in the office. 
 Very much improved relationship with EC since representations. The same can be said with peer institutions 
(frequent meetings with AFD, a bit less but still with KfW or WB). Active participation with regional 
economic communities. Very different level and quality of cooperation compared to beforehand. Being able to be 
informed, involved at earlier stage.  
o E.g. Pretoria: 80% of approvals and 74% of signatures were project originated, developed, and 
nurtured locally. This is quite “parlant” as to the efficiency of this system (although this is not 
sustainable). 
 « Proactive »: what does it mean? E.g. Mozambique: opening up of a port  that project has been stopped; it 
got basically blocked (partial promise of funding but nothing happening). Promoter got nervous. EIB went to 
promoter, discussed root causes, went to discuss with WB, and then back to the promoter. Is that proactive? Not 
in the sense that the project already existed, but that it involved proactive attitude. 
Source: MN 024 
 
In the same line, the Mid-term evaluation of the EIB's external mandate report the following with 
regard to local offices in Turkey, Morocco, Tunis, Egypt, and South Africa (the latter covering a 
number of ACP countries): 
“All offices have the character of representative offices and support to appraisal of new operations is only done 
exceptionally. The offices each have one or two professional staff seconded from Luxembourg none of which are 
technical staff (engineers).  
When the offices were set up they were envisaged to serve a representative role with national stakeholders, to support 
the operational divisions in project identification and in monitoring, and to improve the coordination with the EU 
delegation and with the IFIs and DFIs with local offices of their own. 
The Commission assessment of FEMIP in 2006 pointed to the need for reinforced local presence of the EIB in the 
FEMIP further to the 3 local offices already then established and of the partnership role of FEMIP to be enhanced. 
Interviews with project beneficiaries and other external stakeholders have shown that the mainly representative role of 
the existing local offices and the absence of a local presence in other countries are considered an element that reduces the 
non-financial value added to beneficiaries. It is also seen to reduce the capacity of the EIB to cooperate effectively in the 
field with the EU and with IFIs/DFIs in mandate loan operations. 
The local offices at the same time report that the monitoring missions from Luxembourg to support project 
implementation have become fewer in the face of cost cutting measures to improve cost coverage. 
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Beneficiaries expect project monitoring to include staff with technical expertise, since this expertise is not available in 
the local offices. They compare this situation with that of other IFIs and DFIs represented, with at least some 
engineering expertise in their local offices. 
The interviews with IFIs and DFIs showed the scope of these offices to be much wider with active participation in 
project development from seconded engineers. The offices would typically have between 4 and 10 professional staff, 
including staff hired locally. The interviews exclude the likes of the World Bank and the IFC, which have 
substantially larger local offices but also a broader mission. 
The IFIs/DFIs interviewed in Serbia where the EIB does not have a local office had mixed views on the need for 
one. For the cooperation required on larger scale and relatively less complex transport projects, the absence of a local 
office was deemed to be justified. 
The DFI interviewed (KfW) with a broader and more development oriented focus in the environmental infrastructure 
sector saw the absence of the EIB as a problem in the EU/IFI/DFI coordination work that takes place within the 
framework of the Infrastructure Projects Facility (IPF) of the Commission and which targets municipal infrastructure 
investments. 
The DG charged with running the IPF, DG ELARG, shared this view and added that the absence of an EIB 
local office impacted adversely on the effectiveness of the IPF where the EIB is the largest player in terms of funding 
availability. The Bank was found by this DG to be unable to substantively follow up with municipalities on project 
proposals as opposed to the EBRD and the KfW which both have local offices. 
The EU Delegation representative in Belgrade interviewed covering the key areas of municipal infrastructure 
investments confirmed that coordination efforts on projects, involving also other IFIs/DFIs, was hampered by the lack 
of a local EIB office. 
In countries where the EIB does have a local office, staff resources was pointed out as an issue since the technical skills 
in demand were not available among the staff in the offices. Also, it was found that since the Egypt office is a regional 
one covering several countries, it constrains the availability of local staff for projects in Egypt. A similar situation was 
found in South Africa, where the office is also regional.” 
Source: Mid-term evaluation of EIB's external mandate, COWI, March 2010 (pp104-105) 
 
EIB staff members noted that they have undertaken a peer comparison analysis on allocated 
resources based on end-2007 figures, which showed that the EIB had staff levels that remain 
limited vs. peer institutions:  
“Peer comparisons are useful in providing orders of magnitude, but in doing so their different roles and funding 
arrangements have to be borne in mind. Nevertheless, by any yardstick, the Bank’s ACP operations would appear to 
be considerably less staffed than those of its peers. The most relevant peers are IFC (its African operations only), 
FMO, DEG and Proparco (bearing in mind that Proparco would appear to obtain considerable corporate 
support from AFD, its main shareholder). (…) Broadly, ACP-IF staffing is similar to that of FMO and 
Proparco, which do not operate in as many countries and have much smaller outstanding portfolios. Staffing in DEG 
and in IFC (SSA activities only), which is probably the closest comparator, are much higher although IFC’s costs per 
staff member are lower, no doubt reflecting the extensive use of locally recruited personnel as well as most likely lower 
corporate overheads”. 
Source: MN 027 
 
The Mid-term evaluation of EIB's external mandate (i.e. all activities outside the EU excluding 
ACP and OCT countries) report that benchmarking with other institutions is complex:  
 “Among IFIs the EIB is often considered a very efficient institution with large volumes of lending processed per staff, 
the cost to asset ratio, and the cost to loans outstanding as efficiency indicators.  
A proper efficiency assessment in terms of such benchmarking requires, however, that comparison be made between 
broadly similar institutions.  
In this context, it appears that, for example, comparisons between the EIB and other MDBs such as the EBRD in 
terms of efficiency are very complex since these institutions present a different business model and are different in terms 
of tasks assigned and external resources available.” 
Source: Mid-term evaluation of EIB's external mandate, COWI, March 2010 (p145) 
 
Nevertheless, the related “Report and recommendations of the Steering Committee of “Wise 
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Persons”” noted for the external lending mandate (excl. ACP) that the evaluation concludes that 
the capability of the EIB to properly contribute to EU external policies and serve EU interests is 
hampered by limited staff and limited local presence.”:  
“One of the EIB’s most important comparative advantages is its lean and efficient set-up, which entails limited 
administrative costs. Compared to other IFIs, the EIB presents the highest ratio in terms of lending volume per staff 
member. For reference, the EIB operational lending directorates include about 200 staff members dealing with direct 
banking activity in regions outside the EU (including about 80 staff members working on ACP). An additional 
estimated 100-150 support staff is involved in external financing activities (project appraisal/monitoring, legal, credit 
risk) or administrative and financial support. 
EIB lending signatures outside the EU in 2009 amounted to EUR 8.8bn, an amount higher than the total activity 
of EBRD, and about 1/3 of the combined activity of IBRD and IFC over the period 2004-2008.  
The EIB transfers the financial benefits of its funding to the beneficiaries with relatively low margins to cover 100% 
of the administrative costs. The EIB has specific targets to ensure cost coverage of operations and build the necessary 
reserves to self-finance capital increases and support the expansion of the activity, on the basis of its statutory 
obligations. 
Nevertheless, with reference to EIB activity in the regions covered by the external mandate, the evaluation found that 
the tight staff resources of the EIB reduce in certain circumstances the effectiveness of EIB operations taking into 
account the requests put on EIB, as well as expectations of the EU Institutions and civil society. In particular, the 
evaluation found that: (i) the translation of EU policies into EIB lending strategies and the economic and sector 
analysis of country needs are very limited; (ii) the EIB efforts to monitor project implementation, ensure local presence 
and follow-up on environmental and social aspects, appear still insufficient; (iii) the EIB ability to satisfy the 
mandate requirements on development aspects is only indirect. The project selection process is also influenced by limited 
resources, by a higher emphasis on relatively larger and relatively less complex operations. 
Thus, the evaluation concludes that the capability of the EIB to properly contribute to EU external policies and serve 
EU interests is hampered by limited staff and limited local presence.” 
Source: Camdessus, “Mid-Term review of EIB external mandate – Report of the Steering Committee” February 
2010 (pages 26, 37) 
 
The Wise Men Report provides on p60 the following table with indicative staff data of EIB and 
peer institutions operating outside the EU, indicating where ACP countries are covered: 
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It comments hereby the following: “With respect to local presence, it is noticed that the EIB has established 9 
small external offices (5 in ACP, 3 in Mediterranean, 1 in Turkey) with about 27 staff in total, which have mainly 
a representative function. This local presence is much lower than that of MDBs and the main EBFIs (see Table 4 in 
annex 3) and is found to limit the effectiveness and impact of EIB operations. It is thus recommended to reinforce the 
role of local offices, exploiting possible synergies with the Commission’s delegations, in order to enhance project 
monitoring and help overcoming project bottlenecks, as well as to improve interaction with beneficiaries including 
supporting public participation in EIB due diligence process.” (pp25-26) 
“as shown in Table 4 in annex 3, it can be estimated that the EIB lends outside the EU more than EUR 40m per 
staff member (about EUR 25m including ACP), compared with about EUR 3‐7m for a typical MDB, i.e. about 
10 times more, given the different mandate and type of activity of the EIB.” (p26) 
Source: Camdessus, “Mid-Term review of EIB external mandate – Report of the Steering Committee” February 
2010 (pages 60) 
 
In terms of human resources, an EIB source noted that they have increased, but that activities in 
ACP are much more time-consuming. There are also internal organisational issues in terms of 
resources: “Two points should be made at the outset. First, there has been an increase in staff over the last few 
years. Second, by the nature of the business, there is no ideal staff number that can be generated by precise 
quantification. 
Under Lomé IV, i.e. until about 2002, ACP activities were handled by roughly 64 EFT staff across the Bank (of 
which 35 in ACP-IF), a figure that had remained more or less constant since Lomé IV came into force in 1990. 
The comparable figure for 2008 is 115 EFT, of which 76 in ACP-IF. At the same time, the Bank’s traditional 
systems and procedures for measuring efficiency and productivity indicate a sharp drop in productivity, with the average 
number of projects per loan officer having dropped below. In this regard, one notes a clear – and 
worrying – trend whereby operational staff is actually no longer able to allocate sufficient time to the identification and 
appraisal of new operations, and progressively has had to take on more and more activities of an administrative 
nature, or at least tasks not directly project related. (…) in 2007, only 41.4% was related to specific projects. A 
similar pattern can be observed for 2008 (…). 
Operational support provided by other Directorates to the ACP-IF is also a source of concern and largely reflects the 
shortcomings of the Service Level Agreement (SLA) signed between the Bank and ACP-IF at the end of 2002, 
which defined the number of EFT staff or ad hoc resources expected to be dedicated to the IF by the EIB-Corporate 
and their related charges. (…) The SLA has, actually, never really been properly implemented and resources have to 
a large extent been allocated on an ad hoc basis, depending on priorities, which has sometimes resulted – and 
continues to result – in major bottle-necks. The lack of available and dedicated resources for ACP-IF operations 
(and this is also true for ENPC and ALA Departments) in other Directorates is certainly another explanation for 
lower productivity, and may well become even more of an issue in view of the current focus on achieving ambitious 
corporate targets in the Ops A countries in response to the economic and financial crisis.” 
“Un des objectifs de l’ABU-IF (Autonomous Business Unit Department) était de nous donner une certaine 
autonomie budgétaire. Mais in fine on n’a pas bénéficié de cette autonomie. On était par exemple soumis aux freeze 
des engagements de ressources de la BEI quand il y en avait. On a par exemple dû se battre 3 ans pour avoir 5 
ressources supplémentaires. » 
« Problème clair: on est sous-staffés. Y compris au niveau des opérations. Faire un projet en RDC n’est pas la même 
chose qu’au Benelux ou même au Maroc. Maintenant : moins de 1 projet par an signé par personne. Les gens 
passent plus de 50% de leur temps à faire autre chose (monitoring, tâches administratives).» 
Source: MN 027 
  
EIB staff members mentioned that this implied significant overwork at HQ Level:  
«Le staff de la BEI sur IF travaille typiquement 20-30% de plus que les 8h par jour comptabilisées --> faire 
attention aux benchmarks (ex. est-ce que l’overtime est comptabilisé ?).» 
Significant overwork is also mentioned for Regional Offices (see I-9.2.2 below).  
Source : MN 027, MN 024 
 
According to an EIB staff member, the workload is not evenly divided across the time. That staff 
member estimates that it does not miss too many opportunities, thanks also to the local offices, but 
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the EIB would certainly be more proactive if more resources would be available. 
The proactiveness could be improved regarding the monitoring phase, the follow-up rather than 
the identification phase. For instance, the World Bank performs more upfront work compared to 
the EIB. As long as the EIB works in strong cooperation with other donors, it is not really an issue. 
Regarding the monitoring phase, the EIB has some difficulties to be very proactive. This is 
explained by insufficient resources available on the field and the distance from Luxembourg. The 
EIB local offices would work differently (e.g. set up an advisory board,...). Increasing the number of 
staff in local offices would certainly improve the projects monitoring.   
Source: MN017 
 
A Commission representative notes that the EIB is an efficient organisation, although possibly with 
limited staff: 
“EIB is understaffed”: probably it’s true. The EIB is a very lean & efficient institution, and the EU wants to keep 
it as it is. If we recommend that more staff is needed, we have to take into account that the EC is behind the EIB. 
The EIB might be more involved in CSP/RSP, etc., for instance with one paragraph dedicated to the EIB, but the 
EIB should rely on EC policies etc., not duplicating the work. EIB is not just another IFI; it is the bank for the 
EU.”  
Source: MN 020 
 
Staff: An EIB staff member mentioned that EIB staff in charge of ACP operations have 
experience in both banking and development:  
“ACP : Turnover beaucoup plus bas pour ACP par rapport à d’autres (plusieurs ont plus de 20 ans dans le 
département). Beaucoup ont background dans le financement du développement (SFI, AFD, etc.) ou PPP etc. venant 
chez nous par intérêt. Avec double casquette banquier + développement. Beaucoup d’économistes de formation, 
également ingénieurs (agronomes). 
Mobilité interne : décision a été prise de renforcer la mobilité interne, entre types de départements et entre régions 
géographiques. Avant la région ACP était celle qui avait le plus d’interaction avec la CE. On avait toujours les 
instruments de blending (risk capital, IRS, equity). Maintenant ces instruments se généralisent peu à peu dans la 
Banque , ce n’est plus une spécificité ACP, il faut donc ouvrir cela à la BEI. A aussi du positif : avoir des gens avec 
de l’expérience EU peut être utile. 
Nouvelle règle 3-5-7 : Après 3 ans sur un poste il faut commencer à envisager de changer, 5 ans cela devient plus 
délicat, 7 ans out.  Mobilité interne intra-ACP : on change typiquement de pays tous les 5 ans, c’est l’idée. Mais ne 
pose pas trop de problème. Le département est suffisamment intégré pour que cela ne pose pas trop de pbm. Hand-
over bien fait, avec mission sur le terrain avec ancien et nouveau.  
Missions des opérationnels : pas aussi longues qu’à la WB (juska 3 semaines). Typiquement 3-4 fois par an en 
mission, chaque fois une semaine. » 
Source : MN 027 
 
EIB staff members emphasized that proactiveness is hampered by the number of resources, as 
detailed above under I-9.3.1.  
 
TA:  The 2009 TA Cotonou Annual Report provides information on resources and a description of 
the organisational structure for managing TA (on pages 1 and 7- 8 respectively):  
 “At the end of 2009, nineteen (19) TA operations were ongoing requiring a substantial amount of Bank staff 
resources to monitor and ensure their successful completion”.  
“The organisational structure for preparing and implementing TA operations has been derived from the proven EIB 
approach for project appraisal. For environment, water, human capital and infrastructure related projects, a TA team 
is composed of a geographical (OpsB) and sector (PJ) officer; for financial sector and risk capital operations, the full 
responsibility lies with the geographical team. The teams are responsible for defining the relevance, substance and 
expected results of each TA operation, for the monitoring of the consultant and the approval of reports. The TAU 
supports the TA team on administrative, procedural, technical and contractual matters during the preparation and 
implementation of TA operations, and it liaises with external stakeholders, ensures compliance, organises the tender 
process, checks the overall quality and acts as the main interlocutor during audit and evaluation exercises.” 
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EIB staff members noted that they had to face the teething problems of managing TA:   
“Start was like under FEMIP, takes some time, get used to working with consultants. Since then they have done a 
lot of things especially in the financial sector, notably micro-finance.” 
Source: MN 102 
In this respect, a recent evaluation covering EIB TA under FEMIP (i.e. in the Mediterranean 
region) noted that “regarding TA on EIB loans, despite the EIB’s limited experience with managing TA prior to 
the creation of the FEMIP Support Fund, interviewees recognise that the EIB was in the best position to identify 
and manage the TA necessary for the loans it provided, albeit with support from the Commission in one reported 
case”.  
Source: Evaluation of Commission’s Aid Delivery through Development Banks and the EIB, ADE, 2008 (p52) 
 
A senior EIB staff member notes that monitoring is still an issue: “We are lean but indeed it 
[monitoring resources] is a constraint. We don’t have the resources to do this.” 
Source: MN 020 
 
EIB staff members note hereby that lack of resources hampered setting up of a monitoring system 
for measurement of development impact: 
“Selon « Fair evaluation »  (international financial reportings standards – IFRS) il faut faire chaque année un 
inventaire de la valeur des actifs, y compris de la FI, notamment pour travail de provisions -  on fait cela en même 
temps que le monitoring.  
Monitoring de l’impact en termes de développement : a été demandé clairement il y a qqs années. On a du mal à le 
mettre en place par manque de ressources. Le responsable BEI avait été voir des peer institutions pour voir comment 
ils faisaient : ils ont des ressources dédiées. Nous n’avons pas ces moyens.  
Décision du CD prise d’harmoniser maintenant toutes les activités monitoring au sein de la Banque dans le TMR 
(Transaction Management Restructuring), pareil pour EU et Externat Lending Mandate et ACP etc. Problème : 
c’est du monitoring point de vue risque. Le Département Projets serait sensé faire le monitoring point de vue physique, 
mais ils n’ont pas les ressources. Souvent ils font du copier coller de ce qu’on fait ici. » 
Source : MN 027 
 
Another EIB source completes the above, noting that monitoring entails an additional burden and 
can be as resource intensive as the appraisal/diligence process, and even more so with the crisis of 
the last years:  
“The ACP monitoring plan was discussed and endorsed by the Management Committee on 30 September 2008. 
The traditional Bank concept of monitoring, which also encompasses disbursements, no longer suffices to convey all 
that is involved in managing operations and contracts post signature, an example being agreeing to waivers. The 
obligations that flow from Basel II and the application of IFRS in terms of annual valuations of each individual 
operation with apparently no allowances possible for small operations of minimal materiality entails an additional 
burden in terms of post-signature activity and can be as resource intensive as the appraisal/diligence process, as 
evidenced from the ACP-IF time recording statistics. And this is without taking into account the likely spill-over 
effects of the current financial crisis in developing countries, and resulting impact on the ACP operators with whom 
the Bank is involved. It is already evident from recent developments (including the likely higher level of 
provisioning under the IF for 2008) that a number of projects under implementation are facing problems and will 
require a more intense and resource intensive follow-up during the year. This situation may persist throughout 2010.” 
Source: MN 027 
 
The issue of limited staff resources for monitoring is also observed in the other EIB operating 
regions outside the EU:  
““The limited staff resources made available by the Bank for mandate loan operations have been found to impact 
not only monitoring but also to reduce effectiveness through the project selection process.” 
“Contractual requirements. The project case studies show that the number of contractual undertakings of finance 
contracts with sector conditionality are few, and with limited monitoring of and enforcement.  
Monitoring of contractual requirements in general is not found satisfactory. The e-survey of EIB staff showed that 
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time constraints for the majority often or very often affected monitoring and project follow-up. Both factors reduce 
Programme effectiveness.”  
“(…) limited availability of staff resources have impacted on operational procedures including appraisal and 
particularly monitoring procedures.” 
Source: Mid-term evaluation of EIB's external mandate, COWI, March 2010 (p vi, p145) 
 
Monitoring of TA is not easy notably due to availability of resources and of local staff, according 
to EIB staff members.  
“as they are not a development Bank or not staffed as one (and no staff on site most of the time) generating and 
monitoring TA is not easy for them.  They need to delegate the contracting authority. Sometimes they can do it 
themselves : e.g. Solomon Islands: engineer in Sidney office to be able to run the show. 2nd case in Kenia: Head of 
EIB office: engineer: he was involved.” 
“Monitoring consultants is not always easy. Bigger TAs: we try to monitor them closely, e.g. every 6 months. The 
EIB is not on site… We don’t have daily contacts. But we try to meet them when we go over there. And, important, 
we have people in-house who could do the job, in the sense that they are capable, they know what should be done, they 
know the job; this makes monitoring easier”. 
“Microfinance: challenge to find the right consultants. It is always a challenge to find good people in the market. All 
in all we find good people. We work quite a lot with big consulting firms, e.g. there are always on big infrastructure 
projects. Note: Under the IF we use the EIB eligibility criteria: worldwide, for people and firms. Not as the 
Commission (EU 27)” 
Source: MN 102 
General Pacific The opening of regional office in the Pacific Region has been a considerable improvement 
compared to the previous situation. EIB tasks managers used to conduct fly-in fly-out missions to 
the Pacific which did not permit to properly identify projects and to allocate resources efficiently.  
The resources of the Regional Office remain extremely limited compared to other agencies. World 
Bank, ADB, and Commission have each between 60 and 80 resident staff in the region. EIB has 
only 4 and covers 19 countries. Obviously this does not permit to have the same proactivity as the 
other agencies. 
However, the Office with its limited resources, participates to 4 coordination groups : private 
sector, infrastructure, energy, regional coordination.  
It prepares a quarterly report covering an analysis of the region from the political and economic 
point of views, the situation of the projects, and studies of specific topics. Moreover the Office 
produces a small weekly report for the headquarter. These tasks mobilise two full time staff. 
Given that there are many potential projects in the Pacific Region, with the current organisation 
there are not enough human resources to identify, prepare and monitor projects. One person in 
Luxembourg is responsible for the preparation of projects (in practice 1 person can prepare 3 
projects per year). There are four persons in the regional office in Sydney to identify projects, to 
conduct the contacts with the governments of the region, to coordinate with other donors and 
financial agencies and to monitoring the projects. 
 
The choice of Sydney to establish the regional office, rather than a Pacific country has been 
questioned. The advantage of Sydney is that several donors (World Bank, ADB, Aussaid) have 
made it their focal point in the region. Moreover Sydney is a hub through which most project 
promoters in the Region would regularly go and where many regional consultancies are based. The 
alternative of being located in one Pacific country would make contacts easier with that country but 
more difficult with all other part or the region. The main disadvantage of Sydney is that it is not the 
seat of the regional Delegation of the Commission for the Pacific. 
Sources: MN313, MN343. 
 
Manque de visibilité de la BEI faute de ressources. Il faudrait pouvoir aller beaucoup plus dans les 
pays. Effort de marketing envisagé par le bureau régional mais crainte de ne pouvoir suivre.  
Source: MN313 
General Kenya The constraints in terms of resources within the Regional Offices were also mentioned during the 
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country visit in Kenya. The Regional Representation based in Nairobi has 3 full time staff and 3 
support staff to deal with 18 countries. On this basis it is very difficult for the EIB to have a 
strategic approach, especially outside the sectors defined by the Business Plan. This is also a 
constraint in terms of follow-up of the projects. Coordination with other IFIs for monitoring can 
however lighten the burden to a certain extent. 
Source: MN 331 
General Dom. 
Republic 
Visibility: In the Dominican Republic, the role of EIB is not well highlighted in the EU 
Delegation’s communications. Neither is it more broadly vs. taxpayers and all beneficiaries. 
Visibility could be reinforced by: 
- A joint communication plan 
- More EIB investment in communication 
- The EC could impose in its communications guidelines to include EIB projects in the EU 
Delegations’ communications 
Source:  MN 004 
 
Is EIB visible to final beneficiaries ? (E.g. SMEs/MSMEs?)  In the Dom. Rep, Banco ADEMI does 
not refer to EIB in its individual loan contracts, but Banco ADOPEM does. 
Source:    MN 401, MN 403 
General (Lomé 
IV) 
Monitoring (1/2): The Evaluation of EIB financing through individual loans under the Lomé IV 
Convention (covering the period 1990-2003, before the set-up of the IF under the Cotonou 
Agreement) recommended provision of adequate resources to strengthen the EIB monitoring 
capacities, e.g. through TA – see the table below, which also provides the EIB response (notably 
that it might be intensive).  
 
EIB Evaluation’s recommendation 
4 
EIB Services’ Comments 
In order to strengthen the project 
implementation and management 
capacities in particular of public 
sector promoters, institutional 
issues need to be analysed more 
carefully at appraisal, and 
appropriate measures (project 
implementation units, technical 
assistance, training etc.) be 
included as loan conditions. This 
may require the provision of 
adequate resources to strengthen 
the Bank’s monitoring capacities, 
e.g. through Technical Assistance. 
(Sections 3.1.1.2, 3.1.1.3, 3.1.1.5, 
3.1.2 and 6.2) 
The principle has been agreed with the Commission that, 
under Cotonou II, the Bank should have funds readily 
available for the selective use of Technical Assistance 
both for direct projects as well as for financial sector 
operations. In the meantime, the Bank’s services will 
reinforce the application of measures to strengthen 
organisational weakness especially in relation to project 
implementation capacity. While institutional issues are 
analysed in detail at appraisal stage (systematically in some 
sectors, e.g. water), loan conditions relating to 
institutional and regulation reform depend upon the case 
in question, bearing in mind that putting in place the 
required technical assistance and adequately monitoring 
these issues is often a staff intensive exercise, and for this 
the hiring of additional staff is in progress. 
Source: Evaluation of EIB financing through individual loans under the Lomé IV Convention, 
EIB, 2006 (p5). 
 
Monitoring (2/2): that same Lomé IV Evaluation recommended more careful project monitoring, 
whereby the EIB responded that progress had been made already in the first years of the Cotonou 
Agreement (see table below).   
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EIB Evaluation’s recommendation 
5 
EIB Services’ Comments 
Project related covenants have to 
be carefully monitored and 
appropriate decisions taken, 
considering also observations 
made after loan signature. (e.g. 
creation of special funds, 
recruitment of TA, environmental 
measures). (Sections 3.1.1.4, 3.2.1, 
5.3 and 6.2) 
Far fewer subsidy-related special funds will be created 
under Cotonou, but the point is well taken. Over the last 
two years, new resources have progressively been 
allocated to the area of project monitoring (there are 
currently two Monitoring Officers per operational 
division), while progress has been made in the field of 
improving the electronic tracking of contract compliance. 
This will enable the Bank to better enforce promoters' 
contractual obligations. 
Source: Evaluation of EIB financing through individual loans under the Lomé IV Convention, 
EIB, 2006 (p5). 
2001_MOMA_ 
TITANIUM 
This project involved a very significant amount of time and work by the EIB Staff and the 
acquisition of a good knowledge of the promoter and borrower and their management.  
See I-9.1.2 
2003_BOAD PG 
IV 
There was a lack of resources at the time of appraisal of the projects, in particular for having to deal 
with a new instrument (guarantee line):  
“Estimation des ressources nécessaires de OPS, PJ ET JU : Pour OPS ACPIF-I, la préparation de cette opération 
pourrait être affectée par les problèmes de ressources de la division et par la nécessité de coordonner les activités de 
CRD, RD et DEAS (cf. ci-dessous) dans la préparation de cette opération. 
Si le renouvellement du Prêt Global sur RP ne devrait pas nécessiter d’input très important de la part de JU, la ligne 
de garantie dans le cadre de la Facilité pourrait être particulièrement « labour intensive », s’agissant d’un nouvel 
instrument pour lequel JU ne dispose pas nécessairement de Contrat type. » 
Source : FSA Annexe I (of the operation), EIB, 22/9/2003 
2004_Lumwana Considerable amount of resources and time have been devoted to a feasibility study launched in 
2001.  
Sources  
 EIB Fact Sheet A, Proposal to appraise new operation: Zambia Lumwana Feasibility Study, 
Luxembourg, 31/1/2001, OP3/ACPIII/AGORAn°20010013/SAK/ar. 
 EIB. Appraisal Report, Lumwana study, Feasibility study for a copper mining project, Luxembourg 
23/3/2001, PJ/I&S/2001-338/GCE/VMJ/ms 
 EIB Annex to Fact Sheet  B. Board of Directors, Lumwana Feasibility Study,2/4/2001 
 EIB Lumwana Feasibility study Project. Finance Contract between EIB and Equinox Cooper 
Ventures Ltd(Zambia). Luxembourg, Paris, 2/10/2001 
2005_Pacific 
Islands 
The 2009 Project Progress Report of the operation’s contract in Palau mentions that EIB relations 
with the head of the NDBP are good: “Ops has regular e-mail contacts with its President, Acting President 
and Operations Manager, and Finance Manager. The President, Mr. Kaleb Udui, visited EIB in February 2009.” 
Source: “Project Progress Report” (of the operation), EIB, 01/12/2009 (p4) 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
No evidence has been found in that respect. 
2008_EDFI In the case of the first two successive EDFI EUROPEAN FINANCING PARTNERS (EFP) 
operations, a risk was identified that the EFP’s administration (Secretariat) is handled by one 
person.  The recommendation was made to remedy that. 
EIB Group Operations Evaluation 
Synthesis Report : Evaluation of activities under the European Financing Partners (EFP) Agreement, January 
2009 
 
Visibililty: The EDFIs invest more in communications than EIB. EDFIs have a large number of 
communications officers  
Source: MN 407 EDFI BRUSSELS: JAN RIXEN 
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EQ 10 To what extent were IF/OR operations complementary to and coordinated with 
those of the EC and EU MS and of other international and bilateral institutions and 
agencies?  
JC 10.1 Prior to financing one or several operations in a country or a sector, the EIB 
consults the other institutions and agencies active in the field/country, and in 
particular the EC and the EU MS, with a view to enhancing complementarity of 
operations 
General  
The Council decision establishing the general mandate for the period 2007-2013 (EIB 
operations outside the EU except for ACP countries) foresees regular and systematic 
dialogue and early consultation between the Commission on strategies and other policy 
documents with the aimof consistency between EIB external actions and EU policy 
objectives. These consultations are to cover: 
- Commission’s strategic documents (CSP, RSP, etc) 
- EIB’s strategic planning documents and project pipelines 
- Other policy and operationalaspects 
The MoU specifies the procedures for policy dialogue. 
 
Overall, collaboration on strategic issues is found to have improved since the adoption of 
the 2007-2013 mandate. 
 
Cooperation in relation to specific operations normally takes place at partner country level. 
In general, this cooperation has been found to have been carried out on an ad-hoc basis 
where the Commission and the EIB co-financed specific projects.  
 
MoUs have been entered with other IFIs already before the Council Decision of December 
2006 which foresees the cooperation of the EIB with all international organizations active 
in fields similar to its own. Traditionally, IFIs and DFIs co-funding has mostly been done 
through the means of parallel co-financing where the project is split into a number of 
clearly identifiable sub-projects which are financed by different partners. 
 
Source: MN 900 
 
Whereas the recent “Report and recommendations of the Steering Committee of “Wise 
Persons”” does not cover ACP countries but pre-accession countries and countries of the 
Southern Neighbourhood, Easter Neighbourhood, Russia, Asia, Latin America and South 
Africa, it nevertheless provides findings at a general level that are worth mentioning here. 
 
“While cooperation between the EIB and the Commission was very limited before 2000, it has made good 
progress over the period under review i.e. 2000‐2009. There is scope for further improving the combined 
action of the two institutions to contribute to the common EU external objectives. 
 
The EIB relies on the Commission for definition of strategy and policies at country level. The contribution of 
the EIB to this definition is ad‐hoc and rather limited compared with the financial and technical expertise 
developed by the EIB through its interaction with borrowers and project promoters. Moreover, a specific gap 
also exists at sector level. 
 
The Memorandum of Understanding between the Commission and the EIB established under the new 
mandate 2007‐2013 has allowed the start of a closer cooperation and dialogue at strategy and policy level. 
The effort is still in progress: while a high degree of mutual understanding is observed at the political and top 
management level, a part of the staff in the two institutions does not always understand and value each 
other’s role and potential contribution to the common EU objectives. 
MID-TERM EVALUATION OF THE IF AND EIB OR OPERATIONS IN ACP/OCTS 
ADE - EGEVAL II  
Final Report  September 2010 Annexe 9/Page 191 
 
The current EC programming for allocation of EU budget in various external regions is geared to the 
delivery of grant assistance, and not well suited for the delivery of EIB lending support. On the other hand, 
EIB’s programming and project identification is also constrained, e.g. by the terms of its finance 
(nonconcessional) and by its lack of staff.” 
 
“The EBRD has a specific transition mandate and a business model based on local presence and higher 
risk‐taking profile than the EIB. The EIB and the EBRD have different mandates, partly different 
shareholders and different business models, as well as different internal organisational cultures. However, the 
common EU shareholders and the EC have an interest to ensure that the synergies between the two 
Institutions are maximised, also considering that over the last years their areas of operation and sectors of 
intervention have increasingly been overlapping outside the EU.” 
 
Source: Camdessus, “Mid-Term review of EIB external mandate – Report of the Steering Committee” 
February 2010 (pages 28, 33) 
 
Coopération avec la Commission dans les domaines de l’eau, l’énergie. En infrastructure, 
coopération de la CE et BEI dans la Pacific Regional Infrastruture Facility (voir rapport 
trimestriel bureau régional BEI). Participants : néo-zélandais, australiens, Bq Mondiale, 
BAsD. La CE et la BEI ont fait le forcing pour entrer également dans la facilité, avec une 
voix pour la CE et la BEI. Blending AT et prêts apparaît ici aussi comme une solution. 
Dans le cadre de la PRIF les ressources de la Commission (contribution de 10mln au titre 
de grants) seront gérées par la BEI sous forme de blending de ses prêts. 
MN313, MN343 
 
EIB is quasi unknown at the Central Bank of Samoa. The CBS only knows of EIB because 
they are aware DBS has benefitted from a global loan. For them EIB is just another 
multilateral development financial institution but on a very small scale.  
 
CBS has never had any contacts with the EIB. It has frequent and fruitful contacts with 
World Bank and ADB (NB: World Bank and ADB have a “joint WB-ADB liaison office” 
next door to the CBS governor’s office). Their  policy dialogue is quasi continuous on the 
difficult issue on how to finance economic activity in a small island economy. 
 
This lack of visibility is confirmed throughout the interviews. 
MN384; MN367; MN363 
I-10.1.1 The EIB meets the Commission, EU MS and other agencies (including IFIs) 
during the appraisal of its operations so as to promote complementarities between 
interventions 
General According to an EIB staff member, the EC programmatic approach over 5 years is an 
obstacle to complementarity: “La CE travaille avec des stratégies pays à cinq ans avec des secteurs de 
concentration. Mais si la BEI arrive après deux ans avec un nouveau secteur, la CE envoie paître. 
Contrainte à une vraie complémentarité. CE n’a pas la capacité à titre institutionnel (sans parles du 
personnel).» 
Source: MN 007 
 
Note. The Commission has an office in Luxembourg for liaising EC, EP and MEPs with 
the EIB, as described by a Commission staff member:   
“ECFIN L2 based in Luxembourg – relations with IFIs. EP and MEPs have formally to pass through 
ECFIN for contacting the EIB. We co-chair the meeting of the so-called MoU on cooperation and 
coordination between EIB-EC on external mandate (RELEX and ECFIN). ECFIN liaises. Objective 
that EIB projects are eligible under EU policies. We coordinate the say of the 19 DGs (we did not have a 
preponderant “Article 21” before Lisbon, now “Article 19” Consultation Group on the statute of the EIB 
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(“all proposals should be checked by EC and EU MS”, at appraisal phase). But this is not the case for the 
IF as the guarantee is from the EU MS.  
When a project comes to the Board, we receive all EIB projects, incl. IF/OR projects, because the Director 
General of ECFIN is a full member of the Board of the EIB (= extra layer of scrutiny). Around 2-3 
weeks before the Board, we receive the proposal and check it. 
Source: MN 020 
 
A Commission representative notes that the EIB and EC are not that much coordinated for 
CSPs: 
“EIB is understaffed”: probably it’s true. The EIB is a very lean & efficient institution, and the EU 
wants to keep it as it is. If we recommend that more staff is needed, we have to take into account that the 
EC is behind the EIB. The EIB might be more involved in CSP/RSP, etc., for instance with one 
paragraph dedicated to the EIB, but the EIB should rely on EC policies etc., not duplicating the work. 
EIB is not just another IFI; it is the bank for the EU. Normally the EC should conduct analysis.  I 
acknowledge that the EIB is not really taken on board. But now EIB is much more on the spot in recent 
years. RELEX understands it better now. Normally the EC should prepare the strategy for the EIB; only 
the very end, which is deciding on projects, should be left to the EIB.  
In practice it depends actually on the geographical areas. Now under Community guarantee we have a 
structured dialogue (RELEX, ECFIN, etc. with EIB). Before that (and even now): lots of inputs; not 
streamlined for the time being. They talk to each other, but not streamlined. We started to change this 
situation.” 
It appears also from that meeting that there is apparently little triangular coordination 
involving also EU MS.  
Source: MN 020 
 
An EC staff member describes relations between DG DEV, AIDCO and the EIB:  
“DEV participe de temps à autre (3 à 4 fois par an) aux réunions de la FI. AIDCO gère plutôt les 
projets, DEV plutôt les aspects policy & strategy. DEV est consultée pour chaque projet. AIDCO se 
charge de contacter les délégations, les desks géogr. AIDCO et leur demande de se prononcer. DEV ne sait 
pas trop, ne connait pas le détail de l’accord de la BEI avec les politiques de développement de la CE. 
DEV est plutôt au niveau sectoriel. AIDCO et la BEI sont au niveau projet. » 
Source : MN 023 
 
Country visits show that cooperation with the Commission in the field is more punctual 
and informal, than structured and systematic. The approach is not to sit together and design 
a common strategy. No examples could be provided of the Commission calling upon the 
EIB to provide complementary financing to sectors were the Commission is intervening. 
The preparation of the CSP is also a quite formal process. Contact were mostly informal 
discussions through contacts between individuals. Interviews showed also that Commission 
representatives were not fully aware of the activities of the EIB. It was also mentioned that 
the consultation process where the Commission needs to provide its approval for a specific 
EIB financing is more a formal consultation, where the Commission is consulted to late 
(whether at HQ of Delegation level) and where in fact it is very difficult to refuse a project. 
Interviewees also explained that the state of mind of the Bank and the Commission are very 
different, Banks working on the basis of risk assessment, whereas the EC has a 
development policy agenda. The Commission also mentioned that it had never been invited 
to participate to any feasibility exercise. In Kenya, for the mid-term review of the CSP, 
there had been quasi no consultation.  (MN 331 and MN 332).  
 
Interviewees at country level underlined that there was close cooperation with other IFIs. 
There are indeed lot of opportunities in many sectors and as a general rule, IFIs prefer to 
share the risk (« Nobody wants to go alone »). Moreover most lenders have their limits on 
projects. (MN 321, MN 331).  
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According to an EIB representative, several initiatives are taken to in terms of collaboration 
with the EC delegations: visiting Delegations to explain their activities, coordination of 
external communication with the EC Delegations (ask the Ambassador to be present), 
when there is an EIB mission, the EC Delegation is systematically visited (MN 266).   
 
Private Sector and Trade are priorities of the EC in the Dom. Rep.  EIB works with the 
banking system and microfinance institutions- this is good complementarity with the 
Commission- EC could not do it- does not have the instruments nor the know-how 
Good but sparse contact with the regional EIB coordinator who comes for key events. 
EIB is present at coordination level, e.g. contributes to EC programming 
Source:  MN 004  
 
EIB makes efforts at communicating w/ the EU Delegations in Senegal and Dominican 
Republic.  (In the DR, EIB coordinates better with the EU Delegation than several EC 
DGs.) 
Lack of local EIB representation makes it difficult for AFD, IDB, IFC, to coordinate 
Source:  MN 004 , MN 406 , MN 400,  MN 410, MN  253,  MN 257 
 
The lack of resources of the EIB Regional Office in the Pacific prevents a real participation 
of the Bank into the policy dialogue of the donors and the countries.  In case of co-
financing of a particular operation the Bank closely cooperates with others. 
Similarly with the Commission, the EIB activities are not, or very vaguely known, by the 
Commission except for a few operations. When there is a decision to go together for a 
sector (e.g. water sector in Samoa-, then cooperation is very close. 
MN 317; MN367 
2003_BOAD PG 
IV 
See I-10.2.1 
2003_Dakar-
Ziguinchor 
See I-10.2.1 
2004_OLKARIA The project is in line with the World Bank Energy Sector Recovery Programme. 
Source: EIB Note to Ops B/ACP-IF-2 Opinion for Appraisal, Luxembourg 14/9/2004. 
PJ/ENERCOM/I&S/2004-965/EG/fe 
2004-WAGP D6 provides the list of persons and institutions consulted during the appraisal mission 
conducted from 22 to 27 May. It does not include the Commission, the MS nor other 
agencies.  
2001_MOMA_ 
TITANIUM 
It is worth noting that the EIB has not required the Commission Opinion on this project 
because under the Cotonou Agreement this is required only for IF projects in cases of 
subsidised loans, public-sector loans or financial sector loans.  
Source EIB Moma Titanium Project Mozambique, RM/CRD on operation already 
approved, 27th March 2003., §5 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2006 
The CSP/NIP 2003-2007 for Kenya, in a section devoted to PSD, refers to: 
 Kenya’s privatization strategy (“EIB will follow the privatisation process to identify 
opportunities”, with emphasis on infrastructure 
 The Micro-enterprises support programme (MESP) and the establishment of a 
Micro-credit Trust Fund.  However, there is no clear connection between such 
effort and EIB’s effort to reach micro-enterprises under this Project.  It is not clear 
if EIB could utilize this Trust Fund in relation to its operations in this field. 
The CSP/NIP 2008 for Kenya on the other hand contains an expanded PSD review, 
namely: 
 The Private-Sector Development Strategy is anchored in five strategic goals, all 
related to the business environment 
 PSD medium-term policy objectives of a general nature (competitiveness of SMEs, 
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infrastructure development, capacity building, Kenyan ownership, reposition the 
PS to contribute substantially to employment and GDP, developing 
entrepreneurship) 
 The EC financed Micro-Enterprises Support Programme Trust Fund (MESPT), 
but the link with EIB operations in this field is not made. 
 A Technical Cooperation Facility (TCF) of € 4.6 m to implement EC assistance, 
“notably covering technical studies, project formulation, implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation”, but seemingly without a connection with EIB 
operations. 
A two page Annex on EIB Financing Operations in Kenya lists EIB targeted activities in 
Kenya at that point of time- i.e. not necessarily valid in further years.  However, this 
indicates that EIB has a relatively detailed country approach in this case. 
2005_Pacific 
Islands 
See I-10.1.2 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
No evidence has been found in that respect. 
I-10.1.2 The EIB is active, during the appraisal of its operations, in the search for synergies 
with the Commission, EU MS and other agencies’ (including IFIs) interventions 
General Some joint appraisals are now taking place with other funders. Different banks will not each 
appraise projects they are co-funding. Instead, they will recognise and use the appraisal 
carried out by others. The EIB already relyies on sectoral and technical studies carried out 
by the World Bank. 
 
Source: Counter Balance, Challenging the EIB, “Corporate welfare and development deceptions : why the 
EIB is failing to deliver outside the EU?”, February 2010 (page 27) 
 
EIB staff always consult w/ the EU Delegations in Senegal and Dominican Republic. 
Source:  MN 004, MN 257  
 
The EIB contacts with the Commission and other agencies, mainly WB and ADB have 
considerably improved since the creation of the Regional Office in the Pacific. However, 
the visibility of the EIB remains extremely limited. It could be observed that neither the 
European Delegation in Fiji, nor the ADB office had a clear idea of the EIB activities in the 
Pacific region. The situation is improving with the regional office and considerable efforts 
are done identify joint projects but the very limited resources of the Bank do not allow to 
develop the full potentialities of cooperation with other donors. 
Source: MN313, MN363, MN337 
 
Whereas the Commission, the WB and the ADB are identifying their interventions 
essentially through the policy dialogue they engage with the partner countries, the EIB does 
not have a policy dialogue with the partners, but respond to requests. It does that in it not 
active in searching for synergies with other agencies but it does so only a project level.  
Given the fact that under the 10Th EDF the focal sectors of the Commission are, in most 
Pacific countries, renewable energies and water and sanitation, the search for synergies 
might be intensified but it would require that when conducting its policy dialogue the 
Delegation has a good understanding and takes into account the potential contribution of 
the EIB and that the EIB is fully aware of the policy dialogue conducted by the 
Commission with the partner countries. At the moment this does not seem to be the 
case.The formal consultation of the EIB on the Commission country and regional strategy 
papers does not permit to reach this objective. 
Source: MN313, MN362. 
 
Cooperation is also limited by the fact the EIB may have comparative advantages in sectors 
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that are not selected as focal sectors by the Commission. For instance, the EIB is active in 
supporting the private sector, notably with the global loans to financial institutions. The 
Commission’s activities to support the private sector in the region are extremely limited and 
essentially in the context of its regional programme one focal of which is trade related 
capacity building in view of strengthening the regional integration. 
Source: MN313, MN362 
 
The Evaluation of EIB financing through individual loans under the Lomé IV Convention 
(covering the period 1990-2003, before the set-up of the IF under the Cotonou Agreement) 
recommended strengthened cooperation with other co-financiers, in particular other 
MDBs, at the project identification, formulation, and follow-up stages - see the table below, 
with shows also the EIB response and explanation:  
 
EIB Evaluation’s 
recommendation 2 
EIB Services’ Comments 
Co-operation with other co-
financiers in particular other 
MDBs needs to be 
strengthened to ensure a 
more co-ordinated 
approach towards the 
identification, formulation, 
and follow-up of project 
related and other measures 
that need to be taken to 
support the successful 
implementation and 
operation of projects (e.g. 
environmental impact 
assessments, monitoring 
systems, market or 
institutional reforms). 
(Section 3.1.1.4)  
 
Co-operation on projects with co-financiers, which 
leads to more efficient targeting and use of 
development resources, is clearly to be encouraged. It 
is particularly important for a more co-ordinated 
approach towards the identification, formulation and 
appraisal of projects. The division of responsibility in 
relation to follow-up and monitoring between MDBs 
should be clearly defined at appraisal stage. In general, 
this is already the approach adopted. In a number of 
sectors (e.g. water) it is one of the main reasons for the 
good performance of some of the projects evaluated.  
Successful implementation and operation of projects 
depends not only on the Bank’s efforts but also on the 
acceptance of this approach in practice from all co-
financiers, as they have their own particular agendas 
and constraints. To overcome these difficulties the 
Bank will continue to strengthen the cooperation with 
other MDBs.  
 
Source: Evaluation of EIB financing through individual loans under the Lomé IV 
Convention, EIB, 2006 (p4). 
 
During country visits no clear examples were given of synergies between Commission and 
EIB activitities. Commission interviewees highlighted that there would be room for 
synergies though, notably in certain sectors such as infrastructure and private sector.  At 
present, the Commission is not making specific or systematic efforts to examine where the 
EIB could fit in (MN 332). 
Pacific Samoa The preparation of the support to the water sector in Samoa offers a good example of 
cooperation between the Delegation and the EIB. A proposal was made by the EIB to 
provide a TA grant, under the IF, for the development of a technical assistance facility 
called the “Water project preparation facility”. This would provide welcome support to the 
sector budget support of the Commission and will be used for the support of the 
independent water schemes that would not be covered by the government support.  
However, the decision about who, the Commission or the EIB, will manage this TA is not 
made. Surprisingly, the EIB would like the Commission to manage it, but the Commission 
does not know if its procedure allows it to manage an EIB funded TA. 
Source: MN 384 
2003_BOAD PG See I-10.2.1 
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IV 
2003_Dakar-
Ziguinchor 
See I-10.2.1 
2005_Pacific 
Islands 
Information available for this operation does not provide much evidence of coordination.  
Nevertheless, it mentions cooperation with the Asian Development Bank for defining the 
structure of guarantees as a new instrument:  
« The proposed guarantee product might be a new instrument for the Bank and in defining its structure, co-
operation will be sought with the Asian Development Bank and CRD to ensure consistency with the 
Bank’s mandate and coherence with its credit risk policy guidelines. » 
Source: “Fact Sheet A – Proposal to appraise new operations” (of the operation), EIB, 
29/09/2005 (p3) 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
Monitoring and follow-up of the projects implemented could be performed jointly with the 
EU Member states and possibly with other donors.  
« Document de stratégie pays et programme indicatif national pour la période 2008-2013 », European 
Community, 2007 Part II p3 
 
According to an EIB staff member, this project shows the coordination mechanism which 
exists between the EIB and the Commission. The EIB and the Commission have worked 
together in the context of the subsidy granted in the Water Facility framework. 
 
Source: MN016 
I-10.1.3 The EIB takes into account the EC’s RSPs, CSPs and RIPs/NIPs in identifying its 
operations, and the EC’s RSPs, CSPs and RIPs/NIPs build upon EIB findings 
Operation 
/General 
The EC acts on the basis of 5 year programming, which EIB cannot do for obvious 
reasons.  
(see also MN 201) 
At the most, the abovementioned EC Programme documents may refer to Private sector 
development (PSD) in the following manner: 
-  need to improve the business environment;  
-  government efforts at privatization, or PPPs for infrastructure; 
-  public-private dialogue and such themes;  
-  interventions of CDE, EBAS, DIAGNOS, etc.; and 
-  institutions in the periphery of the private sector. 
References to EIB are very broad, the EC programming documents such as NIPs 
specifically state that EIB and IF activities are not part of them, and often an Annex is 
appended indicating EIB’s areas of focus at that point of time (i.e. not necessarily applicable 
2 -5 years later). 
This “disconnect” between the EC and EIB lead to the following lost opportunities: 
-  TA, blending, ... 
-  Stronger coordination in infrastructure finance, the main field largely shared between the    
   EC interventions and EIB operations. 
 
2005_ACPGLOB 
ADEMI 
 
The RSP for the Caribbean (Cariforum)  and the RIP 2003-2007 refer to EIB focus areas, 
but these are not built into the RSP/RIP.  
The RIP 2003-2007 states: The Bank could co-operate with suitable local and regional intermediaries in 
financial sector operations wherever they can be found and limit[s] itself to directly financing the occasional 
big operation in power, infrastructure, etc. 
This seems to reveal that in 2005 the RIP was out of date, as the ADEMI operation 
demonstrates.  This is an illustration of how EIB moves alongside the market, whereas the 
EC remains locked into programming initiated in 2002(3) without updating.  
 
The CSP and NIP 2001-2007 for the Dominican Republic, on the other hand, does refer to 
EIB’s efforts to reach SMEs through specialized intermediaries, and refer to the ADEMI 
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operation. 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2004 
The CSP/NIP for Madagascar indicates simply that EIB “peut contribuer à metre en 
oeuvre le SC “ but without indicating how, and specifically stating that the IF is not part of 
the NIP. 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2006 
The CSP/NIP 2003-2007 for Kenya, in a section devoted to PSD, refers to: 
 Kenya’s privatization strategy (“EIB will follow the privatisation process to identify 
opportunities”, with emphasis on infrastructure 
 The Micro-enterprises support programme (MESP) and the establishment of a 
Micro-credit Trust Fund.  However, there is no clear connection between such 
effort and EIB’s effort to reach micro-enterprises under this Project.  It is not clear 
if EIB could utilize this Trust Fund in relation to its operations in this field. 
The CSP/NIP 2008 for Kenya on the other hand contains an expanded PSD review, 
namely: 
 The Private-Sector Development Strategy is anchored in five strategic goals, all 
related to the business environment 
 PSD medium-term policy objectives of a general nature (competitiveness of SMEs, 
infrastructure development, capacity building, Kenyan ownership, reposition the 
PS to contribute substantially to employment and GDP, developing 
entrepreneurship) 
 The EC financed Micro-Enterprises Support Programme Trust Fund (MESPT), 
but the link with EIB operations in this field is not made. 
 A Technical Cooperation Facility (TCF) of € 4.6 m to implement EC assistance, 
“notably covering technical studies, project formulation, implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation”, but seemingly without a connection with EIB 
operations. 
A two page Annex on EIB FINANCING OPERATIONS IN KENYA lists EIB targeted 
activities in Kenya at that point of time- i.e. not necessarily valid in further years.  However, 
this indicates that EIB has a relatively detailed country approach in this case. 
 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2006 
The CSP/NIP 2003-2007 for Kenya, in a section devoted to PSD, refers to: 
 Kenya’s privatization strategy (“EIB will follow the privatisation process to identify 
opportunities”, with emphasis on infrastructure 
 The Micro-enterprises support programme (MESP) and the establishment of a 
Micro-credit Trust Fund.  However, there is no clear connection between such 
effort and EIB’s effort to reach micro-enterprises under this Project.  It is not clear 
if EIB could utilize this Trust Fund in relation to its operations in this field. 
The CSP/NIP 2008 for Kenya on the other hand contains an expanded PSD review, 
namely: 
 The Private-Sector Development Strategy is anchored in five strategic goals, all 
related to the business environment 
 PSD medium-term policy objectives of a general nature (competitiveness of SMEs, 
infrastructure development, capacity building, Kenyan ownership, reposition the 
PS to contribute substantially to employment and GDP, developing 
entrepreneurship) 
 The EC financed Micro-Enterprises Support Programme Trust Fund (MESPT), 
but the link with EIB operations in this field is not made. 
 A Technical Cooperation Facility (TCF) of € 4.6 m to implement EC assistance, 
“notably covering technical studies, project formulation, implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation”, but seemingly without a connection with EIB 
operations. 
A two page Annex on EIB FINANCING OPERATIONS IN KENYA lists EIB targeted 
activities in Kenya at that point of time- i.e. not necessarily valid in further years.  However, 
this indicates that EIB has a relatively detailed country approach in this case. 
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JC 10.2 EIB did participate in mechanisms that ensure coordination throughout the 
preparation and implementation process 
General Whereas the recent “Report and recommendations of the Steering Committee of “Wise 
Persons”” does not cover ACP countries but pre-accession countries and countries of the 
Southern Neighbourhood, Easter Neighbourhood, Russia, Asia, Latin America and South 
Africa, it nevertheless provides findings at a general level that are worth mentioning here. 
 
“Cooperation with IFIs 
The EIB President regularly attends the biannual meetings of the Heads of MDBs (and IMF) and the 
annual meeting of the Heads of MFIs (including the EC and multilateral financing institutions). The EIB 
actively participates in several networks of IFIs both on horizontal subjects (environment, evaluation, risk 
management, budget and planning, internal audit, etc.) and on operational cooperation by region. 
 
The EIB has signed several Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) with all the main IFIs in all external 
regions, in most cases involving the EC as well. These MoUs have proven to be useful agreements to 
establish a form of dialogue and cooperation, but their actual impact especially in operational terms is often 
limited. 
- Cooperation with the World Bank Group is more limited than with EBRD or EBFIs although 
increasing in particular in ACP and Mediterranean as part of the response to the crisis and 
related response initiatives promoted by IFC. Several projects have been co‐financed in the private 
sector between the EIB and IFC particularly in ACP region. The World Bank (IBRD) 
considers that there are more opportunities for cooperation with the EIB in the co‐financing of 
large public sector infrastructure projects. Institutional dialogue is taking place in the framework of 
the Heads of MDBs meetings, in the framework of the Luxembourg process with EC and IMF 
for cooperation in the Mediterranean, and the recent crisis response initiatives. 
-  Cooperation with CEB is very good at institutional level, and both banks closely cooperate in the 
framework of Western Balkans Investment Framework. At operational level, the opportunities 
for co‐financing are limited due to the specific nature of CEB mandate focusing on social sectors, 
which has limited overlap with the current EIB external mandate. 
- Cooperation with ADB is intensifying on the basis of a bilateral MoU, and recently this 
materialized in an agreement for the delegation of procurement and disbursement tasks from the 
EIB to the ADB for a specific investment programme. 
- Cooperation with IADB is relatively limited institutionally but quite regular at project level, and 
mainly based on a bilateral MoU covering Latin America and Pacific regions. 
- Cooperation with AfDB is increasingly taking place in the framework of the EU‐Africa 
Infrastructure Trust Fund, where the AfDB participates as observer at project financiers’ level. 
 
Cooperation with EBFIs 
The EIB has a very close relationship and collaboration with European bilateral financing institutions 
(EBFIs), in particular AFD/KfW in the Mediterranean region (as well as in ACP). In these regions, the 
three Institutions have significant levels of interaction at institutional and operational level, and this leads to 
several opportunities for co‐financing increasingly promoting the mutual reliance concept.” 
 
Source: Camdessus, “Mid-Term review of EIB external mandate – Report of the Steering Committee” 
February 2010, (page 34) 
I-10.2.1 Existence of donor coordination mechanisms at the design and implementation 
stages 
General The EIB participate to many coordination mechanisms of projects in which it is involved 
with other agencies and as well as in regional important initiatives, such as the Pacific 
Regional Infrastructure Facility. 
MN313, MN362, EIB Regional Office in the Pacific, Quarterly Reports 2009 QIV, 2010 
QI. 
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Acc ording to Counter Balance, the EIB has some agreements in place with various 
development finance institutions to foster co-financing: 
- It is supposed to co-finance with the EBRD, as a general rule, in the countries 
where they both operate. The report stresses that it does do so but in some 
countries only. 
- It has Memoranda of Understanding with the WB, ADB, AfDB, KFW and AfD 
but these have not yielded significant results 
 
Source: Counter Balance, Challenging the EIB, “Corporate welfare and development deceptions : why the 
EIB is failing to deliver outside the EU?”, February 2010 (page 28) 
 
An EIB staff member noted that “mutual reliance” is work in progress but encompasses a 
number of issues: 
“La recommandation du rapport Camdessus d’encourager les cofinancements avec les autres (mutual reliance 
etc.) a un coût. Avec la mutual reliance, on est en phase pilote avec KFW et AFD, mais cela coince sur 
plusieurs points. Risk assessment est un réel problème. AFD est par ailleurs très stricte sur money 
laundering par exemple. EFP : cela marche très bien par contre. » 
Source : MN 027 
 
The 2009 Cotonou TA Annual Report notes (p7) that several TA operations were 
developed/implemented in close co-operation and partnership with EIB’s development 
partners:  
“TA is a horizontal tool that allows the EIB to cooperate closer with the European Commission, IFIs and 
bilateral organisations. Several TA operations were developed and/or implemented in close co-operation and 
partnership with EIB’s development partners, e.g. the WAPP initiative (in co-operation with World Bank, 
AFD, AfDB, USAID), TA in Liberia (in co-operation with IFC and AfDB), due diligence studies in 
co-operation with the AfDB, the World Bank and the Italian Government, etc.” 
 
An EIB staff member described as follows the EIB-EC cooperation and distribution of 
labour:  
 “Within the Commission: you might have people who say need for more collaboration, but also those that 
think that each has its field of competencies. AIDCO: tendency to say that EIB should focus on the 
investment and not on policy, strategy. In terms of coordination and cooperation MEDA and Cotonou are 
very different. In Cotonou the EIB and the Commission are doing different things. The Commission does 
not finance private sector, not productive infrastructure, they are more focused on health sectors, education 
and budgetary support. Maybe water and sanitation is an exception and there indeed they cooperate 
(Ethiopia, Mozambique). What about private sector? The Commission with PROINVEST, supporting 
CDE, BIZCLIM: this is a bit the Commission’s private sector programmes. When the EIB speaks about 
the private sector, it is more concrete, they  talk directly at the level of the promoters.  
Source: MN 102 
 
An EIB staff member mentioned that there is room for EIB-EC coordination particularly 
in microfinance and in case of blending grants and loans:  
“Room for coordination with Commission on TA: in microfinance. Commission co-funded some of their 
investees (EC 1 M€; EIB 2 M€). They will then sit jointly in donor committee. In first phase of TA they 
used a new method: tracked closely the performance of the final beneficiary on basis of performance based 
agreements: performance indicators per contract (a template the recipient should fill in). They are tapping 
their experience in the field of benchmarking. They worked CGAP (consultative group to assist the poor – 
gcap.org): any publication on microfinance. In sectors where the Commission is also active there is 
cooperation and coordination. When it comes to blending: good to coordinate with the Commission.”  
“Commission has experience of managing TA. But the types of TA we are both doing is quite different – 
e.g. the Commission do not finance power plants.  Joint area: capacity building of microfinance. Example: 
Commission funded TA for one of our programmes. They are putting €1M in addition of our €2m. In the 
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first set of TAs, what they did was new thing… performance-based agreements. We can find reports etc. on 
their web site, with indicators per contract. We decided to follow closely this way of operating. We are 
tapping Commission experience. We are now doing our mid-term review – EC will be involved to a certain 
extent (e.g. in selection of experts).”  
 
An EIB staff member mentioned that TA increases the coordination but also sometimes 
the competition among peer banking institutions:  
“In ACP regions you do not have a lot of very strong promoters. E.g greenfielding in microfinance. Public 
sector would need TA. No single infrastructure where there is no TA. Intensive cooperation ongoing: e.g. in 
Ethiopia on the investment and the TA intensive cooperation with the WB and African Development 
Bank. Sometimes there is also competition. TA leads them to more coordination. Whatever you do in 
infrastructure, it is related to a larger initiative: so need for coordination.” 
Source: MN 102 
 
Donor coordination mechanisms exist in Senegal and Dominican Republic for public sector 
projects.  However, EIB is not present.  
Source:  MN 004, MN 257,  MN  253 
 
 
Pacific general ADB Subregional Office South Pacific (based in Suva, Fiji) has no experience of 
cooperation with the EIB. One experience in Cook Islands with a possible identification of 
wind power project. But the project appeared to be unviable. 
Cooperation with the EC Delegation :mainly exchange of information.  
Some de facto division of labour between ADB and EC: ADB is active in urban areas, EC 
more in rural areas. Not clear whether this happens to be like that for historical reasons or 
is the result of concerted coordination. Coordination and co-financing could be improved. 
ADB considers that it is particularly difficult with EC, largely due to their procedures. (NB 
ADB interlocutors tended to consider EC and EIB as a single entity). 
Source: MN337 
2003_BOAD PG 
IV 
The 2003 fact sheet of this operation combining (a) an OR global loan, (b) IF guarantee, 
and (c) IF equity investment), mentioned the following regarding complementarity with 
notably the World Bank Group and the European Commission: 
“L’intervention de la Banque, dans le cadre de la FI serait complémentaire à celles envisagées par la Banque 
Mondiale dans le cadre du projet de « développement du marché financier de l’UEMOA » qui devrait être 
présenté au Conseil de la BM du mois de décembre prochain. Ce projet comporte 4 composantes : 
- Renforcement institutionnel à travers une assistance technique aux acteurs du marché (Conseil 
Régional, Bourse Régionale des valeurs mobilières, Commission de l’UEMOA etc.) 
- Ligne de crédit pour le financement d’infrastructures favorisant l’intégration régionale, 
principalement des routes  (approx. USD 90 millions) 
- Facilité de garantie et d’assurance pour promouvoir les investissements privés dans des projets 
d’infrastructures de petite et moyenne taille. Cette facilité s’élèverait à USD 140 millions dont 
USD 70 millions pour la garantie partielle IDA et 70 millions pour la garantie de MIGA. 
- La coordination globale du projet. 
Un programme d’appui institutionnel financé par la CE vient de démarrer. Le CDE a également signé un 
accord de partenariat plus spécialement orienté vers le secteur du coton avec la BOAD. 
L’intervention de la Banque permettrait de renforcer parallèlement les interventions de la BOAD en faveur 
des entreprises du secteur privé dans la zone UEMOA et de favoriser l’intégration régionale. 
La Banque dispose d’un siège d’administrateur au sein du Conseil de la BOAD et exerce à ce titre une 
influence nettement supérieure à sa participation au capital. Cette participation revêt un caractère stratégique 
pour la Banque dans cette région » 
Source : « Fact Sheet A : Proposition portant sur l'instruction d'une nouvelle opération » (of 
the operation), EIB, 26 September 2003 (p2) 
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The March 2004 fact sheet mentioned the following, adding the AFD as co-financier: 
« Pour a, b et c : 
. Expérience satisfaisante de la Banque avec la BOAD au cours de ces dernières années 
.Complémentarité avec les interventions des autres bailleurs de fonds notamment celle du groupe de la 
Banque Mondiale et de l’Agence française de développement dans le cadre du projet de développement du 
marché financier de l’UEMOA (approuvé au CA de la BM de février dernier) et celle de l’U.E. (sic) 
pour le renforcement institutionnel de la BOAD (approuvée en 2001, subvention de EUR 1.9 millions). 
Le plan d’action d’assistance technique préparé dans le cadre de ce projet sera établi en coopération avec la 
Banque afin d’aider la BOAD à satisfaire les conditions de mise en place (cf. ci-dessous)» 
Source : “ Fact Sheet B : proposition de financement » (of operation 2003_BOAD PG IV), 
EIB, 11 mars 2004 (p3) 
2003_Dakar-
Ziguinchor 
This operation involves several actors and co-financiers. The financial plan should indeed 
be the following (as at 26 March 2004): 
- €6m grants of the KfW for the acquisition of the boat  
- €3.5m grants of the AFD for works on the harbor of Ziguinchor and the island of 
Carabane 
- €3.5m-€5.5m of the Government and the Autonomous Harbor of Dakar  
- €6m-€8m senior loan of the Investment Facility 
 
A 2003 EIB fiche also mentioned possible European Commission support through TA: 
“La Banque vient de recevoir une requête officielle du Gouvernement Sénégalais dont les principaux éléments 
sont repris ci-dessus. Cette requête fait suite au naufrage du Joola, au cours duquel plus de 1800 passagers 
ont disparu. Cette opération pourrait être mise en œuvre en étroite coopération avec la KfW (qui a offert une 
subvention de EURO 6 millions) et avec le soutien de la Commission Européenne (financement de 
l’assistance technique).” 
 
Sources : « Relevé quotidien (RQ) » (for this operation), EIB, 9 April 2003 (p1); « Fact Sheet 
A : Proposition portant sur l'instruction d'une nouvelle opération » (of the operation), EIB, 
26 March 2004 (p2 and 3) 
 
Upon the Senegalese government, the EIB evaluated the project in cooperation with the 
KfW. 
Source : Operation’s « Conseil d’administration. Prêt sur les ressources de la FI. Projet 
Liaison maritime Dakar-Ziguinchor (Sénégal) », EIB, 2004, p2 
 
This project is a good example of strong coordination between donors: EIB, KfW and 
AFD. It was a real co-financing project. 
Source: MN017 
2004_OLKARIA The view of the authorities is that the input of EIB has been important in the donor 
coordination forum (WB, JICA, EIB, AFD) that is now instrumental in assisting the 
Government of Kenya to implement its reform of the energy sector (initially the reform has 
been designed with World Bank assistance under the Energy Sector Reform and Recovery 
Programme). EIB’s approach has been very consistent and helpful. EIB and AfD are 
extremely flexible and easy to work with. Technical capacity of EIB (purely technical as well 
as financial) highly appreciated. 
Source MN371 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
The CSP for the programming period 2008-2013 makes reference to coordination groups 
between all donors in order to improve the aid’s coordination.  
 
Source : « Document de stratégie pays et programme indicatif national pour la période 2008-2013 », 
European Community, 2007 p26 
 
The EIB cooperates closely with the EU and other donors in the water and sanitation field. 
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Source : « Document de stratégie pays et programme indicatif national pour la période 2008-2013 », 
European Community, 2007 p35 
 
Existence of a specific document related to the action plan on harmonization, alignment 
and efficiency of the aid to Senegal. This document is aimed at obtaining a general action 
plan on Aid effectiveness in order to facilitate the achievement of Paris Declaration’s 
objective by 2010. The donors involved in Senegalese programmes are invited to 
participate.  
Source : « Document de stratégie pays et programme indicatif national pour la période 2008-2013 », 
European Community, 2007 p63 
 
The EIB and other lenders adopted a cooperation agreement between the lenders and the 
promoter in order to coordinate and harmonize their action. 
 “The project lenders have adopted a programme-based approach with a view to 
coordinating and harmonising their action, in application of the Paris Declaration 
principles on harmonising procedures among lenders. The harmonisation and 
cooperation arrangements between the lenders and the promoter will be defined in a 
cooperation agreement. Signature of this agreement will be a condition precedent for the 
first disbursement, as will the finalisation of an operational procedures manual. This manual 
will be prepared by the promoter, assisted by a consultant; it will specify the programme 
operating procedures, arrangements for commitments and disbursement, the eligibility 
criteria for proposed investments, the procurement rules and procedures for programme 
monitoring and external audits. The manual and cooperation agreement are standard 
documents which could be applied generally and used by other lenders in connection 
with subsequent investments.” 
 
Source : “Conseil d’administration. Prêt à l’investissement bonifié sur ressources propres. Projet 
PROGRAMME EAU », EIB, 2007, p4 
I-10.2.2 At design stage, the EIB is active in existing donor coordination mechanisms  
2003_Dakar-
Ziguinchor 
See I-10.2.1 
2003_Dakar-
Ziguinchor 
See I-10.2.1 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
No evidence has been found in the specific project documents regarding the design stage.  
 
Monitoring and follow-up of the projects implemented could be performed jointly with the 
EU Member states and possibly with other donors.  
« Document de stratégie pays et programme indicatif national pour la période 2008-2013 », European 
Community, 2007 Part II p3 
 
According to an EIB staff member, this project shows the coordination mechanism which 
exists between the EIB and the Commission. The EIB and the Commission have worked 
together in the context of the subsidy granted in the Water Facility framework. 
 
Source: MN016 
I-10.2.3 At implementation stage, the EIB is active in existing donor coordination 
mechanisms 
General An EIB sources noted that there is a veritable plethora of coordination initiatives, the utility 
of which are very variable. The EIB aligns less representatives than peer institutions:  
“The Bank is expected to play its part both by participating in various fora and by extending its co-
financing efforts (e.g. EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund). Implementing the 3 ‘ Cs ‘ of coordination, 
complementarities and coherence has spawned a veritable plethora of MoUs/LOIs, donor consortia and 
other meetings or initiatives, the utility of which are very variable. Some are unavoidable and, by and large, 
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useful such as CGAP (micro-finance), EMPEA (private equity), ICA (infrastructure) and MFW4A 
(financial sector). But many of the more informal, and even some of the formal, meetings and fora, to which 
the Bank is invited de rigueur because of its size and role as the EU’s long-term lending institution, are of 
dubious utility. Yet not attending is often not an option and by comparison the World Bank, AFD and 
KfW usually turn up with 2-3 times as many representatives as the EIB.”  
Source: MN 027 
 
An EIB source noted that co-financing and collaboration is labour intensive and hence 
costly. A cost-effective alternative might be “delegated coordination”:  
“Co-financing and hence collaboration with such peer institutions as the World Bank, AfDB, IFC, AFD, 
KfW etc., has been the Bank’s practice for many years and generally works well. However, co-financing is 
more labour intensive than operations where the Bank is the sole financier, and, on the basis of the 80/20 
yardstick, trying to improve coordination further with the Bank’s well-known co-financing partners is going 
to require disproportionate time and effort. The issues raised by the goal of “delegated coordination” whereby 
certain parts of the project cycle are delegated to one or other co-financing institution have recently been 
discussed in the Management Committee. A working group is currently finalising proposals in this respect 
and some form of delegated coordination will undoubtedly form part of any future strategic approach.” 
Source: MN 027 
 
An EIB staff member notes that relations with EC, peer institutions and other stakeholders 
have improved since the creation of regional offices: “Very much improved relationship with EC 
since representations. The same can be said with peer institutions (frequent meetings with AFD, a bit less 
but still with KfW or WB). Active participation with regional economic communities. Very different level 
and quality of cooperation compared to beforehand. Being able to be informed, involved at earlier stage. E.g. 
Pretoria: 80% of approvals and 74% of signatures were project originated, developed, and nurtured locally. 
This is quite “parlant” as to the efficiency of this system (although this is not sustainable).” 
Source: MN 024 
 
Structured coordination mechanisms to which the EIB participates exist in certain sectors. 
Examples are for instance the coordination meeting in the energy and private sector in 
Kenya. A work in progress concerns the mutual reliance, set-up on demand of AfD and 
KfW who want to formalise more their cooperation. It also aims at making life easier for 
clients in terms of transaction costs: they only have to deal with one appraisal mission, one 
monitoring team, etc (MN 331).  
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2006 
EIB participates to the advisory committee. Its representatives attend always and are 
perceived as good partners that provide very useful advice to the Funds on how to conduct 
their activities, improve their marketing etc… 
The documents of the Investment Committee are circulated to all investors in advance of 
each meeting, so that those who wish may attend the investment committee as observers.  
The Fund say they very much value the presence of the EIB, not only because it is with the 
IFC the largest contributor, but also because of its expertise. 
Source:  MN352 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
 
No evidence has been found in the specific project documents regarding the 
implementation stage.  
 
Monitoring and follow-up of the projects implemented could be performed jointly with the 
EU Member states and possibly with other donors.  
« Document de stratégie pays et programme indicatif national pour la période 2008-2013 », European 
Community, 2007 Part II p3 
 
According to an EIB staff member, this project shows the coordination mechanism which 
exists between the EIB and the Commission. The EIB and the Commission have worked 
together in the context of the subsidy granted in the Water Facility framework. 
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Source: MN016 
2008_EDFI One of the two main objectives of the three successive EDFI EUROPEAN FINANCING 
PARTNERS (EFP) operations is the strengthening co-operation between eligible EDFIs 
and EIB. 
Source : Project documentation 
 
This strengthening effectively occurred. 
The EFP initiative is in line with joint statements on aid harmonisation such as the Paris 
Declaration [and the Accra High Level Forum].  
Source :  
EIB Group Operations Evaluation 
Synthesis Report : Evaluation of activities under the European Financing Partners (EFP) Agreement, 
January 2009 
JC 10.3 EIB operations are complementary to those of other institutions and agencies with 
similar objectives 
Prelim. Findings Whereas the recent “Report and recommendations of the Steering Committee of “Wise 
Persons”” does not cover ACP countries but pre-accession countries and countries of the 
Southern Neighbourhood, Easter Neighbourhood, Russia, Asia, Latin America and South 
Africa, it nevertheless provides findings at a general level that are worth mentioning here. 
 
“Co-financing of projects between EIB and other IFIs or EBFIs is found to be very significant in the 
regions covered by the mandate. More than half of the EIB lending under mandate has been co-financed with 
other IFIs or EBFIs in 2008 and in 2009. Co-financing has always been a key feature of EIB operations, 
considering that the EIB finances only up to 50% of the investment cost, and that particularly public sector 
projects in external regions require pooling of funds from multiple sources. 
IFIs’ operational cooperation can take various forms: 
- IFIs’ coordination on respective complementary financing activities towards a common area of 
operation. 
- Parallel co‐financing (which currently is the predominant form of co‐financing), where each IFI 
finances separate project components of the same investment, and negotiations with the borrower are 
held separately with each IFI following its own procedures on procurement, environment and social 
aspects, credit risk, disbursements, monitoring, etc. 
- Joint co‐financing of the same project, for instance for projects with relatively larger external 
financing needs with application of “mutual reliance” wherever possible and identification of the 
“lead IFI”. Joint co‐financing should be pursued when it makes sense in the interest of the project 
beneficiaries.” 
 
“The “European Financing Partnership” between the EIB and EDFIs for financing private sector projects 
in ACP is found to be an excellent example of pooling of resources, delegated cooperation and full mutual 
reliance on the “lead IFI”.  
 
Source: Camdessus, “Mid-Term review of EIB external mandate – Report of the Steering Committee” 
February 2010 (pages 32, 34-35) 
I-10.3.1 EIB operations and those of other institutions and agencies (including IFIs) 
support the same objectives 
2003_BOAD PG 
IV 
See I-10.2.1 
2003_Dakar-
Ziguinchor 
See I-10.2.1 
2004-WAGP Obviously the World Bank who contributes to the guarantee of the project supports it.  
Cf Fact Sheet B, CRD Opinion and Appraisal Report. 
2005_EMP Commitments have been made by five IFIs/DFIs (AfDB, IFU, Proparco, SwedFund and 
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AFRICA FUND 
II 
CDC), and 12 local investors 
IFC for instance was a “mobilizer” for the first fund, but seemed to have considered it was 
not needed here. 
Source: Project Docs 
          MN 254: AFIG v0-01 20 100413 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2006 
This is clearly the case. The Fund (BPI Kenya) is co-sponsored by IFC and Business 
Partners International. Other investors are IFI (IFC, East African Development Bank) and 
private groups.  
Source : MN352 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
The EIB and other lenders adopted a cooperation agreement between the lenders and the 
promoter in order to coordinate and harmonize their action. 
 “The project lenders have adopted a programme-based approach with a view to 
coordinating and harmonising their action, in application of the Paris Declaration 
principles on harmonising procedures among lenders. The harmonisation and 
cooperation arrangements between the lenders and the promoter will be defined in a 
cooperation agreement. Signature of this agreement will be a condition precedent for the 
first disbursement, as will the finalisation of an operational procedures manual. This manual 
will be prepared by the promoter, assisted by a consultant; it will specify the programme 
operating procedures, arrangements for commitments and disbursement, the eligibility 
criteria for proposed investments, the procurement rules and procedures for programme 
monitoring and external audits. The manual and cooperation agreement are standard 
documents which could be applied generally and used by other lenders in connection 
with subsequent investments.” 
 
Source : “Conseil d’administration. Prêt à l’investissement bonifié sur ressources propres. Projet 
PROGRAMME EAU », EIB, 2007, p4 
I-10.3.2 Evidence of synergies between EIB operations and those of other institutions and 
agencies (including IFIs) supporting the same objectives 
General  
In 2009, the EIB co-financed several operations with other IFIs/DFIs. For example: 
- The large scale investment programme in Cameroun launched by CAMWATER, 
the state utility in charge of maintaining and developing the drinking water 
infrastructure,in the context of the reform of the urban water sector. The funding 
comes from the EIB OR and the IF (both TA and Interest rate subsidy), as well as 
from the AfD. 
- The support to the “Communauté Electrique du Bénin”, the bi-national public 
utility in charge of electricity generation and transmission, provided by EIB OR, 
the EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund Subsidy, and IDA and KfW 
 
Source: MN 901 
 
According to an AfD representative, they are often in a co-financing logique, also because 
in fact they do not have the choice. It is not possible to do things alone. (see MN253) 
 
According Counterbalance the EIB is doing too little co-financing. Qutoing at the 2009 
external evaluation carried out for ACP and OCT, the report points that out of 26 projects 
in 2008, 13 were co-financed by international development finance institutions, bilateral or 
multilateral donors.  
 
Source: Counter Balance, Challenging the EIB, “Corporate welfare and development deceptions : why the 
EIB is failing to deliver outside the EU?”, February 2010 (page 27) 
 
2003_BOAD PG See I-10.2.1 
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IV 
2003_Dakar-
Ziguinchor 
See I-10.2.1 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
According to the DIAF document prepared by the EIB, the project was consistent with EC 
country and regional policies, with national priorities and contributed to specific EU 
development initiatives. The project is thus considered to enter into the national 
programme aimed at decreasing the poverty in Senegal. Furthermore it contributed to the 
investment program necessary to achieve the Millennium Development Goals and it was in 
line with the EU development cooperation. 
 
Source : “Appendix Development Impact Assessment Framework”, EIB, p1  
I-10.3.3 Evidence of conflicts, duplication or overlapping between EIB operations and those 
of other institutions and agencies (including IFIs) supporting the same objectives 
General No evidence has been found in the specific project documents.  
 
I-10.3.4 Evidence of an EIB’s leadership in the promotion of cooperation and 
complementarities with interventions supported by other institutions and agencies 
(including IFIs) 
2003_BOAD PG 
IV 
See I-10.2.1 (the WB had apparently the lead) 
2003_Dakar-
Ziguinchor 
See I-2.4.1 
2005_EMP 
AFRICA FUND 
II  
Evidence of lack of leadership 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2006 
In this case the EIB joined an initiative sponsored by others and did not take a leading role.  
Source : MN352 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
No evidence has been found in the specific project documents.  
 
JC 10.4 The mandates of the EIB IF and OR envelope are distinct and complementary, and 
well coordinated 
I-10.4.1 The mandates of the EIB IF and OR envelope pursue different objectives 
General There is an issue of OR and IF eligibility in the water and sanitation sector in Senegal.
EIB was involved in this soft sector already under Lomé. 
Cotonou says: Commercially run public sector entities- and same for IF or OR.   In 
addition: can OR take non-commercial risk, which IF cannot? 
 
 Programme Eau- this is a OR loan to SONES, a commercially run public entity.  
But issue of State guarantee, i.e. degree of security of EIB loans 
EIB has accepted to make a loan to SONES without State guarantee, whereas other IFIs 
(such as WB) always have State guarantee.  MinFin says: simply because EIB doesn’t ask for 
it (and a “letter of comfort is not equivalent to a State Guarantee in financial terms.  Why 
should EIB be junior to the WB or ADB when applying OR resources?   EIB is a twilight 
zone between WB and IFC.   
Source: MN 263  
          MN 265  
 Assainissement Dakar- this is a OR loan to the State, passed on to ONAS as 
subsidy.  ONAS is perhaps expected to be commercially run, but is not financially 
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viable. 
 Dépollution de la Baie de Hann- same as above. 
 Laison Dakar-Ziguinchor- this is under IF- the project is not viable a such. 
In the sanitation sector, EIB is in effect providing budgetary support to the State.  Is this 
the role of EIB-OR?   The whole financing package is soft- onlending by the State will 
never be reimbursed.  What about sustainability of the IF? The debtor is the State of 
Senegal.  In this case, IF should master the scene of sustainability of State debt, which IF 
does not do.  A different approach is called for in the case of non-viable sectors, and 
questions arise if this is EIB’s area at all 
I-10.4.2 The mandates of the EIF IF and OR envelope promote a search for synergies 
between instruments 
General Funds from the IF and the EIB’s own resources are complementary. The main difference 
lies in the higher level of risk that can be borne by the IF financial instruments. IF 
operations focus on the riskier end (market segment) of private and public sector projects, 
i.e those projects that do not meet the EIB’s own resources prudential limits and require 
the use of risk-bearing financial instruments. Funding from EIB’s own resources is more 
focused on public sector and large-scale private sector industrial undertakings, following the 
approval by member states of new modalities for OR lending in the ACP, whereby the EIB 
is allowed to take more risks compared to other regions in the world.  
 
Source: MN 901 
I-10.4.3 The mandates of the EIF IF and OR envelope avoid duplication between 
instruments 
JC 10.5 EIB has a satisfactory interface with other EU initiatives to foster investment as well 
as the business climate in the ACP countries and OCTs 
I-10.5.1 The EU deployed specific instruments/initiatives to support private sector 
development in the ACP and OCTs.  
General The Europe is aware of the importance of the private sector within the development 
policies. Therefore the CSPs emphasis the role that has to be played by the Europe as well 
as by the International Community in that sector. 
For example, through the Economic Partnership Agreement, the Europe tends to allow the 
SMEs to benefit from investments opportunities such as the IF. 
 
More specifically, the “private sector development strategy” has been approved in 1999. 
This document has been set up in partnership with the local administration, representative 
of the private sector and the donors. 
 
Source : “Document de strategie de cooperation et programme indicative pour la période 2002-2007” 
European Community, p 31, 67, 95 
I-10.5.2 Evidence that EIB and EU initiatives to foster private sector development promote 
a search for synergies  
General A Commission interviewee provided the following information with regard to EIB 
coordination with EC instruments:  
 « Il y a une stratégie de la CE pour le secteur privé (même si ce n’est pas un ‘secteur’ en tant que tel, et 
comprend également le commercially-run public service).  
 BIZCLIM :  
o €10m (= pas beaucoup de grants CE). Nouveau BIZCLIM disponible en décembre 
2009 
o la BEI fait partie du Conseil d’Administration  certains projets pourraient avoir une 
certaine complémentarité. BIZCLIM destiné à améliorer l’environnement des affaires 
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(ex. codes miniers, microfinance). Niveau d’action différent de la BEI qui est par projet. 
o BIZCLIM et BEI participaient ensemble en microfinance : recherche de synergie et de 
complémentarités, le staff se rencontrait. Mais pas toujours évident de trouver synergies. 
Et budget CE pas gros, poids différent.  
 Promotion de la coopération entre les intermédiaires dans le secteur privé (ex Chambres de commerce). 
Ex. PROINVEST (mais c’est la fin) 
 Soutien et promotion des investissements.  La FI  
 Microfinance : €15m  
 CDE (Centres pour le Développement des Entreprises): offre €18m par an 60% de frais de 
fonctionnement – OLAF est sur le coup)  Processus de restructuration de ces centres - La réforme 
est en cours. 
 Energy Facility and Water Facility (both AIDCO managed): Moyens beaucoup plus importants 
qu’en microfinance par exemple. 
 EU-Africa Infrastructure TF (pas du secteur privé en tant que tel) : Il s’agit d’un TF où il y a des 
grants de la CE et des EU MS (€370m de grants actuellement). Créé dans une optique de blending ; 
ils peuvent accompagner des projets de la BEI, de l’IF ou d’autres institutions financières 
internationales. Quatre types d’instruments :  
o AT 
o Bonifications d’intérêt 
o Subsides directes 
o Primes d’assurances risques pour les investissements risqués des start-up (ce dernier 
instrument n’ayant pas encore été utilisé).  
Ex. AT : étude ESIAF dans le cadre de Gilbel Gibe (Ethiopie) payée avec le TF. Pas clair pourquoi ils 
n’ont pas utilisé l’enveloppe AT de la FI. Peut-être parce que le projet était très risqué / critiqué par 
ONG ? Je ne sais pas en fait.” 
Source: MN 023 
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2006 
Unfortunately there is some evidence of the absence of conscious synergies. 
 
Via its participation in the BPI-K fund the EIB is obviously pursuing objectives 
complementary to those of  the €7 million ASMEP Commission programme. Assistance to 
Small and Medium Enteprrises (ASMEP) is implemented jointly by the Commission and 
the Government of Kenya (through the Ministry of Trade). The programme launched in 
October 2007 focuses  on capacity building for SMEs, facilitating information 
dissemination and business development support.  
 
BPI provides  $US 2.5 mln  technical assistance through one of the components of the 
umbrella MSME project.  
However, there was no awareness in the BPI staff of the ASMEP project of the 
Commission.  Similarly the Delegation of the Commission has no information on the 
activities of BPI supported by EIB. 
 
The Kenyan authorities have placed a high priority on private development support and 
consider that targeting SMEs is particularly important due to the numerous specific 
difficulties they face; the coordination of the different supports addressed to the SMEs are 
therefore of paramount importance but seem to be very weak. 
Sources; MN352, MN347, MN332 
I-10.5.3 Evidence that EIB and EU initiatives to foster private sector development avoid 
duplication. 
2006_EAU 
SENEGAL 
No evidence has been found so far.  
2005_ACPGLOB 
CA2006 
Cf.. I-10.5.2 
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Annexe 10 – List of persons met 
This annexe provides a list of persons met during the course of the evaluation, with 
indication of their function where available. It presents first the staff members of 
respectively the EIB, EC, IF Committee, ACP Secretariat, IFI/EDFIs, and NGOs. 
It then shows the persons met during the country missions, respectively in 
Senegal, Kenya, the Dominican Republic and the Pacific. 
European Investment Bank 
Surname Name Location Function 
Prud’homme Guido EIB Brussels 
Office 
Head of Unit 
Carano Alessandro EIB Brussels 
Office 
IFI Coordination Officer 
Niang Samba 
Khary 
EIB Dakar 
Office 
Business Analyst Afrique de l’Ouest 
Diouf Abdou EIB Dakar 
Office 
Directeur des Etudes et de la Planification 
Lucet Christophe EIB Dakar 
Office 
Head of Dakar Office 
Mejia Cristina EIB Dakar 
Office 
Loan Officer 
Ferreira Yves EIB Fort-de-
France Office 
Head of Fort-de-France office 
Nzioka Nicholas EIB Nairobi 
Office 
Business Analyst 
Simonsen Kurt EIB Nairobi 
Office 
Head of Nairobi office  
Milianitis Nikolaos EIB Nairobi 
Office 
Staff member 
Abad Alfredo EIB Pretoria 
Office 
Head of Pretoria office 
(since August 2010) 
White David EIB Pretoria 
Office 
Head of Pretoria office  
(until August 2010) 
De Jong Jean-
Philippe 
EIB Sydney 
Office 
Head of Sydney office 
Sève Alain EIB 
Luxembourg 
Associate Director, Head of Operations 
Evaluation 
Alcarpe Felismino EIB 
Luxembourg 
Chef de Division, Politiques de 
responsabilité d’entreprise 
Maertens Matthias EIB 
Luxembourg 
Chief Compliance Officer 
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Surname Name Location Function 
Amadori Maria 
Chiara 
EIB 
Luxembourg 
Directorate for Operations 
outside the EU and Candidate Countries, 
ACP-IF Department, Operations & 
Monitoring Assistant Microfinance 
Collin Catherine EIB 
Luxembourg 
Directorate for Operations 
outside the EU and Candidate Countries, 
ACP–IF Department, Portfolio 
Management and Policy, Head of Division
Deransart Anne-Marie EIB 
Luxembourg 
Directorate for Operations 
outside the EU and Candidate Countries, 
ACP-IF Department, manager for Socredo
Gálvez Verdú Irene EIB 
Luxembourg  
Directorate for Operations 
outside the EU and Candidate Countries, 
ACP-IF Department, Caribbean & Pacific 
Division, Investment Officer 
Manolova Petia EIB 
Luxembourg 
Directorate for Operations 
outside the EU and Candidate Countries, 
ACP-IF Department, Loan Officer 
Marciano Michel EIB 
Luxembourg 
Directorate for Operations 
outside the EU and Candidate Countries, 
ACP-IF Department, Senior Loan Officer 
Palanza Flavia EIB 
Luxembourg 
Directorate for Operations 
outside the EU and Candidate Countries, 
ACP-IF Department, Eastern & Central 
Africa, Head of Division  
Perez René EIB 
Luxembourg 
Directorate for Operations 
outside the EU and Candidate Countries, 
ACP-IF Department, Pacific & Pacific 
Islands, Deputy Head of Division 
Rüttgers Heike EIB 
Luxembourg 
Directorate for Operations 
outside the EU and Candidate Countries, 
ACP-IF Department, Southern Africa and 
Indian Ocean Division, Deputy Loan 
Officer 
Shirran Jane EIB 
Luxembourg 
Directorate for Operations 
outside the EU and Candidate Countries, 
Legal Department, Senior Counsel 
Van 
Grunderbeeck 
Isabelle EIB 
Luxembourg 
Directorate for Operations 
outside the EU and Candidate Countries, 
ACP-IF Department, Loan Officer 
Walsh Bernard EIB 
Luxembourg 
Directorate for Operations 
outside the EU and Candidate Countries, 
ACP-IF Department, Director 
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Surname Name Location Function 
Ynaraja Ramon EIB 
Luxembourg 
Directorate for Operations 
outside the EU and Candidate Countries, 
ACP-IF Department, Southern Africa and 
Indian Ocean Division, Loan Officer 
Zambon Diederick EIB 
Luxembourg 
Directorate for Operations 
outside the EU and Candidate Countries, 
ACP-IF Department, Portfolio 
Management and Policy, Deputy Head of 
Division 
Curwen Martin EIB 
Luxembourg 
Directorate for Operations outside the EU 
and Candidate Countries, Director 
General, 
Gounot M. EIB 
Luxembourg 
Directorate for Operations outside the EU 
and Candidate Countries, ACP-IF 
Department  
Hendus Tassilo EIB 
Luxembourg 
Directorate for Operations outside the EU 
and Candidate Countries, ACP-IF 
Department, Associate Director 
Kerpen Stefan EIB 
Luxembourg 
Directorate for Operations outside the EU 
and Candidate Countries, Head of 
Technical Assistance Unit 
Koning Monique EIB 
Luxembourg 
Directorate for Operations outside the EU 
and Candidate Countries, ACP-IF 
Department, Loan officer 
Gordon Bernard EIB 
Luxembourg 
ENPC Department, 
FEMIP Maghreb Division, 
Head of Division 
Klümper Serge EIB 
Luxembourg 
Head of Division for Southern Africa and 
Indian Ocean 
Carter Peter EIB 
Luxembourg 
Head of Environment and Social Office 
(ESO) 
van Zonneveld René EIB 
Luxembourg 
Independent Consultant 
Brescia Lorenzo EIB 
Luxembourg 
Innovation & Competitiveness 
Department  Manufacturing, R&D and 
Innovation 
Guihard-Brand Stéphanie EIB 
Luxembourg 
Lending operations outside the EU, Senior 
Coordination Officer 
Palmgren Joakim EIB 
Luxembourg 
Project and Structured Finance, Credit 
Risk Department (CRD) 
Hiers J. EIB 
Luxembourg 
Projects Directorate 
Clintworth Mark EIB 
Luxembourg 
Projects Directorate – Air & Sea, Project 
Engineer 
Gschwindt Eberhard EIB 
Luxembourg 
Projects Directorate, Technical Adviser  
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Surname Name Location Function 
Saich Nancy EIB 
Luxembourg 
Projects Directorate, Technical Advisor 
Mauritius Terminal Container 
Selimovic Tarik EIB 
Luxembourg 
Risk Management Directorate, Credit Risk 
Department (CRD), Financial Institutions 
& related risks, Credit Officer 
De Gruyter S. EIB 
Luxembourg 
Risk Management Directorate, Credit Risk 
Department (CRD), Project and Structured 
Finance 
Lombardo Paolo EIB 
Luxembourg 
Risk Management Directorate, Credit Risk 
Department (CRD), Project and Structured 
Finance, Head of Division  
Ziller Bernard EIB 
Luxembourg 
Senior economic adviser 
Galoppo Massimo EIB 
Luxembourg 
Strategy and Corporate Centre; Budget, 
Analytics and Partnerships 
 
European Commission 
Surname Name Delegation/DG  Unit/Function 
Opperer Thomas Delegation in Apia Attaché Head of the Technical 
Office 
De Raeve Robert Delegation in Suva First Counsellor, Political and 
Trade 
Mateus-Paula Raul Delegation to 
Cameroun 
Head of Delegation  
Vergos Zissimos Delegation to Kenya Head of Infrastructure section 
Laafia Ibrahim Delegation to Kenya Head of Section macroeconomics, 
governance, private sector 
Pourtune Frédéric Delegation to Senegal Chargé de Programme, Section 
Infrastructure 
Hervio Gilles Delegation to Senegal Head of Delegation 
Horejs Irene Delegation to the 
Dominican Republic  
Head of Delegation 
Tamborski Mariusz DG DEV Infrastructure and communication 
networks, trade and regional 
integration), Policy Officer - 
development, monitoring and 
programming 
Csoto Laszlo DG ECFIN Project Manager - EU policies 
Cempelova Daniela EuropeAid Evaluation Officer - Evaluation 
manager 
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Surname Name Delegation/DG  Unit/Function 
Bogusz  Grazyna EuropeAid, Unit C4 Centralised ACP Operations, 
Gestionnaire des programmes de 
coopération économique et 
commerciale 
Pedersen Jesper EuropeAid, Unit C4 Centralised ACP Operations, 
Programme Manager - EU policies 
- Chef de secteur  
Zaninello Stefania EuropeAid, Unit C4 Centralised ACP Operations, 
Section Economique 
Hyon-Naudin Céline EuropeAid, Unit E2 Quality support Business, Trade, 
Regional Integration 
 
EU initiatives 
Surname Name Country/Organisation  Function 
Keene Patrick Centre for the 
Development of 
Enterprise (CDE) 
Chef du Bureau Régional des 
Caraïbes 
Norton-
Murray 
Marie Louise Centre for the 
Development of 
Enterprise (CDE) 
Regional office for the 
Caribbean,  Regional expert and 
programme manager 
 
Investment Facility Committee  
Surname Name Country/Organisation  Function 
Mierow Daniel BMZ (Germany) Member of the IF 
Committee 
af Ursin Anne Finland Member of the IF 
Committee 
 
Secrétariat ACP 
Surname Name Organisation 
  
Function 
Rammoneng Motooa Secrétariat ACP  Intra-ACP Projects Portfolio 
Management and Quality Support 
Officer 
Sahadutkhan Shazi Secrétariat ACP  Expert in charge of Private Sector 
Issues 
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IFIs / EDFIs1 
Surname Name Institution 
  
Function 
Liger Jean-Marc AFD - Agencia de 
Santo Domingo 
Director 
Vicini Valery AFD - Agencia de 
Santo Domingo 
Gerente de Operaciones 
Marcelli Jean-Pierre AFD – Kenya 
representation 
Regional Director 
Castaing Denis AFD – Senegal 
representation 
Directeur 
Vasseur Christian AFD – Senegal 
representation 
Member 
Rixen Jan EDFI Office in 
Brussels 
General Manager  
Rohana Salem International 
Finance Corporation 
(IFC), World Bank 
Group 
Resident Representative, 
Dominican Republic and Haïti 
Ramirez 
Rufino 
Smeldy Interamerican 
Development Bank 
(IDB), Dominican 
Republic 
Sectoral specialist, Multilateral 
Investment Fund 
 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) 
Surname Name Organisation Function 
Stoyanova Desislava CounterBalance Coordinator 
Ellmers Bodo Eurodad Policy and Advocacy Officer 
Weitsch Martina European 
Peacebuilding 
Liaison Office 
Quaker Council for European 
Affairs 
Simpere Anne-Sophie Les Amis de la Terre Responsabilité des acteurs 
financiers  
 
Senegal 
Surname Name Institution/ Organisation Unit/Function 
Castaing Denis AFD – Senegal 
representation 
Directeur 
Vasseur Christian AFD – Senegal 
representation 
Member 
Ndiaye Papa Madiaw AFIG, Dakar Directeur général 
                                                 
1  International Finance Institutions (IFIs) and European Development Finance Institutions (EDFIs) 
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Surname Name Institution/ Organisation Unit/Function 
Backer Patrice AFIG, Dakar Directeur général Adjoint et 
Chief Operating Officer 
Amoussou Faustin Bank of Africa Directeur Général 
Tembely Oumar Banque Ouest-Africaine 
de Développement 
(BOAD) 
Chef de la Mission de la 
BOAD au Sénégal 
Mbaye Souleymane Cosama Directeur technique et 
armement  
Diallo Seydou Cosama (Consortium 
sénégalais d'activités 
maritimes) 
General Manager  
Fourtune Frédéric EC Delegation to Senegal Chargé de Programme, Section 
Infrastructure 
Hervio Gilles EC Delegation to Senegal Chef de Délégation 
Mbaye  Ndiaye 
Marème 
ECOBANK Directeur Wholesale 
Koffi Julien ECOBANK Head of Treasury & Financial 
Institutions 
Coffi Quam-
Dessou 
Yves ECOBANK Managing Director (Dakar) 
Khary Niang Samba EIB Dakar Office Business Analyst Afrique de 
l’Ouest 
Mejia Christina EIB Dakar Office Chargée d’opérations 
Diouf Abdou EIB Dakar Office Directeur des Etudes et de la 
Planification 
Lucet Christophe EIB Dakar Office Head of Dakar Office 
Guyon Hervé MicroCred Sénégal Directeur Général Adjoint 
Lepatre-
Lamontagne 
Alain MicroCred Sénégal Président du CA 
Dieudonné Ruben MicroCred Sénégal, Siège Directeur Général 
Ousmane BA Mamour Ministère de l’Economie 
et des Finances 
Chef de la Division de la 
Coopération 
Ndecky André Ministère de l’Economie 
et des Finances 
Conseiller Technique 
Thioub Yérim Ministère de l’Economie 
Maritime, de la Pêche et 
des Transports Maritimes
Agence nationale des affaires 
maritimes (Anam), Directeur  
Magueye Gueye Ministère de l’Economie 
Maritime, de la Pêche et 
des Transports Maritimes
Agence nationale des affaires 
maritimes (Anam), Directeur 
des Transports Maritimes, 
Fluviaux et du Port 
Cissé El Hadj Ministère de l’Economie 
Maritime, de la Pêche et 
des Transports Maritimes
Directeur de Cabinet 
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Surname Name Institution/ Organisation Unit/Function 
Ba Boubacar Ministère de l’Economie 
Maritime, de la Pêche et 
des Transports Maritimes
Secrétaire Général 
Ndaw Mouhamed PEPAM (Programme 
Eau Potable et 
Assainissement) 
Coordonnateur propogramme 
PEPAM 
Niang Abdoul SONES Directeur des Travaux 
Fall Cheikh SONES (Société 
nationale des eaux du 
Sénégal) 
Directeur Général 
Boulenger Pierre WSP (Water and 
Sanitation Programme) 
Senior Water & Sanitation 
Specialist 
 
Kenya 
Surname Name Institution/ 
Organisation 
Unit/Function 
Marcelli J.P. AFD – Kenya 
representation 
Regional Director 
Gitonga Sally Africa Re Centre BPI Chief Investment Officer 
Vergos Zissimos EC Delegation to 
Kenya 
Head of Infrastructure section 
Laafia Ibrahim EC Delegation to 
Kenya 
Head of Section 
macroeconomics, governance, 
private sector 
Simonsen Kurt EIB Nairobi Office Head of Nairobi office 
Milianitis Nikolaos EIB Nairobi Office Staff member 
Nzioka Nicholas EIB Nairobi Office Staff member 
Angelei Joshua Friends of Lake 
Turkana 
n.a. 
Keya  James Friends of Lake 
Turkana 
n.a. 
Masibo Moses Geological Society of 
Kenya 
Mines and geological 
department 
Ochieng Georges Kengen geothermal 
station 
n.a. 
Nthiga Moses Kengen geothermal 
station 
Resident Project Engineer 
Judkins Darryl Kengen geothermal 
station 
Sinclair Knight Merz Ltd, 
Project Manager 
Kagiri David N. Kenya Electricity 
Generating Company 
Ltd. 
Engineer 
Nyoike Patrick Ministry of Energy CBs Permanent Secretary 
MID-TERM EVALUATION OF THE IF AND EIB OR OPERATIONS IN ACP/OCTS 
ADE - EGEVAL II 
Final Report  September 2010 Annexe 10/Page 9 
Surname Name Institution/ 
Organisation 
Unit/Function 
Yobteric Agnes C. Ministry of 
Environment 
Director Programmes projects 
and strategic initiatives 
Lenayapa Lawrence Ministry of 
Environment and 
Mineral Resources 
Permanent Secretary 
M. Ngari Lawrence Ministry of 
industrialisation 
Assistant director of Industries 
Kimuri  E.N. Ministry of 
industrialisation 
Director of industries 
Githinji Rosalind Ministry of 
industrialisation 
Principal Industrial 
development officer 
K.Munguti John Ministry of 
industrialisation 
Senior Assistant Director 
Meja Vitalice Reality of Aid Africa 
Network 
Coordinator 
Ghoshal Satyajit Site of Magadi Soda 
project 
Director of Finance 
Osewe Victor Site of Magadi Soda 
project 
Financial Controller 
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Dominican Republic 
Surname Name Institution/ 
Organisation 
Unit/Function 
Liger Jean-Marc AFD - Agencia de 
Santo Domingo 
Director 
Vicini Valery AFD – Agencia de 
Santo Domingo 
Gerente de Operaciones 
de la Rosa Francisco Banco ADEMI,  
Santo Domingo 
Director of loans 
Hernaández A. Gregorio Banco ADEMI,  
Santo Domingo 
Executive Vice President 
Arsenio Ureña Manuel Banco ADEMI, 
Santo Domingo 
President 
Rivas de 
D’Oleo 
Ramona Banco ADEMI,  
Santo Domingo 
Vice President Finance 
Rondón Guillermo Banco ADEMI,  
Santo Domingo 
Vice President of Business 
Development 
Canalda de 
Beras-Goico 
Mercedes Banco ADOPEM, 
Santo Domingo 
Executive Vice President 
Canalda Ricardo Banco ADOPEM, 
Santo Domingo 
Legal Adviser 
de Canalda Mercedes Banco ADOPEM, 
Santo Domingo 
President 
Alt. Reyes 
Frías 
Sonia Banco ADOPEM, 
Santo Domingo 
Vice President  Finance and 
Accounts 
Ramirez 
Rufino 
Smeldy Banco Intermaricano de 
Desarollo (BID) 
Sectoral specialist, Multilateral 
Investment Fund 
Keene Patrick Centre for the 
Development of 
Enterprise (CDE) 
Chef du Bureau Régional des 
Caraïbes 
Norton-
Murray 
Marie Louise Centre for the 
Development of 
Enterprise (CDE) 
Regional expert and programme 
manager 
Horejs Irene EC Delegation to the 
Dominican Republic  
Head of Delegation 
Ferreira Yves EIB Luxembourg Head of Fort de France office 
Kilvio Jorge FONDESA Director Ejecutivo 
Lantigua 
Estrella 
Juan FONDESA Director of Development 
Rohana Salem International Finance 
Corporation (IFC), 
World Bank Group 
Resident Representative 
Dominican Republic and Haïti 
Vega Annelie Moroconcoco – comida 
empresial 
Final Beneficiary 
Richardson Hector D. Nicromwha Beauty 
Equipment 
Final Beneficiary 
Urena Alberto Taller de Ebanesteria 
“Ideas y Decoraciones”
Final Beneficiary 
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Pacific 
Surname Name Institution/ Organisation  Unit/Function 
Goffeau Alain ADB South Pacific 
Subregional Office (Cook 
Islands, Fiji Islands, 
Kiribati, Samoa, Tonga, 
Tuvalu) 
Head, Project 
Administration Unit 
Phelps Richard ADB South Pacific 
Subregional Office (Cook 
Islands, Fiji Islands, 
Kiribati, Samoa, Tonga, 
Tuvalu) 
Senior Infrastructure 
Specialist 
Foon Dallas Air Pacific General Manager Strategic 
Planning 
Bourne Iosefo Central Bank - Financial 
Research and Market 
Development. 
Deputy Governor 
Wongsin Saumani DBS Main Office in Apia Acting General Manager 
Price Anthony Digicel Office, Suva, Fiji. Chief Financial Officer 
Vuibureta Naomi Digicel Office, Suva, Fiji. Financial controller 
Opperer Thomas European Commission, 
Delegation in Apia 
Attaché Head of the 
Technical Office 
De Raeve Robert European Commission, 
Delegation in Suva 
First Counsellor, Political 
and Trade 
Patel Hasmukh Fiji Electricity Authority - 
FEA 
Chief Executive Officer 
Vai Kolone KVA Consult General Manager 
Tagicakibau Taina Ministry of 
Communication and 
Tourism 
Permanent Secretary 
Roleobaro Tevita Ministry of 
Communication and 
Tourism, Suva 
Department of 
Communication 
Tuanoma Janam Ministry of 
Communication and 
Tourism, Suva 
Department of 
Communication 
Jogier Shridesh Ministry of 
Communication and 
Tourism, Suva 
Senior Economic Planning 
Office Department of Public 
Enterprises 
Navuku Josefa Ministry of 
Communication and 
Tourism, Suva 
Senior Financial Analyst 
Tuinalele Tevita Ministry of 
Communication and 
Tourism, Suva 
Tourism Department 
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